Posted on 11/23/2003 5:19:13 AM PST by Cannoneer No. 4
The Army is redirecting priorities in the Future Combat Systems program, in an attempt to meet short-term needs for new technologies. This shift in emphasis means the program will be less about developing futuristic concepts and more about upgrading the current tanks, armored infantry vehicles and trucks.
Program officials assert that the chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, supports the FCS and intends to keep the $15 billion project on track to field a new family of vehicles by 2010. But the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan clearly have forced the Army to reassess the program goals. While the FCS previously was viewed as a long-term modernization effort, now the chief wants FCS to begin delivering technologies as soon as possible.
The plan is to “spin off capabilities” out of FCS into the Abrams tank and Bradley infantry vehicle fleets, said Lt. Gen. John S. Caldwell Jr., military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition. But he cautioned that the FCS program is not being significantly restructured or downscaled. Rather, other programs will be “adjusted” to take advantage of the new technologies developed in FCS, Caldwell told National Defense.
Since the FCS got under way more than three years ago, the predominant message heard from senior officials has been the notion of FCS as a “network” or a “system of systems” that would usher the Army into the information age.
Each FCS brigade, called a unit of action, will run 30 million lines of software. More than half of the money in the program will be allocated to ground combat vehicles and C4ISR (command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) systems.
A seamless network of light ground vehicles and aircraft remains the essence of the FCS, but program officials now are stressing that FCS is first and foremost about putting technology in the hands of soldiers. During an industry conference last month sponsored by the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, in Dearborn, Mich., the program manager for FCS, Brig. Gen. Donald F. Schenk, told contactors that they “need to work fast.”
Despite widespread skepticism that the program may not be able to deliver a new generation of vehicles to begin replacing tanks and Bradleys in less than a decade, Schenk said that the goals are achievable. But in his opening comments to the conference, he acknowledged that, with the Army at war, the focus has changed. The technologies of the FCS could “transition” to other programs “more quickly than most people think,” Schenk said.
Among the technologies that could “spiral” from FCS into the current force are wireless communications systems, active protection for vehicles, diagnostics devices to predict engine failures, hybrid-electric power units and advanced truck suspensions, said Albert Puzzuoli, deputy program executive officer for Army ground combat systems.
But for FCS to be successful, he stressed, the Army and its contractors must fix a vexing problem that affects today’s weapons systems: electronics obsolescence. The term refers to the difficulties in upgrading older weapon systems because the electronic components often are out of production and not available in the commercial market. This could pose serious hurdles as the Army figures out how to upgrade the Abrams and the Bradley, so they can remain in the fleet for at least 20 more years.
The Army’s ability to “spiral” technologies out of FCS into Abrams and Bradley depends on “how we attack our electronic obsolescence problems,” Puzzuoli told the TACOM conference. One solution would be to develop a new, less complex electronic architecture in the Abrams and Bradley that is “somewhat compatible” with FCS, he said.
Unless this matter is resolved, he added, “FCS, one day, will suffer electronic obsolescence issues.”
Puzzuoli suggested that one of the more pressing technology needs in the near future will be to equip the Abrams tanks with new or remanufactured engines. The Army had awarded a contract to Honeywell Corp. in 1999 to develop a new turbine engine, the LV100. The plan was to build 1,600 engines to be installed on all Abrams tanks and Crusader artillery vehicles. But the cancellation of Crusader and cutbacks in the Abrams upgrade program drove down the number of engines to fewer than 600. An expected higher price for the LV100 (as a result of a smaller order) and technical problems experienced in the program have prompted the Army to reassess whether it should cancel the project and start over.
“We are currently evaluating the status of that program and where the future lies,” Puzzuoli said.
The current engine, the AGT1500 turbine, is fuel guzzling, has poor reliability and high maintenance costs, he said.
In fiscal year 2004, the Army will need to overhaul more than 1,200 tank engines, a threefold increase over 12 months. The Anniston Army Depot, in Alabama, currently overhauls about 400 engines a year.
The commander of TACOM, Army Maj. Gen. N. Ross Thompson III, said he fears that shortages of key components could severely undermine the depot’s ability to deliver enough engines to meet the Army’s needs in Iraq.
The potential cancellation of the LV100 is not related to the increased need for AGT1500 engines, Thompson said in an interview. “If they don’t continue the program, we’ll have a competition to reengineer and increase the reliability and the durability of the AGT1500.”
Also of immediate need in the field is additional protection for Humvees and other trucks that are not armored. As U.S. forces in Iraq endure continuing attacks by rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and various explosive devices, TACOM officials are rushing to come up with “countermeasures,” such as armor kits.
Ideally, TACOM would like to build more of the up-armored Humvees, but the production line only can assemble 220 per month. The Army has asked for at least 3,500.
Until enough up-armored Humvees can be delivered, TACOM is providing interim alternatives, such as armor kits and a newly designed armor door that can be applied on existing Humvees. The Army’s depots will make 1,000 armor doors for immediate delivery to Iraq, Thompson said.
Armor kits also will be needed for medium and heavy trucks, he said. Future Army rotations in Iraq will see fewer Abrams and Bradleys, and more wheeled vehicles, including the new Stryker.
Upgrading Vehicles
Contractors, meanwhile, await specific direction from the Army on how it will go about transitioning from the current force to the so-called Future Force, equipped with FCS technology.
Much of the technology the Army wants in FCS already exists, experts contend. Vehicle manufacturers are coming forward with unsolicited concepts that aim to prove that.
