Field artillery certification fire in Baghdad

BAGHDAD, Iraq – The King of Battle is back on his throne and in the skies of Baghdad.

The 4th Battalion, 1st Field Artillery Regiment, of Task Force 1st Armored Division’s 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) began its semiannual Table VIII gunnery Dec. 6 and will continue the certification through Dec. 20.

This is the first time guns of this caliber – Paladin Howitzers firing 155 mm artillery rounds – have been fired in Baghdad since President George W. Bush declared an end to major combat operations in May.

A unique feature of this training is that while all other Task Force 1st Armored Division (AD) assets are conducting gunnery at Butler Range – approximately 50 kilometers away from the 3rd BCT area of operations – 4-1 Field Artillery (FA) is firing within the city’s borders. Command Sgt. Maj. James Savitski, 4-1 FA command sergeant major, said the advantage of within-city-limits certification is two-fold. In addition to qualifying, it is a “show of force,” he said.

Following the successful Operation Iron Hammer, the big guns are keeping the division on the offensive and the enemy confused by showing that the Task Force 1st AD is capable of reacting with counter-fire to anybody who decides to shoot mortars or rockets at Coalition-controlled areas, he said.

Savitski added that the gunnery location took a lot of mission-oriented stress off the unit’s soldiers.

“Because of the mission we were already doing we had to figure out how to maximize our time and personnel,” he continued. “This plan allows us to support the division’s efforts and still get our teams qualified." But it is not as simple as going out and lobbing rounds in a city.

An open field was quarantined to serve as the impact zone, with signs posted around the perimeter warning residents to stay away. Psychological operations teams were also used to inform residents of the incoming steel.

Additionally, the air space in the approximate six-mile distance between the firing site and impact zone was cleared of all aircraft. This is done through 4th Brigade – Task Force 1st AD’s aviation brigade – and the division and brigade fire support elements.

Coordination was also made with air operations of neighboring divisions, such as 4th Infantry Division, whose aircraft might be flying through Task Force 1st AD’s area. Calling in artillery is a three-step process, Savitski said.

The forward observers, located within sight of the target, are known as the eyes of the artillery. “We go deep (sometimes 20 kilometers) in to enemy territory to kill the enemy before they get to the brigade, or before the brigade goes to enemy territory,” said Staff Sgt. Shannon Williams, platoon sergeant for 4-1 FA’s Mustang Platoon, better known as COLT, or combat observation lazing team.

The COLT waits at the impact zone to call in the fire and any adjustments that need to be made. The COLT pinpoints targets using a ground vehicular laser locator designator, or G/VLLD (pronounced “glid”). That information is sent to the Fire Direction Center, sometimes called the platoon operation center.

The FDC is often referred to as the brains of the artillery. “The (FDC) computes all of the data (sent by the forward observers) and controls where the guns shoot,” said Capt. Steve Tautkus, Battery A, 4-1 FA, commander. He said the FDC sends the mission to the guns with information such as what type of propellant, fuse and round to use.

“It puts the steel down,” Savitski said. A Howitzer is operated by a four-man crew – the driver, the computer operator, the “number one man,” who loads the round in to the chamber and the section chief, who supervises to make sure everything goes smoothly.

“At my command” missions hold artillery fire until the forward observers give word that the enemy is gathered in the target zone. This allows for massed fire with maximum effectiveness.

In an “immediate suppression mission,” the howitzer crew fires to break enemy contact if a friendly force is pinned down. “Time on target” missions give the howitzers a specific time to hit a single target; all rounds hit the target at exactly the same time.

If artillery is firing at an objective and friendly forces start receiving fire from a previously established target, a priority target mission will be called in to redirect artillery to that target. Schedule of fires gives a list of targets in sequential order of when they are to be hit.

Immediate smoke is the same as immediate suppression, but with smoke rounds; quick smoke lays rapid smoke rounds to block the enemy’s vision as friendly forces move.

After the sun goes down, illumination and coordinated illumination missions are conducted. An illumination mission fires an illumination round to light up the sky, giving visibility of the target at night. Coordinated illumination mission fires an illumination followed by a high explosive round.

For the Gunners of 4-1 FA, the gunnery seems to be a welcome break from their normal routine of patrols and guard duty.

“I didn’t think I would get to fire in Iraq,” said Spc. Joe Wilridge, howitzer crewmember with Battery A, 4-1 FA. “I love shooting rounds. I’m doing what I get paid to do.”

THE WAY THINGS REALLY WORK: The Facts on the FACs December 19, 2003:

The U.S. Air Force has long monopolized the job of controlling combat aircraft in support of ground troops. Until about two decades ago, all of these "air controllers" (or FACs, for "Forward Air Controller") were pilots. But it was always a problem getting sufficient pilots to volunteer for this duty, and the training for the job was taking longer and longer. Moreover, in the late 1970s, the air force began assigning air controllers directly to specific army combat units. In the past, the controllers lived at an air base, only joining with an army unit for training or actual operations. This often created problems, as the army troops were leery about working with a bunch of "strangers." With air control parties (the officer who called in the air strikes and several enlisted airmen to help with the equipment) assigned to army units, more air force personnel were needed for this duty. So in the early 1980s, a new job category, terminal air controllers, was established and staffed with sergeants.

Currently there are 980 enlisted terminal air controllers and 350 officer combat controllers. These 1300 air force personnel are something of an elite force. Most have gone to jump school, and taken much army combat training (including, for some, sniper school). They serve full time with the army units they support, distinguished in the field only by their unique air force rank badges (for the enlisted troops only, as air force and army officers use identical rank insignia.) The air force personnel are considered combat qualified, and in Afghanistan and Iraq many of them found themselves using their M-16s against nearby threats, as well as calling in bombs from overhead warplanes. In fact, fighter pilots serving as controllers on the ground suffer a much higher casualty rate than then their brethren who are still flying. This was even the case in Vietnam, where seven percent of the 3,000 air force controllers were killed in action.

In Afghanistan, the air force had plenty of controllers, so much so that they were able to keep out navy ground controllers (who also handle gun fire support from warships, which was not an issue in landlocked Afghanistan.) The navy was not happy with this, but the air force did have the situation covered. Iraq was a different story, and there were shortages, even with the navy controllers present. At this point, the army and the marines realized several things. One, the GPS smart bombs made bombing missions close to the troops much more popular. Combat commanders now wanted someone in each platoon to call in air strikes. Second, the equipment needed to call in air strikes was lighter, there was less of it and it was easier to use. Third, the air force sergeants who were doing most of the controller work were very, very good. The conclusion was that the army and marines wanted to train some of their own NCOs for these tasks. They had seen how the air force did it (two years of on-the-job training as an assistant to an enlisted controller, then months of formal training), and knew they had people who could do it as well.

The air force is cooperating in the training of army and marine sergeants to be controllers, and doesn't see it's own controllers going away. The air force officer controllers, who command the enlisted controllers and take care of larger issues (like arranging for air dropped troops or supplies and the use of improvised air fields during combat, and so on) are always going to be needed. The air force NCO controllers are another matter. When the air force began training sergeants to be controllers, they found there were many young air force NCOs who wanted that kind of job. There are always far more volunteers than there are open positions for new terminal air controllers. But it would cost the air force over a hundred million dollars a year to supply as many controllers as the army and marines now want. But the air force may be able to save some money if they help train army and marine NCOs to be controllers, and maybe even cut back on the number of air force NCOs doing this work.

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