The Alamo was a fairly complete military victory for Santa Ana. So was Goliad.
But both were treated by the Texicans as 'war crimes' and reasons to demand independence. It did nothing to advance Santa Ana's real war aims of crushing the rebellion.
To think that Fallujah was about mostly quelling 1 town is to miss the bigger picture: Our goal in Fallujah was first *NOT* to let it cause us to lose the whole effort here, by careering out of control. The "MOAB" solution would have led to that. "Atrocities" would have led to a dangerous response from throughout Iraq. We forget that our main challenge was and is political, not military - and there was a deliberate provocative attempt to create an Iraqi 'rebellion'. We forget for example the Ramadi attack, a clearly coordinated attack that led ot one of the most difficult days in Iraq - 12 soldiers killed in Ramadi in one incident. had we had that sort of situation throughout Iraq, it was all over.
Thanks to cool heads in the Marines, the rebellion was first contained, and then sputtered into oblivion. The US military did jujitsu on the rebellion, refusing to play the part of over-reacting oppressor for the Al Jazeera cameras. The so-called 'uprising' failed, and we are now back to a lower level of violence and casualties. Moreover, the solution
Now a previous linked article mentions how 'mujahadeen' are enforcing islamic laws in Fallujah. If so, it begs the question - does this mean most people like that? Or that these folks dont represent Fallujah and represent something else? Either conclusion suggests that we were wise to let Iraqis deal with it themselves: If they *do* represent Fallujah, then in fact we could only win by flattening the place, which would not serve our war aims. If they *dont*, then, while we have missed an opportunity here to kill some militants (yet we got plenty), we give an opportunity to see how Iraqis can themselves assert a democratic authoriy *over* such forces.
I am frankly not disturbed by either case - this is local government at its best/worst. I think such lessons of governance are good lessons for Iraq, IF the trend to democracy is intact and safe, because then Iraqi voters will KNOW where their interest lies. Do they want alcohol sellers to get whipped? Do they want a govt of cranky clerics? etc.
You've nailed it here. There is some indication the murder of the four contractors in Fallujah was done with the specific intent of igniting a violent response by our Marines against Fallujah. Like our recent strike against smuggling operations in the western desert (it was NOT a wedding party) they would use our response to enflame a nationwide uprising. But dammit if our response wasn't controlled. Even rational. Certainly not fuel for an explosive and sustained uprising. We didn't fall into their trap. We stepped around it, while still managing to kill a very large percentage of their fighters. They are now trying to regroup. But much of their manpower pool is dead. And some of that pool is accepting less dangerous and better paying employment reconstructing what was destroyed.
The Marine Corps strategy in Fallujah is clearly a gamble. But so far, it appears to be working.
You raise great points. There were many in our nation who thought Mormon government in Utah was out of bounds, but nevertheless most presidents, including Lincoln, let the Mormons govern themselves so long as they didn't cause problems for others.