Armor shell games & body bags

Corruption and /or incompetence in government contracting goes as far back as records are kept and if history tells us anything of these situations, it is that eternal vigilance is simply an integral part of the cost of purchasing goods and services.

The subject is modern armor for our troops – something that has been in short supply for a while now and has become increasingly valuable in tactical, political and financial terms. For decades, there has been an increasing trend in the military to provide protection to people on the pointy end of our spear via body armor and vehicle armor.

With the advent of a guerrilla-style campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan, our military purchasing planners once again have been overcome with an excess of reality as the number of people they envisioned having the tactical need for armor has undergone an exponential upward shift – kind of like today's pressing need for ammunition – as five years ago when today's ammo and armor acquisitions were laid out under Clinton's watch, the possibility of a war was simply not factored in. How silly, they thought – “We” don't “do” wars.

So, today, the movers and shooters in the military have to husband what protective materials they get most carefully and, in fact, they are doing as good a job as could possibly be expected, given what they have work with. However, the unstated cost of this has been the stripping of armor and armor products from the rest of the Army. What this does is place any Army units deployed to a new combat area in the near term to be at risk for significantly higher casualty rates because of the lack of armor.

But this is not true at the industrial, testing and acquisition part of the military logistics chain. A brief examination of what we use in the field, and why, is in order here.

A number of years ago, we adopted an armored version of the HUMVEE, the M-1114 and thought to provide them to units we thought could make good use of them – mostly military police units. But, as happens in war, we found that some gear is far more useful due to the changes in enemy tactics we have adapted to. There is also the fact that the M-1114 is one very expensive item, having had to be redesigned, mechanically upgraded and strengthened almost from the ground up because its armor is so heavy.

Overloading a vehicle causes it to break down much more frequently, as well as diminish its combat usefulness, as less equipment and troops can be carried in each one. In a recent presentation on an internal analysis of vehicle and equipment morbidity in Iraq, the Army cites overall weight and environmental conditions as the significant factors in a widespread failure to maintain our vehicles in operational condition.

Our always-adaptable troops have taken to putting many different types of field-expedient armor on the composite-framed standard HUMVEE, but at a very substantial weight penalty and with variable effectiveness in preventing casualties. The reason they have done this is because the present armor kits (that don't always fit the tactical needs) in the inventory are prohibitively expensive and in very short supply.

These last two items go hand in hand – price and availability. Because of the price, the military simply cannot afford to buy many of these items – this is just the reality of budgets and it affects the industrial base as fewer potential orders means a lack of business investment in output capacity. But this view assumes the technology and its costs are stable – a very major assumption.

Take for instance the very expensive "SAPI" ceramic body-armor inserts that have been in desperately short supply. The Army will be almost up to supplying the needs in combat areas this month (if suppliers meet their deadlines, but none of them are). But as the Army leadership is most carefully prioritizing who gets them, the flipside is that very few of our units not in an active combat area have them and no protective gear will go back with units as they rotate out of theater. So we are still in a shortage situation overall and therefore can expect an increased casualty rate in any combat-exposed units that are deployed to another hot spot.

But why is this? One answer lies within the community that develops the standards for items that the military buys. In the case of body armor, it has been said in industry circles that the size tolerances for the ceramic plates are "tighter" than currently used production technology can routinely meet. From an engineering standpoint, it is projected that this is the result of trying to conserve expensive component materials, but has created vastly increased expenses from size-rejected inserts coming off the production line.

Companies making them must charge for this, resulting in a far higher per accepted-unit cost. In an effort to mitigate this waste, companies have taken to grinding down the edges to meet the tight specifications, but in doing so, this can create micro-cracking of the ceramic material's matrix that could cause it to fail if hit by a bullet along its periphery ... but at least it is now within the contract size specs. Currently, only one company has achieved a production backlog of just 3,000 units, but that is far better than the performance of its peers.

Nonetheless, one of the hurdles that any product sold to the military must pass is performance testing and, for the ballistic armor sold to the Army, that means the testing center in Aberdeen, Md. There are a number of penetration standards existent within the industry, such as from Underwriters Laboratory, the National Institute of Justice, law enforcement and corrections. But while these are good enough for the CIA and the FBI, the Army requires companies to go through Aberdeen's Test Center so that items may be tested under simulated field conditions and so as to prevent any tampering with test results in aid of a fraud against the government.

Funding is always a key issue in discussions of this type and this is no exception within the zero-sum scenario. Even callously withholding the human costs from consideration, casualties still cost a lot of money. If you can reduce the number of casualties, it follows that you can spend that money elsewhere to good effect.

