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Iran May Have More Nuclear Skeletons, Experts Say

November 25, 2003
Reuters
Louis Charbonneau

VIENNA -- Iran will escape being reported to the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday for violating its non-proliferation obligations, but arms experts suspect Iran has more nuclear skeletons in its closet that will come to light.

The U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Board of Governors meets to adopt an IAEA resolution that "strongly deplores" Iran's 18-year cover-up of a secret nuclear program that included uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.

But the resolution, which was put to the board after a week of haggling between France, Germany and Britain and Washington, also "welcomes Iran's offer of active cooperation and openness."

The United States had originally hoped to send Iran to the Security Council for possible sanctions for violating its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But the European trio opposed this from the start and Washington eventually acquiesced.

Jon Wolfsthal, deputy director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a U.S.-based think-tank, said the disagreement between the European Union's three biggest states and America might resurface in the future.

"It's very likely that Iran has more skeletons in its closet, and if they come to light, there will probably be another split between the United States and Europe on what's the best approach to take," Wolfsthal told Reuters.

"My concern is that there is no agreement either within Europe or between the key players on what to do when the shoe drops," he said, adding that he was unsure if the Europeans were prepared to take Iran all the way to the Security Council.

The resolution contains a so-called trigger clause -- if further breaches by Iran are uncovered, the IAEA board will meet immediately to consider "all options," one of which is the Security Council.

IRAN'S TWO-DECADE COVER-UP

The IAEA resolution is a response to an IAEA report that details Iran's cover-up of sensitive atomic research for nearly two decades. It said there was "no evidence" of a covert arms program but the jury was still out as to whether one existed.

Secretary of State Colin Powell said the United States was very pleased with the resolution, especially the part which immediately refers any future Iranian violation of international agreements to the IAEA board.

"That's...an element that we wanted to see in the resolution, which points out that action will be forthcoming -- appropriately so -- if there is any indication in the future that Iran is not meeting its obligations," he told reporters.

Gary Milhollin, head of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a U.S.-based think-tank, told Reuters the resolution had "locked Iran into the declaration" it gave to the IAEA in October that Tehran insists was complete and accurate.

But if Iran has any more secrets, the trust that the Europeans have given them will be betrayed and the IAEA board will be under intense pressure to report Iran to the Council.

"If the present declaration turns out to be false, then all bets are off and this deal unravels," Milhollin said. He added he would not be surprised if some of Iran's "skeletons" were further undeclared imports of nuclear material.

Wolfsthal said the administration of President Bush clearly supported the IAEA inspection process, though some in Washington saw the resolution as a kind of a trap -- a chance to let the Iranians hang themselves.

http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=3891547

Playing Footsie With Iran

Christian Science Monitor - Editorial
Nov 26, 2003

George W. Bush both loathes and needs Iran, a ranking member of the "axis of evil."

His diplomatic codependency played out this week when he backed off demands for international economic sanctions against Iran - even though UN inspectors caught it red-handed a few months ago hiding a uranium- enrichment program.

Even with the possible threat of a nuclear Iran upsetting the Middle East power balance, Mr. Bush has to make trade-offs.

First, the US needs Iran's help in the war on Al Qaeda. Many top members of that terrorist group are under guard in Iran, and could provide vital information in catching Osama bin Laden.

Second, Bush needs the Shiite-run Islamic Republic of Iran to use its influence with the Shiite majority in Iraq next door to help the US hatch a stable democracy.

Bush has other tricky problems with Iran, which itself is over struggling how to mix Islam and democracy.

For outsiders, it's sometimes difficult to tell whether the hard-line ruling clerics prevail on every decision, or whether reformers under President Mohammad Khatami sometimes win.

Then the US faces the embarrassing postwar question of whether its secret intelligence is accurate in claiming Iran is making an atomic bomb, despite Iran's claim of a strictly civilian program.

One skeptic of the US claim is the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. Its staff, and most of the IAEA's 35 member countries - including Britain - opposed a US move to have the IAEA board ask the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran for violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, the IAEA accepts for now Iran's promise to open its facilities for inspections.

Of course, the threat of sanctions - and indeed a renewed Israeli threat to bomb any Iranian nuclear-weapons facility - helped force the economically weak Iran to concede to the IAEA's demands - at least for now.

If Iran is caught once again hiding weapons-grade nuclear material, the US will have been proven right, forcing a fresh confrontation between the international community and yet another defiant Middle East regime. And the IAEA's decision to give Iran a second chance will have set a bad precedent in the effort to prevent nuclear proliferation. Much depends on the effectiveness of IAEA inspections.

The best hope is that Iran's more-reformist faction has won the argument and shelved any of the nation's nuclear ambitions.

And that's the best choice for the ruling clerics if they want to survive the rising mass of unhappy and unemployed Iranian youth.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1126/p10s02-comv.html?entryBottomStory

Holding the line in Afghanistan

Christian Science Monitor
November 25, 2003 edition

By Mansoor Ijaz and Malalai Wassil

NEW YORK – With Iraq's reconstruction mired in Al Qaeda's well-planned guerrilla warfare, and Taliban remnants resurgent throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, there seems scant room in US policyplanning these days to focus on long-term strategies aimed at stabilizing countries ravaged by radicalism. But by not doing so, US policymakers are showing signs of forgetting the reasons Osama bin Laden's legions were willing to strike out and die for their cause.

While the terrorist challenge will not easily fade, as multiple, indiscriminate terrorist attacks in Turkey and Saudi Arabia have now shown, it is vital to limit the scope and impact of its threat by focusing on educating future generations in countries that are today's havens for terrorists. US policymakers must focus on cutting the terrorists' recruitment cords by rehabilitating the education systems of countries like Afghanistan so the pursuit of jihad becomes one of seeking knowledge and becoming productive members of society, not joining terrorists in their quest to destroy humanity.

After 23 years of conflict, Afghanistan's education system had become the worst in the world. An estimated 80 percent of the country's 7,000 schools were damaged, if not completely destroyed. At the height of the Soviet invasion, primary-school enrollment was roughly 54 percent for boys and 15 percent for girls. But war with the Soviets, followed by a devastating civil war and the antieducation rule of the Taliban, reduced those numbers to 35 percent for boys and just 3 percent for girls at the primary school level, and 10 percent and 2 percent, respectively, at secondary levels.

Little wonder that bin Laden and Al Qaeda's educated leadership structure thrived in such a vacuum, picking off young men prone to years of systematic fighting to join its jihadist plots because they had no system in place to teach them any better. Targeting the uneducated was, from the inception of Al Qaeda, a cornerstone of the terror group's strategy for expansion.

Initial efforts to revive Afghanistan's education system, and that of Pakistan where radicalism still thrives, may yet be successful if US policy planners can be persuaded that results are forthcoming from the trickle of money being sent in. Preliminary data from Afghanistan is promising, but much more needs to be done to stay the course.

