The goodists-What is the significance of the Geneva Accord, signed by self-appointed negotiators?

What is the significance of the Geneva Accord, just signed by self-appointed Israeli and Palestinian negotiators?

According to some Palestinians, it is a betrayal of their most cherished national aspiration, which is to return by the millions to their ancestral villages and orchards and houses in Israel. According to some Israelis, it is a piece of reckless freelance diplomacy that creates dangerous expectations about what Israel can realistically give away in any genuine negotiation.

But according to the editorial board of The New York Times, the Accord is a "courageous feat" that defies "the usual extremists" on both sides to prove that "Israelis and Palestinians of good will [can do] what their current leaders have shown themselves incapable of doing.... declaring in concrete terms how the conflict can end." The Times, as usual, is right.

THE NOTION that good will is the answer to whatever's the problem has always been a powerful one in world affairs.

Let's say that Nation X refuses to comply with international demands to allow inspectors to monitor some suspicious activity. Well, then: We must dazzle Nation X with proofs of our good intentions. High-level diplomatic overtures. Economic aid. Deference to Nation X's political, cultural or religious sensitivities. Or imagine the people of Nation Y have bestirred themselves to fury and violence against their neighbors. This must be because they have grievances it would behoove the rest of us to comprehend. And let's not forget Nation Z, currently suffering a dreadful economic crisis. Mustn't the world band together to keep Nation Z's children from going hungry?

The nations that spring to mind with these generic examples are North Korea, the Palestinians and Zimbabwe. Or they are the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and Somalia. All are, or were, the beneficiaries of a great deal of Western good will. Most of this good will was advocated on the principle that that which is given shall be repaid in kind: good for good and evil for evil. And yet in nearly every case, the opposite proves true: good is repaid with cynical manipulation, contempt and sometimes war.

It is not very interesting to ask why bad people play good people for suckers. It's more interesting to ask why good people so often allow themselves to be played.

Are they stupid? I don't think so. The people whose names are associated with appeasement -- Neville Chamberlain -- with "human rights" -- Jimmy Carter -- with constructive engagement -- Bill Clinton - with a peace process -- Shimon Peres -- all had or have well-deserved reputations for smarts. Their admirers, too, generally belong to the smarter set.

Nor can such people be easily accused of naivete. It's easy to forget now, but there were plausible and sophisticated reasons for a weak Britain to seek accommodation with Germany in 1938. The human-rights case -- although Carter never really put it to the Soviets -- did much to undermine the USSR from within. Equally, there was a strong strategic case for Israel to seek peace openings with its neighbors following the collapse of their patron state. As for Clinton, he sought to use America's "unipolar moment" to resolve nettlesome conflicts while setting a good tone for global stewardship -- a reasonable enough approach.

Finally, it would not be right to say these people -- I call them "the Goodists," with a bow to Oriana Fallaci -- are just too trusting and well-intentioned for their own good. Clinton, certainly, is no paragon. He did not rise to high office on the strength of his goodness, but rather because he, like the other notorious Goodists, are grasping, calculating, egotistical men.

First there is the fact that the politics of good will are conducted not for the benefit of its recipients, but to satisfy the needs of its practitioners. Clinton may or may not "still believe in a place called Hope" (after Hope, Arkansas, his hometown), but the line helped create the impression that the president was a big-hearted man who "cared." UN Secretary General Kofi Annan is another one who's big on the good-will front. But that, after all, is his job: to cheer the optimists, to declare his good intentions, to say things that Ecuador, Kampuchea and Syria can agree on. Whether the things he says are actually true or constructive is a secondary consideration.

Secondly, there is the tactical aspect. By preemptively demonstrating one's good will, so the thinking goes, you deny your opponent the chance to doubt it. "I don't accept campaign contributions from big tobacco," says candidate M, " -- and I challenge my opponent to do the same." In a sense, this is what Ehud Barak attempted with the negotiations at Camp David: By making what he thought were astonishing concessions up front, and in the presence of Clinton, he sought to embarrass Yasser Arafat into making reciprocal concessions.

Thirdly, the politics of good will are a convenient mask for weakness. Between the prospect of being defeated in war or appearing generous in negotiation, many statesmen might sensibly choose the latter. Yitzhak Rabin bucked his usual instincts and agreed to Oslo in part because he believed, following the Scud missile attacks of 1991, that Israelis had lost their stomach for war. The detente of the 1970s, which aimed to ease tensions with the Soviet Union through arms control and trade agreements, came at a time when the US was withdrawing from Vietnam, beset by an oil embargo and embroiled in domestic upheavals. This is what's known as making a virtue out of necessity.

Such considerations makes for smart politics, particularly in democracies where voters act as frequently upon their feelings as they do upon their interests. It also explains why Goodists so often attempt to transform the terms -- indeed, the very nature -- of foreign policy debates.

Thus, according to the Goodists, the great global challenges are poverty, hunger, disease and war. This may be true in the most general sense. But it sidesteps the hard fact that the real culprits are the foolish and sometimes ill-intentioned leaders whose policies lead to such things. Goodists would also contend that the real goal for nations at war is moral victory -- if necessary, by means of surrender -- rather than victory itself.