Since Sept. 11, suppliers of military-related products and services have enjoyed resurgence of demand, and established armor suppliers have reaped the financial benefits. Because of the increased level of demand there have been new companies entering the marketplace with innovative products that are more cost effective than those already in the inventory. The situation becomes even more fluid when you consider that the present suppliers do not have the manufacturing capacity to supply all the potential orders even if the improvements in technology and new cost efficiencies were not present.

Given the high level of overall expenditures generated by a war, it would seem that simultaneously being able to economize while significantly improving the overall fighting effectiveness of our forces and reduce casualties (and their attendant high costs) would be win-win-win situation that the Pentagon would embrace, but this is not the case when it comes to armor for the Army.

Here are but two examples of the inexplicable problems concerning armor acquisitions that have surfaced.

Deploying units had contacted U.S. Global Nanospace, based in Nevada, to develop an effective, but lighter weight product than those already approved, but not readily available. A newcomer to military armor contracts, USGN had seemingly passed all of the hurdles posed by the acquisitions system by early December and publicly announced that they had an approved effective, lower-cost /weight armor. But USGN had limited success getting its products through the purchasing hoops and into the supply stream, despite its clear superiority to its armored steel equivalent.

From Jan. 5-10, Aberdeen was slated to conduct additional testing specifically to satisfy the urgent armor requirements, yet the results are being withheld despite repeated inquiries. Aberdeen has met these reasonable requests with silence and has now failed to return any calls made to them. In a normally routine and transparent process, the sudden shut down of all communication and their arbitrary actions are becoming alarming.

In this case, the low-cost USGN HUMVEE applique kits weigh a mere 300 pounds compared to the 2,200-pound steel product presently approved. This significant weight reduction and cost savings would solve a number of important vehicle reliability issues, including those noted above. Why would a product such as this be withheld?

Army units getting ready to deploy to Iraq are in a quandary because even though they have pre-deployment orders, they can't acquire armor kits, such as for the HUMVEE, except through a nearly year-long acquisitions process. Because a year's advance warning is not given to units chosen to deploy, additional body and vehicle armor is therefore not available to it before it deploys.

The acquisition rules presently in place preclude it from using many of the services of the "Rapid Equipping Taskforce" until it is actually deployed in a combat area, so the system essentially has placed a "Catch-22" situation between the unit getting the armor it needs before it starts taking casualties. Nobody in the acquisitions portion of the logistics bureaucracy seems to have questioned the monetary, human and political costs of retaining peacetime rules in a wartime scenario.

While all of this is going on, the Army's 1st Cavalry division has also been preparing to deploy and looked at the high-cost kits long approved by the Army for its standard HUMVEEs before it goes into the combat zone of Iraq. So the 1st Cavalry turned to Global Technologies, a small Texas company – run by a veteran of that unit – to get at least some of its "soft" vehicles hardened with armor, specifying that the armor has to stop a bullet from an AK-47, the ubiquitous small arm of the Middle East, as the basic Army standard for such armor requires.

What happened next in this situation is both a small miracle and a nightmare. The armor product developed by Ballistic Solutions – a subsidiary of this Texas upstart – not only worked in independent UL standard tests, but is 20 percent lighter than the presently approved vendor’s composite offerings. And, it was offered to be sold to the 1st Cavalry – at an acceptable profit – for about 80 percent less money than what the presently approved vendor charged for its products, although without the ballistic glass with fittings that the 1st Cavalry specifically did not want.

Additionally, it is field-repairable, though it is kind of homely-looking when compared to the "pretty" stuff currently approved. Now five times as many of the "soft" HUMVEEs the division has could have been protected, the troops could safely carry more gear and the unit could be more effective – and their leaders also knew this would equal fewer casualties.

At the end of last October, when the division's commander went through the paperwork to actually buy the product, the Army soon said "No," it needed to be tested at Aberdeen first. So Bill Frazier, the company's president, immediately next-day-air freighted the samples to the lab and, being brand new to military contracts, neglected to send the written pro-forma proprietary declaration with the materials since he was verbally assured by Aberdeen that it will be treated as such and the testing will be expedited. After all, his old unit needed this product to protect their young soldiers.

Time passed and eventually the company got a phone call back from a staffer at Aberdeen who said "You didn't fail, but you didn't do as well as some other armor we tested." After that, nobody at Aberdeen would return Global Technologies calls, nor was a written report sent. However, a field-grade military staffer at Aberdeen did exchange a few e-mails with the company, then shortly cut them off by stating "This is a very busy office" and referred them to the Public Affairs Office for further non-specific and /or non-responsive answers.

