Camus as Conservative: A post 9/11 reassessment of the work of Albert Camus

Orthodoxy Today ^ | 12/20/03 | Murray Soupcoff

[bdeaner]

Now here's an interpretation of Camus you're NOT likely to see in the academy!

[Cicero]

True. But frankly, anyone who worries about all that poststructuralist trash is wasting his time. Heidegger caused endless trouble with his arcane nonsense. I rather liked Camus when I was in college, but the whole existentialist mind trip is a waste of time.

I'd recommend a nice little article entitled "The Secret that Leo Strauss Never Revealed, published in Asia Times by someone using the pen name of Spengler and posted her at:

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/910008/posts

Here's an extract which sums up what I'm trying to say:

---

And yet there is the nagging problem of Heidegger, who rejected all tellers of absolute truth and Socrates most vehemently. As an impressionable young man, Strauss fell under Heidegger's influence and never quite shook it. Considering Heidegger's grandiose reputation, it is depressing to consider how cheap was the trick he played. What is Being?, he demanded of a generation that after the First World War felt the ground shaky under their feet. It is a shame that Eddie Murphy never studied philosophy, for then we might have had the following Saturday Night Live sketch about Heidegger's definition of Being with respect to Non-Being, namely death. The use of dialect would make Heidegger's meaning far clearer than in the available English translations:

"What be 'Be'? You cain't say that 'Be' be, cause you saying 'be' to talk about 'Be', and it don't mean nothing to say that 'Be' be dis or 'Be' be dat. 'Be' be 'Be' to begin wit'. So don't you be saying 'Be' be 'Be'. You wanna talk about 'Be', you gotta talk about what ain't be nothin' at all. You gotta say 'Be' be what ain't 'ain't-Be'. Now when you ain't be nothing at all? Dat be when you be daid. When you daid you ain't be nothing, you just be daid. So 'Be' be somewhere between where you be and where you ain't be, dat is, when you be daid. Any time you say 'Be' you is also saying 'ain't-Be', and dat make you think about being daid."

That is all there is to Heidegger's Existential idea of Being-towards-death. Metaphysical pettifogging of this sort appeals to people whom the disintegration of social order has made uncertain about their sense of being.

[Chi-townChief]

Killing an Arab - The Cure, 1980

Standing on a beach
With a gun in my hand
Staring at the sea
Staring at the sand
Staring down the barrel
At the arab on the ground
See his open mouth
But hear no sound

I'm alive
I'm dead
I'm the stranger
Killing an arab

I can turn and walk away
Or I can fire the gun
Staring at the sky
Staring at the sun
Whichever I choose
It amounts to the same

Absolutely nothing

I'm alive
I'm dead
I'm the stranger
Killing an arab

Feel the steel butt jump
Smooth in my hand
Staring at the sea
Staring at the sand
Staring at myself
Reflected in the eyes of
The dead man on the beach

The dead man
On the beach

I'm alive
I'm dead
I'm the stranger
Killing an arab

[bdeaner]

"What be 'Be'? You cain't say that 'Be' be, cause you saying 'be' to talk about 'Be', and it don't mean nothing to say that 'Be' be dis or 'Be' be dat. 'Be' be 'Be' to begin wit'. So don't you be saying 'Be' be 'Be'. You wanna talk about 'Be', you gotta talk about what ain't be nothin' at all. You gotta say 'Be' be what ain't 'ain't-Be'. Now when you ain't be nothing at all? Dat be when you be daid. When you daid you ain't be nothing, you just be daid. So 'Be' be somewhere between where you be and where you ain't be, dat is, when you be daid. Any time you say 'Be' you is also saying 'ain't-Be', and dat make you think about being daid."

LOL. Having read Heidegger, I can appreciate this. Thanks for the link to the Strauss article. I'll check it out.

[LadyDoc]

In college, I only read the Stranger.

When I was a doctor, however, I read The Plague, and found it clinically interesting. In some way the plot is similar to the movie "jaws": a danger to the community occurs, and many refuse to recognize it, and many others feel there is nothing they can do to fight to danger, but a few people got together and decided to fight...even though the powerful in the town ridiculed their efforts, ... and because they chose to fight, the "plague" was defeated...

