Why Biden’s Pardons Are Unconstitutional and VOID

Armstrong Economics ^ | 23 Jan 25 | Martin Armstrong

[tired&retired]

Someone above posted that you send the same attack comments every time one of this guy’s articles are posted.

[TexasGator]

Did that person say I had a hardness in my heart?

Nope!

[woodpusher]

Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915)

The only pardon that has any real validity is that for Hunter. All of these “preemptive” pardons are not valid. The Supreme Court made this issue very clear.

Pure, total, utter bull pucky by Martin Armstrong.

The Burdick court at 263 U.S. 87 explicitly stated: "In our view of the case it is not material to decide whether the pardoning power may be exercised before conviction.

The Burdick court expressly offered NO OPINION about whether the pardon power may be exercised before conviction. Martin Armstrong simply avoided mentioning that truth, and never mentioned the existence of the truth of the Garland court which directly addressed and decided the issue.

https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep071333/

Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866)

Syllabus

9. The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control.

10. A pardon reaches the punishment prescribed for an offence and the guilt of the offender. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. It gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited, or property of interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.

11. The petitioner in this case, having received a full pardon for all offences committed by his participation, direct or implied, in the Rebellion, is relieved from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason, committed by such participation. For that offence, he is beyond the reach of punishment of any kind. He cannot, therefore, be excluded by reason of that offence from continuing in the enjoyment of a previously acquired right to appear as an attorney and counselor in the Federal courts.

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Opinion of the Court at 71 U.S. 380-381:

The Constitution provides that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment."

The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions.

Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender, and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that, in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.

There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices forfeited or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgment.