Posted on 04/16/2004 9:43:21 PM PDT by NormsRevenge
WASHINGTON, April 16 — The commission investigating the 9/11 attacks has concluded that immigration policies promoted as essential to keeping the country safe from future attacks have been largely ineffective, producing little, if any, information leading to the identification or apprehension of terrorists.
The commission said one program had proved so fruitless that it was discontinued after less than a year.
The critical assessment was released this week as part of a preliminary finding to a final report due in July. It returned a spotlight to programs that have been controversial from the start, aimed mostly at people, like the 9/11 hijackers, from Muslim or Arab countries. Critics have said the government engaged in a wholesale roundup of these people, kept them in jail for months, in some cases without access to lawyers, and conducted closed-door legal hearings on their status.
Many of the libertarian and pro-immigration groups that have criticized the Bush administration for what they deem the unfair and unnecessary focus on these groups hailed the findings. They said that as the first independent assessment of government actions after 9/11, it affirmed their misgivings.
"Clearly, the government was overreaching," said Timothy H. Edgar, legislative counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union, about the immigration programs. "We raised concerns from the beginning that they not only interfere with time-honored civil liberties, but they were likely to prove to be ineffective."
But a former Justice Department official involved in the development of the programs defended them as critical to counterterrorism efforts.
Kris Kobach, a Republican candidate for Congress in Kansas who served as counsel to Attorney General John Ashcroft from 2001 to 2003, said the programs had yielded great benefits by leading to the identification and deportation of hundreds of people with criminal backgrounds or indirect ties to terrorism.
Mr. Kobach said the commission viewed the impact of the programs too narrowly, drawing conclusions based solely on the application of antiterrorism laws, rather than others, like immigration law. "The commission is looking for a terrorism label affixed to an individual," Mr. Kobach said in an interview. "But it's failing to realize that just because the F.B.I. hasn't gotten to the point of applying the terrorism label, it doesn't mean the individual is not a terrorist."
Perhaps the most controversial of the programs was one that sought to identify "special interest" immigrants, which resulted in the arrests of more than 700 people, most from Middle Eastern countries, who were charged with violating immigration laws and held for months, in many cases, until federal agents cleared them of any involvement in terror-related activities.
The commission report echoed concerns raised when these programs were initiated. The concerns led to an investigation by the inspector general at the Justice Department that found that officials "made little attempt to distinguish" between immigrants who had ties to terrorism and those who did not.
Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies, a civil libertarian organization, called the detention program misguided, saying: "Hundreds of people's rights were violated, and, very importantly, the United States is now seen around the world as a country where Arabs and Muslims can be arrested in secret and held without charges. That's a very dangerous development in terms of a country promoting democracy and human rights as an antidote to terrorism."
But Mr. Kobach said the detention program had proved more valuable than the commission knew, leading to the deportation of at least three men with "strong, substantial connections to terrorism," including a roommate of one of the 9/11 hijackers, an immigrant who confessed to attending a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and another who was found with 75 pictures of the World Trade Center.
In response to the inspector general's report, the Department of Homeland Security issued new guidelines last month to streamline the process for handling cases involving immigrants held in connection with national security concerns.
The commission report also disparaged a program that requires additional screening for visa applications from 26 predominantly Muslim countries. It charged that investigators had not been processing them in a timely fashion and that "no terrorists have been uncovered" by the effort. The report also cited a program, begun in November 2001, that delayed visa applications from the same countries and a few others. The commission concluded that the program, which was shut down 11 months later, "yielded no useful antiterrorist information and led to no visa denials."
Other critics said the two programs had discouraged students, artists, entrepreneurs and other travelers from visiting the United States and alienated a community "that was as shocked as anyone by the 9/11 attacks," in the words of Frank Sharry, executive director of the National Immigration Forum, an advocacy group.
But Mr. Kobach defended both efforts, saying that the first was necessary for the security of the country and that the second was a temporary and necessary action while efforts were under way to make sure federal investigators could scrutinize the names of visa applicants.
The commission criticized a fourth program, the Absconder Apprehension Initiative. Its intent was to round up 5,000 immigrants from countries with a Qaeda presence who were facing deportation and to expedite their expulsion. The commission found that by early 2003, 1,139 had been apprehended, a group that included 803 who had been deported, 224 who were awaiting deportation and 45 who were being prosecuted on other criminal charges.
But so far, the commission report said, "we have not learned that any of the absconders were deported under a terrorism statute, prosecuted for terrorist-related crimes or linked in any way to terrorism."
Mr. Kobach asserted that the so-called absconders were already in violation of immigration laws and some were wanted for other criminal violations, including more than 100 who were found to be sex offenders.
"In many cases," he said, "we have kicked terrorists out of the country over garden-variety immigration laws."
This battle shaping up in '04 seems more than just up-hill, lately. It could be the last hill.
The article below states, "The voluminous documents contain a variety of communications between White House personnel, Vice Presidential personnel and officials at the Immigration and Naturalization Service." I decipher that to mean the actual memo(s) from Gorelick was not released publicly at the October 9 Senate Subcommittee meeting. Instead, Gorelick's memo or directives are mentioned in other documents that were released -- the communication between the WH staff, Gore's staff, and INS.
Not for commercial use. Solely to be used for the educational purposes of research and open discussion.
PR Newswire
October 11, 1996, Friday
Washington Dateline
Is 'Citizenship USA' Really Vote-Buying?" Asks FAIR
WASHINGTON, Oct. 11
Materials made available to the public Wednesday during congressional testimony by Rosemary Jenks of the Center for Immigration Studies, reveal that the INS program to decrease naturalization backlogs was targeted by White House political officials in mid-1995 as a vote-getting initiative to be executed as fast as possible, without regard to integrity or competence in the process.
Jenks released a variety of internal administration documents subpoenaed earlier by congressional investigators looking into allegations that " Citizenship USA" had become a politicized form of political graft, used by Clinton Administration officials as a way to obtain votes. Citizenship now brings with it the promise of access to welfare benefits and additional visas for relatives.
According to Dan Stein, executive director of FAIR, the Federation for American Immigration Reform, the materials in their totality "reflect a blatant attempt by the White House and the Office of the Vice President to try to use the program to dilute the process and influence the outcome of the 1996 election."
The voluminous documents contain a variety of communications between White House personnel, Vice Presidential personnel and officials at the Immigration and Naturalization Service. These materials demonstrate the following:
* The Vice President's "re-inventing government" project was knee-deep in trying to force the INS to naturalize "a million new citizens before election day."
