But why did secession nullify the deed to Sumter? There was no qualification to that affect in the legislation that passed title to the federal government. No option to reclaim the land, no 'out'. Once the land passed to the federal government then constitutionally only Congress could make laws for the disposition of that property. South Carolina had no legal rights to that land whatsoever. None. South Carolina, and the rest of the confederacy for that matter, simple appropriated the land. Perhaps stole is a better word. And this was done without any offer of compensation, only vague and insincere offers to negoitiate on matters of disagreement. And then only if Lincoln would recognize the validity of the southern rebellion.
It has been a popular illustration with the advocates of the Union, that if a State may secede, so may a county from a State, or a town from a county, until society break up into chaos. The fallacy of this is very obvious. A State claims to secede in virtue of her right as a sovereignty. When a county becomes a sovereignty it may prefer an equal claim, but then it cannot be a county. The comparison fails in other respects. The secession of a State from others is the case of men who separate; the secession of a county would be that of a limb torn from the body. There is also no such practical danger as that which has been described. The secession of a single State would be suicidal; it would be surrounded with custom-houses, cramped with restrictions, and crushed under the expenses involved. North Carolina and Rhode Island, after refusing to join the Union, and holding out for more than two years, were at last constrained to accede, by the same causes which will always prevent any State from attempting to stand alone. Practically the right could not be exercised, even if conceded, except by a number of States together, sufficient in resources to enable them to maintain their position, and to endure the heavy cost of a separate government. Indeed, if justly governed, it is by no means clear why there should be any desire to secede.
A much more subtle argument was used by Jefferson, since often repeated. He observed that if one State claimed the right to secede from the rest, the others would have equal right to secede from one State, which would amount to turning it out of the Union. The argument is based on the assumption that a State, claiming the one, and objecting to the other, would exhibit a conflict of principles. But a State would protest against ejection because it involves compulsion; and she claims a right to retire, because if compelled to remain, that is equally a compulsory restraint. Both really involve the same principle; ejection and imprisonment are equally acts of compulsion: and this principle is alike objected to in both cases.
It has been argued that a State would thus claim the right to exercise her will against the others, whilst denying them the right to use their will as against herself. But the case is not one of will within the limit of individual action, but of compulsion extending to, and exercised over, another. A State compelled to go or to remain has a forcible restraint imposed on its will; but in seceding it imposes no restraint on the will of others -- they remain free to follow, or continue as before.
Another illustration frequently used reminds us that the United Kingdom is a Union. It is asked how we should like Ireland to secede. A natural reply would be, that if Ireland were a slave-owning country, we should not only approve of her seceding, but insist upon it. We might first strive to prevail upon her to alter the system; but if that proved impossible, or she refused to comply, there is assuredly no thought of profit or advantage, that would induce this country to maintain such a partnership. If the argument be seriously brought forward, it would appear singular it should not be known that our system differs from that of the United States, and that rights may exist under the one that are unknown to the other. We have not yet proclaimed the sovereignty of the people in Ireland, or taught that governments rest in the "consent of the governed," and may be abolished when no longer promoting the pursuit of happiness. The systems spring from different roots; and to impute to them similar results is to argue that different trees might bear the same fruit.
Another case has been urged, that of Florida, a district which has proved costly to the Union, from local wars with the Indians, lighthouses, and even the first cost of the soil; on which grounds an appeal is made to a sense of justice. Those who address themselves to a sense of justice are not fortunate in taking Florida as their ground, and seem to have forgotten how the Union abstracted it from Spain. Apart from this, these matters are altogether beside the question of constitutional right. Secession, if lawful, gives no right to lighthouses without paying for them, and the fact of having built lighthouses is no answer to the right of secession. To leave a partnership is one thing; another, to settle accounts with the firm. The impression exists, that the people of the South proposed, from the first, to pay for all Federal property, and sent commissioners to Washington to arrange this. If against the share to be paid to the North, there were placed the amount abstracted by it through its tariffs during the last thirty-five years, it is not improbably that the South would have money to receive.
It has been urged that reasonable men would not have formed a system exposed to ruin at any time by the secession of its constituents. But the question is not whether the terms of the compact were wise or prudent, but simply what those terms are, and the force they possess. Men make injudicious wills, but these cannot be disputed on the ground of their narrow wisdom. The argument ignores, too, the facts which surrounded the framing of the Constitution. It was the result of a series of compromises. Hence that which may appear unreasonable for any community to have enacted for itself, is reasonable enough when viewed correctly, as the best system it was possible to compass under the circumstances.
Much stress has been laid on the term "supreme," as applied to the federal laws. In reality their only supremacy is in extent -- in extending throughout the whole country, whilst the action of a State law is confined within its boundaries. Apart from this, the State is as supreme as the federal law. No question exists of relative rank, of any superiority; each is supreme in its own department, both are equally powerless beyond it. The Federal Government has indeed no absolute law-making power; for all its laws are liable to be declared void by the Supreme Court. That court declared null and void the most important law ever passed by the federal legislature -- the Missouri compromise. It sits not merely as the interpreter, but as the judge of the law.
It has been argued that the present Constitution differs in principle from the Articles of Confederation, in enabling the Federal Government to act directly on individuals, instead of doing so through the State governments. The inference is drawn that the sovereignty of the States has been surrendered by this concession. Had such a right been committed to a foreign Government, or to any substantive power, this might have been a natural inference. But the Federal Government has no substantive power, and is only the joint agent of the States. These act directly on their own citizens, each through its special government or agent, in the great majority of cases. They agree to act on them through the Federal or common agent in certain other specified cases. This is simply a more effective manner of procedure, a question of detail, greatly improving the administration, but affecting in nowise the question of sovereignty. Further, it was pointed out by Madison in the Convention that the principle itself was not new, but existed under the Articles of Confederation, in several cases which he specified.
A federal republic is a partnership of republics. It has been argued that, admitting this to be the case, still, when once formed, it could not be dissolved by one without the consent of the others. But a very common form of partnership, in this and other countries, is partnership at will; from this any one party may retire without consulting the rest. And it seems to have escaped observation, how much wider are the powers of a sovereign State than those of a private individual. To a partnership of States the words of Madison apply: "When resort can be had to no common superior, the parties to the compact must themselves be the rightful judges, whether the bargain has been pursued or violated."
It has, indeed, been contended that the principles of a partnership at will could not apply, because this was to last for ever. On the point of duration the Constitution is silent, except in what is merely the expression of a desire, in the preamble, "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." On this subject there is no enactment or injunction. But on turning to the previous Articles of Confederation, we find in the title the words "perpetual union," and in the body, the express injunction -- "And the union shall be perpetual." On this point they clearly possessed greater force than that of the Constitution; yet, notwithstanding this, they were terminated at the end of a few years, and that, too, with liberty to any State to leave the Federation altogether. The Union has, therefore, proved, by its own act, that terms of this nature have no force of law, but simply indicate the intention and the desire of the parties at the time. We find, too, that the Federal Government entered into a close alliance with France, the terms of which strongly enjoined that it should last for ever; yet these terms were held to be no obstacle to annulling it, without the consent of the other party.