The materials that Global Technologies and U.S. Global Nanospace submitted to Aberdeen have not been selected for field-testing in Iraq either.

And according to a Dec. 24 piece, "Up in Armor" by Bob Cox in the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, the Pentagon's spokesman, Maj. Gary Tallman said: "... that even if Frazier's armor were to prove adequate, the Army would probably opt to buy a superior, albeit heavier and more expensive, armor. That's just the culture here ...”

As for the troopers of the 1st Cavalry division, they’ll just have to make do with whatever they can get.

But it gets still curiouser: Nobody "inside" the acquisitions system is talking to anybody about this issue. Professionals within the armor business for decades are actually getting the "you-don't-want-to-be-asking-about-this-for-your-own-good" kind of responses from colleagues that Hollywood conspiracy films have long favored. Long-time industry insiders have told me they have never seen this kind of a response to a simple matter of testing materials for suitability.

Even if the technical aspects of the test results were to become classified, as sometimes happens, there is still a written report issued that states the test was performed and whether the material passed or failed, as well as the standard that was used.

In discussions with members of the support and procurement community, it has been alleged that about a decade ago, Aberdeen had been suspected of irregularities in testing procedures and of other malfeasance relating to the early development of the Bradley fighting vehicle. After the post-mortem of the Bradley situation, the Army formed the "Joint Live Fire Office" to address some of the issues that had been raised.

Given the items above, there seem to be a number of likely questions for any external investigation to answer.

In light of the circumstances of the long-approved products becoming unexpectedly non-competitive in the military-armor marketplace due to the financial and performance efficiencies achieved by the two independently produced products – why has Aberdeen refused to issue written reports, reversed its own approvals and inexplicably retained some of the submitted test samples that they now say have not been tested?

Has the Army's acquisitions quality watchdog – Aberdeen – and the Pentagon become directly corrupted by commercial influences? If so, why and to what extent?

Why has the Army declined to protect several times as many troops at the same expenditure levels within the same category of already approved funding?

I would hope that the answers to these questions lay in more benign explanations, but there is one thing the troops and I know for certain: Body bags are not in short supply, even if funding and armor is.

This writer provided the information above – along with corroborating evidence – to Republican Congressman Rob Simmons (2nd District, Conn.) who went public on WTIC’s "Connecticut Today Show" on Monday, Feb. 2, and declared that he was taking the membership of the House Armed Services Committee to Aberdeen next week where they will require the armor to be shot at for testing, so they can witness it.

If the materials pass, they will force the Army to get the armor to the troops. Congressman Simmons went on to say that some 60 companies had been stonewalled by Aberdeen and /or were willing to manufacture armor under license in order to provide our troops with the equipment they need and that the situation of single manufacturer, who can not meet our needs, will be ended.

>> I sympathize with the sentiment, but that ain't the way things work in the real world anymore.

Personally, I think the US is in the situation to define what the real world is. Apparently our enemies already think we do. They don't like American capitalism and culture. They think that we force our businesses and culture on the rest of the world. I don't agree with our enemie's view of America forcing itself on the world - business only survive if customers come and buy our products. They certainly like our culture - dispite their protests, and mine for that matter. American culture via music, film, etc. is a major export to the world - and they eat it up readily.

But if they are willing to believe we force ourselve on them that's all for the better. It simply makes it is a whole lot easier to force what we want as a nation on to them. A good chunk of the world already thinks we define what the real world is - and we should step up to the plate and act like the leaders that we should be. We define the terms, especially to our enemies.

>> We don't do total war, we don't get Congress to declare war ...

We also don't teach history in our schools any longer. Most people have no idea what total war is about. The closest thing that they saw of it was in the first Gulf War when we hit the Iraqi's in retreat from Kuwait. How many people think it is unfair to attack a retreating enemy? This would make a great Jay Leno on the street question. Bush 41 lost his guts back then when the images started flowing in and the *kind* American people saw what war really looks like.

The lesson to be learned here is simple. War is ugly. It is the last resort. But by doing war right you don't have to do it as often. Like you said, "we don't whip the crap out of anybody so bad that the next two generations are complete pacifists." I'll add that it may last even longer than two generations with the Japs. We should have never let their security folks (military - haha) into Iraq. The Japs might get a taste for it again. By the way, I'm not big on coalitions - and history teaches good lessons on that as well.

Getting Medieval.

We certainly are not getting medieval on Iraq or Afghanistan. And I tell you, what we have done is taken the high moral ground. The high moral ground differs though, from the high mortal ground. You don't always win the body count holding the high moral ground. Today our troops are sacrificing themselves to defend the civilians of the enemy, while rebuilding the enemy's country, WHILE being under fire. Unprecedented in History. God Bless America.