* Vice Presidential personnel and several working on the White House staff pushed to expand the President's visibility and profile among newly- naturalized citizens, even pushing to ensure the President's welcome letter was given to each new citizen, and trying to find a way to obtain names and addresses for follow-up mailings.
* Memoranda were issued to District Directors by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, Commissioner Doris Meissner and Deputy Commissioner Chris Sale, "delegating full authority to waive, suspend or deviate from non- statutory policies, regulations and procedures to enhance the speed and convenience of the process for those who do. We hold you responsible for your judgment and results." This sort of memo creates an atmosphere of strategic non-performance of duties and of political intimidation of the type that has lead to fraud and misrepresentation to Congress in the INS scandal known as Kromegate.(snip)
Gorelick is mentioned only twice in the October 9 hearing:
October 9, 1996, Wednesday
CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
Statement of Rosemary Jenks, Director of Policy Analysis, Center for Immigration Studies, Washington, DC Before the
Immigration Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States SenateOctober 9, 1996
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am Rosemary Jenks, Director of Policy Analysis at the Center for Immigration Studies, a non-profit, non-advocacy research institution. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss an issue that is central to our national identity, the bond that holds us united as one people: United States citizenship. United States citizenship is the most valuable and the most cherished privilege our nation can bestow upon an individual. It is a privilege that is sought by millions around the world. It carries with it the right to travel freely, to hold certain public offices and to petition for the immigration of family members. Most importantly, however, it carries with it the right, and the responsibility, to take part in shaping and securing the future of this country by voting for elected officials at all levels of government.
We have all seen media reports on the politicization of the naturalization process, the "dumbing-down" of the requirements for naturalization, cheating by naturalization applicants at outside testing entities, and criminals and other ineligible aliens being granted U.S. citizenship. At issue here today is not simply whether one political party or another is seeking an electoral advantage or whether the requirements for naturalization are being circumvented or flouted, but rather whether the meaning of United States citizenship is being compromised. If the media reports are accurate, then our conclusion must be yes.
In order to determine the accuracy of the reports, we must examine the evidence. Thanks to the work of the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs' and Criminal Justice of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and the integrity of a number of INS employees from across the nation, this evidence is available. Unfortunately, it presents a disturbing picture of changes to the naturalization process, apparently motivated by election-year concerns, that have far-reaching implications that will endure long after next month's balloting. These changes set a troubling precedent for future administrations--Democratic or Republican--and for future generations of Americans.
Attached to this statement is a "Naturalization Chronology," which I have pieced together after reviewing thousands of pages of documents, including email exchanges, from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the White House, and the Office of the Vice President, and speaking with numerous INS employees around the country. I use that chronology as a general guideline to examine the current naturalization process and how it developed.
The requirements for naturalization are set out in the Immigration and Nationality Act., Among other things, applicants are required to submit an application form, the N-400, a copy of their alien registration card, the "green card," fingerprints, photographs and a fee of $95 to the INS. In general, they must prove that they are at least 18 years of age; that they have resided in the United States as lawful permanent residents for a minimum of five years (unless they marry a U.S. citizen, in which case it is three years); that they are able to read, write, speak and understand English; that they have at least a minimal knowledge of U.S. history and government; that they are of good moral character; and that they do not have a serious criminal record. Upon receiving the N-400 and the accompanying paper work, INS enters the information into an INS
Center for Immigration Studies, October 9, 1996
Database and forwards the fingerprints to the FBI for a criminal record check. INS is then required to wait for 60 days for a reply from the FBI. If the FBI finds a criminal record, or a "hit," the fingerprints are sent back to the INS office along with a copy of the criminal record. If no criminal record is found, the INS does not get a response from the FBI and can proceed with the adjudication process after 60 days. INS examiners (or District Adjudications Officers, DAOS) then schedule an interview with the applicant, during which the applicant is tested on English, history and government knowledge and asked questions to determine good moral character. If all the requirements are met, the application is approved and the applicant is scheduled for a swearing in ceremony. Otherwise, the application is either denied or continued, depending on the nature of the problem.
Testing Fraud
In 1991, the government established criteria under which outside (i,e., non-government) testing entities (OTEs), including for-profit business, could be authorized to administer standardized tests to determine a naturalization applicant's ability to read and write in English, along with his or her knowledge of history and civics (see attachment 2). The tests are comprised mainly of multiple choice questions, but applicants also have to write two simple sentences that are dictated to them. To date, the INS has authorized six OTEs to administer these tests: Educational Testing Service (ETS), Comprehensive Adult Student Assessment System (CASAS), Southeast College, Naturalization Assistance Services (NAS), Marich Associates and American College Testing (ACT). These OTEs in turn may license community based organizations (CBOS) and other affiliates to administer the tests on their behalf, in compliance with the requirements set out in the Federal Register notice. However, neither INS, nor the individual OTES, have an effective monitoring process to ensure that requirements relating to the security of the tests or the integrity of the testing are met.
The first indications of trouble with the system came in 1992, when INS examiners began to encounter naturalization applicants who presented test certificates (indicating that they had passed the standardized tests) at their interviews, but were unable to communicate in or understand English. ETS complained to INS Headquarters that some examiners were refusing to accept ETS test certificates as evidence that applicants had passed the written/read English and history/civics test. Headquarters sent a memo to the field offices forbidding examiners from retesting applicants and directing them, instead, to question applicants (through an interpreter) on how they were able to pass the test.
In July 1994, NAS presented a proposal to INS to be authorized as an OTE (see attachments). NAS lists how it meets each of the criteria in the Federal Register notice, except that it details its experience in "Driver Improvement School" for the first criterion, which requires a testing entity to "demonstrate experience in developing and administering reliable standard examinations in the English-language and civics areas" emphasis added . NAS clearly does not have such experience, and so should have been found ineligible. Nonetheless, NAS quickly established itself as the leader of OTES, setting up hundreds of testing sites across the nation. Half of all naturalization applicants tested by OTEs use one of the 500 or so NAS affiliates.
Center for Immigration Studies, October 9, 1996
The point of contact at INS Headquarters for "information on the citizenship testing programs, including test site additions and deletions," in July 1994 was W. R. "Skip" Tollifson, a Senior Immigration Examiner. Mr. Tollifson retired from the INS on March 29, 1996 and began working for NAS on April 1, 1996. He testified, under oath, during a September 10, 1996 hearing of the House National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee that he, "did not, per se, approve this NAS application," and that he did not consider taking a job at NAS to be an ethics violation. An Ethics Officer in the INS General Counsel Office, on the other hand, wrote in an email exchange:
Employees have suggested to me that Tollifson approved NAS, a
naturalization testing entity even though they did not meet the
Service's criteria, failed to properly monitor NAS,- he was
overheard negotiating for employment and has now violated the
post employment restriction laws... (see Attachment 4).