United Defense LP, for example, recently unveiled a 20-ton armored vehicle equipped with a 120 mm gun that was fired at a shooting range in California, according the UDLP officials. The demonstrator—powered by a hybrid-electric engine—is a modified armored gun that originally was developed in the early 1990s for Army light forces and subsequently was cancelled to fund other programs.
UDLP resurrected one of the six 105 mm prototypes and installed a 120 mm gun designed at the Army’s Watervliet Arsenal.
The company claims that the vehicle is not intended to meet FCS requirements, given that the Army selected General Dynamics as the provider of direct-fire vehicles for FCS. UDLP was designated the supplier for the artillery systems.
In what appears to be a tit-for-tat move, General Dynamics unveiled its own concept for a 20-ton 105 mm howitzer, which would be compatible with the Stryker family. Company officials said the Army has not yet settled on whether the FCS howitzer will be 105 mm or 155 mm, even though UDLP is developing a 155 mm non-line-of-sight cannon for FCS.
As far as FCS requirements are concerned, the Army has been “really vague,” said Dean Lockwood, combat vehicles analyst at Forecast International, a market research firm. For that reason, “contractors are showing what is possible and what is not.”
Lockwood believes that the Army is moving toward a hybrid force of light quick-reaction and heavy armored units. “With FCS, they want something in the middle.” Stryker, he said, is the “first incarnation of FCS. It’s the test-bed and interim program for it.”
Marine Lt. Gen. James Cartwright, of the Joint Staff, called FCS “the most transformational thing that is going on in the Department of Defense.”
Given the uncertainty about future conflicts and geopolitics, “the Army knows its goals are probably ambitious,” Cartwright said in a speech to the Institute for Defense and Government Advancement. The schedule may slip, “but they’ve got the right mindset,” said Cartwright. “They’ve got a heck of a challenge.”
Interesting. I wonder where this idea came from. It's been in science fiction games for years, but yet another sci-fi to reality technology?
But think about the terrain in Iraq. In Baghdad and Fallujah, where patrolling is most hazardous, patrols are done on urban terrain. There are guard rails, tall medians, and heavy traffic. None of that slows down the Bradley. It can drive over the medians and guard rails. It actually manuevers easier in traffic, because it does pivot turns and the local drivers show a lot more caution around the Bradleys than the HMMWVs. Also, many homes have walls around the property. If you are conducting a raid, the best way to do it is to use a Bradley to smash through the wall, so that the dismounts can make a quick entry into the building. The only places that a HMMWV can go that a Bradley can't are tight alleyways. But why would anyone drive down a tight alleyway?
"It makes a lot of sense from a tactical point of view: Greatly increased vision, greatly decreased visibility, and fewer turtles."
Actually, less vision, because you are down at the level of the other traffic. The Bradley allows the gunner and BC to see from a vantage point over ten feet in the air. Decreased visibility is not really an issue, since one of the purposes of nearly every patrol is to put forth a heavy presense, to reassure the population and disrupt enemy activity.
One of the complaints about the Bradley is that they carry fewer soldiers. The M113, for example, had a mobile command center variant. The Bradleys must abut two special Bradleys back to back to carry out this function.
As far as expense, the M-2 Bradley and the original M1 are pretty close to the same cost.
Theyre using RPG7s because they're available, and they work. If we come up with countermeasures that defeat the PG-7 warhead, they'll switch to something else that works. All we do with RPG-7 specific countermeasures and procedures is buy a little time.
Did you get the FReepmail I sent you?
I had a couple, and replied. Check yours.
In Country, the M-113 was a death trap, with most riding on the outside so you wouldn't be trapped when it hit a mine. Maybe conditions are different in Bagdhad...
I think that any infantry unit (101st, 82nd, etc) in theatre should have Bradleys, even if they are not mechanized units. It doesn't take long to teach a soldier how to drive a Bradley. Right now, the 101st and 82nd are using soft-skinned HMMWVs. There are Bradleys in theatre. 3rd ID turned in their Bradleys in early June. If they are not available now, then something is wrong.
The MP and CA units there all have M1114s, if I remember correctly. 1st AD has its tanks and Bradleys.
"My point is that trying to turn the humvee into an armored vehicle is a bad idea from the start: if we need an armored utility vehicle, we should design and build one, not try to modify something that does not properly fit the need."
Good point.
Production rates remain suboptimal and even with current plant expansion planned, will not reach more than 200 per month by year-end. This is a ridiculous situation and I'm asking any freepers that have some ideas on this to help forward them to me as I am very active with congress on this matter. At the same time realize that 50,000 commercial grade hummers will be produced by GM along next year and those are subsidized with a small business tax deduction by $100K. Thus your local dentist gets a yellow hummer but your boy in Iraq rides around in essentially an open bed pickup taking RPG, machinegun and IED hits.
Anyone that has ideas or a means of resolving this issue, please contact me.
The armored door package seems like a good start. It looks like they ought to be made standard on all Humvees in the fleet, certainly on all in Iraq.
The problem with that is the support infrastructure...even if they also have the support vehicles (fuel HEMTTs etc) they don't have the people, the mechanics, 77F's etc etc that a mech force needs. It isn't as easy as handing them Bradleys, but you have a point...they ought to get what they need people wise to get the equipment they need. Which gets to another point...even in a mech force, think about how big your tail is. I know in an armored battalion the non-tankers easily outnumber the tankers. That probably is not true in an infantry unit at the battalion level, but once you go to the brigade and division level it certainly is, plus there is all the COSCOM people. Think about how many non-trigger pullers are in theater...and they are largely where the casualties are because the terrorists try pretty hard to avoid attacking people trained, equipped and motivated to counter-attack. Those non-trigger pullers need something with some small arms/schrapnel protection.
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