There is no historical evidence that the Bill of Rights applied to the states. There is good historical evidence that it applied only to the federal government.
I'm not saying that your's is an unreasonable interpretation- just that it is not the interpretation that was held when the Constitution and Bill of Rights was ratified and put in operation.
As I said, I just don't understand why people want to believe otherwise.
Apparently it is merely the desire to read the most rights into the Constitution. I think the most rights can be had by being faithful to the Constitution as it was understood by the Founders. A living Constitution is too easy to abuse- no matter how well meaning one may be.
Your POV is skewed; with all due respect. Both of these statements are non-sequitur. In proper perspective the first ten Amendments of the BoR's applies to "the people." They enumerate and describe general 'inalienable' rights of individuals in particular ways. (The Tenth asserts that the enumeration is not exhaustive.) They also specify particular actions that would violate those 'inalienable' rights.
The BoR's does not grant or in any way limit the rights of 'the people.' The DoI expressly delineates the source of rights (our Creator) and their nature (inalienable).
With or without the 14th A.; what definition of the word 'inalienable' would the founders have considered infringible by the States? Do you contend that the founders intended the Constitution to be protection of 'God given' rights only from the intrusion of the federal government and that State gov.'s could ignore or dismiss them as they saw fit?
There is some evidence, though perhaps not from the immediate period around ratification of the Constitution.
See: Nunn vs Georgia, an 1846 Georgia Supreme Court decision.
" I am aware that it has been decided, that this, like other amendments adopted at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the United States, and does not extend to the individual States. The court held otherwise, however, in the case of the People vs. Goodwin, (16 John. Rep. 200) and Chief Justice Spencer, who delivered its opinion, says: "The defendant's counsel rely principally on the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which contains this provision "Nor, shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." It has been urged by the prisoner's counsel, that this constitutional provision operates upon State courts--proprio vigore. This has been denied on the other side. I am inclined to the opinion, that the article in question does extend to all judicial tribunals whether constituted by the Congress of the United States or the States individually. The provision is general in its nature and unrestricted in its terms; and the sixth article of the Constitution declares, that the constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding. These general and comprehensive expressions extend the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, to every article which is not confined by the subject matter to the national government, and is equally applicable to the States. Be this as it may, the principle is undeniable, that no person can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offence."
The language of the second amendment is broad enough to embrace both Federal and State governments--nor is there anything in its terms which restricts its meaning. The preamble which was prefixed to these amendments shows, that they originated in the fear that the powers of the general government were not sufficiently limited. Several of the States in their act of ratification recommended that further restrictive clauses should he added. And in the first session of the first Congress, ten of these amendments having been agreed to by that body, and afterwards sanctioned by three-fourths of the States, became a part of the Constitution. But admitting all this, does it follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? Is this a right reserved to the States or to themselves? Is it not an inalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is too dear to be confided to a republican legislature.
Questions under some of these amendments, it is true, can only arise under the laws and Constitution of the United States. But there are other provisions in them, which were never intended to be thus restricted, but were designed for the benefit of every citizen of the Union in all courts and in all places; and the people of the several States, in ratifying them in their respective State conventions, have virtually adopted them as beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own legislatures, as well as that of Congress. If a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of the State of Georgia and of the United States, is it competent for the General Assembly to take away this security, by disarming the people? What advantage would it be to tie up the hands of the national legislature, if it were in the power of the States to destroy this bulwark of defence ? In solemnly affirming that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, and that, in order to train properly that militia; the unlimited right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be impaired, are not the sovereign people of the State committed by this pledge to preserve this right inviolate? Would they not be recreant to themselves, to free government, and false to their own vow, thus voluntarily taken, to suffer this right to be questioned? If they hesitate or falter, is it not to concede (themselves being judges) that the safety of the States is a matter of indifference?
Such, I apprehend, was never the meaning of the venerated statesman who recommended, nor of the people who adopted, this amendment.
The right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for a redress of grievances; to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures; in all criminal prosecutions, to be confronted with the witness against them; to be publicly tried by an impartial jury; and to have the assistance of counsel for their defence, is as perfect under the State as the national legislature, and cannot be violated by either.
Nor is the right involved in this discussion less comprehensive or valuable: "The right of the people to bear arms shall not be infringed;" The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and hear arms of every description, not merely as are used by the militia, shall not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and void, which contravenes this right,
...
We are of the opinion, then, that so far as the act of 1837 seeks to suppress the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, that it is valid, inasmuch as it does not deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear arms. But that so much of it, as contains a prohibition against bearing arms openly is in conflict with the Constitution, and void; and that, as the defendant has been indicted and convicted for carrying a pistol, without charging that it was done in a concealed manner, under that portion of the statute which entirely forbids its use, the judgment of the court below must be reversed, and the proceeding quashed. "