Reports of testing fraud at affiliates of the OTEs began to increase dramatically in late 1994. INS examiners came across increasing numbers of naturalization applicants who, despite having an OTE test certificate, were unable to communicate in or understand English. Some affiliates were charging as much as $850 to prepare and test immigrants. Examples of documented fraud during the administration of the tests include test proctors pointing to the correct answers on the answer sheet, tests being given in the applicants' native language instead of English, and the sentences being written on a blackboard so applicants simply have to copy them. Some affiliates guaranteed that, as long as applicants could sign their names in English, they would pass the test. Affiliates were using print media often ethnic newspapers-radio and television ads to advertise their services. Some ads included false promises and/or blatant lies, but there were no regulations governing the content of the ads. In October 1995, INS Headquarters instructed field offices that the "inability of an applicant with an OTE certificate to speak English may not be the sole reason" for determining that there was fraud in the testing.
Testing fraud was uncovered in Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Virginia. In Tucson, AZ, an examiner emailed his supervisor asking how to handle an applicant who failed his interview because of lack of knowledge of history and government, and then returned two days later with a test certificate from ETS. The supervisor responded, "Punt, what else. If his English was alright, we have one more U.S. citizen" (see attachment 5).
The three most-publicized cases were in Minneapolis-St. Paul, Honolulu and Dallas. In November 1995, an investigative reporter from a St. Paul television station took a hidden video camera into an NAS- affiliated testing site and recorded test proctors drilling applicants on the test questions and answers prior to the test, applicants sharing answers, and the test proctors giving applicants the correct answers during the test.
INS suspended NAS on November 22, after seeing the broadcast of this tape, and gave NAS ten days to respond to the allegations of fraud or request a hearing before Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, Louis Crocetti. On December 5, NAS' lawyers demanded that NAS be reinstated until a hearing could be held or they would file a lawsuit in Federal Court. On December 13, INS and NAS signed a stipulated settlement agreement underwhich NAS. was reinstated with certain conditions, including the permanent suspension of the St. Paul affiliate. NAS further agreed to comply with new criteria for quality control, as long as all OTEs would have to do the same. INS agreed to apologize in writing for any trouble caused by the suspension to NAS and all NAS affiliates in good standing (see attachment 6). INS Headquarters also convened a working group to develop official guidelines for INS investigations of testing fraud, as there appeared to be none in existence.
On January 22, 1996, following an investigation by the INS Honolulu District Office,'INS directed NAS to suspend an affiliate in Honolulu. The INS investigation led to the arrest and criminal prosecution of four employees of the affiliate. No action was taken against NAS following that incident, but in February, INS Headquarters officials discussed the possibility of designating a contact person to track all testing entity violations, in case INS needed a record of them for litigation. Also in February, INS documents indicate that the INS Office of Internal Audit was cooperating with the Department of Justice's Office of Inspector General (OIG) on an OIG investigation of testing fraud.
In early 1996, a former NAS employee, Jewell Elghazali, contacted the investigative reporter who had uncovered the fraud in St. Paul and told him of additional testing fraud. The reporter put her in touch with "20/20", which then began an undercover investigation of an NAS affiliate in Dallas, TX. "20/20" took a hidden video camera into the testing site and taped test proctors giving the applicants the questions and answers to the test prior to its administration, pointing to' correct answers on the answer sheets during the test, and speaking to the applicants in Spanish, among other things. Ms. Elghazali told "20/20" that, while she was grading tests for NAS, she came across entire batches of tests in the same handwriting and with the same incorrect answers on every test.
In April 1996, INS Headquarters sent instructions to the field offices on procedures to follow to report and initiate investigations of complaints of testing fraud. In May 1996, after it was notified of the "20/20" investigation, INS Headquarters sent a memo to, field offices with guidelines on conducting unannounced on-site inspections of testing sites. The guidelines require each District Office to visit one site per quarter.
On June 10 1996, "20/20" interviewed INS Executive Associate Commissioner T. Alexander Aleinikoff regarding the tape from Dallas (see attachment 7). Mr. Aleinikoff was unable to explain why NAS had been authorized as an OTE, in light of its experience in driver's education. However, he assured "20/20" that simply passing the standardized test does not mean an applicant will be naturalized because he or she still has to demonstrate the ability to communicate in and understand English at the INS interview. When asked whether it might be conflict of interest that Mr. Tollifson works for NAS, Mr. Aleinikoff stated numerous times that there was an "on-going investigation" into Mr. Tollifson's activities. However, attachment 4, dated three days after the interview, notes that Mr. Aleinikoff wanted INS to "commence an investigation."
On June 28, 1996, INS issued NAS a "Notice of Intent to Suspend." On July 12, INS Headquarters sent a memo to the field offices directing them to continue to accept NAS testing certificates. To my knowledge, no further action has been taken against NAS to date.
The number of licensed affiliates of the six authorized OTEs grew from 309 in May 1993 to over 1,000 by mid-1996. Reported incidents of testing fraud also increased dramatically. As of July 10, 1996, INS reported that about 25 percent (250,000-300,000) of all naturalization applicants used the OTES. Their overall pass rate is 85 percent, although the pass rate for NAS is 93 percent. "Re-Engineering" Naturalization
Doris Meissner was sworn in as Commissioner of the INS in October 1993. During her confirmation hearing, Mrs. Meissner correctly described naturalization as a process that is beneficial to immigrants, to America and to the INS. She indicated her "intention to be much more active on the part of the Service where naturalization is concerned." I think we would all agree that an efficient and timely naturalization process is a laudable goal, provided it is done in a thoughtful and responsible way. I do not doubt that that is exactly what Commissioner Meissner had in mind. Somewhere along the way, however, it appears that the plan was commandeered by people whose only goals are speed and high numbers.
As noted in the attached chronology, about 270,000 N-400 applications were pending (not including any that had been received, but not been entered into the computer) when Commissioner Meissner took office. According to testimony before the House National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, a 1994 General Accounting Office study found that -about 80 percent of N-400s were processed within four months during that year, although the wait was seven to ten months in certain cities. The number of N- 400 applications received in FY 1994 surpassed FY 1993 receipts by only 21,487. In FY 1995, however, INS expected a much larger increase because of a combination of factors, including the 2.7 million beneficiaries of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) amnesty becoming eligible based on the five-years residence requirement, the passage of Proposition 187 in California in November 1994, and legislative proposal, to bar non-citizens from certain meanstested welfare benefits.