And yet we do it because we can. In the case of Iraq, our enemy is weak, we outnumber them, we have superior firepower, and there is no other country bordering the region that comes up even to our ankles. But does this compassionate conventional combat strategy deter or encourage future enemies.

What will our response be to a dirty nuke or real suitcase nuke explosion over Manhattan killing 300,000 Americans? Will we still use this conventional strategy? If so what country will we attack. With what troops? Have we painted ourselves into a corner for future military response. Will there be an expectation of minimal civilian loss of life irregardless of our losses in protecting them? Will our leaders feel they have to follow the precedence set in these bloody days?

Do these losses day after day, become the necessary payment for spreading Democracy? Is Democracy the ultimate defense against the ultimate weapon?

If we look at Germany and Japan in WWII, both countries had radical rabid populations. The Nazis were baking millions in ovens and the Japanese were just slaughtering Asians and attacking in suicidal waves. Democracy cured those malignant cancers. But not before the tumors were ripped out and stomped on, shredded, burned and blown to hell. Nazism and Japanese Militarism.

In Iraq we have Islam. Until we get rid of Islam like we did with the tumors that were controlling German and Japanese minds, all our compassionate bleeding and rebuilding and whatever else - will be wasted. You just have to look at Turkey. That country is democratic and they voted in a most democratic way, to not allow our 4th Division to attack from the North. Something that would have shortened the war significantly.

A Democratic Islamic Republic did, without losing one man or firing one shot, what the Iraqi military could not do in two wars. It stopped an entire U.S. Army Division,( the most modern one at that!)

In Islam there is no separation between church and state.

Islam only coexists with Islam. All other religions must be submissive to it and pay a submission tax.

Compassionate Conservatives beware, or you too will be on your hands and knees praying 5 times a day.

Time to get Medieval on them before they get to where they can on US.

No Borders No Vote.

There are alternatives to the M1114. Why are none of them being pursued?

Unfortunately, they are, and it looks like we're in for another round of the M880 and CUCV debacle.

If those civilian vehicles are used to temporarily replace the Humvees and other tactical vehicles sent to combat zones after having armor packages, well and good. But if those vehicles are purchased instead of additional M1114 Humvees, with the choice in the field being limited between unarmored militarized civilian vehicles or Strykers, we're in trouble. And if those civilian-with-green-paint vehicles start turning up in combat zones, watch out.

GM Reveals Hybrid Military Pickup to Army

January 10, 2002

Truck Trend

General Motors Corp. and the U.S. Army revealed a diesel hybrid military pickup truck equipped with a fuel cell auxiliary power unit (APU) that could become the model for the Army's new fleet of 30,000 light tactical vehicles by the end of the decade.

The diesel hybrid improves Army fuel consumption by 20 percent over conventional diesels, reduces emissions and provides troops with clean, reliable electrical power. These are crucial elements in helping to transform the Army into a lighter, more mobile military unit. And with fuel transportation costs reaching up to $400 a gallon depending on training or battlefield operations, the taxpayer savings could run well into the millions of dollars.

The fuel cell APU would replace the loud engine- and battery-based stationary generators the Army now uses for field power, thus enhancing the Army's "silent watch" capability, or the ability to operate undetected by the enemy. Fuel cells are much quieter than engine generators and do not give off as much heat, making them less likely to be picked up by enemy heat sensors. The fuel cell unit also familiarizes the military with the next generation of commercially developed fuel cell technology, so that military vehicles could be powered by fuel cells within the next 10 years.

GM unveiled the heavy-duty, militarized version of the commercial Chevrolet Silverado crew cab in a ceremony with Larry Burns, GM vice president of research and development and planning, and U.S. Army Major General N. Ross Thompson III, commanding officer of the Army's Tank-automotive and Armaments Command.

"Our prototype truck incorporates advanced diesel hybrid powertrain technology and introduces the military to the flexibility and security of fuel cell electric power," Burns said. "This defense project is a great opportunity to put large numbers of diesel hybrids and stationary fuel cell units in operation in the interest of national security.

"We also anticipate that it will accelerate cost-effective and durable civilian applications of hybrid-electric vehicles and fuel cells. As an early customer, the military will help drive down costs, increase our learnings, and spur the eventual development of a hydrogen-based economy."

The vehicle was designed and engineered by GM Military Truck Operations, based in Troy, Mich., and incorporates technologies from Allison Transmission Division of General Motors, GM's Fuel Cell Activities organization, and GM's strategic fuel cell alliance partner, Hydrogenics Corp., based in Mississauga, Ontario.

