[tcuoohjohn]

From LCDR Jacobsen's review of " Day of Deceit"

I am a great fan of Toland's and may he rest in peace. Unfortunately he went for the brass ring late in life and came a cropper as a result. Had he checked his data with an naval communications specialist prior to publication he would have saved himself a great deal of grief.

One of the things I have noticed is Pearl Hrbor conspiracy theorists often use the same tactics as " Creation Science" folks. They find a small anomaly in the data and then sugest it is a global proof of their thesis while ignoring the huge body of evidence to the contrary.


<obert B. Stinnett's revisionist conspiracy theory book, "Day of
Deceit." In addition, Villa advanced many additional theories such as the
possibility of an Allied "pinch" of JN-25B, the Japanese naval
adminstrative code, from undisclosed places, the availability of pre-Pearl
Harbor decrypts from Dutch sources, and a concern for what happened to the
radio logs of the SS Lurline. I asked for substantiation and interjecting
some of my personal WWII experiences with Japanese naval cryptologic
procedures and subsequent research in my counter arguments. I also recall
that a hint as to hidden proof of U.S. pre-war decryption of JN-25B was
also suggested.

Now, Timothy Wilford appears with his "new" evidence and advises he and
Villa are working on a joint article "on American foreknowledge of the
Pearl Harbor attack." Equally interesting is Wilford's collaboration with
Stinnett and the announcement that such "new evidence" will be included in
the future paperback issue of "Day of Deceit."

This collaboration information plus Villa's continued critiques on Stephen
Budiansky's clear documentary evidence of no pre-Pearl Harbor U.S. Navy
JN-25B reportable decrypts in his book, "Battle of Wits," gives me the
distinct impression that the Villa/Wilford team is now closer to Stinnett
and his anti-Roosevelt revisionist conspiracy theory much more than
previously indicated during our past exchanges.

Turning to Wilford's post of 23 January, the fact that OP-20-G was working
on the older JN-25B additive messages for code recoveries while Cast at
Corregidor was working on the current JN-25B additive messages is not new
information but a well known and established procedure between them. As
indicated by LT. Parker, the main reason for this split attack procedure
was to reduce the wasteful duplication of book building efforts when so
few personnel were then available for this task and so small a percentage
of recoveries had been made. This continued split working allocation is
further evidence that no current decrypts and translations of useful
intelligence were being made and that the paucity of recoveries still
required an efficient attack towards building up the basic JN-25B
codebook. From an OP-20-G standpoint, more basic JN-25B codebook values
were being recovered through exploitation of the larger group of messages
available in the additive book six series than if they were to work
concurrently with Cast on the much smaller volume of messages available in
the additive seven series. From the message quoted, it clearly shows that
OP-20-G had milked everything from the available messages in additive book
five series and had finally assembled and probably made machine runs on
all the available messages in the additive book six series. They had all
the basic code recoveries and additives made by Cast and FECB in that
series and were starting their work to confirm such recoveries and add new
recoveries with their superior machine facilities and the availability of
all the messages in that series to work with.

From a Cast perspective, their job would be easier if OP-20-G were
assisting on the same additive book series, but that was not the most
efficient use of the limited number of personnel and did not take into
account the long delay for most raw intercepts to find their way to
Washington, D.C. Raw intercepts from Cast, Baker at Guam and Hypo in
Hawaii took up to two months and sometime more for these weekly shipments
to reach Washington, D.C. by ship and rail. The amount of raw traffic
sent by clipper to San Francisco and thence by rail was very limited.
Thus, when the JN-25B additive book was changed on 1 August 1941, most of
those first raw intercepts did not appear in Washington, D.C. until late
September and enough volume to commence an efficient analytical attack
were not assembled until months later. It is likely that even Cast did
not start working on additive seven messages until several months after
the 1 August 1941 change when sufficient numbers of messages became
available to efficiently attack the new additive book in view of the
relatively small number of recovered JN-25B book values. Budiansky's
documentary evidence bears this out. Even after the war started and
quantum leaps were made in resources and book recoveries as well as the
use of radio for message exchanges, delays in recovering new additives and
basic book values after changes continued to plague cryptanalysts for a
year or two.

