Military Split On How to Use Special Forces In Terror War

The Washington Post ^ | 010503 | Gregory L. Vistica

[Archangelsk]

Military Split On How to Use Special Forces In Terror War

By Gregory L. Vistica Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, January 5, 2004; Page A01

With Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld pressuring the Pentagon to take a more aggressive role in tracking down terrorists, military and intelligence officials are engaged in a fierce debate over when and how elite military units should be deployed for maximum effectiveness.

Under Rumsfeld's direction, secret commando units known as hunter-killer teams have been ordered to "kick down the doors," as the generals put it, all over the world in search of al Qaeda members and their sympathizers.

The approach has succeeded in recent months in Iraq, as Special Operations forces have helped capture Saddam Hussein and other Baathist loyalists. But in other parts of the world, particularly Afghanistan, these soldiers and their civilian advocates have complained to superiors that the Pentagon's counterterrorism policy is too inflexible in the use of Special Forces overall and about what units are allowed to chase down suspected terrorists, according to former commandos and a Defense Department official.

In fact, these advocates said the U.S. military may have missed chances to capture two of its most-wanted fugitives -- Mohammad Omar, the Taliban leader, and Ayman Zawahiri, deputy to Osama bin Laden -- during the past two years because of restrictions on Green Berets in favor of two other components of the Special Operations Command, the Delta Force and SEAL Team Six.

They said several credible sightings by CIA and military informants of Omar entering a mosque this spring in Kandahar, Afghanistan, were relayed to U.S. forces at nearby Firebase Gecko, where a Green Beret team was ready to deploy. But rather than send in the Green Berets, who were just minutes from the mosque, commanders followed strict military doctrine and called on the Delta Force, the team of commandos whose primary mission is to kill and capture targets such as Hussein.

In the several hours it took the Delta unit, based hundreds of miles away near Kabul, to review the information and prepare for the raid, Omar vanished, said the sources, all of whom advise Rumsfeld's senior aides.

[Archangelsk]

This is an example of Tier 1 and Tier 2 infighting. I'll leave it up to the operators who are active in this forum to sort this out (as generically as possible) or debunk the author.

[Archangelsk]

Ping for comment and pass along.

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[punster]

I cannot argue over operational jurisdiction. However, I do believe the only effective way to deal with terrorists is to hunt them down and kill them. If they are dead, they will cease to be a threat to anyone.

[Criminal Number 18F]

the U.S. military may have missed chances to capture two of its most-wanted fugitives

I was present when the decision was made for the earlier of these two and the intelligence was not as it is characterised here. Some leaker has been blowing smoke up reporter Vistica's canopy.

in the several hours it took... to prepare for the raid...

Do you really think that our guys waste time playing hacky sack when there's a real chance to investigate an Omar or Zawahiri sighting?

black special-ops elements

Huh?!? What black special-ops elements?

That's a joke, son...

In practice, in the field, there is a very great mutual respect between all the special ops elements and they work together a lot more than you'd think. The same is true of the conventional military. Not at all unusual for one location to have a strac infantry company, some guys with looser uniform policies and some odder gear, and some hippy-dippy civil affairs guys who can get wells and schools built and know all the local atamen, and some dude in a turban who flips back and forth from the local language to American English, who has a hard time remembering his first name and doesn't seem to have a last name at all. And when all those guys work together, it can be as beautiful a thing as a combined-arms offensive. For a lot less money, and with a lot less cleaning-up required afterwards.

d.o.l.

Criminal Number 18F

[Mike Darancette]

Why is it that whenever there is a headline about infighting within the military or the administration it is either from the NY Times or the Washington Post? These reports are always attributed to unnamed sources and prove to be incorrect.

[steplock]

The "infighting" is between the REAL military ((as characterized by the U.S. Marine Corps - US Navy - and parts of the US Army)) and the "clintonian politically-correct" Air Force types who actually believe that the purpose of war is NOT to close in and destroy your enemy.

To the PC types, we are to "persuade" our nice enemies. That's why we had the embassy kidnappings in Iran, the bombings in Africa, the 3000 murdered in NYC - we just didn't treat our enemies nice enough?

[steplock]

A slight correction - the Airforce type being refered to are the PC USAF Academy Colonels & Generals - NOT the true warrior class of the Air Force, the Fighter Pilots and their support crews - they kick butt

[Extremely Extreme Extremist]

Regardless if there's infighting in the military, which I highly doubt it thanks to dubious sources such as the ComPost, everyone pretty much agrees that conventional warfare is out the door.

[Chu Gary]

How sad that the U.S. didn't learn as a result of Vietnam that trying to manage a war from Washington D.C. just doesn't get things done in the field. Better to let the commanders be commanders.

[NutCrackerBoy]

The Pentagon's civilian leaders and generals repeatedly came up with what the report called "showstoppers" to dissuade the White House from launching each mission. It was not because of President Bill Clinton's reluctance to deploy the secret units.

The author of the above is Gregory L. Vistica, Washington Post Staff Writer, indirectly quoting Richard H. Shultz Jr., who is identified as a scholar at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a Pentagon consultant.