Thus, an INS working group conducted a survey in June 1994 of ways to streamline the naturalization process.. One of the proposals they came up with was to waive the personal interview for a number of categories of applicants (see attachment 8).
Naturalization was identified as a "major reinvention effort" in April 1995, according to Associate Commissioner for Examinations, Louis Crocetti. That same month, Commissioner Meissner contracted a management consulting firm, PRC, to work with INS staff to overhaul the naturalization process. PRC and the INS staff conducted a four- week review of the process and produced a "radical redesign" of naturalization. The final report, issued in May 1995, is called Results in 30 Days: Re-Engineering the Naturalization Process (see attachment 9). Among other things, it recommends that INS develop strong partnerships with "Service Providers" --community-based organizations (CBOs) and voluntary agencies (VOLAGS)--which would involve "total sharing of information, joint decision making, and aggressive coloration aimed at best meeting the needs of the applicant." It recommends the introduction of high tech, fully automated and integrated systems to facilitate data entry and criminal background checks, in addition to automatically triggering "pre- qualified 'invitations' to immigrants as they become legally eligible for citizenship." It adds that "long-standing interpretations of eligibility laws and regulations will be reviewed to ... focus upon meeting the demands of today's eligible customers." Finally, it concludes that processing time from submission "to approval will be reduced to 'same day service' for 80% of the applicants."
In June 1995, Congress approved a reprogramming request from INS to provide additional funding for the naturalization initiative. On June 26, Commissioner Meissner submitted a request that the naturalization program be designated as a "Reinvention Lab" under the auspices of Vice President Gore's National Performance Review (NPR - see attachment 10). Her request letter and subsequent INS documentation make clear that the PRC report provided the basis for the "reengineering" of the naturalization process that has occurred over the past year.
In the meantime, N-400 applications were on the rise and examiners were being overwhelmed. District Offices lacked the equipment they needed to process N-400s efficiently. Many offices did not have access to the Naturalization Automated Case System (NACS) database, and those that did were experiencing problems with it. Many offices were (and, reportedly, are) still using electronic typewriters to process applications.
On August 1-2, 1995, INS convened a "Key Cities Meeting" with representatives from the Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York, San Diego and San Francisco INS offices, where 80 percent of the INS' workload is concentrated. Commissioner Meissner introduced these employees to the PRC re-engineering report, explaining that because some "radical" changes would be included, a communications plan was being prepared to clarify the program.
During a senior-level naturalization staff meeting on August 2, it was decided that the staff needed to follow up on the status of the Reinvention Lab designation to pursue "facilities, contracting and procurement issues that warrant immediate exemption to creating policies, regulations etc." (see attachment 11). It was also determined that a memo designating David Rosenberg as the Naturalization Re-Engineering Project Coordinator needed to be drafted, and Mr. Rosenberg's contract extended.
Commissioner Meissner unveiled the "Citizenship USA" (CUSA) initiative on August 31, 1995. The stated objective of CUSA, at least initially, was "to become current" on N-400 applications, meaning that applications would be processed from start to citizenship within six months, by the end of FY 1996. INS designated five "CUSA cities," including Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, Miami and Chicago, which had the largest numbers of pending cases when the program started. Resources, including personnel, equipment and building space, were to be funneled into these five cities, which would serve as the "Reinvention Labs."
The naturalization initiative was approved as an NPR Reinvention Lab on September 5, 1995. On September 11, Commissioner Meissner forwarded to all field offices the executive summary of the PRC report with a memo explaining its origin and asking for comments (see attachment 12). She wrote that "wherever possible, we will use validated re-engineering techniques as outlined in the PRC report to attack the caseload." She added that the report offers "a basic road map for change."
On September 21, 1995, a manager with UNICOR, a Federal prison in Lexington, KY, called the INS in Miami to offer the assistance of UNICOR inmates in preparing naturalization certificates. The INS employee who took the call emailed Headquarters and his supervisors in Miami to inform them of the offer. He noted that there were two potential problem areas: 1) the certificates are prepared from NACS, and "some people might not be comfortable with a direct data link to a federal prison;" and 2) "would be the public relations aspect of having prisoners producing naturalization certificates," especially since some of UNICOR's "employees" are illegal aliens. Nonetheless, the employee saw "nothing impossible about this situation," and suggested that the INS consider it (see attachment 13)
Beginning in mid-October, INS Regional and District Directors were notified that they would be required to detail personnel- including Adjudications Officers, Inspectors, Investigators, Border Patrol Agents, Special Agents, Asylum Officers and clerical workers-to the CUSA offices. As might be expected, the effect on the offices losing the workers was devastating. Offices were unable to perform crucial duties such as employer sanctions enforcement, investigations targeting criminal aliens, adjudications and airport inspections. The funneling of resources into CUSA sites also raised funding questions (see attachment 14).
An INS working group was convened in October 1995 to identify and solve the on-going problems with NACS,, but problems persisted well into 1996 (there is no indication that they have been solved to date). FBI fingerprint and name checks also presented problems. Fingerprint "hits" (indicating a criminal record) from the FBI often were not placed in the application file until after the application was approved for naturalization. On November 16, 1995, INS staff discovered that "for the last 8-10 years FBI responses on records checks have been immediately burned," meaning that INS was "destroying the hits on 1/2 of our name checks (at a cost of probably $1,000,000 per year) and naturalizing an assortment of scum" (see attachment 15).
In January 1996, INS implemented a "Direct Mail" initiative in all the CUSA cities except' San Francisco. Under this system, N-400s are mailed directly to one of the four INS Service Centers (Vermont Service Center (VSC), Nebraska Service Center (NSC), Texas Service Center (TSC) and California Service Center (CSC)) instead of being submitted to District Offices. The Service Centers are suppose to enter the application data into NACS and pull the fingerprint cards and submit them daily to the FBI. When the fingerprint cards have been submitted, Service Center staff are to enter an "X" in the appropriate place in the NACS record, which should automatically start the clock for the 60-day waiting period. When 60 days have passed, the record should automatically come up on the District Office computer as being ready for an interview to be scheduled. If the FBI has made a hit, the fingerprints and criminal record are sent to the Service Center, which is supposed to report daily to the District Office on any hits so that interviews will not be scheduled until the hard copy of the criminal record has been forwarded to the District Office.
