The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898: States’ Rights, The Law of Nations, and Mutual Consent

Again with the 14th amendment! You already said, and I already agreed, that the 14th amendment has nothing to do with "natural born citizen" as meant by the framers in 1787.

Link and quote of me saying those words, please. As you have phrased it, I consider it an absurdity.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not use the term natural born citizen. It defines who, among those born in the United States, are born citizens of the United States.

Persons who becomes citizens by virtue of the circumstances of their birth are natural born citizens. Others are born aliens. Aliens may become citizens at some time after birth through a legal process called naturalization. They are naturalized citizens.

If you choose to make believe that has nothing to do with who are natural born citizens, you are free to have your opinion. Persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens of the United States.

Persons born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are natural born citizens. Persons naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction are not natural born citizens. Persons naturalized were born aliens.

Some of them plus the rest of them, are all of them. United States citizens are natural born citizens or naturalized citizens. There is no third classification.

And you are wrong about the words of the 14th being too clear to admit of any misunderstanding. You clearly have not read what Senator Trumbull said on the matter of how they changed the original verbiage because of "temporary allegiance" and so forth.

I have not only read the debate, but converted the entire thing to an html file years ago, for instances such as this. You have not quoted a word of Trumbull so I will do it for you. Congressional Globe, May 30, 1866. The debate spans pages 2890-2902.

At 2893.

Senator Trumbull stated:

Mr. TRUMBULL. Of course my opinion is not any better than that of any other member of the Senate; but it is very clear to me that there is nothing whatever in the suggestions of the Senator from Wisconsin. The provision is, that ''all persons bom in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens." That means "subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof." Now, does the Senator from Wisconsin pretend to say that the Navajoe Indians are subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United Slates? What do we mean by "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?" Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is, what it means. Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court? Are they in any sense subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no means. We make treaties with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction. If they were, we would not make treaties with them. If we want to control the Navajoes, or any other Indians of which the Senator from Wisconsin has spoken, how do we do it? Do we pass a law to control them? Are they subject to our jurisdiction in that sense? Is it not understood that if we want to make arrangements with the Indians to whom he refers we do it by means of a treaty? The Senator himself has brought before us a great many treaties this session in order to get control of those people.
If you introduce the words "not taxed," that is a very indefinite expression. What does "excluding Indians not taxed" mean? You will have just as much difficulty in regard to those Indians that you say are in Colorado, where there are more Indians than there are whites. Suppose they have property there, and it is taxed; then they are citizens.

At 2894.

Senator Trumbull stated:

I have already replied to the suggestion as to the Indians being subject to our jurisdiction. They are not subject to our jurisdiction in the sense of owing allegiance solely to the United States; and the Senator from Maryland, if he will look into our statutes, will search in vain for any means of trying these wild Indians. A person can only be tried for a criminal offense in pursuance of laws, and he must be tried in a district which must have been fixed by law before the crime was committed. We have had in this country and have today, a large region of country within the territorial limits of the United States, unorganized, over which we do not pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild tribes of Indians roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, and we do not pretend to interfere with them. They would not be embraced by this provision.
For these reasons I think this language is better than the language employed by the civil rights bill.

Today, we do not have large regions within our territorial limits, unorganized, over which we do not pretend to exercise any civil or criminal jurisdiction, where wild Indians roam at pleasure, subject to their own laws and regulations, with whom we do not pretend to interfere.

Well, that's a relief.

The words of the 14th Amendment are clear.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

It matters not what Senator Trumbull may have said. The words were approved by the Senate as a body and ratified by the people as an amendment and they have been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

For the record, Senator Howard was the author of the citizenship clause.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning.
Which they absolutely do not in the case of "natural born citizen."

You willfully do not understand that which you choose not to understand.

Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 21 October 1, 1783 - October 31, 1784

Thomas Jefferson's Notes

[December ? 1783] (1)

Qu. 1. Can an American citizen, adult, now inherit lands in England?
Natural subjects can inherit--Aliens cannot.
There is no middle character--every man must be the one or the other of these.
A Natural subject is one born within the king's allegiance & still owing allegiance. No instance can be produced in the English law, nor can it admit the idea of a person's being a natural subject and yet not owing allegiance.
An alien is the subject or citizen of a foreign power.
The treaty of peace acknowleges we are no longer to owe allegiance to the king of G.B. It acknowleges us no longer as Natural subjects then.
It makes us citizens of independent states; it makes us aliens then.

James Madison, address to Congress, May 22, 1789:

It is an established maxim, that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in general, place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will, therefore, be unnecessary to investigate any other.

With the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783 we stopped being natural born subjects of England and became citizens of independent states.

Those that had been natural born subjects of England became naturalized citizens of the states. The Founders and Framers were not natural born citizens of the United States. Persons born citizens in the independent states were not subjects but citizens. They were natural born citizens. It is just not that hard.

You are entitled to your opinion that the term natural born citizen cannot be comprehended. The Courts disagree.

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 328-329 (1939)

First. On her birth in New York, the plaintiff became a citizen of the United States. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; Fourteenth Amendment, § 1; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. In a comprehensive review of the principles and authorities governing the decision in that case -- that a child born here of alien parentage becomes a citizen of the United States -- the Court adverted to the
"inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship."
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, supra, p. 169 U. S. 668. As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that persons may have a dual nationality. And the mere fact that the plaintiff may have acquired Swedish citizenship by virtue of the operation of Swedish law on the resumption of that citizenship by her parents does not compel the conclusion that she has lost her own citizenship acquired under our law. As at birth she became a citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles.

I understand that in the modern judicial system, "the law" means whatever the judges say it means, even when it clearly contradicts the obvious purpose for which the law was created. The 14th amendment was about Slaves right to vote, but our courts have made it about queer marriage and murdering babies, among other stupid and ridiculous notions they expect us to accept.

You are entitled to your personal opinion. Your opinion is not enforceable law. You are not expected to accept the court rulings, but they are enforceable against you if you choose to defy them. You can make silly statements about the 14th Amendment being about voting rights if that's what makes you feel good. In the real world, abortion is legal and same-sex marriage is legal. Disagreeing with Roe or Obergefell does not change that fact.

The FEDERAL government, the UNITED STATES, —NEVER— adopted the Common Law of England.
If you believe that, then why do you insist "natural born citizen" derives from common law? Is that not a federal issue?

I do not just believe it, I showed it to be a fact. The United States did not adopt the common law of England as its law. The common law of England is its case law, a collection of Court opinions setting precedents.

The Framers were instilled with the language of the common law of England. They used that language when writing the Constitution. Reference is made to common law terms to determine their meaning. The English common law was not adopted and made part of United States Federal law.

If you believe that the Federal government adopted the English common law, cite the constitutional provision, statute law, or whatever official act you claim by which it was adopted. I can readily cite the state constitutional provision or statute law for every one of the original thirteen states. For the United States Federal government, it never happened. For the states it is a mishmash of what was adopted and what was excluded. Each state acted independently.

In my #57, I linked, cited, and quoted the Supreme Court at United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394-395 (1798) that it is impossible to bring a Federal criminal case against anyone based on an English common law crime. It must be a crime in United States law: "the United States, as a Federal government, have no common law; and consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their Courts, for offences merely at the common law."

Okay, so then were do they define "natural born citizen" in the Federal law of 1787? (or earlier)
And don't try to use a later definition. They cannot create a term of art for 1787 that is defined later, the term must be understood at the time it entered the Constitution.

Actually, the Legislature or Courts can define the terms any time they choose, they do not need your permission, and their definition would be quite enforceable.

See Thomas Jefferson, eminent lawyer, quoted from 1783 above.

The treaty of peace acknowleges we are no longer to owe allegiance to the king of G.B. It acknowleges us no longer as Natural subjects then.
It makes us citizens of independent states; it makes us aliens then.

Natural subjects of England became natural citizens of the independent states, and aliens to England.

Court decisions are legally binding and enforceable.

Which is completely irrelevant to my point. Lies can be enforced, this does not make them "non lies" it makes them legally enforced lies.

I have already shown and documented that the Constitution was written using terminology from the English common law.

And if you have read it, you can see it was also written using terminology completely at odds with English common law. The question we are debating is whether the Framers intent for the term of art "natural born citizen" lies within English common law, or outside of it.

The Framers took the term natural born subject and adapted it to American usage, thus natural born citizen.

The evidence of which I am aware is against this claim. What evidence do you have to support such a claim?

Americans are citizens, but not subjects.

English common law does not deal with "citizens." In the English of that era, "citizen" meant someone who lived in a city. It did not mean "member of a nation". Only one place on earth at the time used the word "citizen" to refer to a member of a nation, and that place was Switzerland.

There are no subjects of the sovereign king of the United States. That is because the collective citizens are the sovereign and a king does not exist.

And this is precisely where and why "citizenship" breaks from English common law. English common law recognized (at that time) only "subjects." It had no conception for the term "citizen" other than as a "city denizen."

This is evidence that the origin for this term does not lay in English common law. It lays in "natural law" as conceived by Vattel's common usage of the term to refer to "citizens" (Citoyen) of Switzerland.

Switzerland was the only nation on earth at that time which used the word "citizen" to mean member of a nation, and if you look at their history, it becomes apparent why they used the word "citizen" to refer to members of their nation. The original Swiss confederacy was created by the Union of 8 Cities under the Charte des prêtres, (1370) which explicitly references:

"N'importe qui, étranger ou indigène, hôte ou citoyen d'une ville ou d'un pays, quel que soit son titre, doit pouvoir voyager dans tous nos districts et territoires, et aussi dans ceux des gens qui dépendent de nous, sans danger aucun pour sa personne et ses biens, et nul ne doit l'inquiéter, l'arrêter ou lui causer un dommage."

This matches with what Etymology Online says about the origins of the word.

"Sense of "freeman or inhabitant of a country, member of the state or nation, not an alien" is late 14c."

No instance can be produced in the English law, nor can it admit the idea of a person's being a natural subject and yet not owing allegiance.

Jefferson has that precisely right. "Subject" comes from English law. "Citizen" does *NOT* come from English law, it comes from natural law as explained by a member of the Swiss Republic where the usage of the word was common.

James Madison, address to Congress, May 22, 1789:

It is an established maxim, that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth, however, derives its force sometimes from place, and sometimes from parentage; but, in general, place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will, therefore, be unnecessary to investigate any other.

