Intelligence Points to Militant Action in Saudi Arabia

STRATFOR ^ | May 05, 2004 2208 GMT

[Axion]

Summary

A number of Stratfor sources have indicated that militants are in the final stages of planning attacks on Middle Eastern targets. Based on the identity of -- and intelligence from -- these sources, Stratfor expects any attack to occur in Saudi Arabia, and we doubt it will be an isolated incident.

Analysis

Beginning May 4 and rolling over into May 5, Stratfor received a number of tips from sources in, or knowledgeable about, the Middle East indicating there is an imminent attack planned. As we triangulated that information with intelligence from additional sources, Stratfor has deduced that an attack is most likely to occur within Saudi Arabia, and that it will target Westerners as opposed to Saudis.

The security situation in the kingdom continues to degrade for a variety of reasons.

The mix of source information on the threat crosses business and government intelligence lines in both the United States and the Middle East. All sources have repeatedly proven their value to Stratfor, and that they are all -- independently -- warning of a possible attack makes this a threat that we take very seriously.

To put the gravity of the threat in context, militants shot and killed five Western expatriates May 1 in Yanbu, a petrochemical town on the Red Sea. Two days later, U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Oberwetter advised all Americans living in the kingdom to leave.

The problem Westerners face in Saudi Arabia is three-fold.

First, U.S. policy indirectly stoked the current militant activity in Saudi Arabia.

After the Sept. 11 attacks, Washington deemed Saudi efforts against al Qaeda insufficient. The reasoning for the Saudi tentativeness up to that point was obvious. Al Qaeda's ideological home is rooted in the Wahhabi Islam that dominates Saudi Arabia. For al Qaeda, the Saudi royal family's affiliation with Western interests is a betrayal of Islam and the Sauds are guilty of apostasy. Historically, the royals have dealt with this by providing the country's militants with an out: Go fight infidels elsewhere. This strategy worked well, and Saudi Arabia exported its militants to places such as Afghanistan and Chechnya.

After Sept. 11 -- when several of these "exports" attacked New York City and Washington -- the United States confronted Riyadh over the practice. Stripped of the ability to simply send the militants elsewhere, Riyadh was forced -- by U.S. design -- to deal with the militants within the kingdom. More militants at home mean more militant activity at home -- which means more problems for Western guests.

The second problem Westerners in Saudi Arabia face is that the militants have adjusted their operational methods. The Yanbu attacks were not only the first attacks in that city -- or even in the Hijaz region -- they were also the first attacks in which the militants infiltrated the company employing the victims, even obtaining valid company identification cards. Such sophistication is not only frightening, considering the local nature of the militants, it is nearly impossible to defend against.

Third, the Saudis are still on the learning curve.

The intricacies of tribal loyalties -- and the unique role of religious go-betweens with a leg on each side of the fence -- always have complicated the process of gathering actionable intelligence. But in the aftermath of the November bombings of housing compounds in Riyadh, local Muslims were so outraged that the militants would attack other Muslims that many -- even in the Najd region where many militants come from -- were willing to cooperate with Saudi authorities to root out militant cells. That resulted in a quantum leap in Saudi intelligence capabilities. But the effort remains in its infancy; Saudi domestic intelligence efforts were never robust -- and they still are not. After all, the emphasis before Sept. 11 was on getting the militants out of country, not into Saudi prisons.

Taken together, these factors all indicate that the Saudi security situation is tangibly decaying, and local authorities are increasingly unable to adequately protect foreigners. Expect more Yanbus.

[swarthyguy]

BUMP. The Saudi Cauldron bubbles.

I heard some of jihadis were actually company employees, FWIW.

[barkeep]

Stratfor runs better intel out of a 3000 sq. office than the State Dept ever bragged about. Want to help balance the budget? Fire State, outsource the job to Stratfor, and give them first option on retaining the few competent FSOs and Ambassadors we are blessed with.

[Chameleon]

I really like Stratfor's analyses.

I was arguing one of their fundamental premises in this article last night - that one clear sign we're making progress in the WOT is the rise in terrorist activities in Arab Muslim countries.

The ugly reality is that until countries crack down on militants within their own borders, terrorists will be exported. Homegrown terrorism is a natural result of cracking down against homegrown militants, and such terrorism forces the "Arab Street" to reevaluate their allegiances in the WOT.

[ken5050]

SA has a couple of very tall office buildings..really beautiful modern structures..and very tempting targets..

[Shermy]

Its human nature to remember the successes rather than the failures. There was the bombing of the police headquarters a few weeks ago, forgotten is the four or five car bombs that were intercepted.

This report concords with the vastness of the domestic terror project, something bigger than a bombing or two here and there.

I suspect Yanbu was selected because the petrochemical developments there - competitive with Iran's own. If they direct the locals to attack actual petroleum facilities - that would be a daring excalation of the oil war aspect of this struggle.

[RBroadfoot]

Stratfor runs better intel out of a 3000 sq. office than the State Dept ever bragged about.

I agree, though you set the bar pretty low. I don't always agree with Stratfor's conclusions, but they are always well reasoned.

I vividly remember a speech that the head of Stratfor made for the annual meeting of the National Petroleum Refiners Association in March 2003. It was by far the best analysis of the WOT and events prior to Gulf War II that I heard or read at the time. His pre-invasion predictions of the outcome of the Gulf War II were more accurate than what passes for news analysis (after the fact) in the mainstream media today.

One of the Stratfor observations was that WMD was really a fairly minor reason for going after Saddam. (Remember the speech was pre-invasion; everybody thought they knew that Saddam had WMD in Iraq.) The military objective was a long-term Middle East military base outside of Arab peninsula. Such military presence was, in Stratfor's view, essential to take the WOT to radical Islamist terrorists without offending the sensibilities of Muslims generally. We could fight the war here in USA, but Bush preferred to fight it in the ME.

Too bad that Bush didn't advance such an argument since WMD remain undiscovered. The public increasingly seems to think that the WOT and Gulf War II are completely unrelated. Without understanding the connection twixt the two, the tragedy inherent to war makes Gulf War II seem too costly. (I know, I know ... Saddam didn't order 9/11; he only praised it. But Saddam's intelligence services did have connections with Al Qa'eda.)

[Finalapproach29er]

No kidding!

Dick (effin) Tracy.

[swarthyguy]

Shoulda occupied the damn place before Iraq. Then run a coup op into Baghdad.

But damn Saudis know how to bribe everyone in the USG.