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As you can tell I'm busy reviewing lots of threads from the past few years, checking out articles and posts for details that may seem newly relevant as the ABLE DANGER story unfolds. I believe that many aspects of the 9/11 plot, and especially the mendacious failures of the 9/11 O-mission, will become evident now to millions of people, and it is important to get ahold of all the information that has come out over the past few years that the media and the O-missioners neglected, distorted, and/or lied about.

One thing that jumps out at me from this outstanding article by Andrew McCarthy is the following:

"[the Commission]....does not mention, let alone explain, let alone explain away, that al Midhar was escorted to the meeting by Ahmed Hikmat Shakir."

This Malaysia meeting pre-9/11 and the role of Ahmed Hikmat Shakir is HUGE, because there is no question the meeting took place or that some of the 9/11 hijackers were present, and no one can seriously question that Shakir was an Iraqi intel/Fedayeen agent, as evidenced by later details when he was arrested in Jordan.....

The media and the supposed experts are seriously derelict in not holding the 9/11 Commission to the fire over Shakir -- I can see no plausible explanation at all except that he was an Iraqi intel agent meeting with 9/11 terrorists.....

Yes, the Malaysia meeting is important, and like all other clues, it was dismissed by the DIA and resulted in not only 9/11, but the USS Cole bombing:

One piece of the puzzle that Mr. Fallis uncovered was an intelligence report about a secret meeting of al Qaeda terrorists in a condominium complex in Malaysia in January 2000.
Information obtained after September 11 identified two of them as Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who would be on American Airlines Flight 77 when it crashed into the Pentagon. They met with a former Malaysian army captain, Yazi Sufaat, described by Malaysian authorities as a key link in Southeast Asia for al Qaeda, who later would be tied to the bombing of the Cole. [Yet another name to add to the list of terrorists]
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Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, wrote to all DIA personnel this week to explain the protest resignation of a DIA analyst in October. The analyst, Kie Fallis, quit the day after the USS Cole was attacked by suicide bombers in Aden, Yemen. Mr. Fallis charged that a report he had written on the threat of a terrorist attack in Yemen was suppressed by senior DIA officials.
Mr. Fallis' resignation letter stated that he had "significant analytic differences" with DIA superiors over a terrorist threat assessment produced in June.
U.S. intelligence officials said there were warnings, but they arrived too late. The National Security Agency issued a report shortly after the Cole was bombed warning of attacks in the region —too late to be useful.
Adm. Wilson said he asked the Pentagon inspector general (IG) to investigate Mr. Fallis' charges. In an awkwardly worded statement, the three-star admiral said on Wednesday the IG "found no evidence to support the public perception that information warning of an attack on Cole was suppressed, ignored or even available in DIA." What about the private perception?
The admiral's statement drew smirks from several intelligence officials. It relied on a dodge often used by intelligence analysts to dismiss unwelcome information. Saying there is "no evidence" —like that presented to a court of law — is often used to mask the fact there is lots of intelligence to the contrary that spooks would rather not talk about in public.
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