Posted on 12/18/2003 10:36:53 AM PST by Destro
Edited on 04/13/2004 2:45:16 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
Be careful on characterizing the posts of others as "gross falsification of history", you may have to eat your words--although its much easier to do with electrons than paper. :-)
In the U.S. Army Center for Military History Publication 104-18 German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) it states "the occupiers were opposed by ... forces ... in Albania, by a total estimated to be as many as 20,000, with the strongest group that of the Communist leader, Enver Hoxha." (Chapter 7, Section III)
Gael, that pub is not a long read. It discusses Mihailovich and mentions in passing the role of the Serb collaborationist forces. Takes a "middle-ground" approach to the Chetniks.
After the Germans were driven out of Albania in late 1944, two Albanian Partisan Divisions were then sent by Hoxha to assist Tito in Yugoslavia. Don't want to inflict too much cognitive dissonance on you guys, but Tito used them against both the Kosovar Albanians and the Chetniks.
There was no equivalent type of resistance by any single ethnic group other than the Serbs that was comparable in intensity, scale and duration to the Nazi occupation anywhere else in Europe.
Its all relative. At the conclusion of WWII, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration reported about 30,000 Albanian war dead, 200 destroyed villages, 18,000 destroyed houses, and about 100,000 people left homeless. Albanian official statistics claim somewhat higher losses. Didn't include displaced persons or refugees. Pretty healthy losses in a population of just over 1,000,000. And bespeaks significantly more combat than derived from a force of only several hundred fighters.
I'm not claiming that there was no collaboration among Serbs, Ljotic being a prime example. But the units involved were small, were of dubious loyalty to the Germans though ferociously anticommunist, and were vastly dwarfed in numbers by Serbs in the Chetniks and Partisans. I reject the notion that this small number of collaborators made Serbia a collaborationist state a la Croatia or that there somehow was a moral equivalence between the two.
I'll have to defer re Albania. I know Hoxha had relatively strong forces and IIRC they captured Tirana on their lonesome. But then, their opposition was rather weak by that point.
While there were Albanian Partisans in Kosovo, it appears that many of them switched sides and joined remnants of the Skanderbeg div. and the Balli Kombetar in the "Shabhan Palluzha" uprising (my sources are unclear on the involvement of Albanian Albanian Partisans, as opposed to Kosovo Albanian Partisans, in that motley predecessor to the KLA.)
You are not telling us when the Albanian resistance was formed. Of course, not! Because that would shed a different light on your relativizing and misleading approach at rewriting the history. Even your source (which is exceedingly general) quoting an estmated 20,000 Albanian parisans is misleading.
Why? Because it doesn't tell us a crucial fact that the first real, organized Albanian resistance unit was formed -- with heavy British assistance -- only at the tail end of WWII, when the Germans were already losing (and Albanians had to find a new sponsor)!
The first Albanian partisan division was formed in May 1944. The first -- and only Albanian "corps" (consisting of two divisions) of WWII was formed in August 1944, two months before Tirana fell -- that is after all the Germans evacuated from it, and only nine months before Germany's defeat! The other 2 corps were formed after the war ended in 1945.
Even such authors which you may find dear and close to heart, as Noel Malcom, leave no doubt that the "resistance" in Albania was more political and intertribal than an organized anti-German camapign. Look up his "Kosovo, a Short History," pp. 303-308.
The ethnic Albanian resistance to German occupation in Kosovo, which was part of Greater Albania during WWII, was non-existant for all practical purposes, and communist party members who participated with Yugoslav partisans numbered about two dozen for the whole region.
It is clear to anyone who doean't take a generalist, superficial approach to interpreting history, that Albanian resistance prior to Italy's withdrawl from the Axis, and prior to an imminent German defeat, represented an insignifciant and purely opportunistic aspect of overall resistance to Germans in the Balkans, just as was the case with Bulgarian partisans.
A lot of "partisan" activity had to do with intertribal fighting, as well as resisting Italian attempts to change the stone-age country into something closer to the 20th century.
Tharefore, I reiterate that drawing any parallel between Albanian, Bulgarian and other Balkan resistance movements, and their effect in scope and scale, to the predominantly Serb Yugoslav resistance from the beginning of the German occupation in 1941 until 1945 is a gross distortion of history.
You know, I expected an "explanation" like that on your mental level. I am so glad you didn't disappoint me.
Now here’s the rest: Albanian resistance to the 1939 Italian invasion and occupation began almost immediately. It mounted through the Italian withdrawal from the war in 1943 and continued with the German occupation in 1943-44. When the last Germans retreated north out of Tirana in November of 1944, the Albanians could say they were the only country in occupied Europe that freed itself as no conventional Russian, American, or British forces fought in Albania.
The premise that the formation of Partisan Division and Corps Headquarters equates to the beginning of Albanian resistance does not account for the fact that most of the subordinate units and their troops were already in existence and in action; in many cases for years prior to the formation of the corps and divisions. Original resistance units were regionally based. Partisan leader Hoxha (based to an extent on the advice of Tito’s liaison officer to the Albanians) formed the divisions and corps to serve as command and control nodes for all these “ceta” and battalions in order to facilitate the conduct of large-scale mobile warfare later in the war.
