Since all of these, as well as the background are only whatever their qualities are, when those qualities are perceived, it is the existents themselves that are being perceived. There is nothing else to perceive.
He certainly doesn't mean what he says here. One forms the concept of an entity, e.g. a moon of Saturn, after viewing Saturn with a cheap telescope. No one would say that there "is nothing else to perceive" of that entity. If it were true, then the Cassini mission is a waste of time.
He makes the mistake here of confusing the infallibility of senses with conceptual entities. The senses do indeed deliver qualities of the physical world (as distinguished from the conceptual world), and do so without fail, so long as they do anything at all. That is due to the fact that they are entirely of the physical world and so any information from them is information about the physical world.
However, just because all objects of conception must ultimately be derived from senses and percepts, does NOT mean that those senses or percepts ARE the entities. In fact, that contradicts the very concepts that describe those entities as a thing physically separate.
That is, my concept of the entity "dad's car" categorically excludes at least anything currently within 10 meters of my head, even though I am looking at his car right now. I perceive qualities in my visual field, I recognize SOME of those qualities as derived from the entity "dad's car" which I already have a concept of. However, my concept of "dad's car" is NOT itself "dad's car". Nor are all those qualities I perceive part of "dad's car".
Another part of the confusion is in making a strict distinction between conceptual and physical worlds. The brain is the stratum for our concepts, is part of the physical world, and just like anything else above quantum scales, there is physical continuity between all things in space and time with sharp distinctions being only between the concepts we create.
Still another part of the confusion which the author seems unaware of is that Rand (correctly) uses "integration" along with differentiation to describe the process of concept formation. Integration is merely one aspect of comparing objects of consciousness. It is in this context that one must interpret any quotes of her use of "integration". She does not, as the author would have you believe, consider integration to be a magical means of transferring sensory stimuli to conscious awareness.
It is important to realize that the brain is, from birth, stuctured to identify certain sensory patterns. For example, translating edges in a visual field sets off a distinct and reproducible pattern of visual cortex electrical activity in a cat's brain. Undoubtedly there are other built-in mechanisms that fortunately bias our concept formation into usable ideas. However, this does not mean that a cat or infant recognizes a chair, as something to sit on, in its visual field. In fact, although probably an oversimplification, the Oist description of "chaos" is more apt. This is not because the Oist claims that the percepts the baby experiences are different than the percepts you and I experience. It is because the baby can't recall the conceptual structure that you and I can that give our meaning to those percepts.
This is understandable to us all in terms of our own remembered experiences. For example, not having a particularly sophisticated ear for music, the first time I heard Brahm's 1st symphony, I considered it to be a dull unintelligible string of chords and dynamics. Not random noise like from an untuned radio, but not consisting of any memorable patterns. However, with each new listening, I discover structures that I didn't recognize before. They are completely new to me even though I've listened to it several times and my hearing was perfect each time. My first hearing of Brahm's 1st is like the infant's first experience of its entire surroundings. This is why we don't remember any of our infantile experiences. (Well, the other explanation is that there is some sort of process that consistently causes 100% forgetfullness of infancy in everyone. I'll leave to you which is the most reasonable explanation.)
Thanks for interesting comments.
You quote: Since all of these, as well as the background are only whatever their qualities are, when those qualities are perceived, it is the existents themselves that are being perceived. There is nothing else to perceive.
Then comment: He certainly doesn't mean what he says here. One forms the concept of an entity, e.g. a moon of Saturn, after viewing Saturn with a cheap telescope. No one would say that there "is nothing else to perceive" of that entity. If it were true, then the Cassini mission is a waste of time.
First, this is only an article, not a treatise. You seem to have confused percepts and concepts throughout your comments. I may have misunderstood you, but that is the way it seems. You say, for example, "One forms the concept of an entity, e.g. a moon of Saturn, after viewing Saturn," but this is not about forming concepts, it is about percepts. The percept of Saturn was what is viewed, not the concept that follows.
The article does not say that whatever percepts are perceived (at any one time, for example) are all the perceptual qualities that could be perceived. It says, if physical existents are going to be perceived, all there is to perceive about them are perceptual qualities. I do not think what you quoted was ambiguous on that point, but I can see how it could be misread.
Then you said: He makes the mistake here of confusing the infallibility of senses with conceptual entities. The senses do indeed deliver qualities of the physical world (as distinguished from the conceptual world), and do so without fail, so long as they do anything at all. That is due to the fact that they are entirely of the physical world and so any information from them is information about the physical world.
