Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan. June 1, 2021
The key development between May 2020 and April 2021 has been the evolution of the peace process in Afghanistan pursuant to the agreement signed in Doha in February 2020 and the stated intention of the United States of America and allied forces to complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan by September 2021.
The issue of narcotics in Afghanistan – the production and trafficking of poppybased drugs and methamphetamine – remains unaddressed as yet in the Afghan peace process. This remains the Taliban's largest single source of income. It also has a destabilizing and corrupting effect within Afghanistan and contributes significantly to the narcotics challenges facing the wider international community.
A significant part of the leadership of Al-Qaida resides in the Afghanistan and Pakistan border region, alongside Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent. Large numbers of Al-Qaida fighters and other foreign extremist elements aligned with the Taliban are located in various parts of Afghanistan. Al-Qaida continued to suffer attrition during the period under review, with a number of senior figures killed, often alongside Taliban associates while co-located with them.
The primary component of the Taliban in dealing with Al-Qaida is the Haqqani Network. Ties between the two groups remain close, based on ideological alignment, relationships forged through common struggle and intermarriage.
Al-Qaida and likeminded militants continue to celebrate developments in Afghanistan as a victory for the Taliban's cause and thus for global radicalism. The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) remains diminished from its zenith, following successive military setbacks that began in Jowzjan in summer 2018. However, since June 2020, it has had an ambitious new leader, Shahab al-Muhajir, and it remains active and dangerous, particularly if it is able, by positioning itself as the sole pure rejectionist group in Afghanistan, to recruit disaffected Taliban and other militants to swell its ranks.
Member States have varying assessments of the extent of ISIL-K and al-Muhajir’s links with the Haqqani Network. Meanwhile, the Al-Sadiq office is co-located with ISIL-K in Afghanistan, pursuing a regional agenda in Central and South Asia on behalf of the ISIL core.
In August 2020 (misprint in the document as it states 2021), the Afghan Government released over 5,000 Taliban prisoners, including 400 that required the decision of a specially convened loya jirga by President Ghani, who had previously expressed reluctance to release them due to the seriousness of their offences. According to Afghan officials, of 5,494 Taliban prisoners released, 720 have since returned to the battlefield. Of these, 24 were reported to be currently serving as shadow district governors and 54 as heads of Taliban military units, including Taliban special forces known as red units. A total of five have been recaptured and 13 killed.
Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent operates under the Taliban umbrella from Kandahar, Helmand (notably Baramcha) and Nimruz Provinces. The group reportedly consists of primarily Afghan and Pakistani nationals, but also individuals from Bangladesh, India and Myanmar. Its current leader is Osama Mahmood (not listed), who succeeded the late Asim Umar (not listed). The group is reported to be such an “organic” or essential part of the insurgency that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate it from its Taliban allies. Several Member States characterized this relationship by noting that the wife of the former leader of Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, Asim Umar (see S/2020/415, para. 36), was among 5,000 Taliban prisoners freed by the Afghan Government in 2020 as part of the Doha agreement. The killing of several Al-Qaida commanders in Taliban-controlled territory underscores the closeness of the two groups.
more details https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2021/486
Afghanistan: Who's who in the Taliban leadership
Sirajuddin Haqqani is another of the group's top deputy leaders.
After the death of his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani, he became the new leader of the Haqqani network, which has been credited with some of the most violent attacks that have occurred in Afghanistan against Afghan forces and their Western allies in recent years.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58235639
Let the terrorist war begin...
Unfortunately it is a lot of truth in this article “These epic American blunders made this an unwinnable war” by Christine Fair https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-biggest-american-fuck-ups-that-screwed-afghanistan
Thanks. You just can’t let go of old Nek, can ya? ha
This is significant also...
” According to Afghan officials, of 5,494 Taliban prisoners released, 720 have since returned to the battlefield. Of these, 24 were reported to be currently serving as shadow district governors and 54 as heads of Taliban military units, including Taliban special forces known as red units. A total of five have been recaptured and 13 killed.”
That’s how the Taliban were able to take over the country so quickly, by having their men in place ahead of time.
Apparently this went unnoticed by the CIA and/or military.? How else could everyone in the Biden Admin. say they had no idea Taliban takeover would be so swift? It was coming at them like a tidal wave, and they did nothing to stop it.