Senator, those Mullahs in Iran know better than most that: "Money is the mother's milk of politics." After all, they bought a revolution with it and seized a country. Contrary to the cynics, we refuse to accept or entertain the idea that the millions of dollars that the Islamic regime is disbursing to the Democratic Party, through your supposed Iranian-American fundraisers or the so-called Iranian-American PACs or alleged charities, has anything to do with your comments. Sir, those duplicitous and cunning Mullahs in Iran are dangling the lure of other advantages, prior to the elections, to the other side as well.
Would be nice to have some details on this!!!
Interesting indeed. How to go about looking into this? Might trace it forward from whoever influenced Jimmy Carter's anti-Shah policy, perhaps? Here's an aside on that for those interested:
From Kai Bird, The Chairman: John McCloy: The Making of the American Establishment, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992, 643:
"As late as May 1978, Carter's ambassador in Tehran had reported that the regime was firmly in place, but by the autumn William Sullivan had changed his mind. On November 9, 1978, he wrote a cable entitled 'Thinking the Unthinkable', and recommended that private talks be opened with the Ayatollah Khomenei's entourage in an attempt to broker a peaceful transition to a new coalition government composed of moderate elements in the opposition. Sullivan was not alone in this view. Henry Precht, one of the Foreign Service's most knowledgeable Iran experts, believed the shah was completely isolated."
http://www.workmall.com/wfb2001/iran/iran_history_the_bakhtiar_government.html
Following Khomeini's arrival in Tehran, clandestine contacts took place between Khomeini's representatives and a number of military commanders. These contacts were encouraged by United States ambassador William Sullivan, who had no confidence in the Bakhtiar government, thought the triumph of the Khomeini forces inevitable, and believed future stability in Iran could be assured only if an accommodation could be reached between the armed forces and the Khomeini camp. Contacts between the military chiefs and the Khomeini camp were also being encouraged by United States general Robert E. Huyser, who had arrived in Tehran on January 4, 1979, as President Carter's special emissary. Huyser's assignment was to keep the Iranian army intact, to encourage the military to maintain support for the Bakhtiar government, and to prepare the army for a takeover, should that become necessary. Huyser began a round of almost daily meetings with the service chiefs of the army, navy, and air force, plus heads of the National Police and the Gendarmerie who were sometimes joined by the chief of SAVAK. He dissuaded those so inclined from attempting a coup immediately upon Khomeini's return to Iran, but he failed to get the commanders to take any other concerted action. He left Iran on February 3, before the final confrontation between the army and the revolutionary forces.
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer/back/journals/2000/Vol26_4/8.htm
The key players were Carter, Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Harold Brown did not play a key role because he did not have as much access to Carter compared to Vance and Brzezinski.55 Brzezinski was thought to be more aggressive and innovative than Vance but Vance was believed to be more skilful than Brzezinski in assessing the feasibility of policy options.56 Carter had different expectations from both men due to their different strengths. "Carter believed he would benefit from hearing both the cautious, bureaucratic considerations of Vance and the more action-oriented and abstract considerations of Brzezinski."57
Brzezinski was the more hawkish of the two. He was convinced of the need to maintain a pro-American regime in Iran. He established close contact with the Iranian ambassador to America, Zahedi, who sought to get American support for the Shah through Brzezinski.58 Brzezinski was painting a more optimistic picture of the Shah to Carter and was determined to keep the Shah in power.59 He was a strong advocate for a military clampdown on the opposition.60 Later, he even advocated a military coup but Carter was not in favour of a military crackdown or coup.61
Brzezinski manipulated the advisory process. When Henry Precht (Department of State Desk Officer for Iran) proposed that the US remove the Shah and seek contact with Khomeini's forces for a coalition government, Brzezinski excluded Precht from SCC meetings.62 On 24 October, the State Department had produced a memo on how to deal with the situation in Iran. As he disagreed entirely with the memo, he shelved it permanently.63 Later, he attempted to change Carter's policy subtly by calling the Shah on the telephone on 3 November and stated American support for "any actions that the Shah considered necessary",64 thus implying a military crackdown. He also tried to encourage the Shah to crackdown on the opposition through Zahedi.65 On the other hand, William Sullivan, the US ambassador to Iran, told the Shah that the US would not be responsible for such actions.66 Hence, the Shah was confused by these conflicting messages.
On the other hand, Vance argued that the US could not assume responsibility for a bloodbath in Iran67 and recommended large-scale political reforms.68 He sought a broad-based coalition government that included forces from Khomeini's camp.69 There was a possible move by Vance to move Carter towards his views. The Carter administration had commissioned George Ball, the former Deputy Secretary of State, as an independent consultant. Ball recommended a civilian coalition government.70 A SCC meeting was convened on 13 December to discuss Ball's proposal. On the same day, Sullivan sent a cable recommending the same policy.71
It was plausible that the Ball episode was "a clever and sophisticated move to bring Carter around to Vance's view".72 Initially, everyone, including Brzezinski, liked the idea of appointing an independent consultant. Later on, Brzezinski regretted this move when he realised that Ball was a good friend of Vance's. This move eventually failed because Carter insisted upon a coalition government without Khomeini.73 While Vance was telling the Shah through Sullivan to swiftly establish a civilian government,74 Brzezinski was encouraging a military government.
