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Iran — 'facing its greatest ever crisis'

Michael Jansen

Jordan Times, Thursday, February 12, 2004

THIS WEEK, Iran marked the 25th anniversary of the victory of the Islamic revolution over the shah. But for the two-thirds of Iranians born after the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the triumph of the revolution has become a phyrric victory because the revolution has been hijacked by a clique of ultraconservative clerics who have refused to permit democracy to emerge. Consequently, the Islamic Republic is facing its greatest ever crisis. A month ago, the ultraconservatives banned half of the 8,100 candidates, including 83 members of the outgoing parliament and other known reformists seeking to stand in the Feb. 20 parliamentary poll. They were barred from standing on the ground that they did possess the correct “Islamic” credentials. After weeks of haggling, only 200-odd candidates were reinstated, leaving the field open to candidates allied with the conservative ruling establishment which enjoys little popular support. The reformist camp argued that the ultraconservatives had deprived the poll of credibility and seriously reduced popular representativity in parliament.

The objective of the conservative clerics is to secure a majority in parliament ahead of next year's presidential poll, where they also seek victory. They do not want to risk tensions within the society created by another protracted struggle with the reform camp. The alternative is exercising total control.

During the past century, Iran had four opportunities to create a democratic government responsive to the wishes of its people. The first came between 1906-11, with the rise of the Constitutional Movement, which attempted to curb the powers of the Qajar dynasty. The Constitutional Movement, idealised by Iranian historians, failed because it was too elitist and Britain and Russia intervened.

The second opportunity occurred when the nationalist Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh took power between 1951-53, unseating the Pahlavi dynasty. On that occasion, the US and Britain staged a coup against him and reinstated the shah. While he was supposed to rule as a constitutional monarch, the shah assumed full powers, thwarting prime ministers and ignoring parliament.

The third occasion was in 1979, when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini toppled the shah and established the Islamic Republic. To ensure that the elected institutions of government remained true to his Islamic ideology, Khomeini imposed a clerical superstructure on the state, the vilayet-e-faqih, rule by theologians. In theory, this institution was to provide guidance; in practice, it put the government in a straightjacket fashioned by the most conservative of the political clerics. They imposed a restrictive social and political regime on the Iranian people and exerted close control over the economy through public companies and the wealthy charitable institutions, the bonyads. The rule of the conservative clerics became synonymous with repression, corruption and economic stagnation.

The fourth opportunity for democratisation came in 1997, when the liberal middle-ranking cleric, Mohammad Khatami was elected president by 69 per cent of Iran's frustrated voters. He promised political and economic reform and liberalisation and the establishment of the rule of law and the institutions of civil society. His objective was Islamic democracy within the framework of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. But the conservatives in faqih, determined to retain their power and privileges, fought his attempts at social liberalisation and obstructed his political and economic reforms. The tools the conservatives used in their campaign were the 12-member Council of Guardians and the conservative-dominated parliament. But the momentum of Khatami's democratic revolution within the revolution was irresistible. In 2000, Khatami's supporters won 70 per cent of the seats in parliament. Nevertheless, the conservatives continued to oppose him on every front, through the veto on legislation and candidates for office wielded by the Council of Guardians, and through the judiciary which closed down dozens of reform newspapers and jailed progressive thinkers. Khatami's efforts were stymied and he gradually lost the confidence of the Iranian people, who became disillusioned and apathetic.

While acknowledging that the conservatives have done everything in their power to obstruct Khatami's agenda and curb the reformists, Iranians also blame the president and his supporters for failing to confront the conservatives. But Iranians should never have believed Khatami would take on this task. Khatami is a middle-ranking cleric himself, totally committed to the Islamic Revolution and Iran's Islamic constitution which sets the vilayet-e-faqih above the elected institutions of government. His aim was always to democratise the existing system, not to do away with it, as radicals in the reform camp demand. Although he has repeatedly threatened to resign in response to conservative obstructionism, he has not done so. As a result, he and the reformists have lost credibility. To make matters worse, Khatami's sliding standing with the populace has recently accelerated because he rejected calls to postpone the coming poll, call upon all his supporters to boycott the poll, or support the refusal of officials in the interior ministry and provincial governors to organise the election.

Some commentators draw parallels between the shah and the faqih and predict the early demise of the inflexible mullahs. But this is unlikely. The conservative clerical faction is divided between ideologues, who seem to have the upper hand at present, and pragmatists, who could yet intervene and find a compromise with moderate reformists led by Khatami, thereby defusing the current crisis. Unlike the shah, who had few supporters towards the end of his reign, the conservatives still enjoy the backing of influential merchants and artisans and the deeply devout members of the urban working class and peasantry. Finally, the reformists have no leader other than the moderate president, and the mullahs will do everything in their power to prevent the emergence of a charismatic figure — like Ayatollah Khomeini — who could generate a new insurrection.

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