The Colas of Iraq

BAGHDAD — In a roadside soup and kebab house an hour past the Jordanian border, one of Douglas Feith's best and brightest from the Department of Defense's Office of Special Plans, a separate Pentagon intelligence agency with a focus on Iraq, squints at the Arabic script on his Pepsi can. The origin of a cola product, he explains, is a useful metric for judging which of Iraq's neighbors has the most influence in the country.

He reasons that the stream of commerce brings in much more than Pepsi, but also ideas, attitudes, and, he archly notes, imams and ayatollahs. The particular Pepsi he held, 100 kilometers west of the Sunni triangle, came from Saudi Arabia.

In southeast Iraq, where British soldiers occupy Nasiriyah and Basra, soda cans are labeled in Farsi, indicative of Iranian influence. The Pepsi metric falls a bit flat up north, however, where the preponderance of Turkish-script Pepsi is hardly evidence of a détente between Kurds and Turks.

To some of the architects of the liberation, Iraq's cola wars are a telling indicator of the high-stakes battle among Iraq's neighbors for influence in a post-Saddam state. They worry that foreign interference could undercut the rationale for invading Iraq in the first place: to stabilize the Middle East and establish an inclusive, representative government in Iraq.

Saudi Arabia and Iran — one a dubious ally, the other an avowed enemy — are underwriting subtle and not-so-subtle efforts to seize political influence in Iraq, say several Bush administration officials. Given the accelerated timetable for transferring power to Iraqis, for some in the administration, Saudi and Iranian meddling should compel the U.S. to play a more forceful role in the political process. They fear that Iraq's potential for democracy could be overwhelmed by the very religious extremism that was the root of 9/11.

Few deny that Iraq's neighbors desperately want to undermine U.S. efforts at building an inclusive, representative government in the Middle East, and the debate is largely one of degree. As early as September, L. Paul Bremer acknowledged that "Iran continues to meddle in various ways in Iraq's internal affairs." But there's less agreement on the precise threat they pose, what they are doing to destabilize the region and how to counter it. Those differences, however, are widening, along the familiar State-DoD divide, say sources from both sides.

"The Saudis, of course, worry about a Shia government in Iraq that makes common cause with Shia in the eastern provinces where the oil is," says Richard Perle. "There is evidence to support that Iranians are coming across the border to build a political base not visibly for themselves, but for groups and individuals that they either own or control or think they influence. The best thing for them would be forcing withdrawal of U.S. troops, because it would discourage their own unhappy electorate who are rooting for the U.S."

Iraqi, CPA, and Pentagon officials seem to be in agreement that the Iranians are especially good at destabilizing governments, pointing to the chaos that is commonly known as Lebanon as evidence. A key Kurdish official says, "The Saudis are less effective in this environment than the Iranians." He notes that the Iranians play it both ways. While they were the first country to recognize the Governing Council, they continue to sponsor cross-border activities and are working to undermine the Governing Council behind the scenes.

Iran also has direct influence and is funding the two most prominent Shia political parties: the Dawa and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), headed by the Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He is technically an Iranian national, as Ahmad Chalabi pointed out in Washington last week. Sistani's public incitements over Bremer's plan for transition to democracy come as no surprise to the wing of the administration that has been arguing for a plan to counter Iranian influence since the summer.

Though the amount of political trouble Iran is causing appears to be on the rise, it could be doing more, worry some DoD sources. For now, though, the Iranians can rely on insurgents in Iraq to do their dirty work to drive out the U.S. Army while they focus on the political aspect, gaming the Saudis and the Americans at the same time.

As for Saudi Arabia — the nexus of Wahabbi ideology — the threat it poses to Coalition forces was laid bare by the January 2 raid of the Um al-Tubul mosque in southwest Baghdad, where a large weapons cache was found and 32 suspected insurgents were arrested, including Sheik Mahdi al-Sumaidai. The arrestees were discussing their newly formed organization to increase Sunni power, the Shura Council. Sheik al-Sumaidai, who has not been released, calls himself a Salafi — which is another way of saying he's a Wahabbi, says Ali Al-Ahmed, the director of the Saudi Institute in Washington, a group that seeks to bring democracy to Saudi Arabia.

Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, whose 101st Airborne controls much of the north, including the troubled town of Mosul, acknowledges the presence of "the home-grown and foreign Islamic extremists, some of whom are local Wahabbists." But he added that they are less threatening to his soldiers than former Baathists and common criminals. "The connections among, and fundamental motivations of, this category of bad guys are not always crystal clear. Some just want to attack Americans, and some want us out of the region," says Petraeus.

While Petraeus and his forces have conducted numerous raids on the overtly hostile Wahabbi elements, CPA's policy has been to remain on the sidelines regarding their political activities. That neutrality has left the hawkish faction in the Bush administration enraged that the State Department-dominated CPA would let Iran and Saudi Arabia thwart Bush's goal that "all Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all citizens must have their rights protected."

In the lead-up to the indirect elections that will determine the power distribution and, therefore, the group or alliances that will replace Bremer, some hawks want CPA to drop its political neutrality. One such advocate likens the situation to a parent standing on the sidelines while his 16-year-old son injects heroin.

They argue that Bremer should be the stern father who confronts Iranian and Saudi political influence by creating a tough-nosed political plan to help Iraq's secular parties — parties that favor an inclusive, representative government. For starters, it's time for CPA to start funding the secular parties.

But the administration's doves worry that the same cohort of advisors who predicted that Iraqis would welcome the Americans as liberators is now overestimating foreign meddling in the political process. The doves worry that the ostensible Iranian and Saudi threat is a backdoor argument to channel more U.S. support to the Pentagon's favorite son, Dr. Chalabi. At any rate, they argue that language in the November 15 agreement should provide enough protection so that no one group can rig the system in its favor. The hawks find this naïve.

Despite CPA protestations of neutrality, the U.S. does meddle. The CIA already gives aid to the two Kurdish parties to the tune of $1 million per month, two DoD sources said. And, the CPA and CIA have other pet candidates on the Governing Council, such as Adnan Pachachi and Mowaffak al-Rubaie, though it's uncertain if the CIA is funding their parties.

It is easy to see how the Iranians and Saudis could have more influence than the Americans, and, more importantly, the Iraqis themselves. In a tightly contested future election with multiple parties, a candidate could eke out a win by a thin plurality of the vote. Bankrolling secular parties now could make all the difference for a government later that is not aligned with U.S. — or Iranian or Saudi — interests.

But while the Wahabbis from Saudi Arabia may seek an alliance — and influence — with their Sunni brethren in central Iraq, they still have to overcome the predominantly secular outlook of Iraq's Sunnis. To that end, on the fringes of the Sunni triangle, Wahabbi agents have been establishing schools and preaching in the mosques, says General Petraeus. The Wahabbi effort is as much a "hearts-and-minds" campaign as the one being waged by Petraeus's road-building, well-digging soldiers.

On the immediate political front, the Iranians seem to be the most sophisticated foreign meddlers in Iraq. Three weeks ago, before the organized Shia protests, a DoD official reported back to Washington from southern Iraq — hearing lots of Farsi on the streets and seeing signs, strongly identified with Iran, "No, no America. No, no Israel. No, no to occupation." That report was circulated throughout the Pentagon and the vice president's office.

An interesting article on how both Saudi Arabia and Iran are attempting to influence the situation in Iraq.

Yes, Iran indeed has quite alot of experience in destablizing various regions by suppling arms and sponsoring radical political groups, etc.

It is also interesting to note that while the Clinton adminstration would criticize Iran for supplying arms to Hezbollah in Lebonan and Hamas in the west bank, they (Clinton officials) would tacitly approve the Iranians arming and training of the Mujihadeen, al Qa'eda, and others in Bosnia during the mid-nineties.

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