ATTENTION: COALITION FORCES, CPA, GC & FRIENDS PART III (Security-Military Considerations)

Alaa Smary is an Iraqi Father who, unlike yesterday's Palestinian mother of two and suicide bomber, does what's best for his family with "love and care". Alaa lives in Iraq and writes knowing his people and what will work for their future. This letter is Alaa's third piece in his series: "ATTENTION COALITION" appearing on his blog: http://messopotamian.blogspot.com.

Despite very busy schedule and travel plans I have to get some of this off my chest. I don’t have much time, so I shall summarize as much as possible. I am actually delaying some urgent last minute work to write this.

It is now almost nine months since the fall of the regime, and the baby should be about ready for delivery right now, like somebody has remarked. We don’t have to dwell on the negative side of things, including mistakes, which may have contributed to the present rather unsatisfactory situation, only if understanding these mistakes can help in finding solutions and avoiding further errors.

The remedy to the present situation requires a comprehensive multi-pronged counteroffensive approach. There are these main aspects of this: The Security and Military approach; the Economic approach; the Political approach; and last but not least the Educational and Information approach. It is necessary to have a strategic plan coordinating effort in all these areas, like an orchestra conductor directing the musicians to produce harmony and successful performance. I have no alternative but to deal with each of these concerns separately and then try to see how they can be coordinated.

The present strategy of the Coalition is not something that can be belittled and has produced some quite considerable results. It is based on gathering intelligence and trying to locate, capture or eliminate enemy operatives; and countering with punitive military style counterinsurgency operations, designed to pressurize and intimidate local support or tolerance or simply indifference towards subversive elements. This is of course right and necessary. However, there is still lack of comprehensive security grip on the situation. It would be nice if security can be achieved without any measures interfering with the privacy and freedom of movement of people, but I am afraid in the present circumstances this is quite impossible. People (many of whom unemployed and armed) still wonder about without any real system of identification, and the same applies to vehicles and all kind of movement. There is still no effective local security apparatus and no effective neighborhood level surveillance and control in the cities. Very succinctly put, we need the urgent introduction of new identity (forgery proof) cards; and also registration of all vehicles; comprehensive records of all inhabitants with background checks and analysis and effective, widely deployed and permanent security apparatus. That is not to propose a form of Police State or “draconian measures”, as some have suggested previously when I put forth similar ideas, but merely to implement very normal measures, that are in place in many countries including the U.S.A. As the previous regime’s meticulous records about everybody and everything were lost and destroyed there is practically nothing of significance at the moment to replace them. Any new security force has to start from scratch. I must say, however, that it is likely that some of the records have been hidden somewhere by elements of the previous regime, who, by the way, may be very susceptible to material incentives.

Some time ago I had to go to Jordan and for this purpose I boarded one of the buses which used to belong to the State run transport company, and now is operated and run by God knows who. It was a bit of a fiasco. As soon as the bus left Baghdad to take the Motorway going west the driver informed us that he had to look for gasoline and therefore left the highway and went through Fallujah, Saglawia, Ramadi and all the by- now famous trouble spots looking for the fuel, which had to be bought from the black market, which consisted of tankers stopping some distance from the filling stations selling the stuff at exorbitant prices. Throughout the trip there was not a single check point right up to the Jordanian border. We saw several convoys of the American army going up and down the Main motorway as well as in the aforementioned towns. While stopping at one of rest stations on the main highway, in the heartland of the western region, a pickup truck drew up with about half a dozen characters with faces covered in the traditional manner by Ghutrah’s (the kind of checkered head scarf which should be familiar to westerners by now), they sort of toured the car park surveying everybody and carefully observing the cars parked, probably to decide which ones are worth robbing later. There were no policemen or any form of law enforcement to be found anywhere near, although this was one of the main rest stations for travelers on this main highway. On my way back from Jordan, the same situation; although we were stopped on the highway by an American check point who searched the cars for weapons but did not ask for any form of identification and used sign language to communicate with the travelers. What struck me from this trip is how easy it was to move about, and do whatever you want, in these areas, and especially if you were one of the locals. The CPA has spent much effort and resources in trying to create The I.P., but still this force has not yet achieved the level of strength sufficient to be really effective, especially in those regions, which may be considered, more or less hostile; not to mention the fact that the I.P. are under frequent attack designed to intimidate and prevent the consolidation and strengthening of this vital force. The fact is that the Coalition forces remain the basic law enforcement authority and they can only control their bases and the vicinity, and can only act if they encounter something during patrols; and in any case their number is simply not sufficient for this kind of policing work. People can move about, communicate and do pretty well what they want with ease and relatively risk free. In fact, the level of the insurgency is quite remarkably low-key considering such easy environment.

