Posted on 01/31/2004 9:02:38 PM PST by Cannoneer No. 4
January 31, 2004: The U.S. Army has decided that smart bombs and smart shells make a lot of its artillery units unnecessary. So two thirds of its non-divisional (those that that are not part of a combat division) artillery battalions will be converted to other uses (engineers, military police and civil affairs.) That's 36 artillery battalions containing nearly 10,000 troops. Most of these are National Guard units, who report to state governors until they are called up by the federal government. The governors won't mind having fewer artillery, and more engineer, military police and civil affairs battalions, as these units are more useful for the natural disasters the governors usually call upon National Guard units to help out with.
Killing Crusader and not bringing tube artillery to Afghanistan were grievious blows from which FA may never recover.
I've never heard of air power pinning down an enemy.
Yeah. It's been the subject of a lot of discussion in my circles, where Schultz is known, and not especially trusted. Like Ralph Peters, he thinks that Clinton had a better approach to terrorism. That's like saying France had a better approach to Hitler (you know, among other failings, simply untrue!)
Some of his points, though, are right on. Depending on the levels they've worked at, and some of the fellows I've discussed this with were at high levels indeed, everybody has seen some of his nine points in action, and collectively we've seen all of them, although we may not agree with him on the relative importance of these and other factors.
He is also right in saying that the uniformed military is part of the problem, with its culture of risk aversion. You might have seen the letter from an LT in Kosovo to his successor that's going around the email trees, where he compares life in Camp Bondsteel to life in prison (and finds several of the circumstances favour prison)? That's a perfect illustration of Force Protection madness, that reaches the point of interfering with the mission.
One thing is for sure, though... while the brass might have resisted Clinton administration underlings, they wouldn't have resisted anybody senior pushing for a whack at Osama. There was nobody senior who really wanted to attack Osama -- Clinton's only moves in that direction were aimed at domestic politics, and the Democratic candidates now all offer a foreign policy vision that reverts to Clintonian passivity in world affairs. What Rumsfeld (and Schoo) are doing is a perfect illustration of how the generals bitch and whine as thoroughly as any E-4 rifleman, but when its time to act the generals will follow orders loyally, just like the kvetching troopie.
One of my biggest beefs with Shinseki is that he put his personal politics above his duty. If he felt that strongly about the Crusader (the Maus tank or B-70 of its time, IMHO) then he ought to have resigned and then tried to undermine it -- not vice versa. The only reason his duffel bag wasn't in the E-ring hall after that one was that he was a racial minority, a decorated combat vet, and an amputee -- instead they humiliated him by making him a lame duck, which he asked for.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
Both statements aren't true. AF will provide air support overhead during combat ops, and on call in theater every day. It's coordinated through the joint air control centre (might have my acronym ate up) so those JDAMs might be hanging on almost anything in the US or UK inventory, definitely including naval aviation.
The conditions that can close an airfield to modern aircraft are few, and theatre air taskings are flexible enough that if one airfield or one area is under bad weather, planes come from somewhere else -- I had naval air when I was 700 miles from their carrier, and strategic bombers who came from and returned to the states.
Finally, the GPS system has significant redundancy built in, as does the GPS receiver system on the JDAM kit itself. But given completely absent GPS guidance the JDAM has a fallback inertial navigation system. The accuracy is slightly degraded, but stiill better than first shot artillery. A LOT better -- with a lot more terminal effect.
Right now, we have a continuum of arms in the field from small arms, through mortars, to attack helicopters, to fast movers and strategic bombers. So far, the artillery has not been very useful. There are still potential wars we'll need it for (North Korea, China), but in the GWOT it's been extra stuff to haul around and extra bored snuffies to keep entertained in base camps.
In Iraq, the artillery guys have been patrolling like infantry. It's been a hell of a shift for them but they have done it.
Unless we have another large mechanised war, artillery may well wind up going the way of the horse cavalry, dreadnought battleships, Indian scouts, heliograph battalions, and coast artillery. (Hmmm... maybe we should bring the Indian scouts back? "Hello, I am Sanjay and I will be your reconnaissance element leader today." One more menial job outsourced...)
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
Yep. As long as you're within about 24km of your artillery. (30-something with ERFB). Usually, in practical terms, far less... which means you have to bring it with you, or you have to convince your enemy to revert to the operational art of the First World War (see Korea).
This article shows the kind of weak imagination that our branched officers have. The artillery guy quoted thinks the US is in a bad way because other nations have longer range artillery: "they can outrange us." Maybe they can... can they do any good with it? They outranged us badly in Vietnam (The Soviet 130mm gun was the longest-range gun in the world, then). Saddam outranged us enormously in both Gulf Wars, but you can see what good it did him. (Well, it left a lot of unfired 155 HE lying around, with which to make infernal machines). For every allied soldier killed by the Iraqi's cannon fire, dozens (hundreds?) have been killed by the abandoned cannon shells. And Iraqis who stood by their guns in the combat phase were not rewarded for at -- at least not on this side of the Styx.
So this genius quoted in the article gets into an appendage-measuring thing with all the nations rushing to buy bigger guns. Why bother? Increasing the size of guns, you quickly run into diminishing returns... going to the 52 calibre 155 from the 39 buys you what, maybe another 6,000 metres? And you wind up more roadbound, and bridge-restricted, than presently. And if you are within 30 or 40 K of the enemy, you are not only in easy range of his air, you are liable to be suddenly introduced to his armour (in both cases, "if any.")
Artillery will remain necessary where we're looking at large forces along fairly static lines having to defeat massive human wave attacks. We know where that is, and might be. And for that we need to retain artillery -- not out of concern for the two nights a year that even the birds are walking. For counterinsurgency war, it's not helpful until the war has reached Mao's Third Mobile stage (it's easier to explain stuff using Mao's three stages than our doctrinal seven. Mao was a monster, but a clever one). Otherwise even a firebase (a very artful doctrinal innovation from Vietnam) is more of a target and a drain on the counterinsurgents... as is a mobile column of an arty unit, as is the same unit in a garrison type compound.
I'd rather put the research into improving registration and fire control in mortars. If we could somehow apply computers and get the artillerist's art accessible at the section and platoon size patrol level, we might have something revolutionary. Compared to artillery fire direction and control, mortar operations are crude.
d.o.l.
Criminal Number 18F
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