An estimated 2 million children of the more than 4.5 million eligible (compared with only 1.5 million in school prior to 2002) are expected to enroll at the primary-school level by the start of the 2004 school year.

Female enrollment will represent 30 percent of the total, but needs to rise above 50 percent to sustain the trend toward educating more of the female population. The number of female teachers is also increasing, one signal that US policy is having a positive effect on Afghanistan's harsh antiwomen measures.

But encouraging signs do not a policy success make, and initial results can't be converted into long-term, irreversible trends without money, intellectual commitment, and insistence on government reform of education. Pressure must continue to uphold the right of females to get an education. Women - mothers, to be more specific - are still the heart of traditional Muslim families, particularly in rural areas. Educated mothers - capable of sustaining their own livelihoods - are less likely to let their sons go off to join Al Qaeda's jihadist legions than uneducated mothers dependent on men who routinely succumb to the monetary bribes of mullahs and their terrorist backers.

Some rural areas in Afghanistan still challenge the idea that a girl has a right to get an education. Surely, this cannot be acceptable to US taxpayers footing the bill for Afghanistan's reconstruction. US policymakers should make this clear to the Afghan government - particularly to the warlords operating under official government cover.

The Asian Development Bank estimates $125 million is needed per year for the next decade to reconstruct Afghanistan's collapsed education system. And $40 million more per annum is needed for operating expenses like teacher's salaries, school supplies, classroom facilities, and administrative expenses. In March 2003, USAID pledged $60 million to rebuild the education system - a promise so far unfulfilled.

But even at these projected levels, teachers, the most important cog in the wheel of educating children, earn only $35 to $40 per month. Sadly, only a few teachers have received this paltry sum in over a year. In places like Kabul, where apartment rents have soared to more than $1,800 per month, such salaries don't even permit purchase of basic food supplies. Tripling or even quadrupling teacher pay should be a high priority. More teachers mean more students learning and fewer minds co-opted by terrorism.

Further attention also needs to be given to the "lost generation" - an entire population of might-have-been working-class Afghanis aged 12 to 30 whose education was terminated by Afghanistan's perpetual state of conflict. Although well beyond the usual school age for Afghanistan, these people must be incorporated into the educational scheme through vocational schools that teach basic skills necessary for any productive member of society. What better way to construct democracy than to teach and practice economic self-reliance?

As newly educated entrants come into Afghanistan's job market, an infrastructure for business, trade, and development will also be needed.

Peace Corps lore has it that an African woman once told volunteers, "If you're here to develop us, then you can go home. But if you believe your future is tied to our future, then you can stay." Afghanistan's children are tied to America's future. The US must give them tools to rebuild themselves and their society. To do otherwise puts the future of America's children at risk from uneducated zealots, the products of policy failures that the US helped design with taxpayer dollars. The US made that mistake once; lets hope it doesn't again.

• Mansoor Ijaz, an American of Pakistani descent, is chairman of Crescent Investment Management. Malalai Wassil is an Afghani-born American. Currently a New York Law School student, she fled Afghanistan with her family in 1983.

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1125/p13s02-coop.html?entryBottomStory

Nuclear watchdog set for Iran resolution

By Roula Khalaf in London and Guy Dinmore in Washington
Published: November 26 2003 4:00 |
Last Updated: November 26 2003 4:00

The governingboard of the United Nations' nuclear watchdog is expected today to pass a European-sponsored resolution that deplores Iran's history of concealment of nuclear programmes but recognises its newfound co-operation with inspectors.

The resolution comes after a week of intensive negotiations during which the US was forced to soften its hardline approach and give up attempts to report Iran to the UN Security Council.

However, the UK, France and Germany, the leading European negotiators on the Iran nuclear issue, agreed to toughen the language of their original draft resolution, which now includes a clause that "strongly deplores" Iran's past breaches of its obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The resolution tabled yesterday also warns that, should any further "serious Iranian failures come to light", the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency would meet immediately to consider "all options at its disposal".

European governments resisted US attempts to specify that the most likely option would be a referral to the UN Security Council. But diplomats said there was an understanding that fresh evidence of Iranian concealment or undeclared activities would lead the UK and other European governments to back Security Council involvement.

The talks at the IAEA governing board followed a damning report from the agency that detailed a long history of Iranian concealment and highlighted concerns over the regime's uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities. The report, however, concluded there was no evidence so far that Iran had a nuclear weapons programme, though more investigation was required.

The UK, France and Germany had struck an agreement with Tehran. Under the deal Iran had promised full co-operation and transparency, and agreed to sign an additional protocol to the NPT allowing intrusive inspections of its nuclear sites. The three European governments pledged that if Iran fulfilled its obligations they would not back US efforts to report it to the Security Council.

http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1069493499271

How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq

November 25, 2003
The Washington Post
Rajiv Chandrasekaran

BAGHDAD -- The unraveling of the Bush administration's script for political transition in Iraq began with a fatwa.

The religious edict, handed down in June by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shiite Muslim cleric, called for general elections to select the drafters of a new constitution. He dismissed U.S. plans to appoint the authors as "fundamentally unacceptable."

His pronouncement, underestimated at first by the Bush administration, doomed an elaborate transition plan crafted by U.S. administrator L. Paul Bremer that would have kept Iraq under occupation until a constitution was written, according to American and Iraqi officials involved in the process. While Bremer feared that electing a constitutional assembly would take too long and be too disruptive, there was a strong desire on his own handpicked Governing Council to obey Sistani's order.

With no way to get around the fatwa, and with escalating American casualties creating pressure on President Bush for an earlier end to the occupation, Bremer recently dumped his original plan in favor of an arrangement that would bestow sovereignty on a provisional government before a constitution is drafted.

Bremer's unwillingness to heed the fatwa until just a few weeks ago may have delayed the country's political transition and exacerbated popular anger at the occupation, Iraqi political leaders said.

"We waited four months, thanks to Bremer," said one council member, speaking on condition of anonymity. "We could have organized this [transition] by now had we started when Sistani issued his fatwa. But the Americans were in denial."

People familiar with the discussions among U.S. officials about the fatwa said American political officers were too isolated to grasp the power of the edict right away, assuming that secular former exiles backed by the U.S. government would push Bremer's plan. Even when Sistani's clout became clear, they said Bremer remained reluctant to rework his transition plan right away. "He didn't want a Shiite cleric dictating the terms of Iraq's political future," one U.S. official with knowledge of the process said.

U.S. officials said it took months even for Iraqis to grasp the influence of Sistani's fatwa. Bremer's deputies also hoped the edict could be countered by statements from other Shiite clerics supporting approaches other than general elections, but few of those materialized.

"What we thought was necessary was for there to be a broad consultation to find out what the Iraqi public wanted," said one official involved in the political transition. "In hindsight," another official added, "we should have done it differently."

Who Would Draft Constitution?

Sistani is a frail man with a black turban, a snowy beard and unquestioned clout among Iraq's Shiite majority. Born in Iran but schooled in Iraq, he lives in the holy city of Najaf, about 90 miles south of Baghdad. Although he works out of a modest office on a decrepit alley, he has enormous authority to interpret Islamic law in everyday life.

