KAY: Senator Warner, you're absolutely -- I think -- and I think I've said, but let me be absolutely clear about it -- Iraq was in clear and material violation of 1441. They maintained programs and activities, and they certainly had the intentions at a point to resume their program. So there was a lot they wanted to hide because it showed what they were doing that was illegal. I hope we find even more evidence of that.
WARNER: Part of that program were missiles; clearly, clearly, in defiance of the U.M. resolution in terms of range. They had the potential to incorporate in those warheads, although small quantities, nevertheless very lethal types of WMD. Am I not correct in that?
KAY: You're absolutely correct.
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KAY: Senator Warner, I think the world is far safer with the disappearance and the removal of Saddam Hussein. I have said I actually think this may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought.
I think when we have the complete record you're going to discover that after 1998 it became a regime that was totally corrupt. Individuals were out for their own protection. And in a world where we know others are seeking WMD, the likelihood at some point in the future of a seller and a buyer meeting up would have made that a far more dangerous country than even we anticipated with what may turn out not to be a fully accurate estimate.
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Saddam Hussein developed and used weapons of mass destruction; true?
KAY: Absolutely.
MCCAIN: He used them against the Iranians and the Kurds; just yes or no.
KAY: Oh, yes.
MCCAIN: OK.
And U.N. inspectors found enormous quantities of banned chemical and biological weapons in Iraq in the '90s.
KAY: Yes, sir.
MCCAIN: We know that Saddam Hussein had once a very active nuclear program.
KAY: Yes.
MCCAIN: And he realized and had ambitions to develop and use weapons of mass destruction.
KAY: Clearly.
MCCAIN: So the point is, if he were in power today, there is no doubt that he would harbor ambitions for the development and use of weapons of mass destruction. Is there any doubt in your mind?
KAY: There's absolutely no doubt. And I think I've said that, Senator.
MCCAIN: But you agree with the fundamental principle here that what we did was justified and enhance the security of the United States and the world by removing Saddam Hussein from power?
KAY: Absolutely.
MCCAIN: OK. That's important to establish, because now in this political season, those are attempting to be mixed that because we didn't find the weapons of mass destruction, therefore the conflict was not justified. That's why I think it's important to establish those salient facts.
Now, but obviously, we were wrong, as you said. Now, why were we wrong?
KAY: Senator, I wouldn't pretend that I know all the answers or even know all the questions to get at that.
KAY: I am convinced that that is the important forefront of the inquiry that, quite frankly, you must undertake.
I've got hypotheses of where I think things generically have occurred. I think we became almost addicted to the incredible amount of effort that UNSCOM and U.N. inspectors could produce on the scene and that flow of information...
MCCAIN: Including intelligence gained by the previous administration.
KAY: That's correct. And did not develop our own HUMINT sources there.
Now, this really goes back, quite frankly -- the change took place if you look at it goes back to the Carter administration, when, as a result of things that had occurred in the Vietnam area, essentially our HUMINT capability was spun down and we got in the habit of relying on intelligence collected by liaison services.
If a liaison -- an individual from another country, gets caught as a spy it doesn't make the front page of The Washington Post or New York Times, it's not politically embarrassing and, quite frankly, you don't have a dead American. So there are good reasons to do it.
More importantly, and things that I think you've got to worry about, we have all stressed, why didn't the intelligence community connect the dots prior to 9/11? It all looks very clear in retrospect.
Quite frankly, the most common problem you have with analysts is you do not want them to overanalyze the data. If there are only a few dots connected, maybe they don't belong connected.
I'm convinced in this area, partly because of Iraqi behavior -- to a large extent because of Iraqi behavior -- they cheated, they lied, we knew it, UNSCOM, the U.N. had caught them -- we got in the habit of new pieces of information accreted to this overall consensus view without challenging that consensus.
All I can say is if you read the total body of intelligence in the last 12 to 15 years that flowed on Iraq, I quite frankly think it would be hard to come to a conclusion other than Iraq was a gathering, serious threat to the world with regard to WMD.
SESSIONS: That was certainly, I think, on the heart and mind of the members of Congress. We just felt that it was so impossible they didn't exist.
Now, as your investigation went about, it strikes me that there has -- in the time building up to this final initiation of military action -- that the Iraqi individuals who may have been involved in weapons of mass destruction knew that their programs were the target of this action and that they were in violation of U.N. resolutions. And isn't it true they could have seen themselves as being subject to prosecution for war crimes?
KAY: Absolutely. And a number of those in custody are worried about that greatly. It's one reason they're not talking.
SESSIONS: So not being unclever, they would know and would have a real incentive to destroy every evidence that they had anything to do with weapons of mass destruction. So we could realistically expect many of the documents that would have shown all these actions are no longer in existence?
KAY: That's right, Senator. And that's why I referred to the -- there's probably a level of unresolvable ambiguity we're going to have to learn to live with about this program.