Connecting Dots (Damned if you do and damned if you don't)

Tech Central Station ^ | April 29, 2004 | Ken Adelman

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When President Bush and Vice President Cheney appear before the 9/11 Commission today, they can justifiably claim they took prudent measures — given the flimsy intelligence they'd received on terrorist threats against our homeland.

Most importantly, once the attacks occurred, they radically changed their whole way of operating. They — to use the cliché of the day — "connected the dots," as best they could. Their critics did not.

The very phrase "connecting the dots" highlights actions based on less-than-certain information — on history, hunches, instincts. After all, these are "dots," not fully filled-in scenes.

Take Iraq, the second big issue after 9/11, coming after the expulsion of the Taliban from power.

A big "dot" was Saddam's having — and probably sharing with al-Qaeda — weapons of mass destruction. This was clearly the Bush Administration's premise going into Iraq.

But a premise based on history, circumstantial evidence, clear deception and concealment by Saddam. Moreover, the head of U.S. intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet, explicitly told the President that Iraq's having WMD was a "slam dunk." That couldn't be stronger talk.

Strong enough to convince a president. Strong enough to convince the most fervent war opponent, like Senator Ted Kennedy. On September 27, 2002, during the war resolution debate, Kennedy said, "We have known for many years that Saddam Hussein is seeking and developing weapons of mass destruction."

Now, of course, Kennedy says that the Bush Administration "misled Congress and the American people, because the Administration knew that it could not obtain the consent of the Congress for the war if all the facts were known."

Well, "facts" were known. It turned out some "facts" were wrong.

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