Who exactly is doing the Clinton legacy damage control? I say the Washington Post. Shultz is saying what happened. But look at the bigger picture. The President and the Secretary of Defense should have been adamantly pressing to use effective methods. Why were these intermediate parties so influential that they ended up playing it safe? In other words, it was not because of President Bill Clinton's reluctance, but it was because President Bill Clinton didn't engage the matter at all.

[Steel Wolf]

First off, I'll say that this article is for the most part right on the money, especially in the divisions between regular Army (or conventional joint commands) and SOF forces.

Regular Army and SOF didn't see eye to eye prior to 911, but we stayed as separate as we could. After being forced to work together, the divisions deepened.

First, conventional commanders did not approve of how SOF did business, at all. In the 'big Army', safety is everything, because casualties are to be avoided at all costs. ODAs that stopped shaving to help blend in with the local resistance fighters where sharply rebuked from on high, and forced to meet Army standards. They also chafed at the cavalier, brash manner to which the SOF teams conducted themselves, and thought that they felt above the law.

On the SOF side, well, you can imagine being used to do missions with a certain degree of autonomy and discretion, and then having general grade officers dogpile onto your chain of command. SOF HAS been hamstrung by the excessive restraints placed on us by the joint commanders. An SF group is run by a colonel, and often an AOB will only have a Major. That's not a lot of weight to be throwing around when you're attached to a division or a JSOTF. The conventional commanders feel accountable for what we do, so they neither want to take force protection risks, nor do they want to risk allowing us too much freedom to plan and execute missions.

In the several hours it took the Delta unit, based hundreds of miles away near Kabul, to review the information and prepare for the raid, Omar vanished, said the sources, all of whom advise Rumsfeld's senior aides.

This doesn't really sounds right. I'm not familiar with this particular event, but I am familiar with intelligence. There are a lot of considerations you have to make, by the collectors, analysts and commanders, before you make the call. It may very well be that, in retrospect, if they had gone with course of action A they would have got him, but they didn't. Without more info, and more importantly, more context, it's impossible to say whether or not they made the right call.

This sort of thing does happen, though. We have had some problems with other agencies or units that will stop missions or take away sources if they think that, due to political considerations, it's too sensitive for common SOF folk. That's a nice way for them to take credit for your work, or keep you from succeeding where they couldn't. But I digress.

[Khurkris]

bump to check coments

[Travis McGee]

I believe it. Tier One and Tier Two is a fair way of putting it.

I can't speak to Delta, but today DevGru (ST6) operators have rotated in and out of other SEAL Teams many times. Most SEAL platoons could be called upon to do most ST6 missions if time was critical. The guys at ST6 would probably argue otherwise. But it gets back to the old military maxim about a 90% plan done now always being better than a 100% plan being done too late. And now we're in a war, so casualties are acceptable. That means that if a ST platoon takes some casualties that a ST6 or Delta crew might not have taken, so be it. There's a war on. You can't always wait for the Jedi Knights to arrive, because the target will be gone.

[Travis McGee]

I defer to your practical experience.

[Prodigal Son]

I imagine there's some little nuggets in here somewhere. The problem is, without being on the ground how can we ever know? With a conventional unit like the 3ID they get lots of coverage, are very open to the public and we get a good idea of what's going on. With special units like this, who knows? What we don't know is probably more important than what we do and the very nature of the units themselves ensure that we are never going to know all the pertinent details.

There are a few common sense things we might apply without knowing anything at all. I imagine the higly paid team members (to put it in sporting terms) are never quite happy with the way the coach uses them and the guy sitting on the bench always wants to be in the game. If you've got Kobe and Shaq on the same team they both will always want to get the ball with the clock running out.

Also, any doctrine you develop for the SpecOps type units that is too rigidly enforced will be detrimental in some instances given that one of the key strengths of these units is their versatility and ability to improvise and work on their own iniative. I don't know if that's happening here, mind you, but it's just a common sense thing that could be said at any point.

Have there been any instances of these type things that we know of? Well, sure. There was the item about SF guys having to shave their beards. That was a worrying indicator to me because I don't see how else to read that one except some Pentagon Type in Washington saw pictures of bearded SF guys and raised a stink about it (managing the guys on the ground from Washington).

But, on the other hand, Rummy is pushing for more money for SpecOps and getting it. Things might not be going totally the way a lot of these guys would like (perhaps with good reason) but it is undeniable that they are getting more attention and resources.

Of course, more attention might not be the best thing for these types of forces ;-)

[tubavil]

I do believe the only effective way to deal with terrorists is to hunt them down and kill them.

Correct. And we should be doing that right here, right now. Instead, muslim terrorists are allowed to operate freely.

[walden]

Bump

[verity]

I always assume anything in the Times or the Postule to be fundamentally flawed until proven otherwise.

[punster]

I did not say anything about them being Muslim. Some of them are muslim, but there are plenty of terrorists, who are not muslim.

Termination of terrorists does not mean indiscriminate killing. The target must have a valid strategic value. In other words, there must be incontrovertible evidence they are actively committing terrorist acts. Furthermore, using the military, or paramilitary teams (CIA, etc.) can only be allowed for foreign targets (not that it is existing law, but it is a bad idea running assassination teams in your own country).