This is why the Goodists make a fetish of the concept of legitimacy. To liberate Iraq or not to liberate Iraq? About the only thing interesting about that debate was that so many "good" people actually believed that securing Security Council approval was morally a worthier goal than liberating 23 million people from the boot of a merciless tyrant. Or take the matter of Israel's security fence: Here again, it is left to Right-wingers to fret about militarily defensible borders, whereas to Goodists what matters is whether that fence meets with the approval of The Hague.

GENERALLY SPEAKING, the Goodist approach works best within and among democracies. The European Union is a fine example of this, with political leaders falling over themselves to prove how they are better Europeans than the next guy. In the coming US presidential election, the Democratic candidate is sure to score for squandering world sympathy in the war on terror. As for Israel, Goodist pressure is applied almost exclusively upon it for the same reason that people search for lost keys under the lamppost: that is, Israel is the one country in this region likely to yield to Goodist indignation.

On the other hand, Goodists are not so effective when it comes to dealing with dictators and other nasties. One problem is that Goodists are too sure of their own cleverness. Someday someone will write a good study of the subject, but my guess is that Barak, Chamberlain and the other Goodists failed in their respective peace overtures because they were each convinced they could outwit and outmaneuver their opposite numbers. They did not take into consideration the tyrant's perfect willingness to drop out of the whole game of good intentions -- to stand up, say "no," and walk out.

Then too, Goodists have a hard time comprehending that dictators don't speak their language. Unlike Barak or even Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat cares as much about international popularity contests as he cares about domestic ones. "Be reasonable" was not something Saddam Hussein was ever going to understand, seeing as he owed his life's success to being unreasonable. Only when the US deployed 150,000 troops to the region did Saddam start to make back-channel overtures, but by then it was too late.

Finally, Goodists fail properly to appreciate the relevance of evil. Why can't Israelis resolve their differences with the Palestinians? Goodists will say it's about competition for scarce resources, such as land and water, or mutually exclusive religious claims and cultural narratives -- explanations that allow them to avoid taking any side but their own.

And yet the problem is simple to the point of being simplistic (to use a term the Goodists scorn). The problem is this: One man set himself the demonic, lifelong task of seizing full control of his people so they might participate in his project of destroying the State of Israel. That is the problem. That is it. So long as that man is in place, there can be no solution to the conflict, only capitulation. With that man gone, much is possible.

As I said, the editors of the Times are right. By this, I do not mean that I, too, endorse the Geneva Accord. Procedurally, I oppose it as a usurpation (on the Israeli side, at least) of the government's sovereign and exclusive right to conduct foreign policy. Tactically, I oppose it for conceding more than Ehud Barak was prepared to give away at Camp David, thereby telling the Palestinians they will pay no penalty for always holding out for more. Substantively, I oppose any deal that does not require the Palestinians -- formally, explicitly and unambiguously - to renounce the "right of return."

Still, it is true that the Accord demonstrates what is possible with sufficient good will. To wit, it shows that if you put two nice men together in a room, they will forego violence for conversation, they will overcome ignorance with compassion, and they will agree a structure for peace in the Middle East.

The goal of responsible global statesmanship is to work toward a world in which men and women of good will are in charge. Goodists believe this can be advanced through high-profile demonstrations of niceness. For the rest of us, however, a world of make-believe isn't enough. Sometimes you have to kill the bad guys.

They [goodists] did not take into consideration the tyrant's perfect willingness to drop out of the whole game of good intentions -- to stand up, say "no," and walk out.

Or for a tyrant to sign any treaty, shake hands, see the goodist to his waiting car and then, upon returning to his office, the tyrant rips up the treaty to the great amusement of the tyrants inner circle of thugs.

BTW, excellent article. Explains for the timid, what most of us know by instinct.

It is not very interesting to ask why bad people play good people for suckers. It's more interesting to ask why good people so often allow themselves to be played.

Because they are suckers, which is to say, they're stupid.

Maybe they are/were book-smart, but they didn't/don't have very much common sense, which is a key element of intelligence. Thus, IMHO, they weren't/aren't so smart as they've been made out to be. Also, their admirers tend to suffer from shoulder joint problems related to patting themselves on the back a bit too much. I've always found it useful to question the intelligence of those who proclaim "I'm so smart" the loudest - it seems that they're trying to convince themselves more than anyone else. Ditto for the politicians that they support so vociferously - they seem to be trying to convince themselves that they've made the best choice. Its like the guy who buys a new car and can't stop telling you about how great it is - ever wonder why?

Don't hold your breath. I think that the same thing, with minor textual changes, was said about Central Europe in the late 1930's, and about the budding problem of the Soviets only 10 years later. Its nice to have good will, but if one who is the leader of a nation has too much of it and not enough common sense, then good will is actually a liability. Ask 40 million+ Europeans - oh, that's right, you can't - they're DEAD, because a good-willed twit named Chamberlain trusted good old Adolf. Has Stephens even considered that the Israelis, some of whom are desperate for peace, will grasp at any straw for it, and that the Pallies are playing them for fools? Has it dawned on him that maybe, just maybe, all of this talk on the part of the Pallies is just a well-orchestrated attempt to lull the Israelis to sleep? I don't even know why I asked those questions - I know the answer.

Instead of just plain old "men of good will," what the world (or at least the Free World) needs are pragmatic men (and women) who have a vision of a better world but who also understand human nature and how the world really works - so as not to be taken for suckers. Methinks that Bret Stephens is in the former group.

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