[DoctorZIn]

Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

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[DoctorZIn]

Join Us At Today's Iranian Alert Thread – The Most Underreported Story Of The Year!

"If you want on or off this Iran ping list, Freepmail DoctorZin”

[DoctorZIn]

Stand Up to the Mullahs

March 08, 2004
Telegraph UK
Opinion

The latest instalment of the long-running transatlantic tussle over Western policy towards Iran will be played out today in Vienna at the quarterly meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Americans, as ever, want a tougher resolution off the back of the director-general's latest report, focusing upon the failures of the Islamic republic to come fully clean about its nuclear programme; the European governments, led by France and Germany, but with Britain not far behind, are more willing to accept that measurable, albeit imperfect, progress has been made. Everyone says they want a "tough resolution". The differences lie over what exactly "tough" means. The result is a dangerous lack of clarity that the mullahs are bound to exploit.

The Government's treatment of Iran resembles the way it handled the IRA during the "peace process": no matter what atrocities are committed, it always gives the Islamists "one last chance". And, as with the leadership of the republican movement, there has been an enormous investment in the Iranian moderates at the expense of almost every other consideration. Even though the policy of "constructive engagement" has been a failure - as exemplified by the increased marginalisation, after last month's election, of the reformists clustered around President Mohammad Khatami - the Foreign Office has been woefully slow in constructing alternative approaches based upon support for genuine democracy. Indeed, George W Bush implicitly recognised as much when he slapped down the political director of the Foreign Office, John Sawers, at a recent meeting at the White House. If the Government wants to signal a real shift in favour of Iranian democrats, a good start would be for the Prime Minister to welcome to 10 Downing Street Azar Nafisi, the author of the best-selling memoir Reading Lolita in Teheran.

The failure of policy is worse than just a rigid desire to hold on to the moderate nurse for fear of finding something worse. It is also based upon a fundamentally faulty analysis - that the current Iranian regime is a "big beast" in the regional jungle which will be around for some time to come and which must be handled with great care. This is manifested by the toleration in the British occupation zone in Iraq of the semi-overt presence of Iranian intelligence officers and such pro-Iranian terrorist groups as Hizbollah. British officials are so desperate to keep things sweet that they dramatically downplay Teheran's hand in the Iraqi insurgency - even though senior Jordanians (as well as Americans) are now very explicit about the violence wrought by the Iranians.

This "hear no evil" approach has served the West ill. After all, every time the Americans have sought to make overtures to revolutionary Iran - in 1979 after the fall of the Shah, in 1985-86 at the time of the Iran-Contra affair, and in 1996-97, when the Clinton Administration apologised for America's historic support of the Pahlavi dynasty - the Islamic Republic has read it as a sign of weakness. Why should we in Britain suppose that the clerics take us any more seriously than they do the "Great Satan"?

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fopinion%2F2004%2F03%2F08%2Fdl0802.xml

[DoctorZIn]

'The Conservatives are the Enemies of Social Freedoms'

March 09, 2004
Middle East Media Research Institute
MEMRI

Iranian Reformist Leader Reza Khatami: 'Reform is a Revolutionary Process;' 'The Conservatives Are the Enemies of Social Freedoms'

In an interview with the Egyptian government paper Al-Ahram Weekly, Dr. Mohammad Reza Khatami, the leader of Iran's largest political party, the Islamic Iran Participation Front, addressed the problems facing reformists in Iran.

Khatami, who is currently serving as first deputy speaker in the sixth Majlis (Iran's parliament), was banned, along with his party, from contesting the recent parliamentary elections. Khatami, 45, is the brother of Iranian President Muhammad Khatami and is married to a granddaughter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and was one of the student leaders who occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. The following is the interview, conducted by journalist Mustafa El-Labbad:(1)
'Although We Lost the Election, We’ll Be Back in Power Within Four Years'

Question: "I am sitting here with you in the offices of the Parliament, as your parliamentary term is still running. When do you think I'll be able to meet you here again?"

Khatami: "This question calls for a note of explanation. After Muhammad Khatami won the 1997 elections, it became possible to speak of effective political parties in Iran, of parties with political programs. Since that time, 20 parties appeared, including ours, the IIPF. All these parties participated in the elections but their political roles varied.

"Our party participated in the elections and in political action. We have 250 party offices all over Iran. Our supporters come from all sections of Iranian society. All these factors make it hard for the conservatives to eliminate our party.

"But in a country such as ours, where democratic tradition is still fragile, it is hard for parties to reach the public in the way that has become common in Western countries. However, we will pursue our political objectives against all obstacles, and will use novel methods and tactics. It is very crucial for us to be an effective party in the 2005 presidential elections. Although we have lost these [parliamentary] elections, I believe we can get back to power within four or, at the most, eight years."

Question: "The parliamentary elections have revealed divisions within the reformist camp between the radical wing that you represent and the moderate wing represented by your brother, President Khatami. What are your comments?"

Khatami: "To answer this, we have to consider the outcome of the elections. You will notice that the radical reformists have won the support and sympathy of the Iranian people, because of our position in these elections and because we were prevented from contesting them.

"The moderate reformists thought that there was a possibility for reconciling the conservatives and the reformers. This made them lose not just the elections but the street and the public.

"Look at the low turnout in major cities such as Tehran. This was a negative vote. The conservatives won 20 to 25 per cent of the vote. This means that 75 to 80 per cent do not like the conservatives and do not embrace their views. By going to the elections under the terms of the conservatives and by agreeing to the ban placed upon many reformist candidates, the moderates have lost a lot."

'The Iranians Want Neither the Conservatives nor the Moderate Reformists'


Khatami: "Despite losing the elections, we are in a better position. As we can see, in the light of election results, the Iranians want neither the conservatives nor the moderate reformists. Despite all that has happened, we are a popular political current."

Question: "Do you think that relations between the radicals and moderates in the reformist camp can be mended?"

Khatami: "The recent elections have exposed the divisions among various currents and even within the reformist current.

"I think that the answer to your question is yes - but only once the other wing has reconsidered its position, made a clear assessment about the reforms it really seeks in the political system, and admitted its defeat and the defeat of its ideas in the recent elections.

"But if this wing were to reiterate the same old ideas and tactics, I believe that the gap between us would be hard to bridge."

Question: "Supporters of your party belong mainly to the urban middle class. What have you achieved for them in the past four years of your government?"

Khatami: "Let's be realistic. No government could possibly resolve Iran's immense problems within four years. And yet we have changed the economic infrastructure in a clear manner, led the process of privatization, changed the structure of taxes, and increased government income. Exports have been increasing at high rates.

"The economy grew by eight percent annually. This is a great achievement for us. Also foreign investment increased in a steady manner. We have created 800,000 new jobs.

"However, the enormity of Iran's social problems eclipsed these achievements. Iran needs three million additional jobs. No government can resolve that in four years. We will find that the new conservative government will not be able to resolve the social and economic problems as well as foreign policy. They will lead Iran to real crises within a very short time."

Human Rights and Democracy are Integral Part of Our Foreign Policy; We Want Normal Relations With All Countries Except Israel

Question: "How do you envisage Iran's foreign policy, regionally and internationally?"

Khatami: "Our main idea is to normalize relations with all countries of the world except Israel. We want stability and security in the Middle East and do not wish to interfere in a negative way in the current peace process. We accept what the Palestinians accept.

"But we have faced many obstacles that the conservatives placed in our path. Despite the fact that we could not establish full diplomatic relations with Egypt, the relations between the two countries and their governments are very good. The way Egyptians view Iran has positively changed thanks to our policy, and this is very important.

"Should the conservatives continue to repress the Iranian people, Iranian foreign policy will not be successful, for no country wants to have relations with a government that oppresses its people.

"Therefore, human rights and democracy are integral parts of our foreign policy vision. The success we have achieved over the past four years is under threat from the conservatives. Furthermore, the conservatives are enemies of social freedoms."

Question: "Why?"

Khatami: "Because they believe that social freedoms are against Islam. They are against music, theatre, and cinema.

"It is inconceivable that they grant their citizens even a part of these freedoms. The conservatives are united in repressing society and their opponents. They are also unable to normalize Iran's relations with the world.

"If they were to allow social freedoms and improve their relations with other countries, we would welcome their steps. It does not matter who is to accomplish this - be it us, or them. We will support them if they do that."

'The Occupation of the Embassy Was in Response to the Reactionary Conspiracies Against the Revolution'

Question: "In 1979 a group of students, led by you, occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran and took its staff hostage. Now, a quarter of a century later, how do you view that event?"

Khatami: "These were hard times in the history of our revolution and must not be judged by the standards of 2004. We have to go back to that time to assess the occupation of the embassy in a sound manner.

"The Iranians supported the revolution - 98 percent of them did, according to the referendum on the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Iran suffered from disturbances in various regions, in Baluchistan, Turkmenistan, and Kurdistan. Foreign conspiracies against the revolution were at their peak. The country was in danger.

"Who was behind these troubles and disturbances? The Shah, of course, and the army was pro-Shah, as successive coup attempts proved. And who was the Shah's main supporter? It was the United States, which plotted to suppress the revolution.

"It was impossible for us to stand still. The occupation of the embassy was in response to the reactionary conspiracies against the revolution. The revolutionary students who occupied the embassy wanted to hold the hostages for four days only, not 444 days.

"After the first four days of the occupation of the embassy, it was the revolutionary government that prolonged the hostage situation and conducted a negotiating process that led to the release of these hostages."

Question: "Are you saying that the government prodded the students to take such action?"

Khatami: "No, this is not what I meant to say. What I am saying is that the timing of the release of the hostages and the evacuation of the embassy was up to the government.

"Generally speaking, the taking of the hostages and the occupation of the American embassy are things that can be justified in the context of 1979."

Question: "The student leaders who carried out this operation are the leaders of the reformist current in Iran now, including yourself, Vice President Masuma Ibtikor, Mohsen Mirdamadi, chairman of the National Security Committee in the previous parliament and Ebrahim Asghar Zadeh, leader of the Islamic Iran Solidarity Party. Is this a coincidence?"

Khatami: "The Iranian revolution was a popular revolution and no one can deny that. The vast majority of Iranians supported the occupation of the embassy.

"Also, the domestic situation in Iran changed completely after this action was carried out, and all military operations hostile to our revolution ended.

