I was in transportation and logistics for most of my 26 year career and the troops seldom have what the want but almost always have what they need.
The issue if deployability is a valid one and the methods are fixed. If you go boots on the ground anyplace in the world in 72 hours air is the only way to go and it becomes a choke point because to land an aircraft withany realy lift capability yo need a developed runway thats in a secure area.
One of the major problems with Stryker is and has been cramming one into a C130 which can use semiimproved runways. No problem with loading the vehicles on larger aircraft such as a C5 which can ever swollow an M1 (provided you can talk the tread heads into shucking the huge load of crap they insist on loading on their tracks)
Non logistics types can't see this as a factor. However its said that every general has a logistician riding around on his shoulder whispering in his ear "you can't do that."
Of course I can see this factor. But a year into the war, a war in which even the Stryker force went by ship, 72 hour deployability is no longer a serious factor in what part of the force to use. We need rapidly deployable forces, certainly. We do not need everything in the inventory to be deployable by air in 72 hours, because we just do not fight wars that way.
And it does not make sense to give up real capabilities that really help in the real wars we really fight, for the sake of imaginary deployment urgency that is not there, and that can be met when it is by a specialized portion of the force. We have the 82nd, we have the Marines, we have the 10th Mountain, we have the 3 divisions worth of light infantry in the Guard (some in Iraq now).
We do not need every transportation company to fit in a C-130. They don't, anyway. Yet we run combat patrols in HMMVWs, and move whole companies through IED and sniper combat zones in open trucks. A year into the war. The Marines have APCs but did not bring them. We have M113s in Kuwait but do not use them.
We are not forced to use HMMWVs for all these patrols, but we do. Then we wonder why there is a clamor from congress and the servicemen themselves to put more armor on the things. And tell them they are wrong. A force structure doctrine that does these things is not listening to lessons learned. And as a fact, the uparmored HMMWV solution, which is suboptimal from both points of view, is what we are going to get as a practical result.