LIE TESTS FOR SPY SUSPECTS

New York Post ^ | December 20, 2003 | Niles Lathem

[George Maschke]

WASHINGTON - Army counterintelligence agents are forcing many Iraqi employees of the U.S.-led civilian authority in Baghdad to submit to polygraph tests after a list of Saddam Hussein's spies was discovered in his briefcase, The Post has learned.

Military officials said yesterday "several" Iraqis working as translators and low-level functionaries for the Coalition Provisional Authority and some who have been hired for the police are being given lie-detector tests this week on suspicion they are giving inside information to Ba'athist terrorist cells.

[George Maschke]

Relying on polygraph testing is the wrong way to go about rooting out spies.

In its landmark report, The Polygraph and Lie Detection, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that polygraph screening -- widely used by the U.S. Government to vet employees and contractors with high level security clearances -- is completely invalid and that official faith in the polygraph not supported by the scientific evidence actually poses a threat to U.S. national security interests.

However, since the October 2002 release of the NAS report, the U.S. Government's reliance on the polygraph has actually grown. Just a month after the report was released, Assistant Secretary of Defense John P. Stenbit announced in an official memo that the Department of Defense (DoD) would continue to use the polygraph as before, despite the NAS's findings. Moreover, in a move sought by the DoD, the recently-passed Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 removes the DoD's annual ceiling of 5,000 polygraph screening tests, paving the way for an expansion that may eventually affect many IT contractors working on classified projects.

But polygraph screening has yet to catch a spy. On the contrary, spies like Aldrich Hazen Ames, Karel Frantisek Koecher, Larry Wu-tai Chin, and Ana Belen Montes passed their polygraph screening tests. And in 1938, in what is probably the first use of the polygraph in an espionage investigation, the FBI's trust in the lie detector allowed Nazi agent Ignatz Theodor Griebl to escape to Germany. While failing to catch spies, the unreliable polygraph has wrongly harmed the careers and reputations of many truthful persons. Indeed, about half of FBI applicants who receive conditional job offers are being branded as drug users, drug dealers, and/or security risks by the polygraph.

Most Americans seem to think of the polygraph as an admittedly imperfect but nonetheless generally reliable test that has some scientific basis. But if you might someday face a polygraph "test," it is important that you know the truth about how polygraphic lie detection "works" (and doesn't). The mainstream media have generally been reluctant to disclose this when reporting on polygraphy, in apparent deference to the government agencies that rely on it. In light of the National Academy of Sciences' clear warnings, however, it is high time that the unofficial veil of secrecy be lifted.

The dirty little secret behind the polygraph is that the "test" depends on trickery, not science. You're not supposed to know that while the polygraph operator admonishes the examinee to answer all questions truthfully, warning that the slightest hint of deception will be detected, he secretly assumes that denials in response to certain questions -- called "control" questions -- will be less than truthful. An example of a commonly used control question is, "Did you ever lie to get out of trouble?" The polygrapher steers the examinee into a denial by warning, for example, that anyone who would do so is the same kind of person who would commit the kind of behavior that is under investigation and then lie about it. But secretly, it is assumed that everyone has lied to get out of trouble. (In a variant technique used by the Departments of Defense and Energy, the subject is told to "deliberately lie" to the "control" questions.)

The polygraph pens don't do a special dance when a person lies. The polygrapher scores the test by comparing physiological responses (breathing, blood pressure, heart, and perspiration rates) to these probable-lie control questions with reactions to relevant questions such as, "Did you ever use an illegal drug?" (commonly asked in pre-employment screening). If the former reactions are greater, the examinee passes; if the latter are greater, he fails. If responses to both "control" and relevant questions are about the same, the result is deemed inconclusive.

The test also includes irrelevant questions such as, "Is today Monday?" The polygrapher falsely explains that such questions provide a "baseline for truth," because the true answer is obvious. But in reality, they are not scored at all! They merely serve as buffers between pairs of relevant and "control" questions.

The simplistic methodology used in polygraph testing has no grounding in the scientific method: it is no more scientific than astrology or tarot cards. Government agencies value it because people who don't realize it's a fraud sometimes make damaging admissions. But as previously noted, as a result of reliance on this voodoo science, the truthful are often falsely branded as liars while the deceptive pass through.

Perversely, the "test" is inherently biased against the truthful, because the more honestly one answers the "control" questions, and as a consequence feels less stress when answering them, the more likely one is to fail. Conversely, liars can readily beat the test by covertly augmenting their physiological reactions to the "control" questions. This can be done, for example, by doing mental arithmetic, thinking exciting thoughts, altering one's breathing pattern, constricting the anal sphincter muscle, or simply biting the side of the tongue. Truthful persons can also use these techniques to protect themselves against the risk of a false positive outcome. Although polygraphers frequently claim they can detect such countermeasures, no polygrapher has ever demonstrated any ability to do so, and peer-reviewed research suggests that they can't.

Those interested in learning more about this officially sanctioned pseudoscience will find additional documentation on AntiPolygraph.org. Moreover, with regard to Iraq, it should be recalled that the Washington Times has previously reported that Baath Party loyalists are "proving adept at beating lie-detector tests." The polygraph has a long history of failure in the United States. There is no reason to expect it to do any better in Iraq.

[dennisw]

Get real. Give them lie detector tests. Though imperfect it's better than what's been done so far. You have an axe to grind here.

If I were Paul Bremmer I darn sure would want my Iraqi employees to take a polygraph. And so would you.