"We are now in a similar situation. The student leaders took the right decision at that time, just as they do now, through their support for political reform and its proponents in Iran. They are revolutionaries in the true sense of the word. There is no contradiction.

"Reform is a revolutionary process."

Egypt and Iran: Promoters of Democracy and Freedom

Question: "Finally, what message would you like to address to the peoples of our region?"

Khatami: "Democracy is the basic demand of our peoples. Freedom is the main leverage of democracy, and the relations among the countries of this region have to change.

"Egypt has led Arab and Islamic countries, and still does, in the process of modernization and development. It is capable of consolidating democracy in our region. The peoples of the region, as well as civil society groups, parties and governments, have to keep in touch in order to exchange expertise and learn from one another.

"This is in the interest of the region. We see the Egyptian people as a leading nation in the region. We do not deny their historic role and we look forward to cooperating with them for the benefit of a region that deserves better."

Endnote:

(1) Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt), March 4-10, 2004.

http://www.memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD67604

[garylmoore]

If this is true then why don't we hear more on the subject matter?

[DoctorZIn]

Iraqis Embrace Politics

March 09, 2004
New York Post
Amir Taheri

Although no date has been set for polling day, Iraqi politics has already shifted into election campaign gear. The most dramatic illustration of this so far came last Friday when five Shiite members of the Iraq Governing Council, the nation's interim authority, failed to show up at a ceremony organized to sign a constitutional draft.

The boycott was not announced until the last minute and thus achieved maximum impact. TV audiences throughout the country saw other members of the council milling around, consulting their watches, and in some cases biting their nails, while a group of 24 schoolgirls, dressed in folk costumes, waited anxiously to perform a special number written for what was to be an historic occasion but wasn't.

Some in the Western media saw the Baghdad boycott episode as "a major setback for U.S. plans in Iraq" and "a rupture between the Shiites and the United States." That was quickly proven wrong - the signing took place yesterday. What did these "analysts" miss?

The boycott's point was not to torpedo the draft constitution or to upset plans for the transfer of power to the Iraqis - nor even to make life more difficult for L. Paul Bremer, the American "pasha" who heads the interim Coalition authority.

The five who stayed away are the most experienced politicians among the 13 Shiites who make up a majority of the Governing Council. Iraq observers agree that almost all the "boycott five" will secure seats in the transitional government to be set up June 30 when the occupation period officially ends:

* Iraqi National Council (INC) leader Ahmed Chalabi has had close ties to the United States for decades.

* Abdel-Aziz Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), has done more than many to foster trust between the coalition and the Iraqi Shiites.

* Mohammed Bahr al-Oloum played a key role in the dialogue between the Shiite clergy and the coalition authorities.

* Ibrahim al-Jaafari, leader of the Al-Daawah (The Call) Party and Mouwafak al-Rubii, an independent politician, have emerged as moderate figures with genuine democratic aspirations.

Note, first, that only these five - of 13 Shiites on the Governing Council - decided to stay away. In other words, there was no collective Shiite action to postpone the signing of the draft, let alone derail the entire constitution scheme.

The boycott decision was taken late last Thursday after a grand meeting of Shiite religious, tribal, business and political leaders at the home of Grand Ayatollah Ali Muhammad Sistani, the primus inter pares of Iraqi clerics, in Najaf.

The meeting had been convened to work out strategy in the wake of the terrorist attacks against Shiites in Karbala and Baghdad last Tuesday.

Two Governing Council members briefed Sistani and other clerics about the constitutional draft and invited them to support the document. (Sistani and other ayatollahs have not been given a formal role in the constitutional process because most Iraqis agree that religion should not become directly involved in politics.)

They raised two objections. One concerned a mechanism by which the interim constitution could be suspended if two-thirds of voters in just three of Iraq's 18 provinces so decide. The measure was inserted as added assurance for the minorities, notably Kurds and Turcoman, who fear that the new Iraq, dominated by the Shiite majority, might threaten their legitimate aspiration to autonomy and cultural self-realization. Because some provinces are sparsely populated, such a mechanism could give a few hundred thousand voters a veto power.

The second Shiite objection concerned the composition of the presidential council that will supervise the period of transition: The Shiites will not receive the two-thirds share of the seats that they believe reflects their demographic position in the country as a whole.

In short, the objections concerned technical points that could be ironed out through negotiations.

What is significant is that the Shiite community has been almost unanimous in endorsing the constitutional draft. The Shiites have learned the lesson of 1918-1919, when they refused to cooperate with the British occupation authorities in setting up Iraq as an independent nation-state. As a result, the Shiites shut themselves out of politics for decades, ending up living in a country ruled by the Sunni Arab minority. (The British even imported a Sunni king for Iraq from neighboring Arabia.)

During the past few months, the politics of liberated Iraq has developed its own careful choreography.

This is how things proceed: The "pasha" puts his ideas in circulation. They are immediately attacked by everyone, most notably by the Shiites. Then all sides enter into negotiations that include a great deal of posturing. Eventually, a compromise emerges.

This is almost invariably rejected by Sistani, whose tactic has been to play the democratic card and to call for people power. Then follows another series of negotiations, which lead to new compromise. This is then endorsed by Sistani, often with a wink and a nod.

The tactic is to push the Coalition and the Governing Council to the edge, but not beyond.

The "boycott quintet" is using a similar ploy. They need to do three things at the same time:

* Keep the political process on course.

* Keep their popular base motivated and mobilized.

* Counter claims that they are mere puppets in an American game.

In other words, they are acting as any normal politician would do wherever decisions are not imposed by a despot or a dictatorial ruling clique. That is: The Iraqis are learning democracy on the job.

In the weeks and months ahead, Iraq is going to have a lot of politics with a great many cliff-hangers. Don't be surprised if Chalabi emerges as the leader of a movement to end "American occupation." It would also be no surprise if the next boycott is organized by the Kurds.

Iraqi politicians on all sides are beginning to learn how to use the full bag of tricks that comes with normal politics. The Shiites wish to highlight their numerical strength without scaring away other communities. The Kurds emphasize their 12-year experience in democratic self-rule and their privileged relations with Washington. Sunni Arabs seek to make the most of their administrative experience and the contribution they could make to the nation's new armed forces, diplomatic service and cultural life.

All in all, Iraqis seem to be developing a taste for politics, something they had been deprived of for almost half a century. And that, believe me, is a privilege that few other nations in the region enjoy today.

E-mail: amirtaheri@benadorassociates.com - www.benadorassociates.com

http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/20218.htm

[DoctorZIn]

Iran Demands Entry to Nuclear Club

March 09, 2004
Asia Times
Safa Haeri

Iran on Sunday surprised the international community, and above all the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by seeking to join the world's atomic club, calling on its members for a prompt entry.

"We want Iran to be recognized as a member of the nuclear club, that means Iran be recognized as a country having the nuclear fuel cycle, and enriching uranium. This is very difficult for the world to accept," Hassan Rohani, the secretary of the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), announced ahead of an important meeting this week of the IAEA. Five countries are officially inside that club - the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France.

The UN agency meets in Vienna to tackle Iran's and Libya's nuclear programs, which have been fed by a global black market linked to the father of Pakistan's atom bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. The governing board will consider two resolutions during the meeting, expected to last until Friday.

The first is Libya's long-secret atomic-weapons program, which Tripoli has agreed to dismantle under the supervision of the IAEA. The second issue is Iran, long accused by Washington, among others, of using its atomic-energy program as a front to build a bomb.

Tehran insists that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful and has called on the IAEA to leave it alone. "The case concerning Iran's peaceful nuclear activities should be completely closed at the IAEA board of governors and removed from its agenda," Rohani said on state television on Sunday.

He added that it was time for the IAEA, which launched an intensive investigation into Iran's nuclear program 13 months ago, to confirm the Islamic Republic's innocence.

The "request" for membership to the atomic club by Rohani, who handles the complicated, complex and controversial issue of Iranian nuclear activities and who conducts the difficult and tortuous talks with the IAEA, means that Iran has the capacity of making nuclear weapons, a potential that most US and European experts and intelligence services put at between three and five years to achieve.

Whatever the reasons that motivated Tehran's move, diplomats and experts say that Rohani's declaration not only will not appease international concerns about Iran's determination to set up a nuclear arsenal, but also convince the United States and the European Union to increase pressures on the Islamic Republic to stop all its atomic projects, or face drastic international sanctions.

In a report to be published at the end of this month, David Albright, a former UN weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a US-based non-profit research organization specializing in nuclear matters, will disclose that Iran has the capacity to produce enough enriched uranium to build some 30 nuclear warheads a year.

In Tehran on Sunday, Rohani told the inaugural session of the Assembly of Experts, a body made up of 82 senior clerics that has the power to elect or dismiss the leader of the regime: "We have two goals ahead of us that we must achieve. One is closing Iran's nuclear dossier with the IAEA and bringing the board of governors to take it out of their agenda, and the other is to have Iran recognized globally as a nuclear country."

As Rohani was briefing the Experts, a hardline newspaper warned the IAEA to be "more realistic in its dealings with Iran or the whole game would be jeopardized", and an unidentified Iranian diplomat in Vienna threatened that Iran would resume uranium enrichment and revise its agreement to cooperate with the international nuclear watchdog if the dispute is not resolved in line with last October's agreement.

The envoy was referring to an accord signed on October 21 in Tehran between Rohani with the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany under which Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and suspend enriching uranium in return for getting access to advanced nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, like the construction of nuclear-powered electrical plants.

"Iran will not wait forever to restore its legitimate national right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities and will not accept that the IAEA continue its double-standard policies toward Iran," the diplomat added, quoted by Mehr, a news agency close to the ruling conservatives.

At the same time, and in an obvious coordinated campaign aimed at intimidating the IAEA's board of governors, Mohsen Rezai, the secretary of the powerful Expediency Council that is chaired by former president Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said cooperation with the IAEA would become more difficult if the IAEA decided to limit Iran's peaceful and civilian nuclear activities.

Rohani, in his lengthy and detailed report to the Assembly of Experts, explained why he had to bow to the IAEA's demand to sign the Additional Protocol, revealing that in the event that Iran did not obey, "it would face the same fate as Iraq", meaning a possible military invasion of the country authorized by the UN Security Council.

"The pressures applied on Iran were so great that most of the world's leading industrial nations conditioned trading with us to the signing of the protocol, as seen in the Azadegan oilfields that the Japanese refused to develop," the SCNS influential secretary told a bewildered assembly. (See Japan, Iran sign major oil deal, US dismayed , February 20.)