The implementation of the Direct Mail initiative resulted in almost immediate chaos. Neither Service Center staff nor District Offices fully understood the new procedures. The Service Centers were not filling in the "X" so the 60-day clock was not being started. Because the system is automated, the computers in the District Offices will not bring up the records for interview scheduling until the 60- day clock is initiated and terminates. Thus, the problem was noticed when District Office computers showed no applicants who were ready to be interviewed, even though an estimated 84,000 were in the system. INS' answer to the problem was to run a system-wide sweep to bypass the 60-day waiting period on all N-400 applications entered into the system by the Service Centers on or after February 2, 1996. The sweep was "deemed to be within acceptable process integrity standards" and was "designated a priority by Programs and Field Operations as the four subject sites are nearing a crisis situation regarding eligible cases to be scheduled for interview" (see attachment 16).
Thus, by February 1996, the INS was in a state of utter chaos because of a program that began officially only about four months before. INS offices around the country were being overwhelmed by the increase in N-400 applications-the largest group of aliens amnestied in 1986 had met the five-year residence requirement by December 1995. CUSA offices, in addition to being inundated with backlogged and new cases, were attempting to adopt the new "reengineered" and streamlined adjudication process, thus compounding the confusion. Non-CUSA offices had been forced to detail some portion of their resources, mainly personnel, to the CUSA offices, so they, too, were falling behind. As noted in the attached chronology, the number of N-400 applications pending on October 1, 1995 surpassed 800,000, and new applications were being received in record numbers.
Pressure from the White House
Until early 1996, the push to "re-engineer" the naturalization process and speed up the adjudication of cases appeared to be coming from within INS management. Beginning in March 1996, however, there is no question that the overriding impetus began coming directly from the White House. In fact, the documents show that INS Headquarters actually tried to slow the naturalization juggenaut--at least partly for political appearances-but was over-ruled by higher powers.
The first indication of White House interest in the naturalization initiative was in September 1994, when Daniel Solis, then President and Executive Director of the United Neighborhood Organization of Chicago (LJNO), met President Clinton at a Democratic fundraiser in Chicago. Mr. Solis explained to the President that the growing number of immigrants eligible for naturalization represented a "great opportunity" to get a million new voters, but "we have to get all these citizens naturalized." The President told Mr. Solis to contact senior White House political aides Harold Ickes and Rahm Emanuel. On October 27, 1994, Mr. Solis sent President Clinton a letter detailing what needed to be done to speed up naturalization. The letter was a follow-up to a dinner meeting between the President, Mr. Solis and others (see attachment 17).
In July 1995, Lee Ann Inadomi, Office of Cabinet Affairs, responded to a request by INS Executive Associate Commissioner Robert Bach for information on the possibility of President Clinton writing personalized letters to newly naturalized citizens. Ms. Inadomi pointed out that there were practical (e.g., investment of resources, 30 percent of N-400 applicants are not on NACS), legal (e.g., it could violate the Privacy Act) and political (i.e., it could be seen as campaign politics) problems. Less than a week later, the White House requested information from INS on how such personalized letters might be provided (see attachment 18).
Apparently that idea was abandoned because, as of August 1995, INS District Directors were being reminded to provide the standard presidential congratulatory letter. The memo to the field notes that the White House "has established provision of the letter as a priority." Emails from late September 1995 indicate that INS offices were running short on the letters and there was some degree of panic among INS staff who noted that "the White House is rather insistent" that the letter be provided (see attachment 19).
On September 28, 1995, Mr. Solis sent a letter to First Lady Hillary Clinton to follow up on a recent conversation on the political potential for naturalization streamlining. He noted that INS officials approached UNO with the opportunity to participate in a backlog reduction pilot program that also "may provide the Democrats with a strategic advantage at next year's Convention." His purpose was to establish "support for the proposed pilot program in order to overcome the politics of its implementation" (see attachment 20).
Also in September 1995, a memo was prepared for White House aide Harold Ickes to update him on the naturalization initiative and assure him that CUSA will include voter registration efforts. The memo concludes that while "the INS effort at voter registration," along with the efforts of others, is resulting in registration of new citizens, "the pace of naturalization will limit the number of new voters." A follow up memo was sent to Mr. Ickes in March 1996 with a more positive outlook on the CUSA voter registration drive (see attachment 21).
In January 1996, Congress approved a second INS reprogramming request for the naturalization program, bringing the total reprogramming funds to about $80 million. The following month, Mr. Rosenberg notified the White House that "INS is hiring more than 850 additional staff to process applications," although in fact, his intention was to hire more than 900 temporary workers (attachment 22). He requested assistance from the Vice President's Office in acquiring personnel, ceremony space and funding for CUSA (see attachment 23).
Doug Farbrother from Vice President Gore's NPR office responded zealously to Mr. Rosenberg's request. Mr. Farbrother immediately began looking into extending INS office hours so that they could conduct naturalization interviews on evenings and weekends. He noted INS' concern that the General Services Administration (GSA) might object to providing guards and utilities for extended hours, but indicated his intention to go forward. Ten days later, INS CUSA Offices were notified that they would be extending their hours on evenings and weekends (see attachment 24)
Mr. Farbrother also decided that the INS hiring process was too slow. He saw no need for INS to wait for complete background checks on new hires before bringing them on board. He felt that INS could fingerprint new hires and put them to work while the background checks were being done. The Department of Justice had denied an earlier request from the INS Headquarters Security office to do "lesser scope" background investigations for CUSA t workers, but ten days after Mr. Farbrother considered the issue, INS Deputy Commissioner Chris Sale instructed CUSA offices to "do limited clearances ... (fingerprint check, and drug testing, only). The remaining process will be done while on-duty." The result was that some of the CUSA workers who were hired, and already on-duty, were found to have security problems, but could not be terminated until the full 120-day background investigation had been completed. Moreover, INS Security ran out of funding to do background checks on employees who had already been hired and were working (see attachment 25).
In early March 1995, INS Headquarters staff forwarded via email a message from Commissioner Meissner regarding a promise she had made to White House aide Rahm Emanuel to-provide an update and subsequent newsletters on CUSA progress to Attorney General Reno, Chief of Staff Panetta, Vice President Gore, HUD Secretary Cisneros and other key White House aides (see attachment 26).
Following a meeting with Commissioner Meissner in mid-March, Mr. Farbrother taxed a memo to Deputy Commissioner Sale explaining that he needed either Ms. Sale or Commissioner Meissner to delegate more authority to the District Directors in the CUSA cities in order to "get the results the Vice President wants." Mr. Farbrother included a draft memo (later edited), for Commissioner Meissnerts signature, delegating to the District Directors her "authority to waive INS rules and regulations of INS Counsel clearly questioned the legality of such a delegation of authority (see attachment 27).