Ah, James Madison. I researched him quite a bit on this particular point, and he was defending William Smith's legitimacy as a member of Congress. He was a political ally of Madison. What I discovered about Madison is that he would tell people whatever best suited his interests at the time. In the Case of James McClure, Madison took the very opposite approach and claimed he was a subject of England because his Father had not naturalized prior to his birth.

Another example of Madison's willingness to be two faced was his contribution as a member of the committee which drafted Virginia's ratification statement asserting they had the right to take back their power. 30 years later Madison was disavowing such an idea when the possibility of secession was looming in the 1820s.

The term citizen predates 1776 by centuries. Jefferson was an eminent lawyer. Jefferson could have gotten the word citizen out of any dictionary.

The word had been around, but not the meaning it has now. In the 1760s, the dictionaries I have found only reference "dweller in a city". I have yet to see one that defines it as "member of a nation."

So please show me a dictionary from the time period that defines "citizen" as a member of a nation rather than "town dweller." I can show you several that define it only as "town dweller", with no mention of it representing membership in a nation.

The usage of it to mean "member of a nation" is Swiss. No other place (of which I have found so far) used it with that meaning. Not even France, where "Sujet" meant "Subject" and "Citoyen" meant "City Dweller."

German of course used nothing like that word. Variations of the word "Burghers" is what they used.

You might be interested in the debate we are having in this thread about "natural born citizen." I hadn't seen you posting for awhile and I was beginning to worry about you.

Again with the 14th amendment! You already said, and I already agreed, that the 14th amendment has nothing to do with "natural born citizen" as meant by the framers in 1787.

Link and quote of me saying those words, please. As you have phrased it, I consider it an absurdity.

This is what you said:

Neither the original Constitution nor the 14th Amendment affected the meaning of the legal terms of art, natural born subject, and natural born citizen.

This is how I responded.

Very glad we can agree on that point. So why bring 14th amendment stuff into this discussion? It seems our nexus point lies around the 1776-1787 time period.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not use the term natural born citizen.

No it doesn't, and that is telling. What man could argue that former slaves could be "natural born citizens" when they were clearly not "citizens" prior to 1868.

Persons who becomes citizens by virtue of the circumstances of their birth are natural born citizens.

So long as those "circumstances" aren't created by man made law. We already know from Rogers v Bellei that congress created citizenship is not the same as natural citizenship, because you can lose congress created citizenship by not adhering to the myriad of rules required to retain it.

You cannot lose "natural citizenship" by doing nothing. You *can* (at that time) lose congress created citizenship by doing nothing.

Persons naturalized were born aliens.

Unless congress, using their power of naturalization, naturalizes them at "birth" and calls them "citizens" at birth.

You have not quoted a word of Trumbull so I will do it for you.

Senator Trumbull stated:

Your two Trumbull quotes do not cover the statement he made about "temporary allegiance."

Several years ago I could have put my fingers right on it, but I have since changed computers and browsers and so do not have ready access to the bits of knowledge I acquired on this topic.

From memory, Trumbull said that the original wording they used was more like the Civil Rights act of 1868, but because he was informed of this concept of "temporary allegiance" (expected of legal aliens during times of war or disaster) he said they changed the verbiage to it's current form.

Perhaps you can find that particular Trumbull quote for me?

It matters not what Senator Trumbull may have said. The words were approved by the Senate as a body and ratified by the people as an amendment and they have been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Well sure, after Trumbull and company changed their meaning to reflect his newly acquired understanding of "temporary allegiance" but with the rest of Congress understanding it's meaning in light of the original language.

This is why I said the later adopted language made the meaning less clear rather than more clear.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning.

Which they don't. The 14th is about the worst written amendment in the entire list. It has become the most abused amendment precisely because it can be interpreted so many different ways.

You willfully do not understand that which you choose not to understand.

When I have found evidence that contradicts the normal widespread belief, this makes me question the common understanding. It isn't a matter of refusing to understand, it is a matter of refusing to go along with a claim simply because other people believe it.

This applies to men in dresses, Covid nonsense, "Global Warming" and a whole host of other silly ideas which people attempt to force me to believe simply because everyone else believes them.

You are entitled to your opinion that the term natural born citizen cannot be comprehended.

That is not my opinion. I believe "natural born citizen" can easily be comprehended, but due to forces and people deliberately misleading posterity, the original understanding of it's meaning has been lost, except for certain clues and references that have been left behind.

From memory of Minor v Happersett, (I think that is the one) the court acknowledges that some authorities use Jus Soli and other authorities use Jus Sanguinus but for the purposes of that decision, it was not necessary to address that question.

I do not just believe it, I showed it to be a fact.

I must have missed that. I only recall you asserting it as fact. I do not recall reading anything where you "showed it to be fact."

The Framers were instilled with the language of the common law of England. They used that language when writing the Constitution.

Except where they broke from it, such as Debtor's prison, corruption of blood, and the usage of this newly promulgated word "citizen." There is no "citizen" in the common law of England.

Actually, the Legislature or Courts can define the terms any time they choose, they do not need your permission, and their definition would be quite enforceable.

To quote Lincoln, "Just because you call a tail a leg, doesn't make it so."

Lincoln enforced a lot of crap law too, so I draw a distinction between "enforceable" and "correct."

Court decisions are legally binding and enforceable.
Which is completely irrelevant to my point. Lies can be enforced, this does not make them "non lies" it makes them legally enforced lies.

The problem is that your "point", so-called, is completely removed from United States law. Your point is your opinion, and you cannot discuss it in terms of effective United States law. You can only discuss it in term of legally meaningless birther babble.

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) the Opinion of the Court observes:

169 U.S. 655:

II. The fundamental principle of the common law with regard to English nationality was birth within the allegiance, also called “ligealty,” “obedience,” “faith,” or “power” of the King. The principle embraced all persons born within the King’s allegiance and subject to his protection. Such allegiance and protection were mutual — as expressed in the maxim protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem — and were not restricted to natural-born subjects and naturalized subjects, or to those who had taken an oath of allegiance, but were predicable of aliens in amity so long as they were within the kingdom. Children, born in England, of such aliens were therefore natural-born subjects. But the children, born within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or the children of alien enemies, born during and within their hostile occupation of part of the King’s dominions, were not natural-born subjects because not born within the allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or, as would be said at this day, within the jurisdiction, of the King.

169 U.S. 656-658:

In Udny v. Udny, (1869) L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 441, the point decided was one of inheritance, depending upon the question whether the domicil of the father was in England or in Scotland, he being in either alternative a British subject. Lord Chancellor Hatherley said: “The question of naturalization and of allegiance is distinct from that of domicil.” P. 452. Lord Westbury, in the passage relied on by the counsel for the United States, began by saying:
“The law of England, and of almost all civilized countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions: one, by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political status; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and as such is possessed of certain municipal rights, and subject to certain obligations, which latter character is the civil status or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political status.”
And then, while maintaining that the civil status is universally governed by the single principle of domicil, domicilium, the criterion established by international law for the purpose of determining civil status, and the basis on which “the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or minority, his marriage, succession, testacy or intestacy, [169 U. S. 657] must depend,” he yet distinctly recognized that a man’s political status, his country, patria, and his “nationality, that is, natural allegiance,” “may depend on different laws in different countries.” Pp. 457, 460. He evidently used the word “citizen” not as equivalent to “subject,” but rather to “inhabitant,” and had no thought of impeaching the established rule that all persons born under British dominion are natural-born subjects.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the same year, reviewing the whole matter, said:
“By the common law of England, every person born within the dominions of the Crown, no matter whether of English or of foreign parents, and, in the latter case, whether the parents were settled or merely temporarily sojourning, in the country, was an English subject, save only the children of foreign ambassadors (who were excepted because their fathers carried their own nationality with them), or a child born to a foreigner during the hostile occupation of any part of the territories of England. No effect appears to have been given to descent as a source of nationality.”
Cockburn on Nationality, 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful Digest of the Law of England with reference to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896, states the following propositions, his principal rules being printed below in italics:
“‘British subject’ means any person who owes permanent allegiance to the Crown. ‘Permanent’ allegiance is used to distinguish the allegiance of a British subject from the allegiance of an alien who, because he is within the British dominions, owes ‘temporary’ allegiance to the Crown. ‘Natural-born British subject’ means a British subject who has become a British subject at the moment of his birth.’ ‘Subject to the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any person who (whatever the nationality of his parents) is born within the British dominions is a natural-born British subject.’ This rule contains the leading principle of English law on the subject of British nationality.”
The exceptions afterwards mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two:
“1. Any person who (his father being an alien enemy) is born in a part of the British dominions, which at the time of such [169 U. S. 658] person’s birth is in hostile occupation, is an alien.”
“2. Any person whose father (being an alien) is at the time of such person’s birth an ambassador or other diplomatic agent accredited to the Crown by the Sovereign of a foreign State is (though born within the British dominions) an alien.”

169 U.S. 682:

The real object of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, in qualifying the words 'all persons born in the United States' by the addition 'and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the national government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases,—children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign state,—both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law, from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 1, 18b; Cockb. Nat. 7; Dicey, Confl. Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 155; 2 Kent, Comm. 39, 42.

169 U.S. at 687:

The words 'in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the first sentence of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution, must be presumed to have been understood and intended by the congress which proposed the amendment, and by the legislatures which adopted it, in the same sense in which the like words had been used by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known case of The Exchange, and as the equivalent of the words 'within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States,' and the converse of the words 'out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States,' as habitually used in the naturalization acts.

169 U.S. at 693-94

The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: The fourteenth amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. His allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke in Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 6a, 'strong enough to make a natural subject, for, if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject'; and his child, as said by Mr. Binney in his essay before quoted, 'If born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle.' It can hardly be denied that an alien is completely subject to the political jurisdiction of the country in which he resides, seeing that, as said by Mr. Webster, when secretary of state, in his report to the president on Thrasher's case in 1851, and since repeated by this court: 'Independently of a residence with intention to continue such residence; independently of any domiciliation; independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance, or of renouncing any former allegiance,—it is well known that by the public law an alien, or a stranger [169 U.S. 649, 694] born, for so long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason or other crimes as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulations.' Executive Documents H. R. No. 10, 1st Sess. 32d Cong. p. 4; 6 Webster's Works, 526; U. S. v. Carlisle, 16 Wall. 147, 155; Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 6a; Ellesmere, Postnati, 63; 1 Hale, P. C. 62; 4 Bl. Comm. 74, 92.
To hold that the fourteenth amendment of the constitution excludes from citizenship the children born in the United States of citizens or subjects of other countries, would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States.