However, Rohani expressed the hope that because of Iran's "clear-cut and full" cooperation with the IAEA, the board would not take the case to the Security Council for economic sanctions. "Even the Americans have indicated that they would not insist on the matter," he added.

Diplomats in Vienna said a draft resolution prepared by the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand does not mention the Security Council and balances criticism of Iran with praise for granting the IAEA access to sites and agreeing to suspend all activities linked to the enrichment of uranium.

The IAEA will also discuss technology and equipment for enriching uranium sold to Iran by Pakistan's Khan. According to a report by Malaysian police based on the apparent confession of a wealthy Sri Lankan who serves as a middleman, Khan sold Iran a number of centrifuges for US$3 million. But Tehran has constantly denied the accusations, saying that it obtained second-hand material on the black market, with no information about its origin.

IAEA inspectors who found traces of aluminum enriched with new equipment known as P-2 say Iran concealed this equipment from them, but the radical daily Keyhan on Sunday accused the agency of "gross lies and total dishonesty", reiterating that Iran had told inspectors about all of its activities and installations.

In a sharp-tongued comment, Hoseyn Shariatmadari, a high-ranking intelligence officer appointed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as editor, said that although the October 21 agreement with the foreign affairs ministers of Europe's big three was a choice between bad and worse, the IAEA, under pressure from the "US and Zionist circles has gone far beyond honesty in dealing with the Islamic Republic".

Quoting Khamenei as having warned the IAEA and the leading powers "not to try to challenge Islamic Iran's right to possess nuclear technology", Shariatmadari called on the authorities to be ready for "the big showdown" and urged lawmakers elected to the next Iranian parliament not to approve the protocol if the IAEA failed to accommodate Iran.

The additional protocol, which allows IAEA inspectors to carry out "instant" and unrestricted inspections of all Iranian nuclear installations and projects, has not yet been approved by the outgoing Iranian majlis (parliament).

According to Mehr, continuing accusations against Iran, despite its cooperation with IAEA inspectors, has irked the Iranian delegation, which has accused the agency of dealing with Iran in an "illogical manner ... There is nothing permanent. We signed the additional protocol ... and when to resume is in the hands of our system [the ruling Islamic establishment]," Rohani said at the assembly on Sunday, reiterating that Iran's atomic projects, like an electric plant that is under construction at the Persian Gulf port of Booshehr, with assistance from Russia, are for civilian purposes.

But Washington insists that Iran's ruling ayatollahs want to use atomic installations, and Booshehr, for advancing military aims.

The IAEA's latest report on Iran said that agency inspectors had unearthed designs and parts for the advanced P2 uranium enrichment centrifuge, capable of producing bomb-grade uranium at twice the speed of Iran's first generation P1 centrifuges. The agency also uncovered experiments in the creation of plutonium, which can also be used as the explosive in nuclear weapons, and polonium, which can spark a chain reaction in a nuclear weapon.

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FC09Ak03.html

[DoctorZIn]

Iran Conservatives Warn on Nuclear Cooperation

March 09, 2004
Reuters
Ha'aretz

TEHRAN -- Angered by tough remarks by the head of the UN’s atomic watchdog, conservative Iranian politicians warned that Tehran may cease cooperation with nuclear inspectors, newspapers reported on Tuesday.

The attitude of conservative legislators, who regained control of parliament from reformists in elections last month, could jeopardize ratification of an agreement signed by Iran last year to allow intrusive snap checks of its nuclear facilities.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohamed ElBaradei criticized Iran on Monday for failing to declare advanced nuclear research and equipment which could be used to make atomic bombs.

One senior conservative legislator said Iran could follow North Korea's example by pulling out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

"Iran's threat about opting out of the NPT is serious," Hassan Qashqavi, member of parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, was quoted as saying by the hardline Siyasat-e Rouz newspaper.

He said the IAEA board of governors' meeting which began in Vienna on Monday had been hijacked by U.S. interests.

"The pressure from America is mainly political and is aimed at depriving Iran of nuclear knowledge," he said. "This will lead Iran to reconsider its nuclear cooperation."

Iran insists its nuclear program is aimed at generating electricity, not making bombs as Washington alleges.

Hardliners' objections to cooperation with nuclear inspectors had been more muted in recent months following Iran's decision last October, under intense international pressure, to agree to snap inspections, halt uranium enrichment and cooperate more closely with the IAEA

’Unfair picture’

Iranian officials last week called for the IAEA to remove Iran's nuclear program from its agenda, arguing that Tehran had done enough to prove it had no nuclear arms ambitions.

ElBaradei promptly quashed that request on Monday, saying there were still too many outstanding questions.

"They are giving Iran another deadline," the hardline Etemad newspaper said in a commentary. "Their main policy is to continue the game, not to end it."

The moderate Iran newspaper said Iran submitted an official letter of complaint to the IAEA board on Monday, arguing that the latest IAEA report painted an unfair picture of Iran's cooperation with the agency.

"The conclusion that there were some shortcomings cannot be justified," the newspaper quoted from the letter.

Hardline papers focused on what they termed the failure of European powers Britain, France and Germany to fulfil an agreement to provide Iran with peaceful nuclear technology.

"Any non-commitment by the agency and Europe...should trigger a response from Iran," newly elected conservative legislator Aladein Broujerdi told the hardline Jam-e Jam daily.

"Iran should not act beyond the framework of the NPT and it should not take steps to meet illogical demands," he said.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=402846&contrassID=1&subContrassID=8&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y

[DoctorZIn]

US, Europe Split On Iran's Failure To Declare Nuclear Ops

March 09, 2004
Dow Jones Newswires
The Associated Press

VIENNA -- The U.S. and allies at the U.N. atomic agency met with major European nations Tuesday to try and paper over key differences on whether Tehran is living up to its pledge to allow full perusal of its nuclear dossier.

A diplomat told The Associated Press that no common language had yet been found, adding he hoped a draft resolution acceptable to both camps could be agreed on by Wednesday, the last scheduled day of the International Atomic Energy Agency's board of governors' meeting.

It appeared clear, however, that the conference would have to be extended because of the transatlantic dispute.

"I'm hopeful for Thursday," IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told The Associated Press. "We'll see."

As the meeting opened Monday, ElBaradei described both Iran and Libya - which has acknowledged having a weapons program and has pledged to scrap it -as being in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

While praising Tehran for some cooperation, he said he was "seriously concerned" about Iran's refusal to declare plans and parts for an advanced uranium enrichment system, calling it a "setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency."

Only Iran remains in the spotlight, with Libya apparently keeping pledges to dismantle its weapons program.

Washington, which is convinced that Tehran once wanted to make nuclear weapons and continues to harbor secrets, seeks tough language to dominate any resolution that might be adopted by the IAEA's 35-nation board of governors. U.S. officials at the meeting have been emphasizing recent suspicious discoveries by the IAEA that Iran provided explanations for only after they were found.

But Germany, the U.K. and France seek to emphasize Iran's progress in unveiling nuclear activities and cooperating with IAEA inspectors since the discovery last year of a secret uranium enrichment program and covert tests that could be applied toward making weapons.

Reflecting the rift, U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton complained in a letter sent to the three European governments ahead of the meeting that their stance was hurting the common effort to get Iran to comply with its promises for full nuclear disclosure, diplomats told The Associated Press.

A U.S-proposed resolution text made available to the AP spoke of "serious failures" by Iran to reveal all and of "most serious concerns" about its activities - language considered too harsh by the Europeans. It also said Iran's declaration of past and present nuclear activities was "neither correct nor complete;" spoke of a "number of omissions," and "reserved consideration" of how the board would react - shorthand for possible future U.N. Security Council involvement.

Still Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA predicted U.S. attempts to push through a tough resolution would fail.

"Almost all colleagues in the IAEA think that we have done our best in our ability to work with the agency," Pirooz Hosseini told reporters.

In an IAEA report made public last month, Tehran was accused of continuing to hide evidence of nuclear experiments unearthed by agency inspectors. The dossier dealt Iran a setback in its efforts to convince the world that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it is fully cooperating with the U.N. agency.

The report mentioned finds of traces of polonium, a radioactive element that can be used in nuclear weapons and expressed concerns with the discovery of a previously undisclosed advanced P-2 uranium centrifuge system - a finding that the U.S. administration said raises "serious concerns" about Tehran's intentions.

Chief U.S. delegate Kenneth C. Brill told reporters he thought it was "striking that the more the agency learns the more the Iranians have to change their stories."

Iran has insisted its interest in uranium enrichment is only geared at generating power and not to arm warheads. To show good will, it has suspended its enrichment program and has also allowed IAEA inspectors broad access to its nuclear programs.

Iran requested an end of the international scrutiny of its past and present nuclear agenda ahead of the meeting, but ElBaradei said Tehran would remain on the agency's top agenda until all outstanding issues are removed.

The board also planned to discuss agency findings resulting from its probe of the complex black market network providing Iran, Libya and North Korea with technology that can be used to make nuclear weapons.

In contrast, a draft resolution on Libya is extremely complementary.

The draft, which also was provided to the AP, expresses "deep satisfaction," with Tripoli's openness, "welcomes the active cooperation," exhibited by Libya, and "congratulates" it for accepting full and intrusive IAEA inspections.

Still, it asks ElBaradei to report Libya's past transgressions to the Security Council - setting up a possible precedent for Iran - and the threat of future sanctions on the Islamic Republic.

http://framehosting.dowjonesnews.com/sample/samplestory.asp?StoryID=2004030910310010&Take=1

[DoctorZIn]

The Folly of Dialogue Diplomacy

March 09, 2004
National Review Online
Elio Bonazzi

If the West doesn't stop Iran today, the consequences will be dire. The only way to prevent a potentially catastrophic outcome in the Middle East is to provoke regime change in Iran. The good news is that to achieve this goal no direct military intervention is required.

Simplicity, naivety, and deceitful complexity.

In every aspect of human life, new ideas, designs, and concepts usually go through three distinct phases. A good dose of naivety characterizes the initial phase of every project, intellectual enterprise, or model; the intrinsic novelty of the subject-matter forces engineers, politicians, and intellectuals to make naïve assumptions, which are progressively refined and adjusted, and new layers of complexity are added to the model, design, or political doctrine in order to better equip it to deal with complex realities.

