Depends how you look at it. I think they kicked a lot of ass that day. In fact, a fellow I went through basic with was on that mission and he is quoted in the book as saying after the run out of the city 'don't feel sorry for us, you ought to feel sorry for them (the Somalis) because we kicked ass'. He was shot in the back not too long before he said that as well.
That mission was considered a disaster because of the numbers lost when America was no longer used to losing troops. They accomplished their objectives that day though on a very trying mission- no armor would've kept those Black Hawks from being shot down.
I don't think the Rangers got creamed that day. I know this a popular way to look at it but I don't agree with it.
Exactly right.
However, if the extraction of the force and downed blackhawks had gone quicker, there would have been significatly fewer casualties.
There was plenty of armor (Pak, Malaysian, Italian, Kuwaiti/UAE), thousands of troops (Paki, U.S. QRF)and plenty of attack helicopters (Italian Mangusta & U.S. QRF Cobras) available in Mogadishu. Since June, the U.S. QRF had completed numerous no-notice and pre-planned operations. The QRF always included contingency planning and exchange of liaison elements with allied elements. Allied armored units were always included as either part of the plan or immediately put on stand-by and in some cases immediately staged forward with attached liaison officers monitoring command freqs.
In contrast, the special ops leaders failed to conduct more than the most rudimentary coordination with the U.S. QRF and did nothing at all with the allied forces. As a result, when things went brown, the QRF and allies had to go from a standing start--where are they? what route are they using? how do we communicate? fire control measures? enemy situation? etc etc.
The best soldiers in the world were let down by their own leaders. It would have been nice to have the armor--we asked for it the first time in July--always better to own the asset you need, but with a little more thinking and planning and coordinating and a little less hubris and arrogance, the combat power needed to help was right around the corner.
There's a principle of war called unity of command and some old advice about never underestimating your enemy--both were disregarded.