I'm not suggesting that the claims of Iraqi WMD were right; the physical evidence certainly seems to indicate the contrary.
I'm only saying that this was a very, very widespread belief in the intelligence community, and it wasn't coming from Douglas Feith or Cheney or anybody, it was coming from the analysts who were working with the raw intelligence, and their reports customarily included extracts from the raw intel. For example, a SIGINT report will include some parts of the actual transcript, an IMINT report will not only explain what was in the pictures but includes the pictures so that the recipient can see for himself.
I certainly didn't see all of this stuff (my interests are in other areas), but I did read the daily classified world intel briefings, which during the buildup included a lot on Iraq and a lot on Iraqi WMD. I saw a great deal of what seemed to be conclusive evidence, and I was convinced at the time. When our guys went to sites where we had very extensive technical reporting indicating that chemical weapons were there, and there were no chemical weapons there, you could have knocked me over with a feather.
I don't think Douglas Feith has any impact on an E-4 transcribing an audiotape or warrant officer matching up a truck in a photograph with a picture of a known Russian chemical decontamination vehicle. Moreover, Ahmed Chalabi can't influence that kind of intelligence gathering. All the various disciplines of intelligence normally reinforce, and, significantly, provide a cross-check on each other.
In this case, that system failed and our decision makers got bad input. I think that is a consensus point. The question is, why? Reporters seek a conspiratorial answer, especially reporters, like those at the Times, with more of a political axe to grind than a concern for facts. But the facts don't support a conspiracy, yet, and they probably won't.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F