Wilford seizes on the terminology used by then LT. John M. "Honest John"
Lietwiler to support his erroneous assumption that Cast was decrypting and
translating JN-25B7 messages suitable for reporting purposes (and
apparently that such decryption provides substantiation of Stinnett's long
held claim of FDR's foreknowledge of Japan's Pearl Harbor attack plans and
complicity in a massive conspiracy to get the U.S. into war with Germany.)
However, Wilford ignores the important qualifying parts of Lietwiler's
letter as to "code recovery efforts, etc. included." When Lietwiler talks
about "reading enough current traffic to keep two translators very busy,
i.e. with their code recovery efforts, etc. included", he is saying the
two translators (who are necessary to establish code book values) are
doing just that--establishing code book values--not making intelligible
decrypts suitable for reporting purposes. "Reading" does not
automatically mean decrypting and translating for intelligence reporting
purposes. Before you can establish new book values, a translator must
"read" enough of a fragmented recovery to tentatively assign a value to a
basic numerical code group.

In the early book building process, most recoveries of JN-25B as in other
codes are made from stereotyped phrases and numerals and it is a slow
process to get enough meat and potato values to begin to produce a
reportable decrypt. Since JN-25B was an administrative code, it was not
as susceptible as a stereotypical reporting code would be to obtain early
usable decrypts. In the case of JN-25B, part of the "reading" process is
to also recover additive book pages. Although it is secondary evidence, I
recall the discussions I had with then Commander (and later Captain)
Lietwiler in 1946-47 and 1956 about our group's pre-war and WWII
achievements. Specifically, that the Pearl Harbor attack was a complete
surprise and that the first reported decrypts of JN-25 were in 1942 after
almost all resources were turned on Japanese naval communications
including the expanded team of Station Hypo in Hawaii.

Although Stinnett enticed some naval cryptologists to "tell their story",
when that "story" did not fit his predetermined conspiracy agenda, he
either ignored, slanted or depricated such first hand primary evidence.
Captain Duane L. Whitlock, who was an analyst at Cast and worked hand in
hand with LT. Leitwiler and other cryptanalysts and linguists during the
time in question as well as FRUMEL later, categorically denies that any
JN-25B decrypts were ever made at Cast before 7 December 1941. Even
Stinnett felt compelled to quote Whitlock (page 72) as follows: "I can
assure those messages (Japan's naval) were not read until they were sifted
out and read in 1946." Whitlock has written about the first decryptions of
JN-25B in his Naval War College paper entitled "The Silent War against
Japan," which is available on the internet. I suppose Villa and/or
Wilford (like Stinnett) will take Whitlock's first hand personal account
to task in their support of "Day of Deceit" and its massive conspiracy
allegations. Curiously, Stinnett later calls Whitlock "one of America's
most honored and heroic code-breakers ..." while previously he intimated
Whitlock is lying.

Wilford compounds his erroneous evaluation of LT. Lietwiler's letter by
uncritically applying Fredrick Parker's article, "The Unsolved Messages of
Pearl Harbor," to that assumption and leaps to his conclusion of American
foreknowledge of of Pearl Harbor. First, there is an understandable amount
of 20/20 hindsight in Parker's conclusions. The only real evidence of any
significantly westward movement of carriers is the 1 December 1941 message
of the Shiya giving its projected westward tracks in the North Pacific
Ocean. To fully evaluate Parker's thesis and to try to make it applicable
to 1941 even assuming some capability at Cast to make an intelligence
worthy decrypt of JN-25B7 (which is denied by those concerned and by
specific documentary evidence), one must consider that Cast only
intercepted a small part of the messages that were available to the
1945-47 team that decrypted and translated those 26,581 Japanese navy
messages. Many of them came from Station H in Hawaii who had more
intercept positions than Cast and possibly also from Station Baker at
Guam. There are indications that some of these messages may have been in
other cryptosystems besides JN-25B.