During the years former president Saddam Hussein was in power -- when the government deemed activist Shiite clerics subversive and ordered many of them killed -- Sistani remained largely secluded from politics. Even after Hussein's government was toppled in April, Sistani shied away from political pronouncements and public appearances.

At the end of June, when Arab satellite television networks erroneously reported that Iraq's constitution would be written by American and British experts, Sistani broke his silence. In a two-page fatwa issued on June 28, he declared that he would only support a constitution written by Iraqis chosen through a general election, not by a council selected by the Americans.

The fatwa declared: "There is no guarantee that the council would create a constitution conforming with the greater interests of the Iraqi people and expressing the national identity, whose basis is Islam, and its noble social values."

In Baghdad, Sistani's pronouncement did not raise immediate alarm among U.S. officials. Bremer's aides assumed the fatwa would be revised or rescinded once they told Sistani how difficult it would be to hold elections right away. There were no voter rolls, constituent boundaries or electoral laws. "There is simply no way to conduct national elections today," Bremer said at the time.

Bremer also feared that elections would create too much uncertainty. The Bush administration wanted an orderly process it could control, including a constitution that would be a model for its efforts to democratize the Arab world, enshrine individual rights, and establish a secular government, religious freedom and equality of the sexes. Bremer believed that holding a vote before political parties had time to establish themselves would result in Baathists and Islamic extremists, the two best-organized forces in the country, dominating the outcome.

Speaking to reporters a few days after the fatwa was issued, Bremer expressed confidence that he would be able to implement "a process that produces a constitution that meets the general concerns that I understand Ayatollah Sistani mentioned."

Bremer was vague about how the authors would be selected. At the time, his aides privately said Iraqi political leaders and Americans would select the writers. But he pledged that the document was "not going to be written by the United States. It's not going to be written by the British. It's not going to be written by the U.N. It's going to be written by Iraqi people."

Overtures to the Ayatollah

Hoping to change Sistani's mind, political officers with the occupation authority sought a meeting. But every overture was met with a polite rebuff. "He didn't want it to look like he was cooperating with the Americans," said Mowaffak Rubaie, a member of the Governing Council who is close to Sistani.

By early July, Bremer had shifted focus to formation of the council, a 25-member body composed of American allies and political neophytes. In last-minute negotiations before the council was named, the prospective members demanded more authority for a variety of issues, including the drafting of a constitution. As a compromise, Bremer offered to let them form a commission that would identify the best way to select the drafters.

Soon after the council was formed, Bremer asked leaders of the country's largest Shiite party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, to meet with Sistani to see if a compromise could be reached on the constitution, said Adel Abdel-Mehdi, director of the party's political bureau. He said the party's leader at the time, Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir Hakim, who was killed in an August car bombing in Najaf, talked to Sistani about backing away from the fatwa.

"We told Bremer there was no hope for compromise," Abdel-Mehdi said. "Ayatollah Sistani was firm in his position."

Bremer's Power Challenged

Upon hearing back from Abdel-Mehdi and other intermediaries, Bremer and his aides figured there was still a way to reach a compromise. They talked about recruiting other ayatollahs, such as Hakim, to issue statements warning about the dangers of immediate elections, U.S. officials familiar with the process said. And they sought to hammer out a middle-ground solution with Governing Council members, the officials said.

"There was still a lot of confidence we would find a way around the fatwa," one U.S. official said.

By August, after lengthy discussions, American political officers and several council members settled on the idea of a "partial election." Instead of allowing anyone to stand as a candidate and having to compile voter rolls for general elections, the occupation authority would organize caucuses in each governorate, or province, that would be limited to political, religious, tribal, academic and trade union leaders as well as other influential local figures approved by the Americans. The caucus would select the drafters of the constitution.

Although holding caucuses would take longer than directly appointing the authors, Bremer accepted the idea, as did several influential members of the Governing Council. "It was the ideal compromise," said council member Samir Shakir Mahmoud Sumaidy. "The process would be more democratic, but it would avoid the problems of a general election."

Despite their confidence, they had no idea what Sistani thought of the plan. The ayatollah remained silent.

In mid-August, the Governing Council selected a 25-member constitutional commission that began discussing ways to choose the drafters. Composed of lawyers, judges and academics, the commission held meetings with influential figures around the country, including Sistani.

What they heard in their meetings was strong support for general elections, several commission members recalled. In their conversation with Sistani, the commission did not even broach the idea of partial elections, said law professor Hikmat Hakim, one of the commission members.

"We told him his fatwa would be respected," Hakim said. "We didn't ask him about the partial elections."

On Sept. 8, the commission voted 24 to 0 to endorse general elections. "It was very difficult, if not impossible, to disregard the fatwa of Ayatollah Sistani," said Yass Khudier, another commission member.

Concerned that a unanimous endorsement of general elections would interfere with Bremer's timetable to wind up the occupation by the end of 2004, U.S. officials grew impatient and urged the council to press the commission for a compromise. "We told them to come up with other ideas," one council member said. "We told them to consider partial elections."

When the commission submitted its final report to the council on Sept. 30, it failed to resolve the impasse. The panel suggested the same three approaches that everyone had been talking about -- direct appointment, partial elections and general elections -- without choosing one of them.

As the report was being completed, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell sought to push the council to endorse partial elections, saying Iraqis should be given a six-month deadline to complete their constitution. Members bristled. "It was an unreasonable demand," said Dara Noureddine, the council's liaison with the commission. "We needed time to achieve consensus."

But consensus was elusive. The council had split into two factions. Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds and some moderate Shiites, such as Ahmed Chalabi, favored the partial elections. Other traditionalist Shiite groups, among them the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution and the Dawa party, cited Sistani's fatwa as a mandate and insisted on general elections.

"We felt elections were the only legitimate way to proceed," the Supreme Council's Abdel-Mehdi said. His party and several other Shiite council members told Bremer that they would not be able reach a consensus on partial elections.

Bremer refused to give up. He chafed at the idea that a cleric would be able to dictate Iraq's democratic transition. "Is the political structure of Iraq going to be in the hands of one man?" Bremer said to a group of visitors in October.

He urged the council's five traditionalist Shiites to try to persuade Sistani to support partial elections, said Rubaie, one of the five. Rubaie said he met with Sistani in October and explained the problems with general elections and the benefits of partial elections. Sistani was unmoved, Rubaie said. "He would not have it."

Shortly thereafter, Sistani delivered his first public pronouncements on partial elections. In written comments provided to The Washington Post, he said there could be "no substitute" for a general election.

Fatwas from other clerics in support of partial elections never materialized. Nobody wanted to take on Sistani.

Occupation Chief Yields

Shiite political leaders insisted an election could be organized in less than six months using food-ration rolls as a voter registry. But Bremer and his aides dismissed that, insisting an election could not be pulled off in less than two years.