Adding complexity, however, is only an intermediate phase. According to Antoine de Saint-Exupery, "Perfection (in design) is achieved not when there is nothing more to add, but rather when there is nothing more to take away."

The best models, designs, and political doctrines are simple. But their simplicity is the fruit of a complex process, which started with naivety, grew through complexity and achieved a level of harmony and integrity possible only after redundancy was eliminated, internal coherence realized, and unnecessary entanglement discarded, all the while striving to capture the true essence of the problem under analysis.

Experience teaches that it is very rarely, if ever, that a successful engineering design, or political or economical doctrine, deviates from common sense, or is counterintuitive. If somebody tried to convince us that in order to achieve an egalitarian society we need to stop taxing the rich and tax more heavily blue-collar workers, we would smell the proverbial rat. A sophism is a plausible but fallacious argument. Unnecessary complexity is deceitful, and often used to muddy the waters and to erect smokescreens that allow unfounded theories to appear logical and coherent.

Which is exactly what certain diplomats and State Department officials are doing when they call for a dialogue with the Iranian mullahs. Their intent is to normalize relations with Tehran in order to seek an understanding — and possibly a deal — with the theocratic regime in exchange for the Islamic republic's cessation of its nuclear program.

According to this foreign-policy school of thought, which for lack of a better term we call "realist," the recent outcome of the Iranian national elections, which marked the defeat of the reformists and the triumph of the Islamic hardliners, is good news. The sophists of the State Department would like to convince us that now that the excruciating internal debate between the Leftist mullahs and the conservative establishment is over, the "pragmatic conservatives" are ready to cut a deal with the West over Tehran's WMD programs.

If we leave for a moment the realm of sophisms, and revert to simplicity and common sense, we realize that the analysis of the Iranian situation is straightforward. One doesn't need a Ph.D in political science to realize that the Iranians feel encircled — American and allied troops are in Afghanistan and in Iraq — and only the nuclear bomb would make the mullahs feel invincible. We are discovering almost daily that the Iranians are more advanced than originally thought in their nuclear plans. On several occasions, they deceived the European Union and the international nuclear watchdog about their true intentions to buy time and continue pursuing their covert nuclear program.

A common trick is to have one theocrat announce Iran's strict adherence to the nonproliferation protocols; and then, a day later, have a different top cleric state exactly the opposite. This happened, for example, last week: Hassan Rohani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, openly announced that an unspecified number of nuclear installations remain undeclared and that the Iranian authorities don't see the need to disclose all aspects of their nuclear program to the IAEA. But, only a few days earlier, the foreign minister of Germany, France, and Britain signed a last-minute deal in Vienna with Iranian representatives that once again stated Tehran's willingness to comply with the IAEA directives.

Why should we care what happens in Iran? Well, for starters, Iran directly sponsors Hezbollah terrorists in Israel, through Syria. Iranian killers are sent into Iraq to foment anti-American feelings. Iran represents today the single most dangerous threat to world stability. It represents an immediate threat to Israel and to the American troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The natural conclusion is that Iran cannot be "fixed." The only possible way out is a regime change. Anybody claiming that "engagement" with the theocratic fascists in Tehran could produce positive results is following the Yellow Brick Road, and is either a genuine victim of the mullah-orchestrated game of deception, or has ulterior motives.

To justify their willingness to continue a hopeless dialogue with the Islamist leaders in Tehran, foreign-policy realists use convoluted and abstract scenarios, which are inevitably counterintuitive. A typical example is their claim that the outcome of the latest Iranian elections is positive because, now that the "pragmatic conservative clerics" finally got rid of their internal opposition, it clears the way to important diplomatic breakthroughs. It is yet another example of deceitful and unnecessary complexity.

Occam's Razor is a logical principle attributed to the medieval philosopher William of Occam. Scientific knowledge is based on experience and self-evident truths, and on logical propositions resulting from those two sources. Occam stressed the Aristotelian principle that entities must not be multiplied beyond what is necessary. In science, the simplest theory that fits the facts of a problem is the one that should be selected.

The basic facts are that the mullahs are developing the nuclear bomb and nothing will stop them. Hitler should have been stopped in 1936, as soon as he remilitarized the Rhineland in blatant breach of the Versailles treaty. The European nations failed to do so, and the end-result was World War II.

If the West doesn't stop Iran today, the consequences will be dire. The only way to prevent a potentially catastrophic outcome in the Middle East is to provoke regime change in Iran. The good news is that to achieve this goal no direct military intervention is required. No more American troops will have to die in a distant land. And the American taxpayers won't have to bear the costs of another expensive military campaign.

Simply declaring that the only U.S. policy towards Iran is regime change, and enforcing it at every level in the administration, would provoke shock waves in Tehran. A resolute and determined U.S. administration could release part of Iran's frozen assets, seized during the hostage crisis of 1979, and use them to fund the Iranian opposition movement, inside and outside of the country. The Islamic regime has lost popular support, and survives only thanks to a very efficient repressive apparatus, exactly like the Communist regimes in eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Imposing sanctions and isolating the regime would provide the final blow needed to overthrow the mullahs.

The strategy explained above is simple but not naïve. It follows the principle of Occam's Razor, is internally coherent, and is based on common sense, historical facts, and the will of the people of Iran. If today we miss this historical opportunity to bring peace and long-term stability to the Middle East, we will have to achieve the same goal in a few years, when it will be much more difficult, expensive, and onerous. If we let the sophists of the State Department have their way, the inevitable showdown with the Islamist regime will only be postponed, but not avoided.

— Elio Bonazzi is an Italian-born political scientist.

http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bonazzi200403090852.asp

[DoctorZIn]

Situation radicalizes on day 4th of Teachers strike

SMCCDI (information Service)
Mar 9, 2004

The Islamic republic regime agents intervened in several schools, on the 4th day of Teachers strike, in order to beat and arrest several teachers and supporter students. These sporadic clashes have increased in the cities of Hamdean, Esfahan and Ardebil while starting in several areas of Tehran and its suburbs, such as Rey, Eslamshahr and Karaj.

Clashes between students and agents of the Islamic republic regime are in constant increase due to these interventions leading often to slogans against the regime and its leaders.

Streets leading to schools are under the constant watch of regime's militiamen intending to avoid any street demonstration.

The repressive move along with the statement issued by the official created Teachers syndicate calling for an end of strike are showing the fear of the regime and its firm intention to put an end to the situation which is radicalizing every day and is spreading to more cities, such as, Malar, Tabriz and Gorgan.

http://www.daneshjoo.org/generalnews/article/publish/article_5261.shtml

[nuconvert]

U.S., Europe Agree on Draft Resolution on Iran's Nuclear Activities

Mar 9, 2004

By George Jahn /
Associated Press Writer


VIENNA, Austria (AP) - Accepting painful compromises, the United States agreed with key European nations on Tuesday to tone down criticism of Iran for its continued nuclear secrecy.
Washington also accepted a draft resolution containing some praise of Tehran's willingness to open its nuclear programs to outside inspection.

Both sides signed off on the draft document prepared for a high-level conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency after days of grueling negotiations aimed at finding the proper mix of praise and criticism.

The United States insists Iran is interested in making nuclear weapons. Washington wanted the meeting to condemn Iran for not fully living up to pledges to reveal all past and present nuclear activities while keeping open options for future involvement by the U.N. Security Council.

France, Germany and Britain, however, wanted to focus on Iranian cooperation with the IAEA that began only after the discovery last year that Tehran had plans to enrich uranium and secretly conducted other tests with possible weapons applications over nearly two decades.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei told reporters negotiations continued on final language. The text of the document still must be approved by all 35 nations of the IAEA board of governors.

But with the trans-Atlantic rift resolved, the greatest hurdle to agreement on Iran appeared to be out of the way.

The compromise reflected the obstacles faced by Washington in its effort to deal harshly with Iran.

When the issue first came up before the board last year, the United States pushed to have Tehran called before the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions, arguing that Iran had violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

But it has been repeatedly forced to back down in the face of widespread resistance at the board. The consensus text, made available to the Associated Press Tuesday, made no direct mention of the Security Council.

The text criticizes Iran for not fully living up to its pledge to be completely open about past and present nuclear activities.

It "notes with the most serious concern that ... (past) declarations made by Iran ... did not amount to the correct, complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear program."

The text also slams Iran for "failing to resolve all questions" about uranium enrichment, which can be used to make weapons, saying the agency "deplores" the lapse.

But it praises Iran for signing an agreement throwing open its nuclear programs to full and pervasive IAEA perusal and "recognizes" Iran's cooperation with agency investigations, even while calling on Iran to "intensify its cooperation."

In Tehran, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said he hoped the IAEA ultimately would come to agree with Iran's assertion that all its nuclear activities are "for peaceful purposes."

The rift over Iran had led to unusual strains between Washington and its key European allies. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton complained in a letter sent to the French, German and British governments that their stance was hurting the common effort to get Iran to comply with its promises for full nuclear disclosure, diplomats told The Associated Press.

"That, of course resulted in some pretty harsh words in reply," to Washington, a senior European diplomat told AP.

In Washington Tuesday, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters that the board should "state clearly that Iran has not yet addressed fully the long-standing concerns about its nuclear activities.

"We need to send a strong signal to Tehran that it cannot refuse to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency with impunity."

Besides Iran, Libya is also on the agenda, with ElBaradei describing both nations as being in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

But with Libya acting on pledges made last year to scrap its programs for weapons of mass destruction, the focus at the meeting was on Iran.

In an IAEA report last month, Tehran was accused of continuing to hide evidence of nuclear experiments, leaving it to agency inspectors to unearth them. The dossier dealt Iran a setback in its efforts to convince the world that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it is fully cooperating with the U.N. agency.

The report mentioned finds of traces of polonium, a radioactive element that can be used in nuclear weapons and expressed concerns with the discovery of a previously undisclosed advanced P-2 uranium centrifuge system - a finding that the U.S. administration said raises "serious concerns" about Tehran's intentions.

Iran has insisted its interest in uranium enrichment is only geared at generating power and not to arm warheads. To show good will, it has suspended its enrichment program and has also allowed IAEA inspectors broad access to its nuclear programs.

While praising Tehran for some cooperation, ElBaradei said he was "seriously concerned" about Iran's refusal to declare plans and parts for the P-2 enrichment system, calling it a "setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency."