The 14th Amendment establishes that ALL PERSONS born in the United States, and subject to te jurisdiction thereof, are born citizens of the United States. The words add no qualifiers about parents.

The Court has explicitly held that the children of foreign parentage born in the United states, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are born citizens of the United States.

Your total argument is that your opinion is the only thing that matters.

Natural law, Swiss law, Swiss philosophers, the Law of Nations, French law, German law, and all the other nonsense sharting from the birther collective mind do not affect the domestic authority to determine United States citizenship according to United States Federal law. You cannot cite the jurisdiction of any foreign law in a United States citizenship determination.

United States law is not perfect, but just about anything is better than the chaos of law by 330,000,000 different opinions, each equally valid.

The sovereign people created a constitution to create a government. It created and empowered a legislative branch to write laws. It required the legislative branch to create a judicial branch to interpret the laws.

While you may wish to take a foreign definition of citizen, created even before there was a United States, and enforce that definition upon the United States, in 2022, as in 1787, the United States had its own definition. Perhaps someone should try your argument in court. Oh, wait....

You should take your argument to an international court in the Hague or to a French court, or a court of natural law if you can find one, or to a Swiss court. Perhaps you would prefer that a Swiss court decree who are, and who are not, natural born citizens of the United States.

United States law is clear. You just do not like it. The author of the thread article had his lawsuit thrown out by the appellate court which found it to be "frivolous" and assessed the costs of the litigation against the thread author. That is a clear statement of the "merits" of this birther babble.

Again with the 14th amendment! You already said, and I already agreed, that the 14th amendment has nothing to do with "natural born citizen" as meant by the framers in 1787.
Link and quote of me saying those words, please. As you have phrased it, I consider it an absurdity.
This is what you said:
Neither the original Constitution nor the 14th Amendment affected the meaning of the legal terms of art, natural born subject, and natural born citizen.
This is how I responded.
Very glad we can agree on that point. So why bring 14th amendment stuff into this discussion? It seems our nexus point lies around the 1776-1787 time period.

- - - - - - - - - -

The Fourteenth Amendment does not use the term natural born citizen.
No it doesn't, and that is telling. What man could argue that former slaves could be "natural born citizens" when they were clearly not "citizens" prior to 1868.

Your argument, such as it is, is telling.

Not even the Founders and Framers would argue that they, themselves, were natural born citizens of the United States. They were not born citizens of the United States. They were born subjects of the king.

The Fourteenth Amendment did not declare freedmen to be natural born citizens of the United States. Nothing did that. They were clearly not born citizens of the United States.

The non-use of the phrase only signifies that nothing in the 14th Amendment converted non-citizens into natural born citizens.

The 14th Amendment declared that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United States...."

Persons who becomes citizens by virtue of the circumstances of their birth are natural born citizens.
So long as those "circumstances" aren't created by man made law.

Unsupportable, ridiculous bullcrap. The Constitution is man made law and stikes down anything and everything in conflict with it. 14A made the freedmen citizens by a mass naturalization process.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Naturalization clause. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Section 1, provides that all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. See Jus soli.

Whatever your opinion of your suggested non-manmade law, United States statute law takes precedent.

We already know from Rogers v Bellei that congress created citizenship is not the same as natural citizenship, because you can lose congress created citizenship by not adhering to the myriad of rules required to retain it.
You cannot lose "natural citizenship" by doing nothing. You *can* (at that time) lose congress created citizenship by doing nothing.

We already know that you have no regard for court opinions and that you miscontrue them to say whatever you want.

Read the Syllabus to Rogers v. Bellei to see what it held.

Held: Congress has the power to impose the condition subsequent of residence in this country on appellee, who does not come within the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of citizens as those “born or naturalized in the United States,” and its imposition is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful. Afroyim v. Rusk, supra, and Schneider v. Rusk, supra, distinguished. Pp. 401 U. S. 820-836.

With a statute law, Congress imposed a condition subsequent on naturalization. Congress did not violate the Constitution is so doing. The law is constitutiional, whether you agree with it or not.

Or, you can read the opening of the Opinion of the Court:

MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under constitutional challenge here, primarily on Fifth Amendment due process grounds, but also on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, is § 301(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 236, 8 U.S.C.§ 1401(b).
Section 301(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), defines those persons who “shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth.” Paragraph (7) of § 301(a) includes in that definition a person born abroad “of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States” who has met specified conditions of residence in this country. Section 301(b), however, provides that one who is a citizen at birth under § 301(a)(7) shall lose his citizenship unless, after age 14 and before age 28, he shall come to the United States and be physically present here continuously for at least five years.

Citizenship of those born abroad is controlled by Federal statute law. The 14th Amendment applies only to those born within the United States.

You are entitled to know whatever you believe, but that does not make it law. If there is a condition subsequent and it requires some act, failure to perform the required act is breach of performance. It is doing nothing when doing something is a specific requirement of law.

Persons naturalized were born aliens.
Unless congress, using their power of naturalization, naturalizes them at "birth" and calls them "citizens" at birth.

Your imaginative misconstruing of 14A only places you in the twilight zone. Can you cite an example of where congress ever used the power of naturalization to naturalize a non-citizen at birth?

Just in case the obvious eludes you, a citizen cannot be naturalized.

You have not quoted a word of Trumbull so I will do it for you.
Senator Trumbull stated:
Your two Trumbull quotes do not cover the statement he made about "temporary allegiance."
Several years ago I could have put my fingers right on it, but I have since changed computers and browsers and so do not have ready access to the bits of knowledge I acquired on this topic.
From memory, Trumbull said that the original wording they used was more like the Civil Rights act of 1868, but because he was informed of this concept of "temporary allegiance" (expected of legal aliens during times of war or disaster) he said they changed the verbiage to it's current form.
Perhaps you can find that particular Trumbull quote for me?

I believe your memory recalls content that is not there, especially on the topic of allegiance. I can provide links to each page of the debate and identify the pages where Trumbull appears to be speaking. Finding your alleged content is up to you.

THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE.
Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session
May 30, 1866 Pages 2890-2902

Senator Jacob Howard introduction of citizenship amendment to 14A, and associated debate and adoption of Howard's citizenship clause in the Senate.

Trumbull appears speaking on 2893, 2894, 2900, 2901.

At 2893-2894, the debate is on the citizenship clause. On 2900-2901, debate is on another part of 14A. Below are links to all the pages of the Senate Debate 2890-2902.

- - - - -

2890

2891
2892
2893
2894
2895
2896
2897
2898
2899
2900
2901
2902

It matters not what Senator Trumbull may have said. The words were approved by the Senate as a body and ratified by the people as an amendment and they have been construed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Well sure, after Trumbull and company changed their meaning to reflect his newly acquired understanding of "temporary allegiance" but with the rest of Congress understanding it's meaning in light of the original language.
This is why I said the later adopted language made the meaning less clear rather than more clear.

The words of the Howard citizenship clause were adopted.

Whatever musings you imagine to have been in Trumbull's head were not adopted.

The purported intent of the lawgiver is irrelevant if the actual words of the law have a clear meaning.
Which they don't. The 14th is about the worst written amendment in the entire list. It has become the most abused amendment precisely because it can be interpreted so many different ways.

The citizenship clause of 14A is not negated because you have discovered myriad ways you can misinterpret or misconstrue the clear words. The Supreme Court is empowered to interpret the laws for all of us. They have done so, and I have quoted them having done so.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

If that is too much for you to comprehend, I suggest getting a lawyer.

"All persons" = All persons. There are no qualifiers about parentage.

"born or naturalized in the United States" = the two ways to become a citizen, to be born a citizen or to be naturalized through a legal process.

"and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" = subject to the laws of the United States, do not enjoy diplomatic immunity.

"are citizens of the United States" = exactly what it says.

"and of the state wherein they reside." = the extinction of state sovereignty. States do not enjoy the right of self-determination. In their infinite wisdom, the sovereign people decided that state have no say whatever in who are citizens of the state.

You are entitled to your opinion that the term natural born citizen cannot be comprehended.
That is not my opinion. I believe "natural born citizen" can easily be comprehended, but due to forces and people deliberately misleading posterity, the original understanding of it's meaning has been lost, except for certain clues and references that have been left behind.
From memory of Minor v Happersett, (I think that is the one) the court acknowledges that some authorities use Jus Soli and other authorities use Jus Sanguinus but for the purposes of that decision, it was not necessary to address that question.

Why do you go from memory? Why do you not do your research?

The Scotus opinion is Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875)

Citizenship was not an issue in Minor v. Happersett. I happen to be so fortunate to have a copy of the Record of Transcript for the case of Minor v. Happersett. The Record of Transcript is the record of documents and pleadings forwarded by the court below to the Supreme Court. In an agreed statement submitted by both parties, it reads, "It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff is a native-born, free white citizen of the United States and the State of Missouri...."

The pull quote you are looking to misconstrue is at 88 U.S. 167-168:

The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [88 U. S. 168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens. The words "all children" are certainly as comprehensive, when used in this connection, as "all persons," and if females are included in the last, they must be in the first. That they are included in the last is not denied. In fact, the whole argument of the plaintiffs proceeds upon that idea.

The citizenship of Virginia Minor was never an issue before the Court. Citizenship was not argued before the Court. While the writing justice issued a dictum about some unnamed persons holding doubts about the citizenship status of children born within the jurisdiction of non-citizen parents, that is not part of the case. While it was a unanimous decision, justices adopted the decision, not the musings of Chief Justice Waite in dictum. Those musings are dicta and his alone.

Minor held that voting rights (enfranchisement/suffrage) was not coextensive with citizenship.