But as U.S. military casualties escalated, Bremer and other Bush administration officials realized their plan would have to be rewritten. "Once it became clear we couldn't get around the election, we knew we had to do something else," one American involved in the process said.

On Nov. 9, Bremer called national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, who was at FedEx Field for a Washington Redskins game. With no viable way to draft a quick constitution, both agreed a major change was needed, according to officials familiar with the talks.

The next day, Bremer hurried back to Washington. After two days of White House discussions, he returned to Baghdad with a new plan in hand.

On Nov. 14, he met with the council's nine rotating presidents to outline the administration's new approach: Iraq would be given sovereignty before it drafted a constitution. It was a dramatic concession.

The next day, he detailed the plan to the full Governing Council at the home of Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish leader serving as this month's council president.

In place of a permanent constitution, Bremer said, the council would be able to draft a basic law that would serve as an interim constitution to enshrine basic rights such as freedom of speech and worship, the separation of powers and civilian control over the military. Once the law was completed, he said, each province would hold caucuses to choose representatives for a 250-member transitional assembly whose members would serve as a provisional legislature. The assembly would also elect members for an executive branch from within its ranks, he said.

Bremer said he wanted the process to be completed by June 30, after which he would bestow sovereignty on the interim government. That government then would be responsible for drafting a constitution.

Although there was general support for Bremer's plan, members pressed him on details. Some protested his requirement that 15-person organizing committees would screen participants in the caucuses. Others questioned whether a 250-member assembly would be able to agree on a government. Others objected to the dissolution of the council after the new government is formed, saying the council should remain as an advisory body.

"The Governing Council has been recognized by the United Nations, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference," Abdel-Mehdi said. "Why disband it? And what happens if the new government runs into trouble? We need the GC as a safety valve."

Several Shiite leaders expressed concern that the organizing committees might exclude candidates because they were Islamic activists. "The veto power should only apply to people who are Baathists or criminals," one Shiite member said.

Bremer did not want to delve into details, according to several members who spoke on condition of anonymity.

Instead, they said, Bremer wanted the council members to accept the plan and announce it to the news media as if they had created it themselves.

"He brushed aside the details. He just wanted an agreement," one member said. "It was 'my way or the highway.' "

In response, occupation authority officials insist the council had plenty of time to discuss the plan, which the officials said reflected the council's desire that the handover of sovereignty be accelerated.

Before his Nov. 10 flight to Washington, Bremer called Abdel-Mehdi in for a meeting.

"If we go for this option, do you think Sistani will accept?" Abdel-Mehdi recalled Bremer asking him.

"I'm sure," Abdel-Mehdi responded.

While Bremer was flying back from Washington, Abdel-Mehdi said he met with Sistani, who endorsed the broad contours of Bremer's new plan to hand over sovereignty to a provisional government, which would convene elections for a constitutional council.

But Abdel-Mehdi said Sistani never passed judgment on the details, particularly those that have concerned other Shiite leaders involving how members would be selected. In response to written questions about Bremer's new approach, Sistani's office said the ayatollah would not comment.

"He certainly has not blessed the plan," Abdel-Mehdi said.

http://iranvajahan.net/cgi-bin/news.pl?l=en&y=2003&m=11&d=26&a=2

I am not of Iranian heritage. I am an American committed to supporting the efforts of those in Iran seeking to replace their government with a secular democracy. I am in contact with leaders of the Iranian community here in the United States and in Iran itself.

Bump to freedom for the Persian people.

UN Censures Iran for Nuclear Cover-ups

November 26, 2003
The Associated Press
George Jahn

The UN atomic agency today adopted a resolution censuring Iran for past nuclear cover-ups and warning that its activities would be thoroughly policed to put to rest suspicions that the country had a weapons agenda.

The resolution, adopted by the 35-nation board of governors of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, did not confront Iran with a direct threat of sanctions - resolving a sticking point between the United States and key European powers over how to deal with Tehran.

Adopted by consensus, the resolution warns against "further serious Iranian failures," saying that could lead the board to consider actions allowed by its statute - shorthand for UN Security Council action.

While welcoming Iran's "offer of active co-operation and openness" - including suspending uranium enrichment and agreeing to thorough inspections on IAEA demand - the measure calls for a "particularly robust verification system" to test Tehran's honesty.

The United States, which alleges that Iran plans to develop nuclear arms, had wanted a specific mention of Security Council action - with an implicit threat of sanctions - should Tehran fail to come clean on past nuclear secrets and renege on pledges to open present activities to full IAEA inspection.

Washington had insisted last week it would hold out for at least a threat of Security Council action over 18 years of clandestine activities by Iran including uranium enrichment and plutonium processing. Under intense international pressure, Tehran suspended enrichment recently and agreed to allow the implementation of stringent IAEA spot checks of its nuclear activities as part of an effort to demonstrate openness and co-operation with the agency.

But France, Germany and Britain opposed a Security Council a threat, fearing Iran could backtrack on its co-operation and its commitment to clear up questions about its past if it was too strongly pressured.

Even as the meeting was convening, Iran's envoy to the IAEA said his country would restart enriching uranium in the future, emphasizing that its decision to stop the process - which the United States links to weapons production - was temporary.

Ali Akbar Salehi also disputed that the resolution contained a "trigger mechanism," as asserted by Washington, that would refer any further nuclear transgressions by his country to the Security Council.

The United States, the European Union and most other members of the 35-nation board would like Iran to dismantle its enrichment program entirely, but Salehi said that would not happen.

"The decision lies in the hand of the Iranians to restart the project in the future, once they feel the time is appropriate," Salehi said, describing the enrichment stop as "temporary — not a cessation but a suspension."

Delegates to the board of governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency have said the compromise draft allows all sides to claim victory. Salehi on Wednesday described the text as "OK."

The resolution refers to the IAEA statute and Iran's safeguard agreement with the agency. Contravention of either the statute and of the safeguard agreement — which is part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — can trigger Security Council involvement.

Salehi, however, disputed that the draft contains such a threat.

"I have not seen any trigger mechanism in this resolution," he said.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday he was "very happy" with the resolution, which "notes that Iran has been in breach of obligations."

"And there is one particular paragraph in the resolution which makes it very, very clear that if Iran does not now comply with obligations and the other agreements it's entered into, then this will be a matter that will be immediately referred to the IAEA board of governors for action, as appropriate under the various statutes," Powell said in Washington.

http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1069846282080&call_pageid=968332188492&col=968705899037

Iran reformist MPs complain of mistreatment

Tuesday, November 25, 2003 - ©2003 IranMania.com

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TEHRAN, Nov 24, Iran daily (Edited) - A lawmaker said in Tehran on Monday that the mistreatment of parliamentarians has deteriorated in the past two years.

"I and my (pro-reform) colleagues have been repeatedly attacked and insulted by certain clerics and military personnel," Mohammad Reza Ali- Hosseini Abbasi said in his pre-agenda speech at the parliament.