In the meantime, Mr. Farbrother was accompanying Mr. Rosenberg on a tour of all the CUSA cities to examine the effectiveness of the initiative and determine what additional resources they might need. The purpose of the trip "was to answer the question: Is CUSA moving fast enough, given the delays caused by budget and furloughs?" Mr. Farbrother and Ms. Elaine Kamarck, Office of the Vice President, were becoming increasingly annoyed with delays in INS Headquarters. They wanted Deputy Commissioner Sale to sign the delegation of authority letter so they could speed up the hiring process in the CUSA cities. On March 21, 1995, Ms. Kamarck notified Mr. Farbrother via email that "the President is sick of this and wants action. if nothing moves today we'll have to take some pretty drastic measures." Mr. Farbrother responded that he was meeting with Deputy Attorney General Jarnie Gorelick and Deputy Commissioner Sale in two days. He stated that if they didn't cooperate with him, he would "call for heavy artillery."
Mr. Farbrother briefed Vice President Gore via email following that meeting and reported that Deputy Attorney General Gorelick had told Ms. Kamarck that INS would "deliver by Tuesday." In fact, she delivered on Monday. Deputy Commissioner Sale signed a memo to CUSA District Directors announcing a 20 percent funding increase, delegation of full authority over funding and hiring, and expedited drug testing procedures and a "special security process" for new hires. Following this decision, INS Headquarters increased the CUSA "production goals" by almost 40 percent. Again, Mr. Farbrother briefed Vice President Gore via email on the delegation of hiring and funding authority. He noted, however, that the CUSA Directors still do not "have enough freedom to do the job" (see attachment 28).
The following day, Mr. Farbrother emailed Vice President Gore about a bet he had made with Ms. Kamarck that "INS headquarters would not give their managers in" the CUSA cities "enough authority, in general, to make me confident they could produce a million new citizens before election day" emphasis added . He concluded that "unless we blast INS headquarters loose from their grip on the frontline managers, we are going to have way too many people still waiting for citizenship in November. I can't make Doris Meissner delegate broad authority to her field managers.. Can you?" (see attachment 29).
A couple of days later, Mr. Farbrother emailed Ms. Kamarck with his ideas on 1) blunting "any charge that we are running a citizenship/Clinton voter mill," and 2) how to avoid the appearance that he is "working against Doris Meissner " (he suggests that he take over Deputy Commissioner Sale's job and that Ms. Sale could work at NPR - see attachment 30).
During the same period, Mr. Farbrother began asking other Federal agencies to find personnel-particularly those who had been RIFed or farloughed-and resources that could be diverted to CUSA. On April 1, he reported to Ms. Kamarck that he had made some progress in getting help from other agencies in Los Angeles and San Francisco, but he complained that "they are still getting way too much interference from headquarters. Am I going to have to keep dragging that ball and chain toward the finish line?" (see attachment 31).
In early April, Mr. Farbrother drafted a memo for President Clinton on "Improving Service for Citizenship Applicants." The first draft again suggested that an NPR employee replace Deputy Commissioner Sale so that "our reinventor would have more direct influence and the INS staff would be less likely to go public with complaints than they would over the interference of an outsider." The second draft, sent via email to Ms. Kamarck on.April 10, included a section called "Lower the standards for citizenship," which discussed, among other things, the reeducation of the older adjudicators "to be more liberal." These two drafts were produced by Vice President Gore's office, indicating that they may not have made their way to the President. The third draft, however, was produced by the @ White House. Handwritten on the top of the first page is: "Monday am brief of Cisneros/VP/Pres." (see attachment 32).
Ms. Kamarck prepared a memo to the Vice President on April 4 to brief him on INS progress prior to a lunch with the President. The memo begins, "As you know, following on the assignment from the President to look into the citizenship backlog, I sent Doug Farbrother on the road to each of the offices where the backlog was most severe." There appears to be no question, in light of this memo, that it was the President who provided the impetus for Mr. Farbrother's frenetic involvement in the naturalization program beginning in early 1996, even though he reports to the Vice President (see attachment 33).
On April 24, 1996 letter from the Southern California I.A.F. (Industrial Areas Foundation) Network shows that Ms. Kiimarck was also instrumental in "re-engineering" the naturalization process, at least in Los Angeles. The letter states that "nationally some 800,000 immigrants will become citizens in time for the election" (see attachment 34). "Re-Engineering" or "Nats-R-Us"?
On May 1, 1996, INS Associate Commissioner for Examinations Louis Crocetti announced in a memo to all field offices that the "new ideas and innovative procedures" that were tested at CUSA sites with "remarkable results," were to be expanded Servicewide to all offices. The memo stated that "most of the action items can be implemented immediately. Others that have long-term effects may take longer to implement." Attached to the memo was an explanation of "Naturalization Process Streamlining Initiatives." According to the implementation dates on the Summary Chart, all the new initiatives should be in effect now (Oct. 1996 - see attachment 35).
There is much of interest in this report, particularly in light of the fact that the American people, to say nothing of our elected representatives, were totally unaware that the naturalization process and requirements were being radically revised. Of special interest to this discussion, however, is the fact that page two of the "Application" section says that "the revised Form N-400 will ... include data collection for voter registration."
As the nationwide expansion of these "Streamlining Initiatives" is predicated on the "remarkable results" of the pilots in the CUSA cities, a brief look at those results is warranted.
Personnel-Temporary workers comprised most of the additional personnel for CUSA. Some 900 temporary adjudicators and clerical workers were hired by INS to accomplish the goal of naturalizing over a million people in FY 1996. As of June 1996, the Inspector General was investigating the training standards for these temporary workers, along with those workers who were detailed from other agencies or offices.
Volunteer workers were also utilized by many district offices. These volunteers included members of CBOS, family members of INS employees, and, in at least one case, legal permanent residents. These volunteers performed clerical duties, including filing, mailed naturalization certificates, and collected Alien Registration Cards and distributed naturalization certificates at citizenship ceremonies, among other things. Attorney General Reno directed her staff to find out "what INS is doing to use volunteers" in the naturalization program. President Clinton and/or Vice President Gore asked HUD Secretary Cisneros "whether qualified volunteers could be generated to assist the INS in naturalization activities." Secretary Cisneros answered affirmatively by providing a proposal from the Southern California Industrial Areas Foundation Network's Active Citizenship Campaign. Apparently none of these people was aware that it is a violation of Federal law for a government agency to use volunteers to perform duties that are normally performed by agency personnel, as it constitutes an unauthorized augmentation of the agency appropriation. This was pointed out in a memo from INS Headquarters Counsel to Regional Directors (see attachment 36). However, as of this weekend, INS employees with whom I spoke say that volunteers continue to be used.
