Special Forces and the Campaign Against Terror (Lengthy and informative)

The World & I ^ | March 2004 | Alan W. Dowd

[quidnunc]

Unconventional means and methods of warfare, using Special Forces who infiltrate by stealth and deception, are not just the province of terrorists and those bent on harming the West and America. The United States has used such forces from the American Revolution to the present.

When able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. … Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. – Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Whether they realize it or not, America's terrorist enemies are students of Sun Tzu, the Chinese military strategist credited with authoring one of the most pivotal treatises in all of warfare. Much has been written about how and why they employ "asymmetrical warfare" to threaten and indeed harm U.S. interests and citizens, but the idea behind it is fairly simple. "We have destroyed the war we do best," as Michael Vlahos of the Joint Warfare Analysis Department at Johns Hopkins observes. "No one can hope to win fighting our kind of war, so they will make war they can win." [1] In other words, the United States is so militarily powerful, so technologically advanced, that the best way — perhaps the only way — to challenge it is to use unconventional means and methods to attack Americans where they least expect it and thus level the battlefield.

The al Qaeda network, for example, has deployed small, self-contained units around the world not to target armies but to carry out operations intended to shock and frighten civilian populations into pressuring Western (especially American) political leaders to change policy. Al Qaeda has used a bomb-laden rubber boat against the USS Cole, car bombs against embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and civilian airliners against skyscrapers. Likewise, members of the Fedayeen Saddam dressed in civilian clothes and even used pregnant women to conduct suicide bombings against U.S. forces in Iraq. Hezbollah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs strap time bombs onto men dressed like rabbis.

However, asymmetrical warfare is not the sole domain of bin Laden's followers, Saddam's leftovers, and Arafat's plainclothes killers. U.S. Special Operations Forces, in a sense, embody America's own brand of asymmetrical warfare. Though their ends and means are far different from those of the enemy, U.S. Special Forces are also students of Sun Tzu: After all, they infiltrate foreign lands by stealth and deception. They are anonymous and adept at blending into their surroundings. They rely on small groups to carry out their missions rather than large armies or air forces. They emerge from the shadows to strike the enemy when and where he least expects it. And they aim to make the business of terrorism so costly, so dangerous, so painful that the next generation of would-be terror leaders will choose a different vocation.

-snip-

Today, Special Operations Forces are rewriting the annals of military history, as they take the lead role in the global war on terror. The way Americans view this campaign against terror — and for that matter, the way it has been prosecuted — can be divided into three broad, overlapping categories. For some, the campaign is a full-blown war against terrorist organizations and their state sponsors. Reforming or destroying them will take years of pitched battles and regional wars of the sort Washington has waged in Iraq and Afghanistan — and is threatening to carry into Syria and Iran.

Others view the campaign as a war against the Islamist ideology. To defeat it, the United States will have to outlast it, outargue it, outthink it, outspend it, outmaneuver it, and outfight it, just as occurred during the Cold War with Moscow. The postwar efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq are indicative of the ambidexterity and endurance required to win such a conflict.

Still others see the effort as a kind of global police action, a campaign to control and contain terrorist activity, just as cops on the beat combat crime. An example of this might be Washington's rapid reflexes in places like the Philippines, Yemen, and Central Asia.

No matter how America's political and military leaders ultimately choose to prosecute the campaign, however — as a hot war, a cold war, a police action, or some combination of all of these — the Special Forces will play a central role. Indeed, they already are.

Within days, perhaps hours, of the attacks on Manhattan and Washington, D.C., U.S. and British Special Forces, along with intelligence operatives, slipped into Afghanistan and Pakistan. They gathered intelligence, made contacts with key tribal leaders, used a mix of bluster and cash to win the allegiance of the various militias that had been fighting in vain against the Taliban, and prepared the battle space for the unconventional war that followed.

-snip-

[PeteFromMontana]

Thanks for posting this. It looks quite informative.

Bookmarked for reading later

[ibbryn]

Can someone please tell me the function of SEAL Team 6 and how they differ from other SEALs.

[Vigilantcitizen]

Locator.

