Is he related to "Islam Combatants Corps" mentioned in this article from 2000:
"The attempted assassination of Saeed Hajjarian on March 12 may eventually prove to have been one of the critical moments in Iran's reform movement. Coming after the solid victory in the parliamentary elections, it suggests that at least some conservatives, perhaps particularly in the security and intelligence organs, are prepared to shift the battle from the ballot box to the gun.
The gunman was, according to the Iranian authorities own announcement, mounted on a 1000cc. motorcycle. Motorcycles of such power are legally restricted to the security services and police. When it was subsequently announced that a student had been arrested and that he had confessed to the crime, it was stated that he had confirmed that the motorcycle was his own, not a government one.
The Iranian media were chafing under a government restriction that only official news be reported on the attack. The "student" involved, Said Asghar, was described as an Islamic radical who may have been involved in an earlier killing. But Hajjarian's own newspaper also said, in a veiled hint at something more, that he and his accomplices were former members of an "organization". Press reports abroad, including the Iran Press Service in London and the London-based Arabic daily al-Sharq al-Awsat were reporting that Asghar was a member of an Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (Pasdaran ) unit based in Shahr-Rey. The al-Sharq al-Awsat story claimed that a faction of the Pasdaran calling itself the "Islam Combatants Corps" was behind the shooting.
The veiled hints of an "organization" being involved, and the unusual ban on the media publishing unofficial reports, would lend credence to the idea that members of the Guards Corps may well have been involved. The Pasdaran leadership is generally supportive of the hard-liners, and last year the Guards Commander warned the media against certain types of reporting.
If the Pasdaran and/or the security services are involved, or appear to be, then the attack may be part of a continuing pattern. For one thing, Hajjarian is a former intelligence official himself, but worse, his newspaper, Sobh-e Emroz, has been leading the campaign to expose the Intelligence Ministry officials who were behind the 1998 series of killings of dissidents. In other words, to many in the intelligence services, Hajjarian may seem the worst kind of traitor: an agent turned reformer, bent on exposing his own former colleagues. Many believe that he himself was the channel for some of the revelations his newspaper?s reporter, Akbar Ganji, revealed about the Intelligence Ministry?s involvement in the 1998 killings. And the Pasdaran and Intelligence Ministry have many links with each other.
Whether or not that is really why Hajjarian was shot, it is clear enough that the issue of the Intelligence Ministry?s attitude towards those who disagree with it politically is once again a crucial issue. There are those who believe that the authorization of the 1998 killings went considerably higher than the officials blamed so far, and that press investigation might have been getting close to finding links with senior clerics.
Whether or not that is true may be less important than how many people believe it to be. Some of the more outspoken reformers are already trying to pin the attempt on Hajjarian on members of the senior clerical leadership. That could lead to an open attack on the system of velayat-e faqih, or clerical rule.
But that could lead to a breach between the reformers and President Khatami. The President has, himself, never sanctioned criticism of the Islamic system, based on the theories of the late Ruhollah Khomeini; support for that system is in fact a requirement for candidates standing for office. The reformers have gotten as far as they have, at least in part, by being moderate. Some have wondered if Khatami runs the risk of becoming a Gorbachev: in opening the windows to change, the system itself comes apart. The Iranian system is neither as monolithic nor as inflexible as the pre-Gorbachev USSR, but the parallels are not completely imaginary.
Certainly many of the young Iranians supporting the reform movement are disillusioned with clerical rule. Twenty years after the revolution, Iran's young do not remember the Shah or the rationale for the imposition of Islamic rule, and have few sympathies for the continued imposition of rigorous social restrictions. Khatami has sought to channel those frustrations in order to change the system from within. But he does not control the Army, the Pasdaran and its "mobilization" militia, the Basij, or the intelligence services. Some called for a major reform of the security elements after the 1998 killings were linked to the Intelligence Ministry; but the government successfully deflected those demands, basically dismissing the killings as a case of rogue agents who would be punished. Hajjarian's wounding brings that issue to the fore again.
Source:
http://www.theestimate.com/public/03242000.html