He argues that "The elimination of the Army's divisions would provide Rumsfeld with cover for his longtime plan to slash tens of thousands of troops from the service's payrolls" and " it will make it easier for future presidents to bog down the U.S. Army in future no-win wars - like the one now being waged in Iraq".
Difficult to do both, cut active forces and rely less on the RC. It also makes little sense to maintain the current heavy force deployment that takes 6 months to put in place and restructure for Homeland Defense. Simply, Abrams' plan was to keep the combat arms (specifically heavy) in the active portion while moving the support they need for large-scale long-term deployments into the Guard/Reserves.
What we're finding is wars are "won" much quicker and devolve into a truce/nation building in months. Abrams' plan becomes obsolete if the combat is over so quickly, but at the same time the forces needed to fight in Afghanistan/Iraq are not being maintained in the standing Army.
Also, under Eric "window-dressing" Shinseki, the Army was moving in the wrong direction for joint/coalition global operations under unified commands. AUSA has often been guilty of leading the conventional ground war line of thinking.
