Please reread my original statement. I did not say that. In scenarios where there are additional nuclear players (terrorists, Russians, whoever), Chicom confidence level in their capabilities comes into play and won't be lost on our war game strategists concerned with those capabilities. You can bet this increasing capability is part of the equation when considering our anti-missile defense requirements as well as our retaliatory strike requirements. While a Chicom first strike is the ultimate threat, the assigned risk level to that is undoubtedly low (hence, your laugh), yet is increased as their capabilities increase. But, of course, you understand nothing of threat analysis so your ill-informed response was expected. BTW, I consult with threat analysts on a relatively regular basis.
You can have the last word. No more pearls before swine.
Actually, if I were the ChiCom government, I would have a very LOW confidence level in the capabilities of Chinese strategic forces--because not one of those weapons has been live-fired. The last missile that went through a live-fire test was the Polaris A-1 (Operation Dominic, Shot Frigate Bird), and that was in 1962. Kindly note that the Polaris A-1 went out of service in 1965.
Given the rather astonishing levels of corruption in China, a wise ChiCom defense minister would worry about whether those missiles that are "operational" are really going to work when the word comes to turn keys. You can test-fly aircraft on a moment's notice, and then return it to the flight line. You can test-fly a missile...once.
Meanwhile, I would also note that the US places a large fraction of its nuclear forces on strategic bombers...and bombers are known to work.