However, just because all objects of conception must ultimately be derived from senses and percepts, does NOT mean that those senses or percepts ARE the entities. In fact, that contradicts the very concepts that describe those entities as a thing physically separate.
I think the confusion here is mostly terminology. Rand, Peikoff, Kelley, and Firehammer all use the same language about perceiving existents. The difference is, the first three think some special process is required to configure perceptual qualities into percepts of entities, and Firehammer contends no special process is required, and all that is required is for perceptual qualities be presented to consciousness just as they are, in the entities themselves, which is the source of the perceptual qualities, since they are already configured in the proper form to be perceived as those entities.
The article does not say the percepts of entities are the entities themselves. In the same sense as the image in the television are the people and things in the image (not the actual people) perception of an entity's qualities is the perception of that entity. It certainly is not a perception of something else.
Another part of the confusion is in making a strict distinction between conceptual and physical worlds.
They are distinct. To not make that distinction would be a blurring of meanings.
The brain is the stratum for our concepts ...
This is a conjecture. No one knows how or where, from the physical aspect, consciousness actually functions. We know there are functions and events in the brain associated with certain percepts, but there are functions and events of other parts of the neurological system associated with those same percepts. But consciousness itself is not physical at all. It is an aspect of life, a self-sustained process that makes the physical organism a living thing. When the process ceases, the organism returns to being just dead matter.
The functions of life process, which "runs" on the physical organism (which remains an organism only so long as the life process continues) is not itself subject to the physical aspects of the organism. Consciousness pertains only to living organisms, and only to the the life process. Neither life or consciousness have any physical properties whatsoever.
Still another part of the confusion which the author seems unaware of is that Rand (correctly) uses "integration" along with differentiation to describe the process of concept formation.
Yes! Mr. Firehammer says she usually uses the word integration correctly, for example in concept formation, but she uses it incorrectly to describe the process of percept formation.
She does not, as the author would have you believe, consider integration to be a magical means of transferring sensory stimuli to conscious awareness.
Go back and read her quotes. It is exactly what she said. She doesn't use the word, "magical," but she does say the "brain" performs some undescribed function by which it integrates "sensory data" into percepts. It is a totally assumed unexplained process, that works "somehow." To me, that is "magic."
Now here is an example of the confusion between percepts and concepts I think you make.
However, this does not mean that a cat or infant recognizes a chair, as something to sit on, in its visual field.
The article is not about concepts. What a chair is for is a concept. No one perceives that. Before one can learn what a chair is or what it is for, it must first be perceived. Before any concepts are formed at all, there must first be percepts. But the Objectivists believe there is no perception of "chairs" at all until the ability to from percepts is "developed." Firehammer says, as soon as a child can see, if a chair is within its visual field, a chair is what it perceives (sees). It will not know what a chair is, or what it is for, or anything else about it, but it will be a chair it sees, and it will be that which the child learns all the other things about. If the visual field itself were a chaos to begin with, how would the perception of anything ever come about? You are right, the brain and the entire neurological system are designed to provide perception from the beginning without any special processing or development.
Now I think you may not understand the Objectivist position on perception, because here is what you said: This is not because the Oist claims that the percepts the baby experiences are different than the percepts you and I experience.
But that is exactly what all of the Objectivist say.
From the article:
"As far as can be ascertained, an infant's sensory experience is an undifferentiated chaos." [Ayn Rand, Introduction to Objectivism Epistemology, Page 5]
Peikoff makes it very clear, a child's consciousness must be developed to perceive things the way an adult does: "In order to move from the stage of sensation to that of perception, we first have to discriminate certain sensory qualities, separate them out of the initial chaos. Then our brain integrates these qualities into entities, thereby enabling us to grasp, in one frame of consciousness, a complex body of data that was gien to us at the outset as a series of discrete units across a span of time." [Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Page 72)
"The reason you see an entity is that you have experienced many kinds of sensations from similar objects in the past, and your brain has retained and integrated them: it has put them together to form an indivisible whole. As a result, a complex past mental content of yours is implicit and operative in your present visual awareness. In the act of looking at a table now, your are aware of its solidity...." [Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Pages 52-53]
"The most primitive conscious organisms appear to possess only the capacity of sensation. ... Human infants start their lives in this state and remain in it for perhaps a matter of months; ...." [Leonard Peikoff, Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Page 52.]
Hank