It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the states at the time of its adoption. If it was, then it may with force be argued that suffrage was one of the rights which belonged to citizenship, and in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. [88 U. S. 172] But if it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed.
When the federal Constitution was adopted, all the states with the exception of Rhode Island and Connecticut had constitutions of their own. These two continued to act under their charters from the Crown. Upon an examination of those constitutions, we find that in no state were all citizens permitted to vote. Each state determined for itself who should have that power. Thus, in New Hampshire, "Every male inhabitant of each town and parish with town privileges and places unincorporated in the state of twenty-one years of age and upwards, excepting paupers and persons excused from paying taxes at their own request,"

Virginia Minor was a citizen, but citizenship did not confer the right to vote. The Constitution was later amended so women could not be denied enfranchisement due to sex. However, a state could still, if it so chose, eliminate the popular vote for president and have the state legislature do the voting.

Moreover, the law is the law. Virginia minor was a natural born U.S. citizen, and had attained the age of 35 years. She met all the qualifications to run for President. Women did run for President before they could vote in a presidential election.

Any doubts that Chief Justice Waite may have perceived were dealt with by the U.S. Supreme Court in Wong Kim Ark which directly addressed the matter, after it was fully argued by both sides. The Minor court did not even have a citizenship issue before it.

I do not just believe it, I showed it to be a fact.
I must have missed that. I only recall you asserting it as fact. I do not recall reading anything where you "showed it to be fact."

Try not to bastardize the quote or remove it from all context. The "it" in question was the Federal goverment, the United States, NEVER adopted the Common Law of England.

The FEDERAL government, the UNITED STATES, —NEVER— adopted the Common Law of England.
If you believe that, then why do you insist "natural born citizen" derives from common law? Is that not a federal issue?

At my #57,

Attempting to cite English common law or state laws or state court opinions to nullify or modify any provision of the Constitution or Federal statute law is a non-starter. Using terminology used in the commmon law of England does not make the common law of England the law of the United States.

As for a lack of adoption of the Common Law of England by the United States, as opposed to partial adoption by individual member states, see United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798).

Chase, J. at 2 U.S. 394-395

2 U.S. 394
The question, however, does not arise about the power; but about the exercise of the power: Whether the Courts of the United States can punish a man for any act, before it is declared by a law of the United States to be criminal? Now, it appears to my mind, to be as essential, that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction. It is attempted, however, to supply the silence of the Constitution and Statutes of the Union, by resorting to the Common law, for a definition and punishment of the offence which has been committed: But, in my opinion, the United States, as a Federal government, have no common law; and, consequently, no indictment can be maintained in their Courts, for offences merely at the common law. If, indeed, the United States can be supposed, for a moment, to have a common law, it must, I persume, be that of England; and, yet, it is impossible to trace when, or how, the system was adopted, or introduced. With respect to the individual States, the difficulty does not occur. When the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it was held, as well by the settlers, as by the Judges and lawyers of England, that they brought hither, as a birth-right and inheritance; so much of the common law, as was applicable to their local situation, and change of circumstances. But each colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new condition; and in various modes, by Legislative acts, by Judicial decisions, or by constant usage, adopted some parts, and rejected others. Hence, he who shall travel through the different States, will soon discover, that the whole of the common law of England has been no where introduced; that some States have rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a great and essential diversity; in the subjects to which the common law is applied, as well as in the extent of its application. The common law, therefore, of one State, is not the common law of another; but the common law of England, is the law of each State, so far as each state has adopted it; and it results from that position, connected with the Judicial act, that the common law will always apply to suits between citizen and citizen, whether they are instituted in a Federal, or State, Court.
2 U.S. 395
But the question recurs, when and how, have the Courts of the United States acquired a common law jurisdiction, in criminal cases? The United States must possess the common law themselves, before they can communicate it to their Judicial agents: Now, the United States did not bring it with them from England; the Constitution does not create it; and no act of Congress has assumed it. Besides, what is the common law to which we are referred? Is it the common law entire, as it exists in England; or modified as it exists in some of the States; and of the various modifications, which are we to select, the system of Georgia or New Hampshire, of Pennsylvania or Connecticut?

There is also the rather simple statement from Erie v. Tompkins. You insist upon resorting to a body of law that does not exist, and seem to hold it in higher regard than the Constitution and Federal statute law which do exist.

U.S. Reports: Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79-80 (1938)

"There is no Federal general common law."

U.S. Supreme Court
ERIE R. CO. v. TOMPKINS, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)

Argued Jan. 31, 1938.
Decided April 25, 1938.

Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

304 U.S. 64 at 78-80

Third. Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State, whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts. As stated by Mr. Justice Field when protesting in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 149 U. S. 401, against ignoring the Ohio common law of fellow servant liability:
"I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country — which is often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time should be the general law on a particular subject — has been often advanced in judicial opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a State. I admit that learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient mode of brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I confess that, moved and governed by the authority of the great names of those judges, I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and confidently, but I think now erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But, notwithstanding the great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States — independence in their legislative and independence
304 U. S. 79
in their judicial departments. Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence."
The fallacy underlying the rule declared in Swift v. Tyson is made clear by Mr. Justice Holmes. [Footnote 23] The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is "a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute," that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of common law are, and that, in the federal courts, "the parties are entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law":
"but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally, but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else. . . ."
"the authority and only authority is the State, and, if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word."
Thus, the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson is, as Mr. Justice Holmes said,
"an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."
In disapproving that doctrine, we do not hold
Page 304 U. S. 80
unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely declare that, in applying the doctrine, this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which, in our opinion, are reserved by the Constitution to the several States.

There is no "citizen" in the common law of England.

And nobody gives a crap because the English common law is not part of United States law.

Court decisions are legally binding and enforceable.

So? That does not make them accurate or correct. Are you talking about what is true, or what the powerful people are capable of declaring to be true when it is not actually true?

Your total argument is that your opinion is the only thing that matters.

My total argument is that "Just because you call a tail a leg, doesn't make it so." Even if you are powerful, you may be able to compel men to believe wrong incorrect things, but this does not make wrong incorrect things into correct things.

Natural law, Swiss law, Swiss philosophers, the Law of Nations, French law, German law, and all the other nonsense sharting from the birther collective mind do not affect the domestic authority to determine United States citizenship according to United States Federal law.

Federal law made decades or even a century or more after people had forgotten the original meaning.

There are no references to the word "citizen" in English common law in the context of member of a nation. Therefore, all claims that the meaning derives from English common law are likely mistaken.

United States law is not perfect, but just about anything is better than the chaos of law by 330,000,000 different opinions, each equally valid.

You keep asserting that I am putting forth an "opinion", but what I am instead putting forth is a series of facts which you don't seem to have any inclination to address.

I have asked you to explain how the word "citizen" derives from English common law, and you keep wanting to talk about court decisions which occurred nearly a hundred years after the term was first incorporated into our founding documents.

How about we focus on origins, and stop trying to argue from false authority. (And by "false authority" I mean people who do not know what the f*** they are talking about when they render their decisions from a position of power.)

While you may wish to take a foreign definition of citizen, created even before there was a United States, and enforce that definition upon the United States, in 2022, as in 1787, the United States had its own definition.

Really? I would like to see it. You have perhaps some source you would like to present? (Other than Wiliam Rawle.)

If I am using foreign definitions for the word "Citizen" it is because the non-foreign definitions of the word in the 1760s do not conform to our modern understanding of the word. Only the Swiss definition conforms to our modern understanding of the word, but if you have found some American dictionary from the 1760s or 1770s that defines "Citizen" as a member of a nation, then please present it.

The author of the thread article had his lawsuit thrown out by the appellate court which found it to be "frivolous"...

So? Perhaps I have not conveyed to you adequately my feeling of contempt regarding the corrupt, idiotic, moronic court system we have in this nation today.

I have had many arguments with a fellow calling himself "Nero Germanicus" about how easy it is to predict a court decision simply by knowing who appointed the judge.

We have seen over and over again that idiot liar judges appointed by Clinton, Carter or Obama are guaranteed to render idiot lying decisions, and much of the time, Republican appointees are little better. They too seem pressured to render silly decisions that conform to whatever is the consensus of the "glitterati" and those who control broadcast media.

The truth often has nothing to do with it. It's all politics and so their decisions have no moral compulsion to them. Just power.

Not even the Founders and Framers would argue that they, themselves, were natural born citizens of the United States.

Well of course they didn't. They make that clear in the Constitution that they didn't regard themselves as "natural born citizens" of the USA. How could they be? You couldn't be a "natural citizen" of the USA unless you were born after the USA was created, July 4, 1776. Even your beloved Federal courts regard citizenship as having been created on July 4, 1776. (Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, if I remember correctly. )

All the founders were born as British Subjects, not USA citizens.

The non-use of the phrase only signifies that nothing in the 14th Amendment converted non-citizens into natural born citizens.

"Natural born citizens" do not and did not require the 14th amendment to be "natural citizens." Therefore, the 14th amendment does not create natural citizens, and this is probably why it does not even attempt to use the term "natural born citizen."

The idea that "natural citizens" can be created by an act of congress is contradictory to the very idea of natural law. Congress can create a law that naturalizes at birth, but they cannot retroactively make "natural born citizens" out of people who were not born citizens to begin with.

And here we are still talking about the 14th amendment when the answers lie in the 18th century, not the 19th.

Read the Syllabus to Rogers v. Bellei to see what it held.

I have read it many times. The gist is that Bellei lost his citizenship due to his failure to comply with the conditions the US congress placed on him through the naturalization law which gave him citizenship.

He was born in a foreign country to an American mother and an Italian father. (If I remember correctly.)

So how about we see what the Judge said in "Wong Kim Ark" about this situation.

"Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by n abling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts."

Hmm. Doesn't sound like "natural citizenship" to me. Can Ted Cruz run for President? Looks like Horace Gray doesn't think so, but I doubt it would be an impediment to him because nowadays we really don't care what is the truth anymore.

Your imaginative misconstruing of 14A only places you in the twilight zone.

It simply means other people don't agree with me, but I always point out that truth isn't decided by consensus. It still remains even when everyone else refuses to see it.

I believe your memory recalls content that is not there, especially on the topic of allegiance. I can provide links to each page of the debate and identify the pages where Trumbull appears to be speaking.

My recollection is that Trumbull did not say it during the debates, he said it during an interview after the Amendment had already been passed.

The citizenship clause of 14A is not negated because you have discovered myriad ways you can misinterpret or misconstrue the clear words.

Not I, it is the courts who have "discovered myriad ways you can misinterpret or misconstrue" the very vague and unclear words.

Some examples. "Gay" marriage. Abortion. Anchor babies. redefining the requirements for President. Banning prayer in public schools. The "incorporation doctrine." Wickard v Filburn. And so forth.

Why do you go from memory? Why do you not do your research?

I have done, and then I have forgotten where I put it. This issue was interesting 10 years ago, but now it is merely an academic discussion. Even if I convince you, it will have no effect on the real world. The herd has made up it's mind, and it won't change it barring some traumatic event.

The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their [88 U. S. 168] parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first.

And see? You found it for me. :)

And here we are seeing a reference to "some authorities" that "go further." But what of the authorities who do not "go further"? So we have one group of "authorities" who do not "go further", and another group of authorities who do go further.

I can tell you right off that one of the "authorities" to whom they are referring is "William Rawle" and his "View of the Constitution."

But what of these authorities who do not "go further"? Do you know to whom they are referring? I know of one I am certain to whom they are referring, but I doubt you know of him.

The citizenship of Virginia Minor was never an issue before the Court.

No it wasn't, but they revealed a bit of knowledge of the matter as an aside. They have told us that there are authorities that hold one thing, and authorities who "go further."

And nobody gives a crap because the English common law is not part of United States law.

Well then, where did we get Jus Soli as the sole requirement for "natural born citizen"?

If you say it derives from "natural born subject" it would appear to me you are arguing in a circle.

There are no references to the word "citizen" in English common law in the context of member of a nation.
Therefore, all claims that the meaning derives from English common law are likely mistaken.

In Hennesy v. Richardson Drug Company, Chief Justice Fuller delived the Opinion of the Court and stated:

In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419, 456, Mr. Justice Wilson said that under the Constitution of the United States "there are citizens, but no subjects. 'Citizens of the United States.' 'Citizens of another State.' 'Citizens of different States.' 'A State or citizen thereof.' The term, subject, occurs, indeed, once in the instrument; but to mark the contrast strongly, the epithet 'foreign' is prefixed."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel, 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 26, (quoted in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,) said: "The term ' citizen,' as understood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term 'subject' in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people; and he who before was a 'subject of the King' is now 'a citizen of the State.'"

In Baldwin v. Franks, Chief Justice Waite delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated:

The section is found in Title LXX, c. 7, of the Revised Statutes embracing "Crimes against the Elective Franchise and Civil Rights of Citizens," and it provides for the punishment of those "who conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same;" and of those-who go in companies of two or more "in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured." The person on whom the wrong to be punishable must be inflicted is described as a citizen. In the Constitution and laws of the United States the word "citizen" is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United States. It is so used in section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments of the Constitution, which provides that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside," and that "no state shall make or enforce, any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."

In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated,

Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction."¹⁰ We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority.
"The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo, supra, at 369 (emphasis added).
In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, at 238.¹¹ Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme:¹²
- - - - - - - - - -
¹⁰ Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ." (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term "jurisdiction" was used. He further noted that it was "impossible to construe the words 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,' in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons 'within the jurisdiction' of one of the States of the Union are not 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' Id., at 687.
Justice Gray concluded that "[e]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States." Id., at 693. As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouvé, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 425-427 (1912).
¹¹ In his separate opinion, Justice Field addressed the relationship between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments:
"The term 'person,' used in the Fifth Amendment, is broad enough to include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is entitled to the equal protection of those laws .... The contention that persons within the territorial jurisdiction of this republic might be beyond the protection of the law was heard with pain on the argument at the bar-in face of the great constitutional amendment which declares that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S., at 242-243 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In Plyler, Justice Brennan also wrote,

Although the congressional debate concerning § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was limited, that debate clearly confirms the understanding that the phrase "within its jurisdiction" was intended in a broad sense to offer the guarantee of equal protection to all within a State's boundaries, and to all upon whom the State would impose the obligations of its laws. Indeed, it appears from those debates that Congress, by using the phrase "person within its jurisdiction," sought expressly to ensure that the equal protection of the laws was provided to the alien population. Representative Bingham reported to the House the draft resolution of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (H. R. 63) that was to become the Fourteenth Amendment. 13 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1033 (1866). Two days later, Bingham posed the following question in support of the resolution:
"Is it not essential to the unity of the people that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States?
Is it not essential to the unity of the Government and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers, within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?" Id., at 1090.
Senator Howard, also a member of the Joint Committee of Fifteen, and the floor manager of the Amendment in the Senate, was no less explicit about the broad objectives of the Amendment, and the intention to make its provisions applicable to all who "may happen to be" within the jurisdiction of a State:
"The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State. This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another .... It will, if adopted by the States, forever disable every one of them from passing laws trenching upon those fundamental rights and privileges which pertain to citizens of the United States, and to all persons who may happen to be within their jurisdiction." Id., at 2766 (emphasis added).
Use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" thus does not detract from, but rather confirms, the understanding that the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction-either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States-he is entitled to the equal protectionof the laws that a State may choose to establish.
- - - - - - - - - -
¹³ "Representative Bingham's views are also reflected in his comments on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866. He repeatedly referred to the need to provide protection, not only to the freedmen, but to "the alien and stranger," and to "refugees ... and all men." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1292 (1866).

In McKay v. Campbell, Judge Deady delivered the Opinion of the Court and wrote,

The rule of the common law upon this subject is plain and well settled, both in England and America. Except in the case of children of ambassadors, who are in theory born upon the soil of the sovereign whom the parent represents, a child born in the allegiance of the king, is born his subject, without reference to the political status or condition of its parents. Birth and allegiance go together. 1 Bl. Comm. 366; 2 Kent, Comm. 39, 42; Ingles v. The Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3. Pet. [28 U. S.] 120; U. S. v. Rhodes [Case No. 16,151]; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 630, and authorities there cited.
[...]
When it is said that by the common law a person born of alIen parents, and in the allegiance of the United States, is born a citizen thereof, it is necessarily understood that he is not only born on soil over which the United States has or claims jurisdiction, but that such jurisdiction for the time being is both actual and exclusive, so that such person is in fact born within the power, protection and obedience of the United States. Generally speaking, the various places in the world are claimed, or admitted for the time being, to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of some particular sovereign or government, so that a person born at anyone of them is without doubt born in the allegiance of such particular sovereign or government.

In Ex parte Chin King, Judge Deady delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated,

By the common law, a child born within the allegiance—the jurisdiction—of the United States, is born a subject or citizen thereof, without reference to the political status or condition of its parents. McKay v. Campbell, 2 Sawy. 118; In re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy. 353, 21 Fed. Rep. 900; Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandf. Ch. 583. In the latter case it was held that Julia Lynch, who was born in New York in 1849, of alien parents, during a temporary sojourn by them in that city, and returned with them the same year to their native country, where she resided until her death, was an American citizen.
The vice-chancellor, after an exhaustive examination of the law, declared that every person born within the dominion and allegiance of the United States was a citizen thereof, without reference to the situation of his parents. This, of course, does not include the children born in the United States of parents engaged in the diplomatic service of foreign governments, whose residence, in contemplation of public law, is a part of their own country. The rule Of the common law on this subject has been incorporated into the fundamental law of the land. The fourteenth amendment declares:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside."
In Re Look Tin Sing, 10 Sawy. 353, 21 Fed. Rep. 905, it was held that a person born within the {Jnited States, of Chinese parents, not engaged in any diplomatic or official capacity under the emperor of China, is a citizen of the United States.

In MacKenzie v. Hare, (1915) Justice McKenna rendered the Opinion of the Court and he stated,

The facts are not in dispute and are stated by Mr. Justice Shaw, who delivered the opinion of the court, as follows:
"The plaintiff was born and ever since has resided in the State of California. On August 14, 1909, being then a resident and citizen of this State and of the United States, she was lawfully married to Gordon Mackenzie, a native and subject of the kingdom of Great Britain. He had resided in California prior to that time, still resides here and it is his intention to make this State his permanent residence. He has not become naturalized as a citizen of the United States and it does not appear that he intends to do so. Ever since their marriage the plaintiff and her husband have lived together as husband and wife. On January 22, 1913, she applied to the defendants to be registered as a voter. She was then over the age of twentyone years and had resided in San Francisco for more than ninety days. Registration was refused to her on the ground that by reason of her marriage to Gordon Mackenzie, a subject of Great Britain, she thereupon took the nationality of her husband and ceased to be a citizen of the United States."
[...]
The marriage of an American woman with a foreigner has consequences of like kind, may involve national complications of like kind, as her physical expatriation may involve. Therefore, as long as the relation lasts it is made tantamount to expatriation. This is no arbitrary exercise of government. It is one which, regarding the international aspects, judicial opinion has taken for granted would not only be valid but demanded. It is the conception of the legislation under review that such an act may bring the Government into embarrassments and, it may be, into controversies. It is as voluntary and distinctive as expatriation and its consequence must be considered as elected.
Judgment affirmed.

In Perez v. Brownell, (1958) Justice Frakfurter delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated,

Of course, Congress can attach loss of citizenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged in voluntarily. See Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 239 U. S. 311-312. But it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions to suggest that a person, in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so. The Court only a few years ago said of the person held to have lost her citizenship in Mackenzie v. Hare, supra: "The woman had not intended to give up her American citizenship." Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U. S. 491, 338 U.S. 501. And the latter case sustained the denationalization of Mrs. Savorgnan although it was not disputed that she "had no intention of endangering her American citizenship or of renouncing her allegiance to the United States." 338 U.S. at 338 U. S. 495. What both women did do voluntarily was to engage in conduct to which Acts of Congress attached the consequence of denationalization irrespective of — and, in those cases, absolutely contrary to — the intentions and desires of the individuals. Those two cases mean nothing — indeed, they are deceptive — if their essential significance is not rejection of the notion that the power of Congress to terminate citizenship depends upon the citizen's assent. It is a distortion of those cases to explain them away on a theory that a citizen's assent to denationalization may be inferred from his having engaged in conduct that amounts to an "abandonment of citizenship" or a "transfer of allegiance." Certainly an Act of Congress cannot be invalidated by resting decisive precedents on a gross fiction — a fiction baseless in law and contradicted by the facts of the cases.
It cannot be said, then, that Congress acted without warrant when, pursuant to its power to regulate the relations of the United States with foreign countries, it provided that anyone who votes in a foreign election of significance politically in the life of another country shall lose his American citizenship. To deny the power of Congress to enact the legislation challenged here would be to disregard the constitutional allocation of governmental functions that it is this Court's solemn duty to guard.