These 1945-47 analysts had the advantage of almost seven more months of
additional messages with the JN-25B book plus all the great work of the
expanded Hypo group and the greatly expanded OP-20-G group with their
almost full effort put to bear on recovering these basic book values. In
addition, the 1945-47 group had no pressure to rush to press with
reportable decrypts and attacked these messages with an academic
thoroughness that included new machine advances made during the war.
Even then there are questionable conclusions and translations that
evidence the use of 20/20 hindsight. For example, the early messages
indicate warlike activity but against whom? Were such training exercises
in preparation for Soviet, British or U.S. ships? The most telling
questionable translations were the reference to NEAR SURFACE? torpedos in
the 23 October 41 decrypt and the parenthetical comment of PROBABLY BOW OR
STERN PLANES in the 28 October message. Without such questionable
identif! ications most of the training exercise messages have little
insight as to a possible Pearl Harbor attack.

Therefore, I see nothing of significant value in Wilford's "new"
discoveries and suggest a closer look into Parker's prefatory statements
strictly limiting the application of his analysis. In addition, a
critical viewing of the 1946-47 translations also show some natural
application of hindsight.

Many wonder why the near 100 percent accurate and complete Japanese
diplomatic message decrypts and translations produced so little action by
high U.S. (and British) officials when viewed by subsequent events. It is
quite likely that the same "noise" that Roberta Wohlstetter attributed to
the interpretation failures of Japanese diplomatic decrypts would also
apply to U.S. officials viewing of partial Japanese naval decrypts even if
they were available at Cast in late 1941. However, it is clear that
neither Wilford nor Villa nor Stinnett has made that first hurdle yet.

It is pertinent to point out that these pre-war U.S.Navy cryptanalyst
linguists forwent promotions to continue to provide vital intelligence in
their dedication to protect the United States from its potential enemies.
When revisionist theorists attempt to prove that President Roosevelt had
knowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor through U.S. Navy
decrypts and failed to act on such knowledge to get the U.S. into the
European war, they are also indicting these cryptologic heros and former
shipmates of mine like Joe Rochefort, John Lietwiler, Duane Whitlock and
many many others for lying and being a part of their alleged coverup.
Frankly, it gets a bit discouraging to have to continually fend off such
unsubstantiated allegations, but soon most of my generation will be gone.
Then, those who want to may succeed in rewriting history by the sheer
weight and enormity of their allegations and the lessened interest of
their opponents.

[jamaksin]

You were saying ...

================================================= From: Philip H. Jacobsen List Editor: "H-DIPLO [Laderman]" Editor's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Author's Subject: Cryptology and Pearl Harbor [Jacobsen] Date Written: Mon, 5 Feb 2001 05:30:16 GMT Date Posted: Tue, 6 Feb 2001 12:16:25 –0500

The last paragraph of this document is:

“Let me assure everyone concerned that the people that worked both on JN-25B and the traffic analysis of Japanese naval communications in late 1941 were dedicated, competent and and experienced professionals. With a much larger staff, up to date equipment and dedicated communications circuits perhaps the outcome might have been different. Any blame should be placed on those who didn't provide the resources to do so. A few dedicated men with relatively little to work with did an excellent job of sifting through two complete call sign changes within a month as well as many other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese including almost complete radio silence and still came up with the a lot of information on the massive Japanese fleet intentions and movements of November/December 1941. And they were and are not now engaged in any conspiracy or coverup.”

[N.B., the “and and” appears in the original text]

In particular, from the above is seen, “ ... other wartime security measures employed by the Japanese included almost complete radio silence ...”

The operative words here are, of course, “almost complete” ...

Yup, Phil’s own words here ...

[Recognize that Phil was not there ... he is not an "eye witness."]