Then I saw a film on a French town that sheltered Jews...camus lived nearby to write this book...and it showed the allegory of the plague as nazism...and it is the story of how most French refused to recognize the horror of what was being done by the Nazis. But the small French village did, and sheltered hundreds of Jews, not "heroically" but merely saying, well they had to be sheltered, so we took them in"

A similar argument could be made about Islamofascism, that since we recognize it as a threat, we must fight...

[Old Professer]

One must remember that all of this was written before modern refrigeration and ice cream.

[bdeaner]

A similar argument could be made about Islamofascism, that since we recognize it as a threat, we must fight...

Yes, exactly. The Plague is quite a good allegory for the situation we are in re: Islamism.

By the way, Doc, what's your specialty, or are you a general practitioner? I'm a clinical psychologist myself.

[cornelis]

This thread is about Camus.

Belittling the understanding of mortality is near to playing the most dangerous game.

[AlbionGirl]

Very interesting expostion on your part.

Off the mark somewhat, but maybe not really (Heidegger rubbing off, I guess?) is the following misconception:

They could experience a Nietzschean "vitality" that only intellectual Ubermensches of revolutionary culture like themselves could truly appreciate. And through the struggle for revolution, they could transcend the empty nothingness of everyday bourgeois existence that so upset them.

I was always under the impression that Nietzche's main philosophical thrust was that the mob (those inately or willingly ordinary), jealous of the superior man (inately or willfully extroadinary), and wanting to disable and destroy him, forms the 'collective' and by this means accomplishes the task.

Communism's goal is not to elevate the superior qualities in the superior man, but instead to lay low those superior beings, and raise up ordinary man, via the collective; the mob. That was part of the Soviet rationale when making the determimation that the bus driver should earn at least as much, if not more, than the physician. So I don't get how this author draws the Nietzchean analogy he does.

I like Nietzche, and consider him near an arch-Conservative, despite his animosity towards the religious in life. I attribute that to the probable cause of an overbearing, not-upright-enough to walk the walk, preacher-father.

But this piece does make me want to give Camus a shot.

[cornelis]

In a similar, but more popular than philosophical vein is De Hartog. In the 60s he wrote The Hospital, about the state of hospitals in Houston.

[cornelis]

the mob (those inately or willingly ordinary), jealous of the superior man (inately or willfully extroadinary), and wanting to disable and destroy him, forms the 'collective' and by this means accomplishes the task.

Michael Oakeshott has an excellent essay on the rise of anti-individualism in the sixteenth century, "The masses in representative democracy."

[mrfixit514]

Sounds like similar themes as those in Ortega y Gasset's Revolt of the Masses and in Benda's Treason of the Intellectuals.

[Penny]

If I may be so modest, I have taught Camus' works for many years. As a moralist, Camus believed through goodness, happiness, liberty, justice, and brotherhood we could put meaning in our lives, moment to moment. (I am always amazed at the insistence of liberal academia to label him an existentialist, an epithet that even Camus rejected.)

A courageous man he was in so many ways, yes, but a conservative man as we know the term today, yes and no. The death penalty, for example, was an abhorent idea to him. Yet, he was ultra conservative in the sense that he fervently believed that governments should never interfere with human liberty, i.e., the ability of human beings to make their own choices and thus their own fate.

Well, I didn't plan on responding because I'm shutting down my computer now, but I was compelled to add to your statement.

With best wishes,

Penny

[AlbionGirl]

I was born in Italy and emigrated to the States when I was just a little girl, and have been back to Italy many times. The reason I mention this, is that I noticed very early on that the peasant class, from which my lineage is derived, exhibits nearly all the tendencies attributed to them by Nietzche. And the most over-arching tendency being jealousy.

I'll give you an example: the last time I was there (2000) I met an old friend of the family, and he was doing very well financially. He's about my parents age of 70, and had done quite well for himself during the 60s and 70s, lost most of his wealth, and then climbed back out of that financial abyss.

I commented to some neighbors that Enzo was doing very well, and that his comeback was impressive. Their reply to me was, 'well maybe, but he's a little deaf, didn't you notice?' I didn't reply, except to shurg my shoulders in an attempt to relay the maxim that to argue against such entrenched obtuseness was obtuse in itself.

Anyway, my point is that rather than admit that he had indeed availed himself of some of his superior qualities, they had to find some unrelated defect, even if it meant naming something that was beyond his control.

The tendency of the inferior to do that is not confined to the peasants in Italy, or Europe in general. However, it flourishes there as opposed to here in the US, because here a man is judged and mostly admired (even if begrudgingly so) for his accomplishments.

