People and Politics / A sheep in wolf's clothing and a wolf in sheep's clothing

Haaretz ^ | May 04, 2004 | Akiva Eldar

[yonif]

MK Michael Ratzon, who was deeply involved in the campaign against the prime minister's disengagement plan, hates being labeled "extreme right."

A conversation with the deputy minister of industry, commerce and employment does reveal surprising positions, far more moderate than those of his boss, Ehud Olmert, the first and most outspoken supporter of the plan to unilaterally disengage from Gaza and the northern West Bank. Thus, Ratzon proposed leaving the Gush Katif settlement bloc in place - but offering the Palestinians uninhabited territory inside Israel.

Ratzon says the idea - mentioned in the Clinton framework and the Geneva initiative - has piqued the interest of some of the Palestinians involved with him in the One Voice campaign, particularly Imad Shaqur, who is Yasser Arafat's adviser on Israeli affairs, and Palestinian Legislative Council member Mofid Abu Rabbo, a leading Fatah official.

Ratzon says that Ariel Sharon and Olmert know about, and are not opposed to, his involvement in the One Voice campaign, alongside Likud MK Gilad Erdan and Labor MK Matan Vilnai. Arafat's brother is on the board of One Voice, and Ratzon has no doubt that he wouldn't be attending without the blessings of his older brother. At the Fatah leadership's request, Ratzon is initiating meetings between them and Likud officials. The first such meeting is slated for Jerusalem in the near future. If the security situation allows it, the next meeting will take place in Ramallah.

Ratzon is contemptuous of the claim there is nobody to talk to on the other side. "A cold shoulder is not policy," he says. "Anyone ready to talk about peace is a partner. If the address is Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas], let it be Abu Mazen. If it is Abu Ala [Ahmed Qureia], let it be Abu Ala. I'm also not afraid of Arafat. He can be left in the Muqata and handled with a carrot and stick approach. We'll stick to our interests and respond harshly if agreements are violated."

Looking backward from the disengagement plan to the short days that Abu Mazen was in office, Ratzon believes that Israel missed an opportunity. He said that instead of unconditional withdrawal, talks should have been conducted with Abu Mazen, thus strengthening him opposite Arafat. "If we're ready for such a far-reaching step as withdrawal, wouldn't it be better to do it though dialogue?" he asks. "Instead of evacuating settlements without any quid pro quo, according to the PLO's stages doctrine, wouldn't it have been better to propose it to Abu Mazen, which would have strengthened him vis-a-vis Arafat?"

He says that he also told Sharon, when the prime minister tried to persuade him to back the disengagement plan, that Israel should speak with whoever is ready to speak with Israel. "I told him that if he was so insistent on going for a unilateral step, then he should go for a comprehensive plan: Let's set the eastern border and announce to the nation that this is the border."

He reminded Sharon that even Labor Party leaders Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak refused to uproot settlements and take the risk of civil strife, at least until a final agreement was on the table. "The people of Israel will accept painful concessions if it knows what the final borders will be, what it will get for them and that it's the end of the concessions."

The day after the Likud referendum, Ratzon is proposing to Sharon that he choose between the only two options that remain: to open negotiations with the Palestinians in an effort to reach an agreement, or to draw all of Israel's borders on all fronts and not only in the south, and withdraw to all those lines.

If it was up to him, Israel would also be trying to reach an agreed border with Syria. Every since the Syrian president began sending signals about his interest in renewing negotiations, Ratzon has openly expressed his view that Israel should not turn Assad down. "The State of Israel, if it seeks peace, must make every effort to reach peace," says the deputy minister from the Likud. "If there is a regional leader like Assad who proposes talking to us from the starting point, without preconditions, it's incredible if we reject his outstretched hand. It does not contradict our need to stick to our interests, and if the Americans disagree, then the effort must be made to persuade them that it would be best for Israel."

He says he founds partners to his views among the leaders of the opposition to Sharon's disengagement plan. He revealed that Uzi Landau, considered the most extreme of the bunch, agrees that a final status agreement will include painful concessions.

Ratzon is also convinced the Palestinian side understands this. Fact is, he says, he and his Israeli colleagues in One Voice have already received two unique understandings from the Palestinian members - readiness to recognize Israel as the state of the Jews, and to drop the term "right" from the "right of return."

Back to the road map

Ten days before the referendum, UN Special Middle East Envoy Terje Larsen filed his periodical report on the situation in the region to the members of the Security Council.

Now, reading the report after the referendum, one sees the first part of his review as particularly anachronistic. The UN secretary-general's representative calls for "internationally supervised temporary security arrangements" in Gaza after an Israeli withdrawal. He says there is a need for an "international presence" to which both sides agree, which would enable Israel to withdraw fully and free itself of the burden of the occupation.

An international presence is necessary, Larsen says, so the Palestinians can rehabilitate their ruined security forces and undertake a campaign against terror and violence in cooperation with the regional and international players. In addition, the withdrawal should be "an end to the occupation of Gaza," and not merely a new military deployment, recognized as such by the international community.

The UN's position, as presented by Larsen, was that the withdrawal has to be complete and absolute and lead to strengthening Palestinian self-rule and the establishment of international entrances and exits to and from Gaza. The occupation will only end when the Palestinians manage their affairs in Gaza, when they live their daily lives without being subject to Israeli rule, when they live without fear of another Israeli invasion of their towns and villages, and when they can travel to other countries from their territory without being subject to Israeli controls, says Larsen. And for all that to happen, there must be security arrangements and a strong and credible government in Gaza after the withdrawal.

Larsen, who was a key international figure during the drafting of the road map, made sure to note for American ears that the disengagement plan from Gaza is not a replacement for the road map. The withdrawal from Gaza could become an historic opportunity leading to full implementation of the road map, says the Norwegian diplomat.

According to Larsen, after they transformed the Gaza withdrawal from an opportunity to mere history, the settlers better not rest on their laurels. Those who didn't want the Sharon disengagement plan will get the Bush road map.

The document Larsen handed in to the Security Council says the two sides failed, and neither met their commitments according to the road map. After noting that the Palestinian Authority must do all it can to put an end once and for all to terrorism, and that the international community should judge the PA according to its achievements in that realm, Larsen turns to Sharon to settle some accounts.

The government of Israel, Larsen writes, did not dismantle outposts, and did not implement the settlement freeze. Indeed, he adds, since the collapse of the road map last year, the number of outposts actually increased. Much Palestinian land was expropriated for the construction of the separation fence, which had a direct influence on tens of thousands of Palestinians, making them wonder if they ever will live in a viable independent state.

When U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell meets today in New York with his colleagues from the Quartet, Kofi Annan might read out the lines from Larsen's letter that say that irrespective of the Gaza withdrawal, Israel must immediately evacuate all the outposts established since March 2001 and totally freeze all the settlement activity throughout the West Bank. The activity in the settlements is a violation of international law and must cease. No excuse can justify Israel's evasions of this commitment. If there was an excuse to avoid dismantling the outposts and freezing settlements, with the Gaza withdrawal seemingly off the agenda, Sharon will now have to find another excuse.

Or maybe the road map will be his way of settling accounts with the Yesha Council.