A security tape shows Shawn Tea Farrens discussing accepting the invitation from them to "fool around with tonight."
Shawn was found dead in her apartment at age 23, ruled a suicide, shortly after the existence of the tape became known.
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, The Secret Life of Bill Clinton: The Untold Stories, Regnery, 1997, pp. 87-88.
The FBI refused Angela Finley's urgent request that Elohim City be raided after confidential informant Carol Howe's report.
Strassmeir returned to Germany without being questioned about his continued association with McVeigh despite repeated denials.
Evans-Pritchard notes Clinton got an eleven-point boost from OKCBomb.
Hate radio and Rush Limbaugh--not Iraqis and islamoterrorists allied with the Aryan Nation with some German intel and FBI bungling tossed into the Veg-O-Matic.
Eyewitnesses did not see either a John Doe Number Two in Oklahoma City nor a missile the following year in New York.
We return you now to Seinfeld, an existence about nothing.
Lehman seems the only commissioner who is doing his job. He posed good questions to Dr Rice, and now he brought up the OKC bombing. Let’s see if he can get it into the final report as well. I wouldn’t bank on it, but if he does that might provide an opening for a new look at the case.
Then someone already mentioned earlier on that a lot of the people who worked on the case are still there (in FBI), and they won’t be very helpful - which may be one of the reasons why the present administration hasn’t been able to do much about it.
Just to show how defensive these large government agencies can be here are some quotes from Ronald Kessler’s 1992 book: Inside the CIA:
”It began on March 1, 1981, when the New York Times Magazine ran an excerpt of Claire Sterling’s book The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism, which suggested that the Soviets were providing the weapons, training, and sanctuary for terrorists as part of the Soviet effort to undermine Western democracy. The CIA never said anything like this. Casey wanted the agency’s analysts to follow up and discover if Sterling’s facts were right. The CIA director had long suspected that the Soviets were in control of world terrorism, using thugs from all over the world as a front for their own devious purposes.
What came out in the form of a draft estimate was ambiguous and not at all what Casey had wanted. According to those involved in preparing the estimate, the evidence available to the CIA at the time did not support Casey’s or Sterling’s views.
”It was a question of semantics,” says David H. Whipple, later national intelligence officer for terrorism. ”He [Casey] would say, ”They [the Soviets] support them, and therefore they are responsible.” We would both go before a congressional committee. Casey would say, ”They are responsible”, and go back to work at noon and leave me to face the committee in the afternoon. I would try to erase what he said, because I was trying to differentiate between Soviet support for national liberation struggles and actual direction of terrorist activities.
”There was pressure internally to say more than we could professionally justify, and most of us resisted that”, Whipple said. ”Casey was on the right. An NIO can’t be as forward leaning as he was... Everything you say has to be supported by intelligence. You can’t sit there and interpret facts. Casey had a way of going beyond that sometimes”. Whipple said that despite more recent revelations of East-bloc support of terrorists, ”I don’t think they’ll ever prove the Soviets instigated actions of terrorism, but they certainly supported people and groups who did engage in terrorism.”
”The analysts were afraid they would be accused of engaging in some political act”, said Adm. Bobby R. Inman, who was deputy director of Central Intelligence at the time. The first draft bent over backward to avoid that. In any intelligence report, you identify assumptions, It said there is no conclusive evidence that this or that. I read it and put a note on it saying, ”This sounds like the prosecutor’s argument on why he decided not to prosecute the case.”
Casey was more blunt. He wrote on the draft, ”This is a bunch of shit.” According to Inman, Casey was concerned more with the lack of logic and flow than with the conclusion.”
Ok, this speaks for itself; Casey and Sterling were right, as has been shown by all the intelligence gathered after the fall of the Berlin wall and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but there are two points I would like to make:
The culture of an organization can be just as difficult to combat as a real cover-up. Casey was a very strong-willed man, and even he had difficulties getting correct information. A much less hands-on boss (eg Freeh) would never get to see reports that didn’t fit the policy of the agency.
Secondly, history does repeat itself. Sterling’s book was savaged by left-wingers and sadly denigrated by CIA analysts. And despite the policies of the President and Casey, the USA was never on a war footing even though a war was waged against the West.
It should be a task for the 911 Commission to discuss how much this lack of understanding regarding the terrorism in the 70s and 80s allowed the subject to be forgotten during the 90s (and treated as criminal not political acts) and thus helped to enable never previously seen attacks on the US mainland.
Eleven-Point Boost ping.