[quidnunc]

The Navy's DEVGRU group, better known as "Seal Team Six",  was made famous by their original commander, Richard Marcinko. Most of who they are and what they do is classified. Responsible for counterterrorist operations in the maritime environment.

http://www.specialforces.net/Seal_Team_6/Default.htm

[Stopislamnow]

Very good article quid, thanks for posting it.

[angkor]

Interesting article.

Aren't these the bad boys from TF121 who captured Saddam?

[Buggman]

Bump for when I get home from work.

Thanks for the post, quidnuc.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

ping

[Cannoneer No. 4]

February 22, 2004: SOCOMs (Special Operations Command) highly trained Rangers, Special Forces and commandoes have a reputation for inflicting heavy casualties, and not taking many in return. Over 5,000 SOCOM troops were operating in Iraq during 2003, and ten were killed in action (five Rangers, two Special Forces, two Air Force and one Army support troops). There was a larger number of wounded, but this number was not released. SOCOM troops avoid casualties through thorough planning, high training levels and excellent team work. Throughout history, the more skilled and better trained troops have consistently won lopsided victories and taken fewer casualties than their opponents. SOCOM deliberately follows in that tradition. But because of the selective nature of such units, you can never have many troops of this quality. SOCOM has about 10,000 "operators" (combat troops) and has a hard time recruiting enough qualified new people to replace those retiring or moving on to other military or civilian jobs. SOCOM also has 35,000 support troops, most of whom were also carefully selected and trained.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

October 16, 2003: In two years of operations, 71 Special Operations troops have been killed in combat or accidents. Another several hundred have been wounded and injured. Only about 10,000 Special Operations troops have been in combat, and this includes some support troops, and crewmen on Special Operations helicopters and aircraft. So the annual loss rate from the deaths and injuries are not quite one percent a year. But it takes 2-3 years to replace losses, and recruiting and training efforts have been increased. Even in peacetime, there would be close to ten percent losses a year from retirement, resignations and injuries. So the wartime losses are not a major strain. But replacing the additional losses also makes it more difficult to increase the number of Special Operations "operators" (like Special Forces, Delta Force and SEALs). Increased recruiting and training operations underway indicate that the Department of Defense is looking at the war on terror is going to be a drawn out operation.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

February 27, 2004: The United States is having a hard time increasing the size of its commando force (Army Delta Force and Navy SEALs). Most of the operators (as the commandoes call themselves) are SEALs, and they are trying to increase their strength by 270 (to about 3,000) in the next two years. It's not easy, as only about five percent of those that apply (and they have to meet minimum physical and mental standards, and already be in the navy, to get that far) eventually get through all the testing and training to become SEALs. The SEALs run five classes, each of 120 men, each year. More than half drop out, or are flunked out, by week six. At the end of the 27 week course, only about two dozen graduate.

Delta Force, which only has a few hundred operators, is thought to be even more exacting. Twice a year, Delta Force recruiters go looking for recruits among active duty soldiers. About five percent of army troops in Korea applied recently, and that might yield a dozen or so Delta operators several years form now.

The commando officers have so far resisted appeals from Pentagon brass to lower standards in order to increase the number of commandoes. The commando leadership know their history, and realize that lowering commando standards simply gets commandos killed in failed missions.

U.S. commandos have been taking the lead in the war on terrorism. The commando units avoid publicity (in order to keep their methods secret), but have been involved in hundreds of operations. The guys who pulled Saddam out of his hole were commandos, and many of the key raids in Iraq and Afghanistan were led by commandos. The most difficult operations tend to go to commandos, because these troops rarely fail. But that's only because they are carefully selected and trained. naturally, the brass would love to have more of these guys. But that's the problem with selectivity; you can't have more.

[Cannoneer No. 4]

February 9, 2004: Some battlefield lessons are difficult to digest, and cause institutional indigestion as well. The most recent case of this was the 2001 Afghanistan campaign. Less than a hundred Special Forces troops, backed by 24/7 air support, were all that was needed to support the Northern Alliance forces and defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in two months. The twelve man Special Forces A Teams operated as they were trained to do. Using initiative, imagination and a good working relationship with their Afghan allies, the went straight for their main goal; the destruction of Taliban and al Qaeda combat units.