As to scope of resistance, Albania was too small to compare with what was going on in Yugoslavia. However, the Albanians did in fact fight the Fascists and Nazis longer than any other resistance forces in Europe. Mussolini’s Army invaded in April 1939 and Albanian resistance began almost immediately and continued through Italy’s collapse in 1943 and the subsequent German occupation. After the Germans fought their way out of encircled Tirana in November 1944, their last units crossed into Montenegro at the end of the month and Albania was considered liberated. Hoxha continued the fight by sending Partisan units to assist Tito in freeing the last of Yugoslavia from German occupation (and perhaps to clean out the last of Mihailovic’s forces). Albanian resistance thus dates from several months prior to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and up through 1945—over five years.
One measure of resistance is occupation force casualties. During the period April 1939-September 1943, Italian losses were estimated as 26,500 dead; 21,000 wounded; and almost 21,000 captured. However, perhaps as many as 19,000 of the dead were based on the 1940-41 Italian war with Greece instead of Albanian resistance, which still leaves the not insignificant number of at least 7,500 Italians dead due to Albanian resistance.
Another measure would be the number of Italian occupation forces needed to pacify the country. They numbered 8-9 divisions up through the Greek debacle and then were drawn down to four divisions. In the face of mounting resistance, they were ramped back up to a total of eight divisions in Albania at the time of the German invasion in 1943; a not inconsiderable number.
Since Albania did not have an Army, but only a lightly armed gendarmerie at the time of the Italian invasion, there was no ready made force available to fight the invaders. As a result, early Albanian resistance was in the form of sabotage, sniping, and ambushes conducted by various nationalist groups. Italians reported guerilla bands in operation starting in May of 1940. At the same time, foreign embassies and newspapers were reporting resistance propaganda, fighting and assassinations. Sabotage was reported at the chromium mines and saboteur-caused damage reduced Albania’s petroleum output by 25%. By May 1941, 5,270 Albanians were imprisoned for anti-Italian activities and 21,131 were listed as “enemies of the state;” which equates to 1 of every 40 Albanians—a fairly significant amount of the population specifically identified as part of the resistance.
By 1943, guerilla operations had progressed to where pitched battles were fought at Leskovik near Korca, near Dibra, and at Permet in which hundreds of casualties were inflicted on the Italians and dozens of vehicles were destroyed. In the spring of 43, the U.S. Army history estimates Albanian guerilla strength as 20,000. The Brits report 10,000 Partisan fighters in thirty bands and twenty battalions with an additional 20,000 reserves. And there were other groups, the nationalist anti-communist Balli Kombetar and the Zogists (monarchists) as well as highly independent northern highlanders who would fight anyone who came into their domain and occasionally cooperate with others against the Italians, the Germans, or the despised communist Partisans.
Based on the size of both Albanian guerilla groups and Italian occupation forces as well as reported incidents and Italian casualties, there was a significant ongoing resistance effort during the years of Italian occupation.
Although the Italian collapse and the German invasion in September of 1943 surprised the Albanians as much as anyone else, both Zogist Royalists and Balli Kombetar nationalists attacked German forces as they entered the country. The communist Partisans, however, were soon the most active; resulting in major German counter-offensives in the winter. Used to the slower and more timid tactics of the Italians, the Albanians were quickly rocked back by the fast moving and hard-fighting Germans. German figures put Albanian guerilla dead at 2,239 by the end of January with 401 more in February and 236 in March.
Despite the losses from the 1943-44 German winter campaigns, in May Hoxha claimed 35,000 fighters and the British SOE reported 20,000 Partisans in twelve brigades. Later in the summer, however, one operation alone cost the guerillas over 2,500 dead and prisoners at the cost of 420 German casualties.
For German casualties in Albania, the Brits estimate 6,000-7,000 killed and 500 captured while a recent “post-socialist” Albanian history comes in at 3,600. Not the big numbers associated with resistance in Yugoslavia, but not inconsiderable either given the 14 months of German occupation in a small country.
Finally, although Hoxha’s historians recorded Albanian deaths at 80,000 out of a population of about one-million; according to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency there were 28,000-30,000 Albanian dead with 13,000 others left invalided. Not as much as Yugoslavia, but again, Albania was significantly smaller.
Here are some references; the first two are the best:
Albania's National Liberation Struggle: The Bitter Victory
Julian Amery’s “Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla Warfare” and “Approach March: An A Venture in Autobiography”.
Always thought Mihailovic was simply trying to make it to the end of the war without causing reprisals to Serb civilians and with a force ready to help the Allied invasion & stop the communists. Opened my eyes as to how much actual fighting was done against the occupiers by the Chetniks.
The Mihailovic resentment of BBC shilling for the communist Partisans was echoed by BLOs with the nationalists in Albania, as well. Not sure that part would be any different today!
Thanks for the references.
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