I couldn’t agree more. The problem is that we didn’t “let them” apply what they learned.
The 1st Mar Div was about to defeat Fallujah, setting a pattern for the rest of central Iraq. Once the Iraqi council (with different priorities than ours) swarmed Bremer, we empowered him to override what the Marines decided. We empowered him to override the lessons the Marines leaned from Vietnam. The Marines didn’t get a chance to exercise how they learned to fight smarter. They didn’t get a chance to defeat Iraq before implanting a civilian government (same as Vietnam).
There were no “overwhelming” tactical problems. The Marines were about to destroy the Fallujahn resistance will minimal civilian casualties. There were only “political” problems. We decided that we couldn’t afford another few dozen KIAs that week, and we decided that we couldn’t afford the months of disturbances it would take to reapply the Marine tactics across central Iraq. Bad decisions IMO.
I fight the tendency to sound disillusioned and spread disillusionment. We can still change. I’m just uncertain how to highlight our core problem and its consequences, without appearing to promote disaster. After all, Dickens Christmas Carol could come across as fatalistic, but it influenced Scrooge with the ghost of Christmas future. [smile]
It was very bad until the battalion was brought up, then another battalion. Fallujah was not a planned assault. A few Army Cobras and some seriously hard core, no surrender Marines, prevented them from being overrun.
Forward units lived off local food and water for days. I mean chasing down chickens under covering fire and saving them in empty sand bags.
I posted the letter from my son's chaplain then. Very grim time. So after a month of this the boys were really tired, weapons breaking down, and most of the enemy were dead. Saleh and Latif come along, lots of pressure from CentCom/Bremer, your're tearing up too much, blah, blah, fricking blah, etc.
So that's why the decision was made. Like I say, it ain't over.