In contrast to the mixed review of Iran, a draft resolution on Libya is generally complimentary.

The draft, which also was provided to the AP, expresses "deep satisfaction," with Tripoli's openness, "welcomes the active cooperation," exhibited by Libya, and "congratulates" it for accepting full and intrusive IAEA inspections.

"There is no case to keep Libya on the agenda," Chief Libyan delegate Giuma Ferjani told the AP. Libya was scheduled to sign an agreement with the agency on Wednesday, opening its nuclear program to full IAEA perusal.

Iran, too, insists it wants its nuclear dossier closed - something ElBaradei has said would not happen until all suspicions about past experiments are dispelled and future openness is assured.

http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/MGAMVRYHMRD.html

[DoctorZIn]

This just in from a student inside of Iran...

"Doc,
400 Schools are closed due to Teachers' strike.
30% of Iranian teachers are at strike now in Iran.
We will hear more on this."

[DoctorZIn]

Iran's Nuke Program Must be Defused

March 09, 2004
Boston Herald
Peter Brookes

Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me. The Board of Governors of the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), meeting this week in Vienna to discuss Iran's increasingly troubling nuclear program (again), should keep that principle in mind.

The latest problem: discrepancies between what Iran declared on its nuclear program in October and what the IAEA actually found on the ground. Iran clearly didn't give the world community the Full Nuclear Monty.

Tehran's claim that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes is ringing increasingly hollow: Nuclear weapons appear the true goal of the mullahs as led by Ali Khamenei. An Iran bristling with nuclear weapons wouldn't bode well for U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Seeing through the fog of Tehran's nuclear antics, John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said, ``We are not going to reduce the pressure on Iran . . . We think the Iranians are still trying to conceal a clandestine nuclear weapons program.''

Supporting Bolton's claim, an IAEA inspection report said Iran omitted P-2 (Pakistani) centrifuge drawings, used for enriching uranium, contradicting Tehran's (supposedly) comprehensive October declaration. Iran, not surprisingly, claims it was a bureaucratic oversight. A pretty significant oversight . . . unless, of course, you're trying to paper over a clandestine weapons program.

The IAEA report also outlined other suspicious activity. Inspectors also found traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU), enriched beyond that needed for power-plant fuel. (The burning question: How much has been enriched already?)

IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei seemed confident that Iran would finally fulfill its promise to suspend uranium enrichment. It pledged to do so last fall in a deal brokered by France, Britain and Germany - the ``EU (European Union) Three'' - in return for the matter being not hauled before the U.N. Security Council.

Of course, Tehran denied it manufactured the uranium. IAEA inspectors are rightfully skeptical.

Tehran has moved to muster the support of the EU Three by telling the IAEA that it has agreed to a ``fuller'' suspension of its uranium-enrichment program. We'll see what that means.

A thumbs-down vote by the IAEA this week could kick the issue to the U.N. Security Council and lead to painful, multilateral economic sanctions against Iran. It could also further delay an impending EU-Iran trade deal, which is contingent upon Iran's good nuclear behavior.

Of course, Tehran's nuclear treachery didn't prevent France from recently initialing a $2 billion oil-exploration deal with Iran.

The question is: What to do?

The administration clearly has its hands full with Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan and terrorism. There is a reasonable argument for letting the EU Three's position of gentle coercion play out a bit more.

Problem is, time is on Iran's side. The longer they can keep the program going, the more progress the mullahs can make toward the bomb.

The prospects for keeping the Iranian Pandora's box closed look pretty bleak. The Iranian case is particularly troubling because of the regime's sponsorship of international terrorism and its alliance with Syria.

Multilateral sanctions might work. Libya is (seemingly) turning over a new leaf because of them. North Korea is begging for aid because of sanctions. Sanctions clearly hurt Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs.

But continued threats, without genuine action, are as meaningless as Iran's promises have proven to be. Keeping the bomb in the box is a tough job, but somebody's got to do it.

( Peter Brookes is a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation. He is reachable at peterbrookes@heritage.org. This column first appeared in the New York Post. )

http://news.bostonherald.com/opinion/view.bg?articleid=388

[DoctorZIn]

Pupils Join Striking Teachers Against Security Forces

March 09, 2004
Iran va Jahan
IRVAJ Network

London -- Pupils in a school in Hamedan, west Iran, joined ranks with their striking teachers and repelled the Islamic Law Enforcement Forces (LEF).

The LEF had targeted the Kothar school in Hamedan, and wanted to intimidate the striking teachers to go back to the classrooms, but the pupils who were outraged by watching the way their teachers were being treated, attacked the LEF and drove them out of school.

The protests soon spread outside the school and the pupils targeted government buildings. LEF anxious about the protests spreading and in fear of more people joining the pupils retreated and were content on containing the protests inside the school.

This morning, there are reports of more students protesting in support of teachers in Jomhouri Ave. Tehran.

In Ardebil and Isfahan the strikes are reported to be solid, and there are irregular classes in the rest of the country.

In Karaj, 700 female students joined their striking teachers.

Iran's teachers are now in the third day of their strike and have vowed not to teach until their demands are met.

http://iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2004&m=03&d=09&a=10

[DoctorZIn]

Iran Teacher Strike Forces Many Schools to Close

March 09, 2004
Reuters
Parisa Hafezi

TEHRAN -- Iranian teachers striking over pay have forced scores of schools nationwide to shut down in the Islamic Republic's biggest industrial dispute for at least two years, teachers and parliamentarians said on Tuesday.

Though frustration over low pay and poor living conditions are widespread in Iran, nationwide strikes are rare in the oil-rich country where hardline judges tolerate little dissent.

Teachers said the strike had not been orchestrated by any labour organisation but had caught on by word of mouth. Labour unions are typically weak and disorganised in Iran.

"We're getting news that most schools are closed because of the teachers' strike and more will be closed until their demands are met," said a parliamentarian, who asked not to be named.

Teachers, who began the strike last week, staged protests outside schools in many cities, including the capital Tehran.

"We should be respected and have better salaries to be able to teach the next generation," said Alosh Hosseini, a 43-year-old father of three who earns a month as a teacher in the northwestern city of Urumiyeh.

"With this salary I cannot even pay my rent," he said. Like many of his colleagues in the public sector, Hosseini has been forced to take a second job driving a taxi to make ends meet.

While teachers said the strike was not politically motivated, some analysts said it could spark a wider crisis.

"It might lead to a political crisis because teachers' influence extends from the working class to the intellectual elite," said Hossein Mirzamani, a political science lecturer at Tehran University.

But another analyst said it was unlikely the strike would spread to other sectors and the approaching Iranian New Year holiday beginning on March 20 would deprive the strike of much momentum.

While Iran's economy has grown strongly in recent years, state employees in particular often complain their low wages are constantly eroded by inflation running at around 16 percent.

Last week, scores of teachers gathered in front of parliament and chanted slogans against the authorities for ignoring their demands.

The main association for school teachers, last week warned of the consequences of a lengthy strike. "This event might lead to a national challenge and ignorant officials are responsible," the Teachers' Organisation said in a statement.

Education Minister Morteza Haji on Saturday promised to resolve the dispute, the official IRNA news agency said.

"There is no cause for anxiety. The problem will be solved in the next days," he said, without elaborating.

http://www.reuters.com/newsChannel.jhtml?type=worldNews

[DoctorZIn]

US, EU Agree on Draft Resolution on Iran's Nuke Activities

March 09, 2004
The Associated Press
George Jahn

VIENNA, Austria -- Resolving intense differences, the United States and key European countries on Tuesday agreed to praise Iran for opening much of its nuclear program to outside inspection while censuring Tehran for continued secrecy in some areas.

Both the Americans and Europeans accepted a draft resolution prepared for a high-level conference of the International Atomic Energy agency after days of gruelling negotiations aimed at finding the proper mix of praise and criticism. The United States insists Iran is interested in making nuclear weapons. It wanted the meeting to condemn Iran for not fully living up to pledges to reveal all past and present nuclear activities and keep options open for future involvement by the UN Security Council.

France, Germany and Britain, however, wanted to focus on Iranian co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency that began after the discovery last year that Teheran had plans to enrich uranium and secretly conducted other tests with possible weapons applications over nearly two decades.

The text still must be accepted by all 35 countries of the IAEA board of governors. Still, with the trans-Atlantic rift resolved, the greatest hurdle on agreement on Iran appeared to be out of the way.

The consensus text, made available to The Associated Press, criticizes Iran for not fully living up to its pledge to be completely open about past and present nuclear activities.

It "notes with the most serious concern that ... (past) declarations made by Iran ... did not amount to the correct, complete and final picture of Iran's past and present nuclear program."

The text also slams Iran for "failing to resolve all questions" about uranium enrichment, which can be used to make weapons, saying it "deplores" this lapse.

But it praises Iran for signing an agreement throwing open its nuclear programs to full and pervasive IAEA perusal and "recognizes" Iran's co-operation with agency investigations, even while calling on Iran to "intensify its co-operation."

The rift over Iran had led to unusual strains between Washington and its key European allies, after U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton complained in a letter sent to the French, German and British governments that their stance was hurting the common effort to get Iran to comply with its promises for full nuclear disclosure, diplomats told The Associated Press.

"That, of course resulted in some pretty harsh words in reply," to Washington, a senior European diplomat told the AP.

Besides Iran, Libya is also on the agenda, with IEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei describing both countries as violating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

But with Libya acting on pledges made last year to scrap its programs for weapons of mass destruction, the focus at the meeting was on Iran.

In an IAEA report last month, Tehran was accused of continuing to hide evidence of nuclear experiments, leaving it to agency inspectors to unearth them. The dossier dealt Iran a setback in its efforts to convince the world that its nuclear program is peaceful and that it is fully co-operating with the UN agency.

The report mentioned finds of traces of polonium, a radioactive element that can be used in nuclear weapons and expressed concerns with the discovery of a previously undisclosed advanced P-2 uranium centrifuge system, a finding that the U.S. administration said raises "serious concerns" about Tehran's intentions.

Iran has insisted its interest in uranium enrichment is only geared at generating power and not to arm warheads. To show good will, it has suspended its enrichment program and has also allowed IAEA inspectors broad access to its nuclear programs.

While praising Tehran for some cooperation, ElBaradei said he was "seriously concerned" about Iran's refusal to declare plans and parts for the P-2 enrichment system, calling it a "setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency."