When higher ranking commanders arrived, things began to slow down. Middle management brings in more people looking for something to do. Special Forces units are organized into groups (brigades) and battalions. There are small staffs to assist the lieutenant colonels (commanding battalions) and colonels (commanding groups.) These guys want to look like they are doing something, so they start communication with their subordinates. This takes time. Before the brass arrived, the twelve man A Teams (six of these comprise a company, supervised by a major and a small staff) were free to get the job done. Now they had to deal with lots of "supervision." This slowed things down. The guys in the A Teams see anyone above company commander as a career officer more interested in getting promoted than in helping the A Teams do their job.

There were other command problems as well. The army wanted to get more troops into Afghanistan, at least so secure bases could be set up. Some of these bases were important, like the airport outside Kabul. There were also diplomats and other government bureaucrats arriving to deal with the new government, and the army had to protect these people.

Meanwhile, the A Teams were eager to go round up senior Taliban leaders and al Qaeda members. But the time of "just doing it" were over. Plans had to be drawn up, discussed and implemented. This was not good for the fluid situation that still existed at the end of 2001 in Afghanistan. You knew it was all over for the fast moving A Teams when the order came down for everyone to get into uniform and shave the damn beards off. The A Teams had been wearing Afghan clothes and letting the whiskers sprout so they could blend in with the friendly Afghans they were working with, and not tip off the bad guys they were chasing. But now the army was in charge, and there was a chain of command that had to be consulted.

There was a similar situation in Iraq, but it didn't involve the Special Forces. While there were even more A Teams operating in Iraq, they were again turned loose and left alone until the fighting was over. But the regular army found that the battle was moving so quickly that the brigade and division commanders didn't have a lot of control over the operation. It was a battalion commanders war. The only valuable things the combat battalion commanders wanted from their superiors were ammo and fuel, and information. The "intelligence" (information), as usual, didn't get down to the battalion commanders fast enough to be useful. But the battalion commanders had "Blue Force Tracker," a laptop based computer program that showed them on the screen where all friendly troops were (via a transmitter all small units had, that sent info to a satellite, and then down to the Blue Force Tracker equipped laptops.) This gave the battalion commanders important information on where friendly troops were, and using instant messaging build into Blue Force Tracker, they could quickly exchange information on the enemy with nearby friendly units. Thus the battalion commanders didn’t have to rely on intelligence from above. So the battalion commanders just fought their way forward. The only orders they got from above were what general direction to go in and where they could find the fuel and ammo trucks they needed resupply from in order to keep moving and fighting. The brigade and division commanders were smart enough to see what worked, and pretty much left the battalion commanders to take care of the war.

The next war will be a little different. The army is installing the other components of the "battlefield Internet" that Blue Force Tracker was only a part of. The complete system will enable a senior commander to instantly see where all his people are and reports showing the latest information on enemy troops (red icons on the same screen, along with all the blue "friendly" ones). No one yet knows how senior commanders will deal with that degree of control. The information on enemy troop locations will probably be pretty accurate, because battalions and companies will have their own mini-UAVs, which will provide more information on what's in front of friendly battalions. In the past, the senior commanders would have everyone halt while information on enemy and friendly positions was examined and a plan prepared. But the 2003 campaign showed that you can make more progress if you just let the battalion commanders size up the situation in front of them and act immediately.

The good news is that in 2003, the brigade and division commanders trusted their battalion commanders and let them fight the battle as they saw fit. But that was because the battalion commanders had better information, thanks to Blue Force Tracker, than ever before. Will the senior brass trust the battalion commanders again? Probably. But that could change. Some senior commanders are tempted by this unprecedented amount of information, and every division commander is tempted to run the battalions again. The battlefield Internet system, in theory, allows them to do that. We won't know how this will play out until the next major campaign comes along.

The Special Forces are still debating on how to deal with all those middle management officers. The big problem with the Special Forces is they very high quality of their A Team troops. These men are the best America has. Well trained, smart, and with lots of initiative and eagerness to quickly solve problems and get on with it. The Special Forces will also have Blue Force Tracker, and lots of other battlefield Internet stuff. They also have their own mini-UAVs.

The next war is never exactly like the last one. But past experience does influence future operations. Exactly how won't be known until it happens.