Finally, to shed more light on the compromise message drafted for Carter while he was away at Camp David, we should examine how each player attempted to manipulate the information presented to Carter. At the meeting on 28 December, Brzezinski took the lead in drafting the message for Carter. He tried to ensure that the message was subtle enough to include the military option.75 The message first stated that the US preferred a coalition government. "If there was uncertainty about the underlying orientation of such a government or its capability to govern, or if the army was in danger of being fragmented" , 76 "then a firm military government under the Shah may be unavoidable".77 Vance was in charge of bringing the message to Carter. At Vance's urging, Carter changed the language to ensure that the military option would not be considered.78 Instead of "a firm military government", the message now advised "a government which would end disorder, violence and bloodshed".79 The Shah failed to see any guidance in this message.
http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/2000/08/15/p12s3.htm
Israel and the US role in the Mideast
The Aug. 9 opinion piece by Henry Precht ("Doing the lock step on Israel") resorts to the tactic of blaming the Jewish community for many Middle Eastern problems. It willfully ignores many aspects of the Middle East situation in order to claim that Jews control Washington and the American media. In fact, media coverage is more balanced than Mr. Precht is willing to admit.
Moreover, he underestimates the importance of US involvement in the ongoing peace process to American interests, instead claiming that the US government's role in the peace negotiations is solely due to the strength of the "Israel lobby." What the article calls a bias in the media is merely a recognition that Israel is America's best friend in the region, is the lone true democracy, and has longed for peace for decades.
It is a shame that at a time when Israel is making far-reaching concessions for peace, and when Palestinians and Syrians are once again missing opportunities to make the lives of their people ones of hope and progress, all Henry Precht can contribute is the old canard of Jewish control.
Abraham H. Foxman New York
National Director, Anti-Defamation League
Anyone wondering why State Department Arabists have gained such a bad reputation need only read retired Foreign Service officer Henry Precht's Aug. 9 opinion piece. Talk about "going native"! He sounds more Arab than the Arabs. Only a mentality such as his could perceive Washington and "lock step" media having "heavy bias in support of Israel." As for Israel "learn[ing] to live with its neighbors," he has that reversed. It is the neighbors who have waged continuous economic, propaganda, and periodic actual war against her, and who have yet to come to terms with her existence. That's a reality that can't be erased by his tendentious appeal to history and citizens.
Richard D. Wilkins
Syracuse, N.Y.
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0822-03.htm
Published on Thursday, August 22, 2002 in the Christian
Science Monitor
Think Before Leaping Into War
by Henry Precht
BRIDGTON, MAINE – There should be little mystery about the outcome of an American war on Iraq. History and the neighborhood teach us the necessary lessons. Let us consider two possible scenarios for an attack:
First, the fighting may be bloody on both sides and prolonged. When the US sent troops into Lebanon in 1982 against the Arab consensus, more than 200 Marines and diplomats fell victim to terrorism. The region was enraged against the US. This time, the psychological buildup in the region opposing a war with Iraq is even more intense and widespread, owing in great part to our association with Israel's repression of the second intifada. We can anticipate anti-American acts of terrorism worldwide.
When the 1991 coalition forces fought to free Kuwait, the price of oil shot up but subsided after a quick victory. Allies paid the bills. This time, a longer war will inflate oil prices and the US budget deficit and deflate the world economy. Despite the patriotic drama that will be played out under President Bush's war leadership, his political future will be dimmed by the distress of many families.
Let us assume a second, rosier scenario that goes according to the Pentagon's plans: Fighting is short and free of serious casualties, Saddam Hussein disappears and is replaced by a congenial coalition of our choosing, Iraqis welcome American troops as the Afghans did and only a relatively few troops remain to ensure order. In a few months, the appointed Iraqi leaders hold free elections and a new coalition takes power.
What kinds of policies will the new regime be expected to pursue? Will they serve the interests of American liberators? How will they affect the region?
First, the fresh faces in Baghdad will want to begin the work of reconstruction. That will mean maximizing income from oil production. Decent relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran will be important; all OPEC will share Iraq's interest in keeping oil prices high.
Second, the new regime will have to establish nationalist credentials. There will be little tolerance for breakaway Kurds or Shiites. (If, somehow, Kurdish autonomy is confirmed by the newcomers, won't Turkey's Kurds see an attractive model and Ankara, a threatening one?) Will the new regime yield Iraq's historic claim to Kuwait? Not if it wishes to remain consistent with historic Iraqi nationalism. Further, for Mr. Hussein's first successors, rebuilding conventional military and internal security forces will be a priority. Before long, a truly national regime will have to oppose the presence of foreign troops on Iraqi soil.
Third, democratically chosen rulers will naturally conform to the Arab consensus on the Arab-Israel conflict, an attitude bound to estrange them from Washington and bring Baghdad closer to Tehran, Damascus, and Cairo.
Fourth, if democracy is seen to work in Iraq, most Arabs will ask, why not in our land as well? The internal pressures on Washington's dependent friends in Amman, Cairo, and Riyadh will mount to open up their prisons and voting booths. Washington won't relish the prospect of Islamic radicals taking power in those capitals.
Fifth, with Iraq liberated, the Bush administration's Middle East agenda will be obliged to focus on an Israel-Palestine solution. That will mean either applying unaccustomed pressure on Prime Minister Sharon or continuing the close support of his policies, abhorred by Arabs. Either way, Washington will have a crisis in its relations with the region.
What is the alternative to these two depressing scenarios? Not an easy one, for it will mean climbing down from the rhetorical heights scaled by Mr. Bush and his war party. Indirect and multilateral diplomacy must be given an honest chance to work. The UN, the Europeans, and the regional Arab states are eager to weigh in with Baghdad to find ways to resume and guarantee truly effective weapons inspections. Baghdad just might be persuaded – given the prospect of yet another devastating defeat.
Bush should also be persuaded – by the danger that either a bloody or rosy regime-change scenario in Iraq could lead to regime change in this country.
Henry Precht is a retired Foreign Service officer with experience in the Middle East since 1964.