I'm reminded of a famous case in New York involving a young man who was convicted of second-degree murder for poisoning his grandfather for the inheritance money. There was nothing in the law that said murderers couldn't inherit, and the young murderer, Elmer E. Palmer, figured the worst case scenario was he would serve a 20-year sentence before enjoying the fruits of his crime. Although the statute was silent on the question of beneficiaries murdering their testators, Justice Benjamin Cardozo decided against Palmer on the principle that no one should profit by their wrongdoing.
The facts of the Schiavo case, like those in Riggs v. Palmer, highlight the deficiencies of a positivist theory of law such as Mr. Palmer's attorneys argued in that case and that you are arguing here. A legal positivist holds that law is nothing more than the collection of rules and obligations set forth in the books. A positivist rejects the idea of moral restraints on validity of laws and would say that Justice Cardozo impermissibly exceeded his authority, either by legislating from the bench or by an unwarranted exercise of judicial discretion.
The New York law on wills in 1882 did not contemplate the possibility of a beneficiary murdering his testator either to inherit sooner or to prevent a change in the will. Similarly the law of Florida governing appointment of guardians and the legal rights and obligations of spouses did not contemplate a legal guardian with financial and other conflicts of interest acting in bad faith.
To adhere to the letter of the law in circumstances not contemplated when the law was written certainly promotes predictability of results in judicial decisions. The question is whether the object of the law is primarily to reach predictable results, as positivists would hold, or to achieve justice, as Cardozo believed.
Cardozo refused to blindly follow the letter of the law if it meant violating its spirit by creating an injustice. A legal positivist denies the existence of such a thing as a spirit of the law. He would therefore allow the murderer to inherit because the 1882 law in question made no distinction between murderers and other beneficiaries.
What a difference a generation makes. When I went to law school, my first-year classmates' reaction to this case was one of surprise. We weren't surprised that Cardozo ruled the way he did. We were surprised that Palmer and his attorney were brazen enough to argue he was entitled to inherit the estate from a relative he poisoned, and that a judge like Cardozo actually took the argument seriously instead of throwing the scoundrel and his shyster out of the courtroom.
I find myself wondering the same thing today.