The simple understanding of the division of the country into hostile and non-hostile zones, from the standpoint of the Coalition, based on sectarian and ethnic divisions is not far from the reality on the ground, unfortunately. Consequently, the situation is quite variable depending on region and location. Those who talk of the “Iraqi People” and what they should or should not do, must always remember this heterogeneity of the population. Also, there is a world of difference between big-city people like the Baghdadis and Basrawis etc., and the provincials. This has always been the case and has plagued Mesopotamian history from time immemorial. The land between the two rivers is essentially a huge oasis in the middle of the desert, and its history has been characterized by the struggle between city cultures versus desert nomadism. The oasis-cities and the desert were always in constant conflict, ebbs and flows, both physically and culturally. Bright periods in our history correspond to epochs when the City is predominant, and conversely dark ages descend when desertification and the peasant mentality creep on the city both physically and culturally. The Saddam era clearly belongs to the latter, and now America is acting as catalyst and agent to bring a new chapter of history belonging to the former. The late Iraqi sociologist and historian Ali Alwardi, has best explained this dichotomy of the character of the Iraqi or Mesopotamian people; his work should be a must reading for Allied strategists, if you want my opinion.

As I have said in previous posts, the campaign should start in Baghdad, the capital. Here is a practical proposal:

It can be announced that in order to improve security and provide the population of Baghdad with new identity cards as well as organizing lists to aid in future elections and the like, special committees are going to make house to house calls in all parts of the Capital. The purpose of these calls would be to issue the papers on the spot. Additionally and to help the people and save them trouble all vehicles will be inspected on the spot and new registration and identification will be performed during the same visits. Special combined Iraqi groups may then be formed and since the population has been previously notified, and ordered to keep all necessary documents and vehicles at hand, neighborhoods can then be cordoned off, but in random order without prior notification, with the help and protection of the Coalition forces, and day long curfews imposed area by area (on different days). The committees will have been previously drilled and trained for the work. Their task will be to perform thorough arms search and data collection and recording about people and vehicles and of course issue of temporary identity papers and car registration. The process should be conducted with the utmost propriety and politeness but at the same time thoroughly and resolutely. Where the CPA can assist is in the creation of a comprehensive database bringing into effect the advantage of technological superiority. This will be the real starting point of the new security system. Meanwhile Entries and Exits of the Capital should be effectively controlled and put under strict surveillance. The importance of these new identification means will become apparent to the population when they will be required for vital everyday transactions, and when it will become possible to monitor vehicles in accordance with the new markings.

I have unfortunately to leave you again at this point, as time is no longer available to me. In future installments we shall have to discuss the more important economic, political and cultural matters, in which reside the real solutions, in the final analysis.

Good post. Thank you!

The CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council have both mentioned the need for a serious, nationwide census before elections can be held.

The Pentagon and CPA agree, too, on the need for a larger Iraqi security force, trained and put to work as fast as they can get them on the streets ~ 200,000 now, more than all Coalition troops in Iraq.

Drill Sargeants from Ft. Benning are heading to Iraq to help train Iraqi soldiers, as well.
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Hamid al-Kifa'i, spokesperson for the Governing Council, Jan. 12 CPA briefing:

MR. AL-KIFA'I: Well, I just want to add one thing, which is very important. It is difficult for us to trust the information, records left to us by the regime of Saddam Hussein. There are at least 5 million people absent from these records.

That's why it is important to, you know, postpone elections, proper elections, until we have a proper census and everyone is on record. And Ayatollah Sistani and the Governing Council and everyone else agrees, you know, that we need to have a proper census; we need to have an electoral law; we need to have the infrastructure for elections ready before we can, you know, carry out any proper elections -- elections that will be safe and sound and trusted by the people of Iraq and internationally.

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