That's the beauty of the US; a free society producing free minds. The greatest gift of my life, following the drawing of life's breath, was the gift of emigration to the United States.

[bdeaner]

So I don't get how this author draws the Nietzchean analogy he does.

The Nietzsche and Camus connection seems to be in the common theme of an emphasis upon life and vitality rather than death and that which is anathema to the vital. Nietzsche's beef with religion was only that it emphasized death at the expense of life, and raised weakness above power. Likewise, Camus was quick to point out that one must imagine Sisyphus happy.

On a similar note, I think it is important to distinguish between the "masses" and communitas. The masses represent the unthinking, mob-like mentality of those who attack greatness out of envy, and who appease their own feelings of weakness by identifying with an anonymous collective. The community, on the other hand, is formed by that vital bond between those who gather together to affirm and strengthen the good life.

Does this ring true with your reading of Nietzsche?

[bdeaner]

Yet, he was ultra conservative in the sense that he fervently believed that governments should never interfere with human liberty, i.e., the ability of human beings to make their own choices and thus their own fate.

Thank you, Penny, for your analysis. It rings true to Camus for me. Incidently, I agree with Camus on the death penalty. I believe in the death penalty in an ideal world, in a just world -- but in a world where we can't even trust the judiciary with our Constitution, how can we trust it with our lives?

[AlbionGirl]

Yes, it does for the most part.

However, when reading Nietzche though I did get the sense that communitas worked only on a very small scale, probably like the Kabutz (sp?) in Israel. But, that as the community expanded, as it was wont to do, the vissitudes of life were capable of transmogrifying it to the 'mob' pretty readily.

[Penny]

If you haven't already, you would enjoy reading "The Guest," a short story from his Exile in the Kingdom. The main character, Daru, mirrors nearly all of Camus' philosophical beliefs (and you'll note some existential touches in the landscape and in themes of alienation as well). A search on Google will yield it for you. (Who knows? You may even arrive on one of my college web site pages).

I understand even though I do not share completely your views on the death penalty. Another time, perhaps, we can discuss this issue on this forum.

Best to you again,
Penny

[cornelis]

Interesting story. It's good to have freedom, and more importantly, the freedom to know what is right and the freedom to do right.

The author mentions the chief distinction between nihilism and Camus: good and evil. But there may be another distinction which the consideration of death brings to light and even abhorrent "existentialism" points out: the meaning of good and evil is contingent on the meaning of death. In Marxism, which runs on class envy, the orientation of freedom and humanity is immanent, which means that the social order is for this world and this world alone, not after death. Death is easy come easy go, with trains and chambers etc.

Some pragmatic views in the United States still allow the consideration of the "future" to capture the meaning of justice, but more and more this is falling away in proportion to which death has become meaningless except for a good joke.

[Billthedrill]

I am always amazed at the insistence of liberal academia to label him an existentialist, an epithet that even Camus rejected.

I know. It's because most of them have only read The Myth of Sisyphus or more likely the CliffNotes version. That one is an express rejection of Heidegger's nothingness - it's what existentialism might have become had not Sartre turned it into an exercise in self-dramatizing and navel-gazing.

The Plague really is a good novel, but it was intended to speak to contemporaries for whom the historical allusions were more obvious then they are in an age when students can't reliably recite who fought World War II. Sartre and Roland Barthes have, in fact, stated that the book is weakened because it lacks direct historical allusion, which I have always suspected was, in fact, a refusal to see it as a mirror for their own activities. In fact, it does not, and its setting, Oran, is not accidental either - French, and yet not France, the characters Camus's contemporaries, and yet not his contemporaries. (I've always suspected it's as close as he felt he could get without a libel suit.)

I don't think it was an allegory at all, although it certainly was heavily metaphorical and broadly allusive to the experience of growing Nazism in his native land. The principal issue for the protagonist is to what degree the impending social catastrophe impels him as a reclusive, reflective individual, to embark on direct action in opposition. It is both a measuring of what individual and collective actually owe one another and what degree that individual may remain withdrawn and still be true to his ethical beliefs with respect to that relation. That is a direct and unflinching statement of the difficulties Nazism represented to the French philosophes of the mid-twentieth century, which Camus answered by joining the resistance early and Sartre, very late. It is little wonder that the latter does not want to see himself in The Plague.