The parliamentarian further said that a senior military commander has said 40 members of parliament do not pray and another has hurled the worst insults at the people's representatives in the parliament.

"When I was young, I used to go mad when clerics were insulted. But I have now lodged a complaint with the Special Court for the Clergy against two clerics who attacked me last year," he said, adding that after several months, the court has not yet brought the culprits to justice.

He accused some Friday prayer leaders of abusing this important forum [parliament] by insulting the parliamentarians for criticizing the status quo.

"These clerics must know that we are not like opportunist officials who would mislead the ruling body by not reflecting the bitter realities of society," he maintained, stressing that those who attack the MPs are either advocates of absolute dictatorship or lack the vision of governance.

http://www.iranmania.com/News/ArticleView/Default.asp?NewsCode=20047&NewsKind=Current%20Affairs

Khamenei says U.S. Sinking in Iraq's Swamp

November 26, 2003
Reuters
MSNBC News

TEHRAN -- Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday the United States was sinking deeper into a quagmire in Iraq and warned that Middle Eastern nations would not tolerate being occupied.

''The American nation should know that Iraq is America's quagmire and America is sinking deeper into it by staying longer in Iraq,'' Khamenei said in a sermon broadcast live on state media to mark the official end of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan in Iran.

''The Americans are so desperate that they are bombing an occupied country...this (Middle East) region does not tolerate occupation,'' the conservative cleric told tens of thousands of worshippers who gathered at a large mosque in Tehran.

Iran has repeatedly called for the acceleration of a power transfer in Iraq and the formation of an independent Iraqi government.

Last week, Iran's moderate President Mohammad Khatami officially recognised the Iraqi Governing Council, a mainly advisory group of 25 people selected by the United States.

''The Americans should know that any imposed government, constitution and elections would face resistance from the people in Iraq,'' said Khamenei, who wields ultimate authority in Iran.

''In free elections the majority of the Iraqi people will choose those who will not allow the Americans to stay one more day in Iraq,'' he said.

Khamenei said instead of providing democracy for Iraq, Washington was oppressing the Iraqi people.

''The Americans, who entered Iraq in the name of human rights, have oppressed the Iraqis so much that they punched the Americans in the face,'' Khamenei said.

''The Americans' claim about bringing democracy to the region is a disgraceful lie,'' he added.

http://famulus.msnbc.com/FamulusIntl/reuters11-26-013627.asp?reg=MIDEAST

Text of the Resolution on Iran

November 26, 2003
The Associated Press
The Anchorage Daily News

The text of U.N. nuclear agency's resolution on Iran that was adopted Wednesday:

"The Board of Governors ...

- Expressed concern over failures by the Islamic Republic of Iran to report material, facilities and activities that Iran is obliged to report pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement;

- Decided it was essential and urgent, in order to ensure IAEA verification of non-diversion of nuclear material, that Iran remedy all failures identified by the Agency and cooperate fully with the Agency by taking all necessary actions by the end of October 2003;

- Requested Iran to work with the Secretariat to promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol, and, as a confidence-building measure, to act thenceforth in accordance with the Additional Protocol; and

- Called on Iran to suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities, including the further introduction of nuclear material into Natanz, and any reprocessing activities ..."

---

"Noting with deep concern that Iran has failed in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, and its processing and use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material has been processed and stored...

- Noting in particular with the gravest concern that Iran enriched uranium and separated plutonium in undeclared facilities, in the absence of IAEA safeguards,

- Noting also, with equal concern, that there has been in the past a pattern of concealment resulting in breaches of safeguard obligations and that the new information disclosed by Iran and reported by the Director General includes much more that is contradictory to information previously provided by Iran,

- Noting that ... Iran has begun cooperating more actively with the IAEA and has given assurances that it is committed to a policy of full disclosure, ...

- Emphasizing that, in order to restore confidence, Iranian cooperation and transparency will need to be complete and sustained so that the Agency can resolve outstanding issues and, over time, provide and maintain the assurances required by the Member States,

- Noting with satisfaction that Iran has indicated that it is prepared to sign the Additional Protocol, and that, pending its entry into force, Iran will act in accordance with the provisions of that Protocol, ...

- Stressing that the voluntary suspension by Iran of all its uranium enrichment-related activities and reprocessing activities remains of key importance to rebuilding international confidence, ...

- Strongly deplores Iran's past failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with the provisions of its Safeguards Agreement, as reported by the Director General; and urges Iran to adhere strictly to its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement in both letter and spirit;

- Endorses ... that the Agency must have a particularly robust verification system in place: an Additional Protocol, coupled with a policy of full transparency and openness on the part of Iran, is indispensable;

- Reiterates that the urgent, full and close cooperation with the Agency of all third countries is essential in the clarification of outstanding questions concerning Iran's nuclear program;

- Calls on Iran to undertake and complete the taking of all necessary corrective measures on an urgent basis, to sustain full cooperation with the Agency in implementing Iran's commitment to full disclosure and unrestricted access, and thus to provide the transparency and openness that are indispensable for the Agency to complete the considerable work necessary to provide and maintain the assurances required by the Member States;

- Decides that, should any further serious Iranian failures come to light, the Board of Governors would meet immediately to consider, in the light of the circumstances and advice from the Director General, all options at its disposal, in accordance with the IAEA Statue and Iran's Safeguards Agreement;

- Notes with satisfaction the decision of Iran to conclude an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, and re-emphasizes the importance of Iran moving swiftly to ratification and also of Iran acting as if the Protocol were in force in the interim, including by making all declarations required within the required timeframe;

- Welcomes Iran's decision to voluntarily suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and requests Iran to adhere to it, in a complete and verifiable manner; and also endorses the Director General's acceptance of Iran's invitation to verify implementation of that decision and report thereon."

http://www.adn.com/24hour/world/story/1067286p-7481524c.html

"Damascus Carefully Observes U.S. Involvement in Iraq"

November 26, 2003
The Power and Interest News
Brian Maher

Syria has a critical role to play in the success of the American effort in Iraq and in America's larger Middle East strategy. The infiltration of foreign militants into Iraq from Syria, which has contributed to the area's instability and has hamstrung U.S. efforts to build a viable post-war Iraq, has been an ongoing concern for Washington. Nearly half of those detained in Iraq by U.S. forces since the end of major combat operations have entered through Syria, according to U.S. officials.

Before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syrian diplomacy seemed to work at cross-purposes. On the one hand, Damascus recognized that it could not afford to become a U.S. enemy, while on the other hand it understood that Washington's plans for the region were incompatible with its own. Damascus professed public support for the U.S. "war on terrorism" and offered tangible support by providing valuable intelligence on al-Qaeda, as well as other militant groups in the region. Nevertheless, Damascus attempted to sabotage U.S. invasion plans, successfully lobbying to deprive Washington of Arab support in the United Nations and helping to sow division among the Western powers, fearing the political fallout from an American victory.

These efforts ultimately failed to prevent the U.S. invasion, and Damascus was put on the defensive by the rapid U.S. victory in Iraq. A nervous President Assad, fearing that Syria may be the next U.S. target, began to eagerly bend to U.S. concerns, pledging to cooperate with the Americans and cracked down on Islamist activity in his country. Under heavy U.S. pressure, Damascus closed its border in April and apparently expelled a number of ranking Ba'athist officials, including Iraq's chief nuclear scientist.

Following the intensification of the guerrilla campaign against the U.S. occupation over the summer months, Syria began to consider its policies anew, sensing U.S. weakness. The almost daily attacks were becoming a needling distraction to the American effort and Damascus realized that a successful, expanding insurgency would place the U.S. in a political straitjacket, hemming it in, precluding it from focusing its energies on Syria. The border area became increasingly porous and scores of militants were allowed free passage to ply their trade in Iraq.

Syrian denials of complicity in this activity ring especially hollow -- there is only one highway running between the two countries and the Syrian border is teeming with army forces tracking smugglers attempting to peddle their wares without paying off corrupt officials. If Damascus truly sought to seal the border area, there would surely be reports of dead militants, eagerly presented to Washington as proof of Syria's fidelity.

Not surprisingly, Washington has brought considerable pressure to bear on Damascus to seal its borders with Iraq and crack down on Islamic militants. The U.S. is forging a regional coalition to isolate Syria, and recently Damascus has been forcefully reminded that it cannot afford to antagonize Washington indefinitely. With implicit U.S. support, Israeli warplanes struck a suspected terrorist camp near Damascus, the first Israeli raid on Syria in 30 years. Damascus realizes that such an attack could only be carried out with U.S. countenance and no doubt considers it a less than subtle expression of Washington's dissatisfaction with Syrian efforts.

In addition, Turkey has joined the American camp by offering up troops to assist the U.S. occupation. Of course, approximately 130,000 American troops lie beyond the Syrian frontier, powerfully reminding Damascus of American reach. Washington hopes that surrounding Syria in such a fashion will force Damascus to reconsider its strategies and yield to American concerns.

These developments are significant because Syria figures into a broader American strategy to apply pressure to the rest of the Middle East, and Iran in particular. Iran represents a more substantial threat than Syria, especially with its potential nuclear capability, and Washington hopes to treat Syria in a way that resonates with Tehran. Should Iran obstruct U.S. efforts in Iraq to an appreciable degree, Washington hopes to make an example out of a militarily weaker and politically vulnerable Syria, highlighting to Tehran the high cost of interference.

This would ostensibly bring Iran and other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, into line, fearing that they could be next on Washington's list. However, the Bush administration is concerned that the perception of American impotence in the face of an increasingly capable insurgency will embolden the opponents of the U.S. presence in Iraq. The insurgency has frittered away the psychological impact that the fall of Baghdad produced on Middle Eastern regimes, which may be a dire portent for America's future in Iraq if visible progress is not made.

Damascus may gamble that the U.S. lacks the political capital and resources to challenge Syria directly, in which case it could greatly increase the cost of the U.S. occupation. Of particular concern from Washington's perspective is the ability of Hezbollah to initiate a potentially devastating insurgency against occupation forces. Damascus uses Hezbollah to advance its foreign policy objectives and exerts substantial control over the organization. Syria unleashes Hezbollah when it suits its purposes, as it did in the Shebaa Farms territory, or reins it in when it senses danger. Damascus would undertake a mighty risk by allowing Hezbollah to incite resurrection in Iraq. Hezbollah's passivity thus far is an indication that Damascus is highly appreciative of the risk.

Both Washington and Damascus recognize that matters have not reached the level of open confrontation, leaving ample leeway for diplomacy. In the end, Damascus is aware of Washington's ability to inflict injury and desperately seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S. Most likely, it will try to reach some sort of accommodation with Washington. Recent reports out of Iraq suggesting that the flow of foreign militants transiting through Syria has slowed may be a sign that Damascus is feeling the pressure.

Washington, in turn, is not in a position to seek conflict with Syria at this time and will continue to pressure Syria indirectly. Any actions against Syria will be limited to the diplomatic and economic spheres -- for now at least. The carrot will be an integral part of Washington's strategy in addition to the stick, despite the passage of the Syrian Accountability Act, which some fear will remove a critical bargaining tool.

The Bush administration realizes that Damascus wants to avoid direct confrontation but will target Syria rhetorically when it wants to send a message to the rest of the region. Because of this, there may be little that Damascus can do in the face of such posturing, short of complete capitulation to Washington's long list of demands that targets Syria's larger role in regional affairs and weapons proliferation. This is not especially likely since many of these demands clash directly with powerful Syrian perceptions of self-interest. But it will do enough to avoid direct confrontation in the short run at least, which is certainly in Damascus' best interest.

http://pinr.com/index.php

An Administration of One

November 21, 2003
Weekly Standard,
Robert Kagan and William Kristol

Bush has made it clear that the only exit strategy from Iraq is a victory strategy, with victory defined as "democracy."

WHEN GEORGE W. BUSH first entered the White House, the conventional wisdom was that his inexperience and lack of vision in foreign policy would be compensated for by his wise and experienced cabinet. This may or may not have been a reasonable view at the time. Right now, however, it is clear that the most visionary and, yes, the wisest and most capable foreign policy-maker in the Bush administration is the president himself. Let's hope the team around him proves willing and capable of fulfilling his clear and historic grand strategy.

This past week has been an extraordinary one for the president. His visit to Great Britain, portrayed by the press beforehand as an impending disaster, was instead a resounding success. The spectacle of anti-Bush and anti-American protesters had a predictable effect on a sensible British public. Polls in Britain show rising support for the war in Iraq and a growing appreciation for the role played by the United States in the world. Bush's speech in London won well-deserved praise even from European critics--more so, actually, than from many of his American critics, who have long since abandoned the pretense of objectivity.

Bush struck exactly the right balance in reaching his hand across the Atlantic and seeking cooperation in the war on terrorism, but without pulling back from his own determination to wage that war forcefully. He began to dispel the label of unilateralism that has been unfairly pinned on him, while still asking Europeans to wake up to the realities of a dangerous world they have been trying so hard to ignore. Bush might be well advised to give more such speeches in Europe. (We have stopped expecting his secretary of state actually to go to European capitals to make the case for the president's policies.)

In his London speech, the president continued to advance what has come to be the centerpiece of his global grand strategy--the promotion of liberal democracy abroad, and especially in the Middle East, where freedom has been most wanting and where the West's record has been most dismal. This was the third speech in less than nine months in which the president made the promotion of democracy his central theme (the first being his speech at the American Enterprise Institute back in February before the Iraq war began, the second his speech to the National Endowment for Democracy earlier this fall). There can no longer be any doubt that whatever Republican "realist" inclinations the president may have inherited from his father and his father's advisers when he took office, he has now abandoned that failed and narrow view and raised the torch previously held high by Ronald Reagan--and before that by John F. Kennedy and Harry Truman.

In this respect, Bush has broken from the mainstream of his party and become a neoconservative in the true meaning of the term. For if there is a single principle that today divides neoconservatism from traditional American conservatism, it is the conviction that the promotion of liberal democracy abroad is both a moral imperative and a profound national interest. This is a view of America's role in the world that has found little favor in the Republican party since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. Reagan was a modern exception--the product, no doubt, of his own roots as a Truman Democrat--but this aspect of Reaganism was largely abandoned by Republicans after 1989. And so we are not surprised to see traditional Republican conservatives, of whom there is no more esteemed intellectual spokesman than George Will, now denouncing the supposed folly of such ambitious ventures. Nor are we surprised that in Bush's own cabinet, neither his secretary of state nor his secretary of defense shares the president's commitment to liberal democracy, either in Iraq or in the Middle East more generally. Indeed, the only thing that surprises us, a little, is the failure of American liberals--and European liberals--to embrace a cause that ought to be close to their hearts.

Liberals and conservatives alike these days seem willing to consign the Arab peoples to more decades of tyranny. "The West," argues Fareed Zakaria, "must recognize that it does not seek democracy in the Middle East--at least not yet." President Bush rejects this counsel. "In the West," Bush noted in London, "there's been a certain skepticism about the capacity or even the desire of Middle Eastern peoples for self-government. . . . It is not realism to suppose that one-fifth of humanity is unsuited to liberty. It is pessimism and condescension, and we should have none of it."

What has also become clear this past week is that Bush is determined to promote democracy in Iraq--and right now. This is a significant step forward. Up until recently, senior Bush officials have tended to avoid using the word "democracy" to describe the goals of American policy. In the Pentagon and elsewhere it has been thought that this sets the bar too high and implies a lengthy American commitment to Iraq, a commitment of money, energy, and troops. The most urgent task, as Donald Rumsfeld and General John Abizaid have been inclined to see it, has been to bring the levels of U.S. forces in Iraq down and turn over the task of security to the Iraqis as quickly as possible. Others in the administration have adopted the familiar argument that the Iraqi people are not yet ready for democracy and have tried to push any real elections as far into the future as possible.

President Bush this week slammed the door on this kind of thinking. First, he set the bar for success high: democracy. The new plan for a handover of sovereignty to the Iraqis calls for regional caucuses to elect a transitional legislature by next May, with general elections planned for the end of 2005. We would prefer to see the elections moved up, but even under the current schedule Iraqis will have a chance to begin participating in democratic politics almost immediately. That is a giant step toward the goal and the commitment that Bush articulated this past week: The United States "will meet our responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq by finishing the work of democracy we have begun."

So much for exit strategies. Bush has made it clear that the only exit strategy from Iraq is a victory strategy, with victory defined as "democracy." "We did not charge hundreds of miles into the heart of Iraq and pay a bitter cost of casualties and liberate 25 million people only to retreat before a band of thugs and assassins. We will help the Iraqi people establish a peaceful and democratic country in the heart of the Middle East." That commitment may turn out to be the most important of Bush's presidency, perhaps the most important of the post-Cold War era.

The second significant point Bush made in London was about troop levels in Iraq. In response to a question about beginning to bring home troops from Iraq next year, the president could not have been clearer. The United States will provide the troops necessary in Iraq. "We could have less troops in Iraq, we could have the same number of troops in Iraq, we could have more troops in Iraq, whatever is necessary to secure Iraq." Unfortunately, Bush's senior advisers treated his remark as if it were a gaffe and immediately began backgrounding reporters that there was no chance of a troop increase next year. That was an appalling error, signifying just how little the president's own advisers understand what's at stake in Iraq.

The president, we are happy to say, does understand. "The failure of democracy in Iraq," he said this week, "would throw its people back into misery and turn that country over to terrorists who wish to destroy us." Failure in Iraq is unacceptable. Al Qaeda and international terrorists "view the rise of democracy in Iraq as a powerful threat to their ambitions. In this, they are correct. They believe their acts of terror against our coalition, against international aid workers and against innocent Iraqis will make us recoil and retreat. In this, they are mistaken." Progress toward democracy is imperative. If that means more American troops are needed, then the administration should not--and we are now confident will not--flinch from putting in more troops, even in an election year.

The president made great progress this week explaining his vision and strategy to the world. He has placed himself at the level of Reagan and Truman, both of whom were also treated with derision by their opponents. Bush's great task now will be to explain his strategy to his own cabinet and commanders and insist that they begin implementing it.

12/01/2003, Volume 009, Issue 12

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/403xbvty.asp

Israel: Iran is Now Danger No. 1

November 28, 2003
The Christian Science Monitor
Nicole Gaouette

JERUSALEM – Even as the US and European nations press Iran harder to comply with international law on its nuclear program, Israel is moving ahead with its own program to check its powerful Middle Eastern neighbor.

Israel is working on a wide range of measures to undermine Iran's nuclear program, with senior leaders hinting that Israel may take preemptive action if that is deemed necessary. Analysts here suggest that action may include a strike similar to Israel's 1981 attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor.

The Israeli initiative includes political, military, and intelligence wings of government and dovetails with US efforts to contain Iran within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The effort reflects the widespread assessment here that Iran poses a greater threat than Iraq has for the past decade and is gaining nuclear expertise more quickly than the US estimates.

"Iran has a clandestine [nuclear] program that is very ambitious," says Uzi Arad, director of the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzilya. "That country thinks big and fast and ... poses a threat that is very real. Should it acquire nuclear weapons or even come close, it would completely alter the Middle East. It's a very ominous threat."

Analysts here argue that the prospect of a nuclear Iran would:

• Threaten Israeli, US, and European security.

• Harden Arab positions in any future peace negotiations.

• Increase militancy and embolden hard-liners.

• Destabilize the Gulf area.

• And encourage other countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, to follow suit.

History of Iranian concealment

The US, Britain, France, and Germany say that Iran has been concealing nuclear research for the past 18 years in pursuit of nuclear weapons, despite signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970.

On Monday, the four nations agreed on a strongly worded IAEA resolution promoted by the US that threatens the possibility of UN sanctions should Iran continue to violate its agreements.

The US charges that Iran is also developing chemical and biological weapons, though the country is party to conventions curbing them. Furthermore, both the US and Israel say that Iran is trying to extend the range of its missiles, which could be used to develop such weapons.

Already, the 810-mile reach of Iran's Shahab-3 missile puts Israel and US forces in the region in striking range. The US charges that Iran will probably try to develop missiles capable of hitting Western Europe or the US itself.

Iran has admitted to concealing aspects of its atomic energy program, but says it is pursuing alternate energy sources, a claim the State Department dismissed as "simply not credible."

In testimony to the US-Israeli Joint Parliamentary Committee in September, State Department official Paula DeSutter said, "The impact of a nuclear-armed Iran in an already volatile region cannot be underestimated. As President Bush had made clear, that cannot be allowed to happen."