In Afroyim v. Rusk, (1967) Justice Black delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated, "Perez v. Brownell is overruled." Justice Black stated,

"Congress having no power to abridge the rights conferred by the Constitution upon those who have become naturalized citizens by virtue of acts of Congress, a fortiori no act . . . of Congress . . . can affect citizenship acquired as a birthright, by virtue of the Constitution itself . . . . The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to citizenship." Id., at 703.
To uphold Congress' power to take away a man's citizenship because he voted in a foreign election in violation of 401 (e) would be equivalent to holding that Congress has the power to "abridge," "affect," "restrict the effect of," and "take . . . away" citizenship. Because the Fourteenth Amendment prevents Congress from doing any of these things, we agree with THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S dissent in the Perez case that the Government is without power to rob a citizen of his citizenship under 401 (e).

Even your beloved Federal courts regard citizenship as having been created on July 4, 1776. (Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbor, if I remember correctly.)

Inglis,

The rule as to the point of time at which the American ante nati ceased to be British subjects differs in this country and in England, as established by the courts of justice in the respective countries. The English rule is to take the date of the Treaty of Peace in 1783. Our rule is to take the date of the declaration of independence.

It looks like you here prefer to follow the rulings of United States courts, created by the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. So much for that English law jibber jabber.

The rule of July 4, 1776 did NOT create citizenship in the United States of America. At the time, there was no United States of America, as a nation. The rule stated in Inglis is about when Americans ceased to be British subjects, not when they became citizens of an American Federal government that did not then exist. They then became citizens of their free and sovereign state. Their independent state actually existed.

In McIlvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, Justice Cushing delivered the opinion of the Court and stated,

Daniel Coxe lost his right of election to abandon the American cause and to adhere to his allegiance to the King of Great Britain, because he remained in the State of New Jersey not only after she had declared herself a sovereign state, but after she had passed laws by which she pronounced him to be a member of, and in allegiance to the new government. The court entertains no doubt that after 4 October, 1776, he became a member of the new society, entitled to the protection of its government and bound to that government by the ties of allegiance.
This opinion is predicated upon a principle which is believed to be undeniable — that the several states which composed this union, so far at least as regarded their municipal regulations, became entitled, from the time when they declared themselves independent, to all the rights and powers of sovereign states, and that they did not derive them from concessions made by the British King. The treaty of peace contains a recognition of their independence, not a grant of it. From hence it results that the laws of the several state governments were the laws of sovereign states, and as such were obligatory upon the people of such state from the time they were enacted. We do not mean to intimate an opinion that even the law of a state whose form of government had been organized prior to 4 July, 1776, and which passed prior to that period, would not have been obligatory. The present case renders it unnecessary to be more precise in stating the principle, for although the Constitution of New Jersey was formed previous to the general declaration of independence, the laws passed upon the subject now under consideration were posterior to it.

All the founders were born as British Subjects, not USA citizens.

How did Hamilton, a citizen of St. Kitts and Nevis, get his British citizenship? How did the Carrolls ever attain British citizenship? On the latter, how did you get around 7 ANNE, c. 5, 1708? Please do share the nature of your research on this one. Just how do you presume to know that ALL the Founders were born as British subjects?

The idea that "natural citizens" can be created by an act of congress is contradictory to the very idea of natural law. Congress can create a law that naturalizes at birth, but they cannot retroactively make "natural born citizens" out of people who were not born citizens to begin with.

There is no such thing as naturalization at birth. A person who becomes a citizen at birth is a natural born citizen. All others are born aliens. Only aliens can be naturalized, and only after they are born aliens.

Naturalization can only occur after birth. To be eligible, one must be an alien, lawfully present in the United States. What stops illegal aliens from being naturalized is that they are not lawfully present in the United States.

Black's Law Dictionary

Naturalization. The process by which a person acquires nationality after birth and becomes entitled to the privileges of U.S. citizenship. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et. seq.

https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2019/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-iii/part-ii/sec-1427/

8 U.S.C. §1427. Requirements of naturalization

(a) Residence
No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his application has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during all the periods referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States.
[...]

Natural born citizens are not created by an Act of Congress. They are created by the birth of a baby. The Constitution sets forth the circumstances of birth by which a baby is determined to be born a citizen, if born in the territory of the United States. Federal law sets forth the circumstances which cause a baby to be born a citizen if born outside the territory of the United States.

And here we are still talking about the 14th amendment when the answers lie in the 18th century, not the 19th.

United States citizenship at birth is controlled by the 14th Amendment of 1868 and the Nationality and Naturalization Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Stat. 235, P.L. 414, as amended. United States citizenship is not controlled by your vivid imagination.

Read the Syllabus to Rogers v. Bellei to see what it held.
I have read it many times. The gist is that Bellei lost his citizenship due to his failure to comply with the conditions the US congress placed on him through the naturalization law which gave him citizenship.
He was born in a foreign country to an American mother and an Italian father. (If I remember correctly.)

The claim tat the naturalization law had anything to do with Bellei is erroneous. The nationality law applied.

Mr. Justice Blackmun delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated,

Mario Aldo Bellei was born in Italy on December 22, 1939. His father had always been a citizen of Italy, and had never acquired United States citizenship.
The Plaintiff's mother, however, was born in Philadelphia in 1915, and thus was a native-born United States citizen. She has retained that citizenship. She has retained that citizenship. Moreover, she has fulfilled the requirement of § 301(a)(7) for physical presence in the United States for 10 years, more than five of which were after she attained the age of 14 years. The mother and father were married in Philadelphia on the mother’s 24th birthday, March 14, 1939. Nine days later, on March 23, the newlyweds departed for Italy. They have resided there ever since.
3. By Italian law, the plaintiff acquired Italian citizenship upon his birth in Italy. He retains that citizenship. He also acquired United States citizenship at his birth under Rev.Stat. § 1993, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 797, then in effect. That version of the statute, as does the present one, contained a residence condition applicable to a child born abroad with one alien parent.

Bellei was NOT naturalized. He became a citizen at birth by virtue of the law of nationality, not the law of naturalization. Only aliens are eligible for naturalization. Bellei was not born an alien.

Further on in the Opinion of the Court,

It is evident that Congress felt itself possessed of the power to grant citizenship to the foreign born, and, at the same time, to impose qualifications and conditions for that citizenship. Of course, Congress obviously felt that way, too, about the two expatriation provisions invalidated by the decisions in Schneider and Afroyim.
We look again, then, at the Constitution, and further indulge in history’s assistance:
Of initial significance, because of its being the foundation stone of the Court’s decisional structure in Afroyim, and, perhaps by a process of after-the-fact osmosis of the earlier Schneider as well, is the Fourteenth Amendment’s opening sentence:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
The central fact in our weighing of the plaintiff’s claim to continuing and therefore current United States citizenship is that he was born abroad. He was not born in the United States. He was not naturalized in the United States. And he has not been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. All this being so, it seems indisputable that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to plaintiff Bellei. He simply is not a “Fourteenth Amendment first sentence” citizen. His posture contrasts with that of Mr. Afroyim, who was naturalized in the United States, and with that of Mrs. Schneider, whose citizenship was derivative by her presence here and by her mother’s naturalization here.

The Dissenting Opinion of Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall, stated,

The Court today holds that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has no application to Bellei. The Court first notes that Afroyim was essentially a case construing the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the Citizenship Clause declares that: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens of the United States. . . ,” the Court reasons that the protections against involuntary expatriation declared in Afroyim do not protect all American citizens, but only those “born or naturalized in the United States.” Afroyim, the argument runs, was naturalized in this country, so he was protected by the Citizenship Clause, but Bellei, since he acquired his American citizenship at birth in Italy as a foreign-born child of an American citizen, was neither born nor naturalized in the United States, and, hence, falls outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees declared in Afroyim. One could hardly call this a generous reading of the great purposes the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to bring about.
While conceding that Bellei is an American citizen, the majority states: “He simply is not a Fourteenth Amendment first sentence’ citizen.” Therefore, the majority reasons, the congressional revocation of his citizenship is not barred by the Constitution. I cannot accept the Court’s conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizenship of some Americans, and not others.

The Fourteenth Amendment, by its language, has nothing to do with persons born outside the United States. Bellei was born a United States citizen. He was not naturalized in the United States.

The Fourteenth Amendment defines birthright citizenship for all born in the United States. It is not the only law which determines who are citizens at birth. All those born abroad are controlled by Federal statute law.

So how about we see what the Judge said in "Wong Kim Ark" about this situation.
"Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory, or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by n abling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts."
Hmm. Doesn't sound like "natural citizenship" to me. Can Ted Cruz run for President? Looks like Horace Gray doesn't think so, but I doubt it would be an impediment to him because nowadays we really don't care what is the truth anymore.

[emphasis added]

A person born out of the jursidiction of the United States can become a citizen by the enactments of Congress conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens.

As your Ted Cruz question is so sloppily worded, I must clean it up. Anyone, of any age, can run for President. There are constitutional requirements to serve as President. A 34 year old could run and get elected, and if he turned 35 by inauguration day, he could serve. I seem to recall that not only could he run for President, in 2016 Cruz did run for President. He was a candidate but did not win his party nomination.

As for Ted Cruz, he was born a citizen of the United States.Ted Cruz acquired citizenship at birth.

https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/on-the-meaning-of-natural-born-citizen/

The Constitution directly addresses the minimum qualifications necessary to serve as President. In addition to requiring thirty-five years of age and fourteen years of residency, the Constitution limits the presidency to “a natural born Citizen.”
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
All the sources routinely used to interpret the Constitution confirm that the phrase “natural born Citizen” has a specific meaning: namely, someone who was a U.S. citizen at birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time. And Congress has made equally clear from the time of the framing of the Constitution to the current day that, subject to certain residency requirements on the parents, someone born to a U.S. citizen parent generally becomes a U.S. citizen without regard to whether the birth takes place in Canada, the Canal Zone, or the continental United States.
2. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2012); Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 303, 66 Stat. 163, 236–37; Act of May 24, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-250, 48 Stat. 797.

The Naturalization Act of 1790 provided,

the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, That the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States....

There can be no doubt what was intended.

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R42097.pdf

Congressional Research Service Report, Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, November 14, 2011, Qualifications for President and the "Natural Born" Citizenship Eligibility Requirement.

