Electronic systems must have a paper trail- otherwise fraud is way too easy.
If the 5K$ machine spits out a punched card with your choices on it for your review, then you stick that in a traditional turn-the-crank voting machine, then there is a hope for independent confirmation. But what takes precedence if there is a conflict? The server HD will give the same tally exactly every single time, while the cards will vary slightly.
I think the old way, mark an X with a pencil and have sworn people count them while being watched by sworn people, is the best even if it is cumbersome. This limits cheating to limited areas and requires many people to be silent if there is fraud.
Most problems have arisen from mechanized voting. Way back, some people would reach around behind the voting machine, untwist the seal wire, and press the "clear counter" lever (mechanical counter on a rachet). Now what do you do? Those votes are gone!
The server HD will give the same tally exactly every single time, while the cards will vary slightly.
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That is the exact point - there is no means to conduct a meaningful recount to check. That is why we are pursuing this.
NOTE: THIS IS NOT AN ENDORSEMENT, JUST WANTED TO SHOW YOU SOMETHING
http://www.vogueelection.com/products_automark.html
This is an interesting approach. You use the computer to configure the election, and to cast the votes. It then prints a ballot, which is then run through a scanner. You still need to inspect scanner code, and the code that combines the precinct totals, but at least there is a paper backup.