In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the appropriate standard of review or of the Court"s traditional role of protecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.ly Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969).
Yet today the fundamental principle that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, breathtaking scope, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), directly targets and constricts core politi- cal speech, the “primary object of First Amendment pro- tection.” Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 410–411 (2000) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because “the First Amendment ’has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for politi- cal office,” Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U. S. 265, 272 (1971)), our duty is to ap- proach these restrictions “with the utmost skepticism” and subject them to the “strictest scrutiny.” Shrink Missouri, supra, at 412 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). In response to this assault on the free exchange of ideas and with only the slightest consideration of the appropri- ate standard of review or of the Court’s traditional role of protecting First Amendment freedoms, the Court has placed its imprimatur on these unprecedented restrictions. The very “purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 (1969). Yet today the fundamental principle that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), is cast aside in the purported service of preventing “corruption,” or the mere “appearance of corrup- tion.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam).
Apparently, the marketplace of ideas is to be fully open only to defamers, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); nude dancers, Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U. S. 560 (1991) (plurality opinion); pornographers, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U. S. 234 (2002); flag burners, United States v. Eichman, 496 U. S. 310 (1990); and cross burners, Virginia v. Black, 538 U. S. ___ (2003).
This portion of the Thomas dissent would make a great tagline.
Sounds like Justice Thomas is as bitter about this as many on this forum. Yours truly included. He certainly gets right to about how crazy the decision is in light of the other fairly recent, decisions of the court.