The Army will evaluate the prototype before establishing performance and procurement criteria and opening the bid process. The Army is expected to want 30,000 hybrids by the end of the decade.

"The potential for fuel cell and diesel hybrid technologies are of critical importance for the Army's next generation of tactical vehicles, and General Motors will play a key leadership role in the research and development efforts for transforming the Army's mobility," said Dennis J. Wend, director of the National Automotive Center, coordinator of the U.S. Army's collaborative vehicle research and development.

"In order for the Army to win today's and tomorrow's battles decisively, we must transform to a lighter, more mobile, more fuel-efficient Army, an Army that is rapidly deployed and sustainable anywhere in the world. The fuel cell auxiliary power unit's quiet operation and low heat signature also are vital elements in reducing the visibility of a deployed force."

GM has a long, proud history of serving the U.S. Army's transportation needs. The automaker has produced about 80,000 military vehicles since the mid-1980s.

The truck's military features include Raytheon First Responder command and control equipment, infrared night vision camera, and GM's "extreme mobility package" to meet the harshest off-road conditions and payload requirements.

"The Army owns a lot of trucks - nearly 250,000 of them, which makes it one of the largest fleets in the nation," said Wend. "Three of top four fuel users in the battlefield are trucks. That's why we need to bring the best and brightest from industry, academia, and government to engage in significantly increasing the fuel efficiency of the our military and commercial fleets."

The heavy-duty, four-door pickup is powered by a 6.6-liter Duramax Diesel V-8 engine, which generates 210 horsepower and 545 lbs.-ft. of torque. The engine is mated to a parallel hybrid electric system for improving urban engine emissions and fuel economy. The system itself can increase fuel economy 25 percent to 40 percent over conventional gasoline trucks.

The hybrid system, under early development by GM for commercial applications, uses a patented split power continuously variable transmission (CVT) with integral electric motors and an energy storage system, to deliver power efficiently to the wheels. The lightweight nickel-metal hydride-based energy storage system weighs a third less and is half the size of lead-acid battery storage systems.

In addition, the diesel-electric hybrid powertrain can operate as a self-contained generator, with the capability of providing up to 30kw "exportable" DC and AC electricity for troop operations in the field. This eliminates the need for separate, less efficient, bulky motor-generator sets typically used.

The fuel cell APU, designed and built by Hydrogenics, is a 5-kilowatt proton exchange membrane (PEM) regenerative fuel cell system capable of producing electricity and hydrogen in remote areas. Today's Army uses extensive surveillance and communications electronics to accomplish its missions on tomorrow's battlefields. These electronics must be powered quietly for long periods of time in a manner that is undetectable by the enemy.

When the vehicle is driven, the PEM electrolyzer uses diesel engine provided electricity to break down water into hydrogen and oxygen, with the hydrogen stored for future use. Later, with the engine off, the stored hydrogen, together with oxygen from the air, is fed to the fuel cell to produce electricity, returning the pure water as a byproduct, which is stored to repeat the cycle.

The regenerative APU thus produces its own hydrogen and the Army does not need to add a new logistics fuel. Any additional water is not a problem since water is already provided to the troops and, in a difficult situation, the fuel cell-produced water is drinkable.

The only sound produced is that of quiet air intake fans, making it perfect for use indoors, in confined spaces or where minimal noise is required. In addition, the fuel cell generates power at relatively low temperatures, removing the risk of enemy detection by heat monitoring devices.

"The fuel cell unit delivers the same amount of power as a conventional generator without broadcasting your presence," said Burns. "The energy density of hydrogen and the efficiency of the fuel cell gives the same capability of equal-sized batteries but with six to 10 times longer operation, particularly in adverse temperature conditions. The military recognizes these advantages as being key to its mission-critical operations."

Military applications require absolute reliability and durability, said Hydrogenics president and CEO Pierre Rivard.

"This is a valuable opportunity to demonstrate the capabilities of a fuel cell system in what are sure to be very demanding conditions," Rivard said. "We always derive significant learnings from opportunities like this and rapidly channel these learnings into our product development initiatives. In this way we ensure that when it's time to start producing this fuel cell technology in larger volume, it is in fact the current best available technology."

The diesel hybrid truck is one of eight different militarized prototypes based on the Silverado that GM Defense will deliver to the Army later this year as part of the Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) program. The program leverages commercial technology to reduce the cost of developing and acquiring a light tactical vehicle, and provides the Army with continuous technology improvement.

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