A paper trail **is** possible, using a combination of multithread key (or touch) logs, standard DB, and paper receipt (a la Visa cards). You want independently threaded and operationally different keystroke logs in case ONE of them gets hacked, the DB for general review purposes, and the receipts (two copies, of course, one for the voter and the other to go into a ''ballot'' box, as paper ballots do right now) for purposes of hard recounts. Upload the e-tally (the DB) to Election Central or wherever, retaining the receipts against the potential desirability of a recount.
It would be extremely difficult to corrupt all three subsystems (five, actually) simultaneously, and the voting results would be available as quickly or more so than now, in some huge majority of cases.
A paper trail **is** possibleA paper trail is a must. The last two elections I voted using this system. There was no tangible record of my vote. Only that I had "participated" via the log of who in my precinct voted that day. Your proposed system would be a vast improvement over what is currently the case. Hopefully we won't conveniently "vote away" many rights before a verifiable system is in place.