Summary
The Constitution sets out three eligibility requirements to be President: one must be 35 years of age, a resident “within the United States” for 14 years, and a “natural born Citizen.” There is no Supreme Court case which has ruled specifically on the presidential eligibility requirements (although several cases have addressed the term “natural born” citizen), and this clause has been the subject of several legal and historical treatises over the years, as well as more recent litigation.
The term “natural born” citizen is not defined in the Constitution, and there is no discussion of the term evident in the notes of the Federal Convention of 1787. The use of the phrase in the Constitution may have derived from a suggestion in a letter from John Jay to George Washington during the Convention expressing concern about having the office of Commander-in-Chief “devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen,” as there were fears at that time about wealthy European aristocracy or royalty coming to America, gaining citizenship, and then buying and scheming their way to the presidency without long-standing loyalty to the nation. At the time of independence, and at the time of the framing of the Constitution, the term “natural born” with respect to citizenship was in use for many years in the American colonies, and then in the states, from British common law and legal usage. Under the common law principle of jus soli (law of the soil), persons born on English soil, even of two alien parents, were “natural born” subjects and, as noted by the Supreme Court, this “same rule” was applicable in the American colonies and “in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the Constitution ...” with respect to citizens. In textual constitutional analysis, it is understood that terms used but not defined in the document must, as explained by the Supreme Court, “be read in light of British common law” since the Constitution is “framed in the language of the English common law.” In addition to historical and textual analysis, numerous holdings and references in federal (and state) cases for more than a century have clearly indicated that those born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction (i.e., not born to foreign diplomats or occupying military forces), even to alien parents, are citizens “at birth” or “by birth,” and are “natural born,” as opposed to “naturalized,” U.S. citizens. There is no provision in the Constitution and no controlling American case law to support a contention that the citizenship of one’s parents governs the eligibility of a native born U.S. citizen to be President.
Although the eligibility of native born U.S. citizens has been settled law for more than a century, there have been legitimate legal issues raised concerning those born outside of the country to U.S. citizens. From historical material and case law, it appears that the common understanding of the term “natural born” in England and in the American colonies in the 1700s may have included both the strict common law meaning as born in the territory (jus soli), as well as the statutory laws adopted in England since at least 1350, which included children born abroad to British fathers (jus sanguinis, the law of descent).
The weight of legal and historical authority indicates that the term “natural born” citizen would mean a person who is entitled to U.S. citizenship “by birth” or “at birth,” either by being born “in” the United States and under its jurisdiction, even those born to alien parents; by being born abroad to U.S. citizen-parents; or by being born in other situations meeting legal requirements for U.S. citizenship “at birth.” Such term, however, would not include a person who was not a U.S. citizen by birth or at birth, and who was thus born an “alien” required to go through the legal process of “naturalization” to become a U.S. citizen.

Your imaginative misconstruing of 14A only places you in the twilight zone.
It simply means other people don't agree with me, but I always point out that truth isn't decided by consensus. It still remains even when everyone else refuses to see it.

And when your rant is over, the actual law remains, unaffected and not blown away by the wind.

I believe your memory recalls content that is not there, especially on the topic of allegiance. I can provide links to each page of the debate and identify the pages where Trumbull appears to be speaking.
My recollection is that Trumbull did not say it during the debates, he said it during an interview after the Amendment had already been passed.

Your recollection just keeps getting better and better. The Senate debate on allegiance took place in the presence of Senator Trumbull. Senator Trumbull did not say anything about temporary allegiance, but he did about partial allegiance.

Let me add back the continuation of what you said in reference to Trumbull:

From memory, Trumbull said that the original wording they used was more like the Civil Rights act of 1868, but because he was informed of this concept of "temporary allegiance" (expected of legal aliens during times of war or disaster) he said they chaged the verbiage to it's current form.

First, it is the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866. 14 Stat. 27. Section 1 states,

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.

Senator Doolittle offered an amendment to replace Senator Howard's Fourteenth Amendment citizenship clause words with words plucked directly from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Senator Trumbull voted against such amendment.

I did give you a link to every damn page.

On page 2893, Senator Trumbull is found discussing "partial allegiance" as raised by another senator, and dismissing it.

Mr. TRUMBULL. Of course my opinion is not any better than that of any other member of the Senate; but it is very clear to me that there is nothing whatever in the suggestions of the Senator from Wisconsin. The provision is, that ''all persons bom in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens." That means "subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof." Now, does the Senator from Wisconsin pretend to say that the Navajoe Indians are subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United Slates? What do we mean by "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States?" Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is, what it means. Can you sue a Navajoe Indian in court? Are theey in any sense subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States? By no means. We make treaties with them, and therefore they are not subject to our jurisdiction. If they were, we would not make treaties with them. If we want to control the Navajoes, or any other Indians of which the Senator from Wisconsin has spoken, how do we do it? Do we pass a law to control them? Are they subject to our jurisdiction in that sense? Is it not understood that if we want to make arrangements with the Indians to whom he refers we do it by means of a treaty? The Senator himself has brought before us a great many treaties this session in order to get control of those people.
If you introduce the words "not taxed," that is a very indefinite expression. What does "excluding Indians not taxed" mean? You will have just as much difficulty in regard to those Indians that you say are in Colorado, where there are more Indians than there are whites. Suppose they have property there, and it is taxed; then they are citizens.
Mr. WADE. And ought to be.
Mr. TRUMBULL. The Senator from Ohio says they ought to be. If they are there and within the jurisdiction of Colorado, and subject to the laws of Colorado, they ought to be citizens; and that is all that is proposed. It cannot be said of any Indian who owes allegiance, partial allegiance if you please, to some other Government that he is "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." Would the Senator from Wisconsin think for a moment of bringing a bill into Congress to subject these wild Indians with whom we have no treaty to the laws and regulations of civilized life? Would he think of punishing them for instituting among themselves their own tribal regulations? Does the Government of the United States pretend to take jurisdiction of murders and robberies and other crimes committed by one Indian upon another? "Are they subject to our jurisdiction in any just sense? They are not subject to our jurisdiction. We do not exercise jurisdiction over them. It is only those persons who come completely within our jurisdiction, who are subject to our laws, that we think of making citizens; and there can be no objection to the proposition that such persons should be citizens.
It seems to me, sir, that to introduce the words suggested by the Senator from Wisconsin would, not make the proposition any clearer than it is, and that it by no means embraces, or by any fair construction — by any construction, I may say — could embrace the wild Indians of the plains or any with whom we have treaty relations, for the very fact that we have treaty relations with them shows that they are not subject to our jurisdiction. We cannot make a treaty with ourselves; it would be absurd. I think that the proposition is clear and safe as it is.

In the Senate debate the following is recorded on Page 2897:

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the amendment of the Senator from Wisconsin to the amendment proposed by the Senator from Michigan.
Mr. DOOLITTLE. I ask for the yeas and nays on that question.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
Mr. VAN WINKLE. I desire to have the amendment to the amendment read. The Secretary read the amendment to the amendment, which was to insert after the word
- - - - -
"thereof" in the amendment the words "excluding Indians not taxed;" so that the amendment, if amended, would read :
All persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, excluding Indians not taxed, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted-yeas 10, nays 30; as follows :
YEAS-Messrs. Buckalew, Cowan, Davis, Doolittle, Guthvie, Hcndricks, Johnson, McDougall, Norton, and Riddle-10.
NAYS-Messrs. Anthony, Clark, Conness, Cragin, Creswell, Edmunds, Fessenden, Foster, Grimes, Harris, Henderson, Howard, Howe, Kirkwood, Lane of Kansas, Morgan, Morrill, Nye, Poland, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman, Stewart, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Wade, Willey. Williams, and Wilson-30.
ABSENT-Messrs. Brown, Chandler, Dixon, Lane of Indiana, Nesmith. Saulsbury, Sprague, Wright, and Yates-9.
So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.
The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question now is on the amendment of the Senator from Michigan.
The amendment was agreed to.

Well then, where did we get Jus Soli as the sole requirement for "natural born citizen"?

To clarify, jus soli or jus sanguinis qualify as meeting the requirement for natural born citizen. Neither one is the exclusive means to acquire birthright citizenship.

Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)

Passing by questions once earnestly controverted, but finally put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, it is beyond doubt that, before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, all white persons, at least, born within the sovereignty of the United States, whether children of citizens or of foreigners, excepting only children of ambassadors or public ministers of a foreign government, were native-born citizens of the United States.
[...]
The real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, "All persons born in the United States" by the addition "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases — children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State — both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 1, 18b; Cockburn on Nationality, 7; Dicey Conflict of Laws, 177; Inglis v. Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99, 28 U.S. 155; 2 Kent Com. 39, 42.
[...]
By the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed," were declared to be citizens of the United States. In the light of the law as previously established, and of the history of the times, it can hardly be doubted that the words of that act, "not subject to any foreign power," were not intended to exclude any children born in this country from the citizenship which would theretofore have been their birthright, or, for instance, for the first time in our history, to deny the right of citizenship to native-born children of foreign white parents not in the diplomatic service of their own country nor in hostile occupation of part of our territory. But any possible doubt in this regard was removed when the negative words of the Civil Rights Act, "not subject to any foreign power," gave way, in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, to the affirmative words, "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is declaratory of existing rights and affirmative of existing law as to each of the qualifications therein expressed — "born in the United States," "naturalized in the United States," and "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" — in short, as to everything relating to the acquisition of citizenship by facts occurring within the limits of the United States. But it has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents, and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.
The effect of the enactments conferring citizenship on foreign-born children of American parents has been defined, and the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the dominion of the United States, notwithstanding alienage of parents, has been affirmed, in well considered opinions of the executive departments of the Government since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.
[...]
Benny v. O'Brien (1895), 29 Vroom (58 N.J.Law), 36, 39, 40.
The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. Every citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States. His allegiance to the United States is direct and immediate, and, although but local and temporary, continuing only so long as he remains within our territory, is yet, in the words of Lord Coke in Calvin's Case, 7 Rep. 6a, "strong enough to make a natural subject, for if he hath issue here, that issue is a natural-born subject;" and his child, as said by Mr. Binney in his essay before quoted, "if born in the country, is as much a citizen as the natural-born child of a citizen, and by operation of the same principle."
[...]
It necessarily follows that persons born in China, subjects of the Emperor of China but domiciled in the United States, having been adjudged, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins to be within the jurisdiction of the State within the meaning of the concluding sentence, must be held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of the first sentence of this section of the Constitution, and their children "born in the United States" cannot be less "subject to the jurisdiction thereof."
[...]
Doubtless, the intention of the Congress which framed and of the States which adopted this Amendment of the Constitution must be sought in the words of the Amendment, and the debates in Congress are not admissible as evidence to control the meaning of those words. But the statements above quoted are valuable as contemporaneous opinions of jurists and statesmen upon the legal meaning of the words themselves, and are, at the least, interesting as showing that the application of the Amendment to the Chinese race was considered, and not overlooked.

