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the Justice Department, with Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick in the thick of important policy decisions, did not see it that way. Committed to the bitter end to the law-enforcement mindset, and overwrought at the mere possibility of violating the ill-conceived "primary purpose" test, DOJ made matters significantly worse. It imposed severe procedural barriers against competent intelligence gathering. As described by the FISA Court of Review in 2002:

[T]he 1995 Procedures limited contacts between the FBI and [DOJ's] Criminal Division in cases where FISA surveillance or searches were being conducted by the FBI for foreign intelligence (FI) or foreign counterintelligence (FCI) purposes. . . . The procedures state that "the FBI and Criminal Division should ensure that advice intended to preserve the option of a criminal prosecution does not inadvertently result in either the fact or the appearance of the Criminal Division's directing or controlling the FI or FCI investigation toward law enforcement objectives." 1995 Procedures at 2, 6 (emphasis added). Although these procedures provided for significant information sharing and coordination between criminal and FI or FCI investigations, based at least in part on the "directing or controlling" language, they eventually came to be narrowly interpreted within the Department of Justice, and most particularly by [the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy Review (OIPR)], as requiring OIPR to act as a "wall" to prevent the FBI intelligence officials from communicating with the Criminal Division regarding ongoing FI or FCI investigations. . . . Thus, the focus became the nature of the underlying investigation, rather than the general purpose of the surveillance. Once prosecution of the target was being considered, the procedures, as interpreted by OIPR in light of the case law, prevented the Criminal Division from providing any meaningful advice to the FBI. (Italics mine except where otherwise indicated.)

As Deputy Attorney General, Gorelick introduced new managerial structures to guide the Department in the midst of a 30 percent increase in the Department's personnel and a 70 percent budget increase during her tenure.

One of Ms. Gorelick's principal priorities was to help prepare the Justice Department to be able to respond effectively to the new challenges of transnational crime and terrorism. To do this, she forged new relationships and administrative protocols with the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, and with the intelligence community.

The Deputy Attorney General also worked with the Department's law enforcement components to better respond to crisis situations in the aftermath of the incidents at Ruby Ridge and Waco. After the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995, she coordinated the government's overall response to the bombing and supervised the investigative and prosecutorial response to the crisis.

"In all of her work with law enforcement," Reno added, "Jamie displayed a sensitivity to the civil liberties of our citizens that gave comfort to all of us who care deeply about the Constitution."

Before joining the Department of Justice, Gorelick served from May 1993 to April 1994 as General Counsel of the Department of Defense. As General Counsel, she supervised the government's second-largest "law firm," consisting of 10,000 lawyers.