In contrast to the mixed review of Iran, a draft resolution on Libya is generally complimentary.

The draft, which also was provided to the AP, expresses "deep satisfaction," with Tripoli's openness, "welcomes the active co-operation," exhibited by Libya, and "congratulates" it for accepting full and intrusive IAEA inspections.

"There is no case to keep Libya on the agenda," Chief Libyan delegate Giuma Ferjani told the AP. Libya was scheduled to sign an agreement with the agency on Wednesday, opening its nuclear program to full IAEA perusal.

Iran, too, insists it wants its nuclear dossier closed, something ElBaradei has said would not happen until all suspicions about past experiments are dispelled and future openness is assured.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=1856&ncid=737&e=6&u=/cpress/20040309/ca_pr_on_wo/nuclear_agency_iran

[DoctorZIn]

Iran Still Poses Threat

March 09, 2004
The Times
Bronwen Maddox

The upbeat mood of this week's meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not seem to be dampened by the volley of demands and warnings yesterday from Iran.

But it should have been. True, it was understandable that there was a sense of relief as the countries that make up the board of governors gathered yesterday for their quarterly meeting.

Libya, which dominated the agenda, has come in from the cold, revealing a ten-year-old secret nuclear weapons programme and agreeing to dismantle it. On Iran, the IAEA found at least as many points to praise as to condemn. In trying to combat proliferation, these are achievements.

All the same, the tone of the declarations that the board is preparing on both countries seems too ready in its praise and optimism. The important question about the Libyan case is whether it is a model for persuading other countries to reject the nuclear path. It is hard to see that it is, apart from rare cases -and Iran does not look like one.

In a long agenda confronting the governors yesterday, it was inevitable that Libya and Iran would dominate. On Libya, members have reached something like consensus and the report that will go to the United Nations Security Council is now almost complete.

However, it is said to be fulsome in praise, almost to the point where some members are discomfited. Libya, after all, broke all its obligations as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

That sin appears to have been forgiven in the outpouring of relief. It is comical how both the United States and Europe find it possible to take Libya as justification of their rival theories of how to combat proliferation.

For the US, Libya's about-turn would not have taken place without the spectacle of the fate of Saddam Hussein. For Britain, France and Germany, so pleased to have persuaded Iran to open its doors to more inspections, it is proof of the power of diplomacy and the attractions of trade.

There is no point trying to adjudicate whether the carrot or the stick had more effect. The point is that even for a small, relatively poor country, it took the coincidence of both to persuade it that it should change course. For all the swell of optimism that this has produced, it is hard to see that this produces easy lessons for fighting proliferation -and certainly not in Iran's case.

In his report to the board of governors, Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General, found two points in Iran's favour. It had co-operated with the IAEA since October, giving inspectors access to sites, scientists and paperwork at its request. It has also, as of last week, agreed to suspend uranium enrichment, the most controversial part of its programme, as the technique could give it the means to make a bomb.

Against that, ElBaradei cited research work on enrichment using centrifuges that Iran had failed to disclose to the IAEA and which raised worrying questions about whether Iran was really in pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite its denials.

This equivocal tone is reflected in the report to the Security Council that the governors are preparing (although the wrangling continues). It is not gushing, but nor is it damning.

True, the co-operation is not to be dismissed. Iran has not refused the IAEA access, but nor has it been as open as it claims. It is disingenuous for Iran to argue that it was not required to reveal "research work", given its pledge, in its own words, to reveal "the full scope of Iranian nuclear activity", including "a complete centrifuge research and development chain".

Iran does not, however, seem to acknowledge the alarm that these omissions have caused. It demanded yesterday that its case be taken off the agenda of the IAEA board of governors on the ground that it was fully cooperating, a pitch that ElBaradei immediately rejected.

It is impossible, too, to overlook Iran's warning yesterday that it was suspending enrichment only temporarily. This is not the deal that Britain, France and Germany thought that they had extracted last year.

The US, Britain, France and Germany are applying to Iran exactly the same carrots and sticks as they applied to Libya. If you are an optimist, you would say these are working.

But the lesson of Libya may be that it is only in very exceptional circumstances that a small, relatively poor country can be deflected from its course. The message from Tehran yesterday was that the inducements on offer are probably not enough -and may never be.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/

[DoctorZIn]

Iran: Official Warns on Iranian Youth Unemployment

March 09, 2004
World Markets Research Centre
Simon Woodward

A government official was quoted yesterday as stating that unemployment among young people (15-29-years old) is in the region of 31%. The figure is well above official estimates of unemployment, with the government estimating overall unemployment at 12.8%. Around 70% of the Iranian population is under 30-years old.

Significance: The government has spent considerable sums in recent years trying to bring the unemployment problem under control. However, it appears to be failing in its attempts, with the IMF and others criticising the level of liquidity being subsequently generated within the economy.

Following their victory in last month's legislative elections, the conservatives have promised that when they take control of parliament in June they will continue with economic reforms and tackle the unemployment problem. With the need to create 800,000 jobs a year, however, they face a sizable task.

http://www.wmrc.com/

[DoctorZIn]

Two More Iranian Papers Shut Down

March 09, 2004
Agence France Presse
AFP

Iran's judiciary has shut down two weekly newspapers, but has offered a reprieve to a reformist daily paper closed for publishing a text critical of the Islamic republic's supreme leader if it apologises, reports said Tuesday.

According to the Iranian Association of Journalists, the latest closures bring to 102 the number of publications shut down by the judiciary - a bastion of the religious right-wing - since 1998.

The latest victims of the crackdown on the press were Time, a weekly tabloid with a sensationalist content, and The Pen of the Teacher, which covers academic issues, the student news agency ISNA reported.

The academic paper drew the wrath of the courts over its coverage of a strike by the teaching profession over demands for back pay and wage rises, its director Mohammad Khaksari told ISNA.

And Time - not to be confused with the US weekly news magazine of the same name - was closed for immoral writings, with its director Shahram Mohammad Nia also receiving a six month suspended jail term.

On the eve of the controversial February 20 elections - from which most pro-reform candidates were barred - the judiciary also closed down the Islamic republic's two main reformist papers, Shargh and Yas-e No.

The two papers had dared to publish a protest letter questioning the role in the mass disqualifications of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, criticism of whom is a criminal offence in Iran.

Shargh has since been allowed to resume publication, after its editor acknowleged he should not have published the unprecedented attack written by reformist deputies.

"Because it has recognised its error, the judiciary has permitted it to appear again," judiciary spokesman Gholamhossein Elham told ISNA.

"Yas-e No was banned for the same reason, but if this newspaper follows the path of Shargh the ban will also be lifted," he added.

A leading member of the Iranian Association of Journalists said the constant threat of reprisals from the courts was killing off good journalism.

"The system's pressure on journalists has brought a self-censorship that harms creativity and enthusiasm," he complained.

"In these conditions, journalists feel more comfortable with blind conformity than with bringing out an original and interesting product for the public."

However, new publication permits have been issued. Outgoing female reformist MP Jamileh Kadivar has been authorised to start up a daily newspaper entitled The Women's Voice, after a precursor - simply entitled Woman - was shut down.

And a member of the liberal opposition, former MP Azam Taleghani, has been given permission to publish a monthly entitled Pilgrim.

According to the Paris-based press rights group Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 11 journalists are currently in jail in Iran.

http://www.afp.com/english/home/

[DoctorZIn]

The Paradox of Anti-Americanism in Iran

March 09, 2004
Middle East Review of International Affairs
Patrick Clawson

This article analyzes the roots of anti-American sentiment in Iran, considering the impact of Islamism, nationalism, Third Worldism, and nativism on Iranian ideology and rhetoric following the country's 1979 Revolution. In addition, the author looks at the extent to which this sentiment has reversed itself on the popular level over the past several years and why that has occurred.

While anti-Americanism has deep resonance in the Arab world, the situation is quite different in Iran, where the United States has in recent years become profoundly popular.

One indicator was the September 2002 poll commissioned by the Iranian Majlis' National Security Committee which found that 74 percent of Iranians favored resumption of relations with the United States and 46 percent felt that U.S. policies on Iran were "to some extent correct," despite the fact that Iranian media constantly harped on Bush's "axis of evil" remark in his January 2002 State of the Union speech.(1) The Ayandeh Institute pollsters who conducted this poll, Abbas Abdi and Hossein Ali Qazian, were sentenced to jail terms of eight and nine years respectively for "publishing nonscientific research."

Why this change from the days of the 1978-1979 revolution and 1979-1981 hostage-taking at the U.S. embassy in Tehran when millions of Iranians poured on to the streets to chant "Death to America?" It is worth understanding why this change has happened both as a case study of regime propaganda and the response by public opinion as well as its importance in the regional context.

The Iranian Exception

The principle reason for pro-American sentiment in Iran today is that the United States is a staunch opponent of the hated clerical regime. Bush pointed to this factor when in his 2002 State of the Union he explained his "axis of evil" remark by condemning "an unelected few [who] repress the Iranian people's hopes for freedom."(2)

There are fewer better explanations for why so many Iranians today are pro-American than Bush's July 12, 2002 statement:

The people of Iran want the same freedoms, human rights, and opportunities as people around the world. Their government should listen to their hopes. In the last two Iranian presidential elections and in nearly a dozen parliamentary and local elections, the vast majority of the Iranian people voted for political and economic reform. Yet their voices are not being listened to by the unelected people who are the real rulers of Iran. Uncompromising, destructive policies have persisted, and far too little has changed in the daily lives of the Iranian people.... There is a long history of friendship between the American people and the people of Iran. As Iran's people move towards a future defined by greater freedom, greater tolerance, they will have no better friend than the United States of America.(3)

As one astute observer of the Iranian scene summed up his impressions from two years of travel around Iran, "America's greatest allies in Iran are the hardliners themselves; their constant anti-American rhetoric has made the United States even more popular among the Iranian people."(4)

That said, the failures of the reform movement have also done much to drain anti-Americanism out of the Iranian system. The hopes for reforms from within the Islamic Republic, which were so high after the unexpected 1997 landslide victory of President Muhammad Khatemi, have died. Khatemi proved unwilling or unable to bring about meaningful change and the clerical hardliners have reasserted control, shoving aside the president and parliament to run the country through the judiciary and the revolutionary institutions (such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps), which report directly to Supreme Leader Ali Khamene'i.(5)

Khatemi's dream had been to inaugurate "a dialogue of civilizations" based on people-to-people exchange with Americans and other Westerners, but without official government-to-government relations. But Khamene'i and his faction explicitly and repeatedly rejected such a shift, refusing also to change Iran's policies to which Washington objected.(6) The reality was that the hardliners who control power blocked even this people-to-people initiative. Not even friends of revolutionary Iran could get visas to visit the country. As was the case with so many others of his policies, Khatami's attempt to modify the revolution's anti-Americanism--into opposition to U.S. government policies combined with friendship with the American people--failed.

