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Thus, the original purpose of the Commerce Clause was primarily a means to eliminate trade barriers among the states. They didn't intend for the Commerce Clause to govern so much of our lives.

Here's how I think of it: The Commerce Clause was written to PREVENT governmental impediments to free commerce (e.g. state tarrifs).

Now it is being used as the prime enablement of governmental impediments to commerce, precisely contrary to the original intent of protecting freedom of commerce.

Here's how I think of it: The Commerce Clause was written to PREVENT governmental impediments to free commerce (e.g. state tarrifs). Now it is being used as the prime enablement of governmental impediments to commerce, precisely contrary to the original intent of protecting freedom of commerce.

The vast majority of the Civil Rights Laws prohibiting discrimination in housing, restaurants, and places of public accommodation and other businesses open to the public is based upon the Commerce Clause. If not the Commerce Clause, then what would be the constitutional basis for the civil rights laws as applied to individuals?

Here's how I think of it: The Commerce Clause was written to PREVENT governmental impediments to free commerce (e.g. state tarrifs).

Now it is being used as the prime enablement of governmental impediments to commerce, precisely contrary to the original intent of protecting freedom of commerce.

I hear what you're saying, but the language of the Constitution doesn't manifest that narrow a purposee:

"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;"

"Regulate" seems more broad than "facilitate."

Is it okay for a court to depart from the language used if the court believes that the "original intent" warrants the departure? Who should they consider when trying to determine the "original intent" of a provision? The guy who drafted it? The members of the Constitutiional Convention, or just the ones who voted in favor of the Constitution? Should we also consider the views of the members of the State ratifying conventions, and, if so, which ones? How can a court pick and choose among varying "original intents"?

These are some of the problems that a court faces when we ask them to actively intervene to limit the power of our elected Congress. ;-)