[Bonaparte]

The army knows all that. The polygraph is just another tool to sweat them with. In that sense, it's useful.

[George Maschke]

No, I wouldn't. The polygraph screening has no validity, it provides only imaginary, not real security. Its real value is not in catching spies, but as an "ass covering" mechanism for counterintelligence officials, who can point to the polygraph to show that they're doing "everything they can" to "get tough" on security.

The Post article mentions that those who "fail" this invalid test are going to be fired. This is especially stupid, as almost all are likely to be innocent, and we'll only be making enemies of those who had been willing to work with us (and their families).

In addition, U.S. officials who naively believe in the lie detector are going to get a false sense of security about those who pass (just like the CIA did with Aldrich Ames).

[George Maschke]

The army knows all that. The polygraph is just another tool to sweat them with. In that sense, it's useful.

Actually, senior counterintelligence officials don't seem to know all that. It appears from their words and actions they truly believe in the lie detector.

[ontos-on]

The line that concerns me is that "it should come as a surprise to no one that we have been penetrated".

This kind of complacent BS should be rooted out now.

[Skywalk]

I'm going to go with Mr. Maschke here.

I recently took a polygraph for the Seattle PD and my candidacy was ended because I "Failed" the polygraph exam on two questions on which I was utterly truthful(and incapable of "omitting" information.) Did they use the polygraph as an investigative tool? No. They used it to disqualify me, without any corroboration with a background investigation.

The Green River Killer(Seattle area, no less) passed his polygraph. So did Aldrich Ames(on SEVERAL tests.) An innocent man failed his and was the target of the investigation into his missing daughter. Another innocent man failed his during the Green River investigation.


It's true that Mr. Maschke has an agenda, as all his posts indicate, but that makes the truth no less certain. Polygraphs are a waste of everyone's time and you'll be putting innocent Iraqis under the cloud of suspicion while letting psychopathic killers operate with impunity.

[Bonaparte]

"It appears from their words and actions they truly believe in the lie detector."

Are you really that easy to head fake?

[Bonaparte]

When Ben Franklin was our ambassador to France, he hired a personal secretary he knew to be a British spy. He was also very casual about where he placed "important" papers and letters.

Clever guy, that Ben.

[TruthShallSetYouFree]

If the suspects believe that the polygraph works, it could be helpful.

[George Maschke]

If the suspects believe that the polygraph works, it could be helpful.

I agree. But the converse is also true: if those administering the polygraph believe that the polygraph works, it could be harmful. Very harmful. The Post article suggests that employees suspected of espionage will be fired and possibly arrested if they fail the polygraph, which suggests that they won't be if they pass.

But anyone can beat a polygraph test. It's quite simple, as I briefly explained above. You'll find a fuller explanation in The Lie Behind the Lie Detector (1 mb PDF).

[R. Scott]

I’m not a believer in the polygraph – but it could work in this case. The polygraph detects a lie if the subject believes it will detect a lie. I am in hopes that most of the bad guys over there are believers in the polygraph.

[George Maschke]

It seems that Iraqis are not big believers in the lie detector. See, for example, the Washington Times article, Saddam's Loyalists Thwart Polygraph Tests.

[at bay]

You have to be in a really compromising position to know what fakery the polygraphs are. I was jailed for a crime I did not commit and offered to take a lie detector test. It came back inconclusive, so I rotted.

On the other hand, once when the sheriff's wanted me to take one, by their people, I took one instead by a former fbi examiner that they would believe in. Having passed that test, I was no longer a suspect. (The accuser in that case later did over 5 years in prison for the crime he had accused me of)

I don't believe in'em, but setting up appointment times for non-existant polygraphs and seeing who doesn't show is a great way to separate the wheat from the chaff, in my investigative experiences.

[George Maschke]

Are you really that easy to head fake?

No head fake. Those in government relying on the polygraph actually believe in it. The National Academy of Sciences recently reported:

"Federal officials need to be careful not to draw the wrong conclusions from negative polygraph test results. Our discussions with polygraph program managers and counterintelligence officials in several federal agencies suggest that there is a widespread belief in this community that someone who 'passes' the polygraph is 'cleared' of suspicion."

[dennisw]

Army counterintelligence agents are forcing many Iraqi employees of the U.S.-led civilian authority in Baghdad to submit to polygraph tests after a list of Saddam Hussein's spies was discovered in his briefcase.....

So these guys are wrong and you are right? I don't buy that notion.

[dennisw]

Sorry about your own experience. Non the less if you were in Paul Bremer's shoes you would be using polygraphs on Iraqi employeees. If you would not then please tell me why.

In Iraq I want to protect our people and polygraphs have their use in such a situation

[Catspaw]

What do you propose as an alternative?

[George Maschke]

What do you propose as an alternative?

We would be better off not pretending that we have a machine that can detect lies: we don't. And we don't need to wait until a real lie detector is invented before ending our misplaced reliance on one that doesn't work.

That said, there is a kind of psychological test that in some situations can be administered using a polygraph instrument. It's called the Guilty Knowledge Test. It can be administered when investigators have information that only they and someone involved in a crime would know. Although this technique is little used in the U.S., it has gained acceptance in Japan. For more on the Guilty Knowledge Test, see The Body on the Stairs: A Pedagogical Detective Story (2.2 mb PDF) by David Thoreson Lykken. (Chapter 21 of A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector, 1st edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.)

[Catspaw]

It's called the Guilty Knowledge Test. It can be administered when investigators have information that only they and someone involved in a crime would know.

And people screening prospective Iraqis for employment would know this how?