FBI Fingerprint Checks--A February 1994 report from the Inspector General found that 5.4 percent of aliens submitting applications for benefits had an arrest record. The top reasons for arrest were immigration violations/deportation proceedings (32%), assault/battery/rape (19%), theft/robbery/burglary (18%) and drug possession/distribution (10%). Rather than investing some of the CUSA funding in electronic fingerprint scanners, which can provide a hit almost instantly, the "streamlined" naturalization process requires fingerprint cards to be mailed to the FBI on a daily basis. On March 29, 1996, however, the FBI did a sampling of receipts from 20 INS offices. Over 60 percent of the fingerprint cards received from Los Angeles had been at the Los Angeles office for more than 30 days before they were submitted. For the New York City office, 90 percent had been at the office for more than 30 days. As an INS employee wrote in an email on the subject: "It would seem the problem is not the FBI, and they know it."
In June 1996, the Vermont Service Center (VSC) sent a shipment of fingerprint cards that should have gone to the FBI to the New York City office, instead. Although District Offices are supposed to be notified daily of FBI hits, several boxes of positive hits sat around at the VSC for some time before being mailed to New York City.
As of June 20, 1996, NACS had ongoing problems relating to the fingerprint checks and another sweep of the system to start the 60-day clock was.being ordered. Despite the variety of problems with fingerprint checks, a Headquarters meeting report noted that Adjudicators were only waiting 45 days (instead of 60) for FBI hits (see attachment 37).
Email from July 17, 1996 notes that some fingerprint cards are being routed for filing before even being sent to the FBI, while "positive hit" lists from the Nebraska Service Center are arriving at District Offices after the interviews have been scheduled. "Operation Jiffy Lube"--A number of INS employees testified, under oath, before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee on September 24, 1996. They testified that' Adjudications Officers feel pressured by their supervisors to "approve, approve, approve;" that good moral character standards are being ignored; that representatives of CBOs complain to supervisors about adjudicators who continue or deny applications, and that sometimes those adjudicators are removed from their duties; that adjudicators who go on outreach interviews have to provide.copies of their tally sheets (showing approvals, denials and continueds) to the CBO representatives; that adjudicators have been told by their supervisors that they are not IRS agents and so shouldn't concern themselves with possible tax fraud, even though that would violate good moral character. 'These employees pointed out that, while the simple fact that an applicant has a criminal record does not automatically make him or her ineligible for naturalization, the fact that he or she lied on the application does. Lying on the application is inconsistent with good moral character and so should make an applicant ineligible for citizenship for five years.
Each of these INS employees came forward knowing that he or she was risking his or her job or other forms of retaliation against whistle-blowers. A popular slogan among INS employees is "no good deed goes unpunished." When asked why they came forward, their answers included: "Because I know there is right and wrong;" "We are sworn to uphold the law;" and "Out of a sense of responsibility." These people, and the thousands of other INS employees like them, are the true heroes of INS. They should be rewarded for their honesty and their integrity, but instead, they are afraid for their jobs.
Following the House hearing, a letter was sent to the Washington Times by the Dallas District Director, who referred to one of these employees as a "disgruntled employee" with a "personal agenda." He was referring to Neil Jacobs, the Assistant District Director for Investigations in Dallas, who testified that, of approximately 25,000 applications for citizenship that were processed recently in Dallas, not a single referral was made to the Investigations unit to investigate a fingerprint hit, good moral character, application fraud or testing fraud.
What the District Director failed to mention about Mr. Jacobs in his letter is,that this "disgruntled employee" was, ironically, awarded the 1995 Harruner Award for Reinventing Government by Vice President Gore for creating the much-touted "Operation Jobs" initiative. (For the record, Mr. Jacobs also has been presented with the 1995 Ford Foundation Award for Innovations in American Government, an INS award for Bravery Above and Beyond the Call of Duty in 1983, INS Outstanding Performance Ratings every year from 1981 through 1992 and 1994 and 1995, and INS Special Achievement Awards in 1975, 1976, 1978, 1985 and 1994.)
The naturalization process, as it now stands, is far different from the one envisioned in our law. While the initial goals of Commissioner Meissner's INS may have been laudable, it is clear now that expediency won out over integrity. Had the new system's designers been committed to efficiency and integrity, different choices would have been made. Instead of approaching naturalization streamlining in a thoughtful and responsible way, changes were made haphazardly with only an eye toward increasing the numbers of successful applications. For example, the 60-day waiting period for the fingerprint checks could have been eliminated entirely, and the process made less labor intensive, had some of the CUSA funding been used to install electronic fingerprint devices in INS offices. Instead, the pre-existing problems were compounded and the result was the granting of our nation's most prized benefit, citizenship, to criminals. The naturalization system has been compromised, not only in the eyes of INS employees who now refer to it either as the "Jiffy Lube Program" or "Nats-R-Us," but also in the eyes of Americans-native bom and naturalized. The forces behind these changes have done an egregious disservice to their country.
Not for commercial use. Solely to be used for the educational purposes of research and open discussion.
The Washington Times
October 29, 1996, Tuesday
After delay, FBI turns over documents; New citizens' past crimes listed
Ruth Larson; THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Justice Department yesterday agreed to allow the FBI to give Congress 52 boxes of criminal records on newly naturalized citizens after intense, daylong efforts to prevent their release.
Justice Department spokeswoman Carole Florman said the delay was caused by "concern about the use of the files" and fears that people could be identified, even though names and Social Security numbers were deleted from the documents.
Rep. Bill Zeliff, New Hampshire Republican, refused to accept new conditions and insisted on delivery as promised.
FBI Director Louis J. Freeh said Friday that Attorney General Janet Reno had authorized him to turn over the records, which were subpoenaed last week by a House Government Reform and Oversight subcommittee probing abuses of the citizenship process.
But shortly before the truck was scheduled to deliver the boxes to Capitol Hill yesterday afternoon, Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick balked at the deal.
The boxes were delivered to the Rayburn House Office Building in the evening.
They are thought to contain 38,246 criminal records found by the FBI last week in its initial review of an Immigration and Naturalization Service computer tape of recent citizenship applicants.
"He feels it's absolutely wrong to prevent the public from learning what it absolutely has a right to know," said a member of Mr. Zeliff's staff.