The aftermath of the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq provided remarkable evidence about how far the pro-American sentiment has gone.(7) On June 22, 2003, the Iranian newspaper Yas-e Now published a remarkable poll that had originally appeared on the "Feedback" web page of the Expediency Discernment Council, run by former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Those polled were given the question, "What are the actual demands of the Iranian people?" and a choice of four answers. They responded as follows:



13 percent chose the answer "solutions to the problems of people's livelihood, and the continuation of the present political policy"--in other words, the current hardline stance.

16 percent chose "political reforms and increases in the powers of the reformists."

26 percent chose "fundamental changes in management and in the performance of the system for an efficient growth"--a position often identified with Rafsanjani.

45 percent chose "change in the political system, even with foreign intervention."
The fact that 45 percent of respondents endorsed foreign intervention if necessary is all the more surprising considering two factors: first, the continued imprisonment of 2002 pollsters Abdi and Qazian; and second, the ominous rumors circulating in Iran that the United States is considering an invasion of the country, though these had no basis in fact.

If the poll showed mass opinion, two interesting letters indicated that many in the elite are concerned about how far pro-Americanism has gone.(8)

On Muhammad's birthday (May 19, 2003), 196 prominent clerics and intellectuals issued an open letter to "express our complete dissatisfaction with the rulers in Iran." The sharp criticism focused on "the unelected institutions" which are "united against the wishes of the people"--phrases that echo those used by Bush. The letter warned that present policies "might provide an excuse to some groups who desire freedom to sacrifice the independence of the country," in other words, a U.S. invasion might be welcomed. It added, "We must learn a lesson from the fate of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein and understand that despotism and selfishness is destined to take the country down to defeat."

On May 25, 2003, forty percent of the Parliament (Majlis) members signed a letter to Supreme Leader Ali Hossein Khamene'i. The letter carefully refrained from any criticism of Khamene'i, but its tone was otherwise tough. It warned, "Perhaps there has been no period in the recent history of Iran as sensitive as this one [due to] political and social gaps coupled with a clear plan by the government of the United States of America to change the geopolitical map of the region." Insisting on "fundamental changes in methods, attitudes, and figures," the letter warned, "if this is a cup of hemlock, it should be drunk before our country's independence and territorial integrity are placed in danger." The hemlock phrase was used by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to explain his 1988 decision to end the war with Iraq.

Neither of the two letters was mentioned in Iranian newspapers, television, or radio because of a ban imposed by the Supreme National Security Council, chaired by President Muhammad Khatami. (This ban belies the commonly held notion that Khatami-era Iran enjoys press freedom.) The Council's concern appears to be the spreading mood in Iran that the country is at risk of a U.S. invasion because of provocative actions by the hardliners. It is interesting to observe that such perceived risk emboldens reformers to step up their criticism of hardliners, contrary to the theory widely heard in the West that U.S. pressure hurts reformers. Indeed, there is by now an established pattern in which U.S. criticism of the hardliners is seized upon by reform elements as a reason why repression should be eased, so as to create national unity and to deprive Washington of a pretext for attacking Iran.(9)

What has occurred in Iran is much deeper than a reflexive "enemy of my enemy is my friend" attitude. The last few years has seen a far-reaching debate among wide sectors of society about the basic issues of Enlightenment thought. On issue after issue, intellectuals have come to argue for the values which America champions, from rule of law to free speech and representative government. Interestingly, many arguments are heard for the state to stay out of religious affairs. A leading intellectual has written a book ‘from prison, no less’ arguing that democracy is incompatible with a state religion.

Hossein Mostafa Khomeini, the grandson of Aytollah Ruhollah Khomeini and himself a prominent cleric, speaks eloquently, from the podium of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, about the importance of individual liberties and a secular state, while applauding America as the embodiment of these values.(10) Indeed, when asked, "What do you think is the best way for the government of the United States to behave in order to encourage the liberation and the freedom of the people of Iran?" Khomeini responded:

The best way is for the United States to help the movement towards democracy, democracy in Iran. They should look at this issue very seriously and not as dispassionately as they have been, waiting for something to happen and then get involved.... One should think how deep the problem and the pressures are in Iran on the Iranian people, that there are so many of them who in fact crave for some sort of foreign intervention to get rid of this calamity.

It is no exaggeration to say that America has won the battle for the hearts and minds of the Iranian people, and the hardline clerics have lost.

At the same time, though, there does remain much anti-Americanism in Iran. In particular, three strands of anti-Americanism bear closer examination:

Proud Iranian nationalists are suspicious that the United States wants to block Iran from what they see as its natural place as leader of the region.

Leftist Third World socialist ideas shaped the entire generation now running Iran, clerics as well as secular intellectuals (though this ideology has no attraction for the young).

Traditionalists, a group that goes far beyond just religious conservatives, are deeply hostile to any implication that U.S. influence--directly or otherwise--would subvert Iran's traditional culture and lifestyle.

Nationalism

For American intellectuals, it is an article of faith that Iranians became anti-American because of the 1953 overthrow of Muhammad Mossadegh. For instance, James Bill writes, "After its part in the overthrow of Muhammad Mosadegh in 1953, the United States found itself the object of growing Iranian criticism... Iranians of all political persuasions increasingly formed a negative image of the United States."(11) Mark Gasiorowski argues that after Mossadegh's overthrow, the Shah was able to hold power only because he was a client of the United States, lacking domestic legitimacy.(12)

The reality of the matter is rather more complex. For one thing, Mossadegh's overthrow came in no small part because of his increasing isolation on the domestic political scene. As Barry Rubin wrote, in the final months, "Kashani [a major clerical figure] went over to the opposition; whole sectors of the National Front [the political movement that had supported him] broke away; and dozens of deputies resigned."(13) Mossadegh may have God-like status among leftist foreign intellectuals, but, as Rubin noted, "In the days after Mossadegh's removal, the shah and Zahedi [the new prime minister] seemed as popular as the National Front leader [Mossadegh] had ever been.(14)

Indeed, the clerical establishment then and now--as well as in the intervening years--have been largely hostile to Mossadegh. That said, there can be little doubt that many Iranian nationalists were profoundly disappointed at Mossadegh's failure and that, as the Shah became more authoritarian, memories of the bad parts of the Mossadegh legacy faded as a legend of a golden age grew.

The nationalism of which pro-Mossadegh sentiment was a symbol was by no means necessarily Marxist, much less Communist. Some of these nationalists were in fact more sympathetic to the clergy than to the left. A good example was the first prime minister after the 1979 revolution, Mehdi Bazargan. Indeed, the first post-revolutionary government was full of such figures from the reconstituted National Front, such as Hassan Nazieh, who became chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company.

This nationalism was profoundly skeptical of the United States, but willing to work with it, so long as Iran got the respect it felt it deserved. During the heady days after the revolution when they were an important part of the power elite, the National Front leaders virtually never attacked the United States. Indeed, in the summer of 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir Entezam was working to normalize relations with the United States.(15)

This nationalist strand had broad support. The hardline cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Beheshti acknowledged in 1980, "It has to be confessed that there are several million Iranians who prefer a liberal government to a militant Islamic government."(16) It was against this liberal nationalism that the Islamic clerics had to wage a vigorous campaign in 1979-81. Indeed, the taking of the American embassy in September 1979 was as much directed against the domestic liberal element as it was against the United States.(17)

The great fear among the revolutionary hardliners--the clerical element that won out and the leftists who wanted the revolution to go further than the liberals had taken it--was that the liberals would reconcile with the United States and establish a democratic, market system consistent with many U.S. values, though with Islam as a state religion. Indeed, the increasingly desperate attempts during 1980 by the Bazargan government to resolve the U.S. embassy hostage crisis were precisely because it saw how anti-Americanism was being used to undermine their position--starting with the December 2, 1979 ratification of the cleric-empowering, liberalism-ending Constitution.

In other words, the fear was that the heirs of Mossadegh--the new National Front--would work with America and for American-style values. That is hard to reconcile with the view that America's overthrow of Mossadegh is the root of Iranian anti-Americanism.(18) Nationalism may be a factor in Iranian anti-Americanism, but it is much less significant than two other elements, namely, Third Worldism and nativism.

Third Worldism

Third Worldism is that mix of socialism and anti-imperialism which blames the West, especially America, and the local elites which work with it for the shortcomings in developing countries, offering a vision of a more equitable and prosperous society once the evil West is forced to give up its death grip on the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is hard to overestimate Third Worldism's influence on Iranian intellectual life between 1963 and 1988.

The "outstanding intellectual" of Iran in the 1960s was Ali Shariati.(19) While studying for his doctorate in sociology and Islamic studies in Paris, he translated Fanon, Guevara, and Sartre and was injured demonstrating against the Algerian war. Returning to Iran in 1965, he lectured at the Husseinieh-i Ershard, a Tehran religious meeting hall financed by the heirs of Mossadegh's movement.

Shariati's lectures before his 1977 death, interrupted by jail time from 1972 to 1975, were extraordinarily popular, circulating on cassette and in transcription. He was the most popular writer on Islam for pre-revolutionary young, urban Iranians.(20) His theme was that Islam was the answer to the evils of capitalism in Iran. Shariati made Islam hip, in no small part by his connecting Islam to Third Worldism, including to political and cultural anti-Americanism. He also disassociated Islam from the clerics, whom he and his audience saw as backward. Not surprisingly, the clerics once in power devoted much effort to undercutting Shariati's influence.

While the clerical establishment hated Shariati, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took a neutral stance, being well aware of Shariati's popularity among the young. Presumably in response to the enthusiasm for anti-Western Islam seen in the Shariati phenomenon, Khomeini began to use many Third Worldist phrases.