Israeli officials have echoed that declaration. In November, Israeli media reported that Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, on a trip to Washington, told US officials that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to abide by nuclear weapons in Iranian possession."

'Existential threat' to Israel?

Meir Dagan, director of Israel's external intelligence agency, the Mossad, told a parliamentary committee this month that Iran posed an "existential threat" to Israel, according to the Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper. He reportedly assured committee members that Israel could deal with this threat.

Like the US, Israel estimates that Iran is three to four years away from building a nuclear bomb. But Israel believes that in 2004, Iran will reach the point at which their nuclear program cannot be stopped.

On the same US trip, Mr. Mofaz told a pro-Israeli lobby group that a nuclear Iran was "intolerable."

"The implicit message of his statements was that if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped in the next number of months, Israel will have to take action of its own - perhaps even to attack - to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into Iranian hands," analyst Amir Rappaport wrote in the Ma'ariv newspaper.

It would not be the first time Israel has taken preemptive action against a perceived threat. In 1981, Israeli fighter jets launched a successful surprise attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor, destroying it.

A push against Iran on all fronts

In the meantime, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has upgraded Israel's efforts against Iran's nuclear program by putting all related committees under Mr. Dagan's command. Mr. Sharon himself will head a ministerial committee.

In this multipronged effort, Israel's foreign ministry will launch a diplomatic campaign to persuade other countries to work against Iran's nuclear program. The Mossad will work with foreign intelligence agencies, the National Security Council will work with the US-Israeli Joint Committee, and Israel's atomic energy body will focus on technical aspects of Iran's program and work with the IAEA.

Israel's concern about Iran stems from the country's proximity, its longstanding hostility to Israel, and its support for groups like Lebanese Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad.

While these groups launch attacks on Israel and its citizens with Iranian support, some analysts here say there remains the potential for direct confrontation between the nations of Iran and Israel.

Zeev Maghen, a senior research associate at Bar Ilan University near Tel Aviv who studies Iran, disagrees, but he acknowledges, "The amount of hostility that has built up in the world in general, and the Islamic world in particular, against my country might push someone over the edge."

"We're the pariah country," Mr. Maghen adds.

A nuclear Iran would also erode Israel's strategic edge. Israel's military, the world's 14th largest by budget, according to the Center for Defense Information, is vastly superior to any of its Middle East counterparts. Israel is also widely understood to have an arsenal of nuclear and other weapons, though officials deny this. It is not a signatory to the NPT.

"Israel has kept an ambiguous posture about this," says Mr. Arad, "but clearly, should Iran become nuclear, it would clearly be an adverse development. The country supports terrorism, has taken a militant line against the peace process, is hostile to the US, and is active in anti-American attacks [in Iraq]. It clearly poses a very serious threat to everybody."

From the November 28, 2003 edition

http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1128/p06s01-wome.html

One Last Chance

November 26, 2003
The Economist.com
The Economist

European governments have persuaded America not to have Iran dragged before the UN Security Council over its suspicious nuclear experiments. But Iran has been told it had better keep its promise to mend its ways.

AFTER struggling for several weeks to reach a compromise on how to deal with the illicit nuclear experiments that Iran has been concealing for the past 18 years, the 35 countries on the board of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have finally reached agreement. On Wednesday November 26th they passed a resolution, which stops short of reporting Iran to the United Nations Security Council, as America had wanted. But the resolution’s wording was tougher than that of earlier drafts—proposed jointly by Britain, France and Germany—which both America and the IAEA’s head, Mohamed ElBaradei, thought too lenient.

The IAEA monitors Iran's nuclear programme. IRNA, Iran's official news agency, presents the official line on news events. See also the Iranian presidency and the Foreign Ministry. The European Union outlines foreign relations with Iran. The US State Department issues statements on Iran's nuclear programme and gives information on non-proliferation. The Federation of American Scientists posts background information on the NPT. Australia's Uranium Information Centre gives details of the various types of nuclear reactor and how they work.

The resolution “strongly deplores” Iran’s breaches of its Safeguards Agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It welcomes Iran’s recent confession of its past transgressions and its promise to allow UN inspectors to make more intrusive checks on the country’s nuclear facilities. But it says that if any further violations are uncovered, the IAEA board would immediately meet to consider “all options at its disposal”—meaning bringing Iran before the Security Council, which may impose economic sanctions.

Iran has repeatedly denied America’s accusation that it is using its civil nuclear-power programme as a cover for bomb-making. But it has been forced to change its story several times, thanks to leaks from Iranian opposition groups and findings by IAEA inspectors. It has now owned up to having secret nuclear facilities. Some of the experiments Iran has carried out—such as producing small amounts of plutonium and metallic uranium—are useful steps towards making a nuclear bomb but not much use for the sort of civil energy programme that Iran is developing. The nuclear-power station that Russia is building for Iran at Bushehr on the Gulf coast is perfectly legal but questionable: why would a country with some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves bother with the expense of nuclear power unless it had other motives?

In July, Mr ElBaradei went to Tehran, with the backing of many of the world’s main powers, to press the country’s government to sign an “additional protocol” to the NPT. This would give the IAEA’s inspectors the right to visit both declared and suspected nuclear facilities at short notice. The agency then gave Iran until the end of October to come clean about all its nuclear dabblings. Shortly before this deadline, Iran sent the IAEA what it said were full details of its activities. The country promised that it would sign up for the tougher inspections regime and suspend its enrichment of uranium (a technique useful for making either bombs or fuel for power plants), though not necessarily permanently.

The IAEA’s board convened last week to discuss a report from Mr ElBaradei which criticised Iran’s treaty infringements but said—to America’s annoyance—that no clear evidence of bomb-building had been found. The board’s deliberations were extended into this week after its members were unable to close the gap between America’s demands for an immediate referral to the Security Council (backed by Israel, a likely target for any Iranian nuclear bomb) and European countries’ desire to encourage Iran to co-operate.

Though Iran is playing down the significance of its nuclear experiments, arguing that they only produced tiny quantities of fissile materials, they show that the country has mastered some of the most important stages in nuclear bomb-making. Thus if it ever pulled out of the NPT, Iran could quickly have such weapons ready. In July, it brought into service a new missile capable, in theory, of carrying a nuclear warhead as far as Israel, or indeed reaching American bases in the Middle East.

Western diplomats said the resolution means Iran will be faced with a stark choice—total transparency or the risk of painful sanctions. But America is still worried, as its secretary of state, Colin Powell, has put it, that the world powers will declare premature victory; indeed, Russia has already stopped threatening to halt the construction of the Bushehr power station and is talking of building a second one. There are, in fact, several more vital steps before the world can be sure that Iran really has given up its nuclear option, as opposed to just pursuing it more cannily: its parliament must ratify the tough new inspections regime; and Iran must then allow the inspectors free rein to do their jobs, without obstruction or obfuscation.

http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2242273

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