A congressional investigator said of Mrs. Gorelick's tactics, "This is just outrageous, for her to be weighing in at the last minute."
He added: "They're scared to death that the rap sheets are going to get out. In every major city - in Chicago, say - they're afraid they're going to have to put out fires on all the murderers they let in."
Rosemary Jenks, director of policy analysis for the Center for Immigration Studies, said: "It's ridiculous. The INS is still trying to stonewall this investigation, when the evidence is clear that criminals were naturalized."
For months, INS employees have expressed concerns about criminal immigrants. In May, an INS employee wrote: "I suggest we keep the current [file] six months, or we'll be naturalizing ax murderers . . . and Nazi war criminals."
Miss Jenks said, "It's interesting that the No. 2 official in the Justice Department was also implicated in the political pressure that came from the White House."
Mrs. Gorelick's name turns up several times in internal White House memos. For example, Doug Farbrother, a staffer in Vice President Al Gore's office, wrote in March about Mrs. Gorelick and INS Deputy Commissioner Chris Sales: "I favor drastic measures. I am meeting with Jamie G and Chris S Friday at 1:30. If I don't get what we need, I will call for heavy artillery."
A subsequent memo outlined the results of that meeting and noted, "Jamie said she would deliver by Tuesday."
The number of convicted criminals granted citizenship has become a hot issue in recent days. Republican Govs. Pete Wilson of California, George W. Bush of Texas, Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey, Jim Edgar of Illinois and David Beasley of South Carolina have demanded that Miss Reno disclose the number of criminals naturalized.
The FBI has not reviewed a second INS computer tape but estimated that as many as 100,000 of the more than 1 million new citizens have criminal records.
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner defended her agency's screening procedures. "INS deports criminal aliens; we do not naturalize them," she said. "INS is removing criminal aliens from the country at record levels," more than 100,000 the past three years.
Mr. Zeliff also has subpoenaed INS documents on possible criminal aliens. Mrs. Meissner has not said when those records will be turned over, only that the INS has "initiated the necessary process to produce the full range of information requested" in Mr. Zeliff's Sept. 17 and Oct. 16 letters.
Mrs. Meissner said the INS has just completed work on a rule change, begun in 1994, enabling the agency to dramatically speed up the process for revoking citizenship "in the small number of cases in which it has been inappropriately granted."
"Swift action in this limited number of cases should not sully, as the recent misinterpretation of our Citizenship USA program does, the reputations of more than one million new American citizens," she wrote.
Drama to Hearings By Jeff Gannon
Talon News
April 13, 2004
WASHINGTON (Talon News) -- The American Spectator reported Monday that Republican staffers on the 9/11 Commission are "looking for a way to place commission member Jamie Gorelick before the body she sits on to explain the Clinton Justice Department's seeming lack of interest in counterterrorism activities." Gorelick, a former deputy attorney general under Janet Reno was a significant participant in making policies that directly affected counterterrorism efforts during the 1990s.
In May 1995, the Washington Post reported, "Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick yesterday said the Clinton administration planned to drop its proposal to give the president absolute power to designate groups as terrorist organizations."
At issue was the Clinton administration's proposed counterterrorism legislation that would prohibit Americans from raising funds to support groups classified by the president as terrorist organizations. The original bill would not have allowed court challenges to the president's designations.
In her testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime Gorelick said, "We will recommend deletion of the assertions in that bill that the president's designations are unreviewable or conclusive."
Gorelick told reporters at the time that criticism from civil liberties groups convinced administration officials that the ban on court challenges was not necessary.
Former FBI Director Louis Freeh appears before the commission Tuesday, and will likely face questions from Gorelick.
Freeh may have some questions of his own for her. He wrote an op-ed piece published in Monday's Wall Street Journal where he points out that in September 1994, he "recommended to Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick that the DoJ strengthen investigative powers against suspected 'undesirable aliens,' accelerating deportation appeal proceedings and limiting U.S. participation in a visa waiver pilot program under which 9.5 million foreigners entered the U.S. in 1994. I also recommended that we include provisions for the detention and removal of undesirable aliens, under a special, closed-court procedure."
Freeh also said that he criticized alien deportation appeal procedures that often took years to conclude and recommended legislation to provide the FBI with roving wiretap authority to investigate terrorist activities in the U.S. one of his recommendations to Gorelick were acted upon.
Instead the deputy attorney general was assigned to Clinton's Citizenship USA program. Former Justice Department investigator David Schippers wrote in his 1999 book, "Sell Out" that it was Gorelick's task to expedite new rules under which criminal background checks were suspended for new immigrants.
The apparent conflict of interest will take on a deeper sense of irony when former Attorney General Janet Reno appears before the panel the same day as Freeh. Few would suggest that she would press her former boss to explain the failures of the department of which she herself played a key role.
In 1994, Reno's Justice Department adopted new rules that prohibited the FBI or the CIA from contacting prosecutors in the Internal Security Section of the DoJ. FBI agent Colleen Rowley called these rules a "bureaucratic roadblock" that hampered the investigation of Zaccarias Moussaoui prior to September 11, 2001.
According to The American Spectator, Republican staffers who say that several commissioners are outraged at the continued leaks by its Democratic members will scrutinize Gorelick's performance. They believe the leaks are being coordinated to embarrass upcoming members of the Bush administration set to testify before the commission.
The staffers point out that their Democratic counterparts leaked a memo last week that showed the Bush Justice Department did not have terrorism on its list of seven top priorities, which included corporate fraud prosecutions and civil rights protections. But what was not disclosed is that outgoing Attorney General Janet Reno set those priorities. The list reflected priorities that were put in place by Gorelick in her time at the Department.
The American Spectator quotes a Republican staffer saying, "[Gorelick] knows better than anyone about what was going on at Justice in the later days of the Clinton Administration. She had close ties there."
The staffer added, "In closed-door meetings, she has defended the Clinton people. How can they claim that Ashcroft and his people could do much of anything six weeks into moving into the building?"
"Gorelick should be testifying during these hearings; she should not be up there creating the appearance she played no role in what happened on 9/11, because she definitely did," says the staffer. "The Clinton folks had eight years to do something about Bin Laden. They did nothing. The Bush people had eight months. You'd think judging by the hearings that it was the other way around."<.B>
Copyright © 2004 Talon News -- All rights reserved.
Freeh also said that he criticized alien deportation appeal procedures that often took years to conclude and recommended legislation to provide the FBI with roving wiretap authority to investigate terrorist activities in the U.S. None of his recommendations to Gorelick were acted upon.
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