Whereas his 1963-64 polemics against the Shah which led to his exile were in no small part directed against leftist reforms ‘land reform and women's suffrage’ his discourse by the late 1970s made Islam sound compatible with Marxism. Ervand Abrahamiam provides numerous examples: "The lower class is the salt of the earth;" "In a truly Islamic society, there will be no landless peasants;" "We are for Islam, not for capitalism and feudalism."(21) Abrahamiam explains how Khomeini changed traditional Shiite interpretations:

Instead of paying occasional lip-service to the 'meek,' he aggressively espoused the general rights and interests of the mostazafin ["a loose term used to depict the general populace: the meek, the poor, the masses," Abrahamian explains]. Instead of talking of institutional reforms, he called for thorough political and cultural revolutions. Instead of preaching quietism, he exhorted the faithful to protest.

It is in this context that Khomeini fit his campaign against America. No longer confining himself to his 1960s complaint against American decadence, he now used language which sounded like it came from Marxist propaganda:

They [the Pahlavi government] have given all our oil to foreigners, Americans and others. They gave that all to the Americans, and what did they get in return? In return they received arms in order to establish military bases for Mr. America. We gave them both oil and military bases.(22)

This marriage of Third Worldism with Islam was the potent mixture which fueled the Iranian revolution. The Third Worldist element, essential to winning the support of urban youth, dictated that this revolution would be profoundly anti-American, not just anti-Shah.

Once the Shah was overthrown, the clerics devoted themselves to consolidating power at the expense of not only the liberal nationalists but also the Marxist left. By 1983, they had destroyed the secular parties, such as the pro-Soviet communist Tudeh party and the Fedayeen Guevarist guerrilla group.(23) But the clerics' main fire was directed against the Mojahedin (the People's Mojahedin of Iran, PMOI, or Mojahedin-e Khalq, MEK).

This was no small event. By mid-1981, the Mojahedin newspaper had become the most widely read in Iran, and they were able to regularly draw many tens of thousands into the streets for protests against clerical rule--plus they made an alliance with Iranian President Bani Sadr against the clerics.(24)

The clerics hit back hard. Not content with their street toughs attacking the left, the clerics threw tens thousands of leftists in jail, torturing many. By the account of Khomeini's designated successor, ten thousand were killed in one month alone. Bani Sadr had to flee the country in June 1981, taking off for Paris in the presidential plane along with Mojahedin leaders with whom he then cooperated politically for several years.

The ferocity of the attacks led the Iranian left and intellectual circles generally to hate the clerics as their main enemy. The West no long seemed as terrible as it once did. Indeed, since the clerics made anti-Americanism a defining characteristic of their rule, the left slowly moved away from anti-Americanism. By the late 1980s, the Mojahedin were presenting themselves as the great friends of the United States and American values.

In short, one of the hardline clerics' accomplishments is that they drained Third Worldist anti-Americanism out of the Iranian intellectual and cultural scene.

Nativism

Pro-traditionalist thinking or Nativism has strong roots in Iran. One of the most important modern Iranian authors, Jalal al-Ahmad, wrote an influential book in 1962 entitled Gharbzadegi--a made-up word usually translated as "Westoxication." His theme was how Iranians are abandoning their traditions to ape the West, at the cost of losing their culture and history.(25)

His argument was rooted in leftism: "By providing a passionate eulogy for a passing era and its customs, Gharbazedgi articulated a Third-Worldist discourse very much skeptical of what the West had to offer."(26) While his work was not specifically anti-American, it was no great leap for his readers to see that the fascination with America which was so palpable in 1960s' Iran was the most obvious aspect of what al-Ahmad was attacking. Complaints about the loss of socio-cultural identity as well as reinforcement of traditional values were major themes of Iranian intellectual life from the late 1950s on.(27) Indeed, Boroujerdi describes the 1960s and 1970s as "the heyday of nativism," showing how its influence was powerful in academia.(28)

Al-Ahmad was a secular, leftist intellectual who nevertheless recommended making use of Iran's religious traditions as the most effective vaccine against Western influence.(29)This strand of thinking became a major element in the formation of the Third Worldist-religious alliance which was central to the success of the 1978-1979 revolution. The cement holding them together was one part the secular left's embrace of cultural traditionalism, plus one part the clergy's embrace of Third Worldist anti-imperialism. These two strands came together to make a powerfully anti-American mix.

In other words, the nativist element in Iranian anti-Americanism is more than religious reactionaries rejecting the modern world and all its ways for age-old traditions: Iranian nativism is also the cry of the secular intellectual wanting to preserve Iran's poetry, music, paintings, and traditions. This makes Iranian nativism extraordinarily different from cultural conservatism in much of the Arab world because it includes a defense of Iran's secular culture.

Arab cultural conservatism is more closely tied to religion and opposes local secular culture. For instance, Saudi cultural conservatism is a rejection of modern science as much as of modern rock music or Hollywood films. Abdel Aziz Bin Baz, the long-time official religious leader of Saudi Arabia argued until his 1999 death that Muslims have a religious obligation to hate Jews and Christians in general.(30) To be sure, Bin Baz rejected American values, but that was part and parcel of his general opposition to modern thought. He wrote a book on the theme that anyone who believes that the earth revolves around the sun should be killed (this from the man who had to approve all textbooks used in Saudi schools).

Some Bin-Baz-like attitudes can be found in Iran. For instance, once the clerics consolidated their rule in the early 1980s, they banned all singing in public (or on the radio) by women. Indeed, the only allowed style of male singing was determinedly old-fashioned. But that is not the only direction in which the clerical nativist impulse could go. When in the 1960s, Khomeini objected to the playing of Western-style music on Iranian radio, he complained that not enough was done to promote Iranian culture.(31) And within a few years after taking power, the Islamic Republic gave a boost to the Iranian film industry, seeing Iranian films as a counterweight to Western influence.(32) The Iranian filmmakers, who were generally leftists of a strongly anti-American bent, were acceptable to the Islamic Republic's hardliners so long as their films drew the young away from Western influence.

But as in so many other areas of Iranian life, this anti-Western/anti-American alliance of the modern left and the traditional clergy has come apart. Now, the filmmakers are harassed by an Islamic Republic that dares not openly ban them but which detests them because they mock the hypocrisy and corruption of the hardline clerics.

The history of Iranian cinema in many ways parallels that of Iranian intellectual and cultural life in general. Whereas anti-Americanism was a prominent strain across the political spectrum in the 1970s and well into the 1980s, the hatred for the hardline politicized clerics has become the driving force of the last decade. In that context, anti-Americanism is subordinated, though not entirely gone.

MERIA JOURNAL Volume 8, Number 1 (March 2004)

- Patrick Clawson is the deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The author of more than thirty scholarly articles on the Middle East, Dr. Clawson's most recently edited the publication How to Build a New Iraq after Saddam (The Washington Institute, 2003). Dr. Clawson has also been a senior research professor at the Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University and a research economist at the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Foreign Policy Research Institute.

MERIA is a project of the Global Research in International Affairs

NOTES

1. This episode is discussed in Nazgol Ashouri, "Polling in Iran: Surprising Questions," PolicyWatch No. 757 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 14, 2003. 2. .
3. The statement can be found at .
4. Afshin Molavi, "Iran: Reformist Blues, Economic Woes," PolicyWatch No. 678 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 19, 2002.
5. The best explanation of Iran's peculiar system--in which each official institution is shadowed by a more powerful revolutionary institution--is Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).
6. Cf. Patrick Clawson, "Khatami's Dialogue with America, Not with Washington," PolicyWatch No. 293 from The Washington Institute, January 8, 1998.
7. This episode is described in Patrick Clawson, "Reading the Popular Mood in Iran," PolicyWatch No. 770 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 7, 2003.
8. This episode is described in Patrick Clawson, "Iran: Demonstrations, Despair, and Danger," PolicyWatch No. 766 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 11, 2003.
9. For an analysis of this reaction to Bush's "axis of evil" speech, see Ray Takeyh, "Iran: Scared Straight?", PolicyWatch No. 622 from The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 3, 2002.
10. .
11. James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 5.
12. Mark Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
13. Barry Rubin, Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 80.
14. Rubin, op. cit., p. 88.
15. Rubin, op. cit., pp. 285-291.
16. Quoted in Rubin, op. cit., p. 306.
17. The fear expressed by the hostage-takers was that the United States would work with the liberals to stage a coup, which they compared to the overthrow of Mossadegh. Cf. Massoumeh Ebtekar, Takeover in Tehran: The Inside Story of the 1979 U.S. Embassy Capture (Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2000), e.g., p. 52.
18. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Barry Rubin, "Regime Change in Iran: A Reassessment," MERIA Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June
2003)
19. The phrase is Ervand Abrahamian's, from Iran Between Two Revolutions
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 464. His analysis of Shariati continues to p. 473.
20. On his popularity and its central role in the 1979 revolution, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 534. See also Ali Shariati, Marxism and other Western Fallacies (translated by Richard Campbell;
Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980). His works are analyzed in depth in Nikpey, op. cit., pp. 99-180.
21. Ervand Abhrahamian, The Iranian Mohahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 22, which is also where the following quote comes from.
22. Quoted in Peter Chelkowski and Hamid Dabashi, Staging a Revolution: The Art of Persuasin in the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York, New York University Press, 1999), p. 39.
23. As described in great detail in Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a
Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran (London: I.B. Taurus, 1999).
24. The definitive account of the Mojahedin's role in this period is Abrahamian, The Iranian Mohahedin (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 186-245.
25. The best study of al-Ahmad's relation to Third Worldist thought--specifically Fannon--is Amir Nikpey, Pouvoir et religion en Iran contemporain (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2001), pp. 86-92.
26. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), p 68.
27. Negin Nabavi, Intellectuals and the State in Iran: Politics, Discourse, and the Dilemma of Authenticity (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2003), pp. 28-64.
28. Boroujerdi, op. cit., p. 132, as part of a chapter on academic nativism, pp 131-155.
29. Nikpey, op. cit., pp. 92-97.
30. His writings and his influence are analyzed in detail in Antoine Basbous, L'Arabie Saoudite en Question (Paris: Perrin, 2002), especially pp. 125-140.
31. Vanessa Martin, Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran (London: I.B. Taurus, 2003), p. 115.
32. Homuz Key, Le cineman iranien (Paris: Karthala, 1999), especially pp. 83-96 and 239-266, and Mamad Haghighat, Histoire du cinema iranien
(Paris: Cinema du reel/Centre Georges Pompidou, 1999).

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