========================================================= Another reference for you:

But, to extend this a bit more, from The Week Before Pearl Harbor by A. A. Hoehling (W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, NY, 1963), in the Epilogue is to be found on Page 200:

“... That panic gripped the second deck of the Navy Department immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor is beyond reasonable dispute. One officer, then in intelligence, now in a high post in the Navy, told this writer that he went to his office safe one morning to find that a number of ‘magic’ dispatches were mysteriously missing. He never retrieved them.

ONI, in fact, had done such a thorough housecleaning of its top-secret and secret as well as not-so-secret files, that, according to another officer on duty at the time, not even a departmental organization chart of November and December, 1941, could ever be found. ...”

Or, on Page 204:

“ ... There are a few specialists, circa 1941, who insist that their memories as well must bear the ‘secret’ tag. A leading cryptanalyst, in retirement, hinting at a kind of passive brain-washing, with his pension as a lever, maintains he has been ordered not to discuss those long-ago codes and ciphers. However, the National Security Council, which he indirectly accused, has denied not only the allegations but any interest in the World War II period. ...”

Perhaps of note in passing, within Hoehling’s text (released some 22 years after the attack) are interviews with several principals, e.g., Stark, Kimmel, Bicknell, McCollum, Rochefort, ..., etc.

You have read this text - perhaps not. The US Navy using a pension as leverage for silence ... my, my ...

But, also note, for some this text might conveniently fall outside of their timeline of relevant Pearl Harbor related text. After all, JN25 in any variant is not mentioned, while Safford is quoted using “Operations Code” at the top of Page 76.

=========================================

And another reference for you:

From: Tim Lanzendoerfer List Editor: "H-DIPLO [Moser]" Editor's Subject: Pearl Harbor Debate [Lanzendoerfer] Author's Subject: Pearl Harbor Debate [Lanzendoerfer] Date Written: Mon, 16 Oct 2000 23:10:41 +0200 Date Posted: Tue, 17 Oct 2000 10:57:01 -0400

As taken from the above document:

“There was one occasion, amply documented. There were no others. Why should the Japanese document the one occasion, but not the claimed others? Why should they broadcast this one occasion on a Navy frequency, but the claimed others on a merchant marine one? Why should they throw away their security with that? They undoubtly had a communications plan; it is documented in Prange's _At Dawn We Slept_ among others -- it was simply not to communicate with any means that could be traced from far away. They did once, because they had to. They did so in an absolutely critical situation, where the presence of the oiler force was required soon and its absence would force the operation to be cancelled. A tiny, short message was despatched, by a Kido Butai leadership that was positively terrified that it had to breach security like that. Unless Professor Villa asks us that we throw out of the window these facts which Prange and others have firmly established through interviews and archival research, for the rather dubious claims of one merchant vessel's radio operator, I do not see how we can ignore all of this.”

=======================================

One more reference:

The Pacific War

John Costello

Rawson, Wade Publishers, Inc.

New York, 1981

Copyright by Atlantic Communications, Inc.

ISBN 0-89256-206-4

(Co-author with Layton and Pineau of “And I was there ...” from 1985. Note that many of the maps are shared ...]

Safford’s letter to Kramer – Page 647:

“Be prudent and patient. I am just beginning to get things line [sic] up on this end. No one in Opnav can be trusted. Premature action will only tip off the people who framed Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short, and will also get Safford and Kramer in very serious trouble. Yet we must have the backing, the rank, and the prestige afforded by Adm. Halsey. Tell Halsey that I knew Adm. Kimmel was a scapegoat from the start, but I did not suspect that he was the victim of a frameup until about 15 December 1943, could not confirm it until 2 December 1943, and did not have absolute proof until about 18 Jan 1944. Capt. Safford has overwhelming proof of the guilt of Opnav and the Gen. Staff, plus a list of fifteen reliable witnesses.”

You and Phil et. al., were saying ...?

======================================================

Very curious this Pearl Harbor topic – notwithstanding what Phil says. Far to many inconsistencies as noted earlier ... Why is that?