Tactically...I think we're doing a pretty good job of being both patient and deliberate...
....I find that to be an incredible compliment -- (laughs) -- that someone would accuse an Army officer and an armored division as being subtle -- that's wonderful. We've arrived, I think -- (laughter) -- if you're referring to our campaign plan here as subtle. And I think I would as well myself describe it as subtle. So I will leave it for you to determine how subtle we are.
.....essentially we want to eliminate Muqtada al-Sadr's ability to intimidate. I mean, let's not romanticize this guy. He is seeking money to lead him into a position of power.... he sets up checkpoints on roads and he extorts money. He goes and he seizes buildings near holy shrines, and he seizes money. He closes hotels and seizes money. He closes businesses and seizes money. Now, why does he do that? He needs the money to pay the militia. There's this circularity to it. So what we're trying to do is we're trying to eliminate his militia from the outside-in -- now we're working inside-out, too -- don't get me wrong. But we are working a little more aggressively on the outside, again giving the opportunity to the Iraqis themselves to solve the particular problem of the man Muqtada al-Sadr.
What affect has the prisoner scandal had on my troops, and how am I going to watch for its long-term effects?
We're all disgusted by it. I mean, I've spent three years of my life in this part of the world -- three consecutive years of my life....trying to convince Arabs in general, and Muslims in particular, that the United States and Americans were interested in their well-being, wanted to be partners, lived a life of values.
We're all disgusted by it. I mean, I've spent three years of my life in this part of the world -- three consecutive years of my life....trying to convince Arabs in general, and Muslims in particular, that the United States and Americans were interested in their well-being, wanted to be partners, lived a life of values.
....our approach to this is not to become less visible and less engaging, it's quite the opposite. It's to consciously try to become more visible and more engaging so that we can try to undo some of the harm that's been done.
I can tell you that the fighting that we've had with the Muqtada militia has gone very well for us, and not so well for them. And that's -- that's -- I don't say that with any pride. I mean, I'm happy my soldiers are doing well, but I would certainly prefer that these young men, who are, frankly, very misled, would -- would understand that they're not going to win this fight.
.... I'll just tell you exactly what I tell my soldiers. If someone attacks them, I tell them that they should maintain contact and finish that fight in as precise a way as they possibly can, because it does no good to be attacked and then to drive by and allow that attacker to live to fight another day. So if someone attacks us, my soldiers understand that the response to that is to turn into the attack, attack back and finish the fight.
As part of that, though, we also talk about being precise, being disciplined and being very careful not to create collateral damage among innocent Iraqi civilians. We've had about a year of experience with this in Baghdad. I think we have a fairly good record with that...
As part of that, though, we also talk about being precise, being disciplined and being very careful not to create collateral damage among innocent Iraqi civilians. We've had about a year of experience with this in Baghdad. I think we have a fairly good record with that...
My soldiers do obey my orders. And if I catch them not obeying my orders, I have many tools at my disposal to correct that behavior.
I hold the reputation not only of my division in my hands, but I hold the reputation of the Army and the nation in our hands. And we're very aware of that.
I would suggest to you, we actually are moving very deliberately and patiently. I have the combat power to go any place I want to go. I mean, I just do.
...we have moved very, very deliberately. It may not appear entirely so, when you see that we've had engagements every day, but they have been engagements that we have very carefully chosen, and once again, where we are in support of the Iraqi people.
~ MAJOR GENERAL MARTIN DEMPSEY, COMMANDER, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION - 5/11/04
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1st Armored Division, ping!
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