In response to my point:

There are no references to the word "citizen" in English common law in the context of member of a nation.

Therefore, all claims that the meaning derives from English common law are likely mistaken.

You responded:

In Hennesy v. Richardson Drug Company, Chief Justice Fuller delived the Opinion of the Court and stated:

In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419, 456, Mr. Justice Wilson said

The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel,

In Baldwin v. Franks, Chief Justice Waite delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated:

In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Brennan delivered the Opinion of the Court and stated,

And so on.

This leaves me with the impression that you are simply dodging my point and won't address it.

What I would expect as a response to my point from your side of the argument would take this form.

"You are incorrect." Here are many references to the usage of the word "Citizen" in English Common law and the dictionaries of that time period."

reference1, reference2, reference3, and so on.

This method of bringing forth the opinions of judges years, decades, and centuries later does not address my point in any meaningful sense that I can understand.

Now I'm thinking this is how you have become accustomed to dealing with legal matters because it appears clear to me that you have much experience with law and are probably either a current or retired Lawyer and/or a Law professor/Legal Scholar like Dr. Franklin.

What I am seeing from you is an iteration of "if the only tool you have is a hammer, all your problems start to look like nails."

The tool you have been using for years is citing precedent, and so this is the tool that comes readily to your hand, but I don't see it as meaningful if the earlier judges got the precedents wrong, or if they simply didn't understand something correctly.

Now let me be clear about something. Your understanding of "natural born citizen" is the one which the current judiciary will impose on everyone.

As I've said before, the fact they have power doesn't make their rulings factually correct, and I am interested in what is objectively true, not whether someone has the power to enforce something which is incorrect, because I do not doubt that at all.

So if your issue on this topic is what the courts will enforce, you have clearly won that argument, but that is not the argument I am attempting to have.

What I am arguing is whether or not this understanding is factually correct, or the result of errors and misdirection.

Can we have that discussion?

Regarding your penchant for placing English common law above United States law, I bring your attention to what English common law actually is, and note yet again that it has never been adopted by the U.S. government as U.S. law.

Magna Charta

Bracton's On the Laws & Customs of England

The Magna Charta was written in Latin. Bracton's On the Laws & Customs of England was written in Latin. Unless one can read Latin, one is reduced to reading somebody's translation.

The medieval English courts which birthed English common law have their court opinions in book collections such as the one linked and shown below. They are a little hard to read as English court opinions were written in Latin back in the day. In the PDF of the book, court opinions taken from the Court of Common Pleas begin at page 18. There is an assortment of such volumes.

Placitorum in domo capitulari Westmonasteriensi asservatorum abbreviatio: temporibus regum Ric. I., Johann., Henr. III., Edw. I., Edw. II.

https://wwwe.lib.cam.ac.uk/earls_colne/reference/state.htm#common

State Records
Overview
This section contains descriptive information about the state records. To view the state source materials, please go to the state records in the documents section.
The central legislative and judicial institutions are the King in Parliament and the King in Council. The King's will is transferred in action principally through the great seal held by the Chancellor, hence the records of Chancery. His government is financed through various offices, principally those of the Exchequer. His peace is maintained through the common law courts, King's Bench and Common Pleas foremost amongst them. The defects in justice are remedied through the equity courts arising out of his Council, particularly Chancery. His peace is further maintained through the Commissions of the Peace issued to Justices.
These branches of government are highly integrated, of great antiquity and sophistication. They were largely established before 1400. Though they were developed, elaborated and modified, they remained recognizably similar until the nineteenth century. The law here administered was the common law of England, including statute, plus the system known as equity. This law was enforced by officers from the village Constable at the lowest level, up through the High Constable, the Justice of the Peace and Sheriff, up to the most powerful men in the land, the Chief Justice of England, the Chancellor and the King.
The records which this system created survive from the twelfth to the nineteenth centuries and are the most majestic and continuous set of governmental archives in the western world. They provide an immense amount of material concerning the integration of every parish in England into a highly centralized and bureaucratic nation state from an early period.
Yet the records are so vast and complex that only a tiny fraction of them have been used by either local or national historians. In the following description it will only be possible to show very generally what exists and what has been searched for one English parish between 1400 and 1750. All the records described below in the sections before 'Commissions of the Peace' are deposited in the Public Record Office, London. The Record Office class numbers are given in brackets.
[...]
The common law courts
The system of English government and finance rested, ultimately, on the common law. Sir Matthew Hale stressed that the common law
is not only a very just and excellent law in it self, but it is singularly accommodated to the frame of the English government, and to the disposition of the English Nation, and by such as by a long experience and use is as it were incorporated into their very temperament and, in a manner, become the completion and constitution of the English Commonwealth' (Hale:30)
He continued as follows:
This law is that which asserts, maintains, and with all imaginable care, provides for the safety of the King's Royal Person, his Crown and dignity, and all his just rights, revenues, powers, prerogatives and governments, as the great foundation (under God) of the peace, happiness, honour and justices, of this kingdom; and this law is also, that which declares and asserts the rights and liberties, and the properties of the subject; and is the just, known, and common rule of Justice and Right between man and man, within this Kingdom.' (Hale:30-1).
The matters which it dealt with are also well summarised by Hale.
This is that law by which proceedings and determinations in the King's ordinary courts of justice are directed and guided. This directs the course of descents of land, and the kinds; the natures, and the extents and qualifications of estates; therein also the manner, forms, ceremonies and solemnities of transferring estates from one to another. The rules of settling, acquiring, and transferring of properties; the forms, solemnities and obligations of contracts; the rules and directions for the exposition of wills, deeds and Acts of Parliament. The process, proceedings, judgments and executions of the King's ordinary courts of Justice; the limits, bounds and extents of courts, and their jurisdictions. The several kinds of temporal offences, and punishments at common law; and the manner of the application of the several kinds of punishments, and infinite more particulars...' (Hale:l7-l8)
The law was called 'common' because it was general to the whole kingdom; its roots were in the laws of the Angles, Saxons and Dane, modified and strengthened by the Normans and Angevins. The praise of Edward Coke was repeated by Jacobs (s.v.common) as follows:
The common law is grounded upon the general customs of the realm; and includes in it the law of nature, the law of God, and the principles and maxims of the law; it is founded upon reason; and is said to be the perfection of reason, acquired by long study, observation and experience, and refined by learned men in all ages.
The common law was divided into two major branches, that concerned with actions between the Crown and an individual, known as 'pleas of the Crown', and actions between individuals, known as 'Common pleas': 'pleas of the Crown are all suits in the King's name, for offences committed against his own crown and dignity, and also against the peace, as treasons, felonies, mayhem etc. And Common pleas are those that are agitated between common persons in civil cases...' (Jacobs:s.v.common).
The process in these two types of plea was slightly different, though there was great similarity across the various courts whose jurisdictions we shall be examining.
In pleas of the Crown, the procedure consisted in essence of the bringing of an indictment or formal charge written in latin, presented on behalf of the King, to the grand jury. This jury would then either find it 'true', that is technically accurate, as a bill and the person to be suspected of the crime, or would dismiss the charge. The Crown would then have to prove the case before a petty or trial jury which would pronounce the person to be guilty or not guilty, and the judge would then sentence the offender.
In civil cases, the procedure was more complex, reflecting the major stages in any case, namely the method of bringing the case to the court's attention, the enquiry into the case, the proof (or 'trial' as it was known), and the decision and enforcement of the decision. The common law action would begin with the plaintiff suing out a writ from Chancery (the 'original' writ), which enabled the relevant court to hear the case. Only if a person's troubles fell within these recognized 'forms of action' could he find a remedy. The 'mesne process' or machinery for bringing a person into court to answer the charge 'was exceedingly cumbersome and afforded vast opportunities for dilatory tactics' (Elton 1960:149).
When the case came to be tried, it was pleaded in front of the judges in a form of law French, though these pleadings were gradually being supplemented by documents. The use of mainly oral trial methods meant that the whole case had to be reduced to a specific point of dispute (the issue). By the fifteenth century, the only method of trial or proof widely used was by the jury, originally of local freeholders. The judge would then give sentence. Thus the major differences from the Crown pleas were that the original writs were brought in by plaintiffs, rather than on behalf of the Crown by the grand jury.
This form of process and the way in which it was recorded have made the central documents produced in these courts difficult to use. From the middle of the fourteenth century, at the latest, the plea rolls were fixed in a rigid form. As Elton puts it:
They effectively record only the regular sequence of instruments under which actions were started (original writs) and the trial of cases was conducted (process out of court)...in Common Pleas and King's Bench the business was written up day by day, so that one has great difficulty in tracking the history of a given case through the rolls. All entries follow common form and tell almost nothing of the personal or individual facts behind a case: one will be told the names of the parties and usually their employment or status, and one is likely to discover the cause alleged in dispute, but that is all. (Elton 1969:59).
They are consequently daunting records to use, but, as we shall see, they can be supplemented by other classes.
The common law was enforced and administered by a number of courts whose overlapping jurisdiction is confusing, and constantly changing over time. To simplify very considerably, the most important court for the hearing of pleas of the Crown was the King's Bench. Judges also held assize commissions under which they tried Common pleas in the locality (by process of gnaws pries ). They came also to hold commissions of oyer and terminer and of gaol delivery: these enabled them to hear pleas of the Crown (criminal jurisdiction).
The most important court for civil litigation was known after the type of action as the court of Common Pleas (Common Bench). Common law jurisdiction was also claimed by the two great governmental departments, Chancery and Exchequer. At the lower level, and to be dealt with elsewhere, were the local franchises, the courts leet and courts baron, which, as we shall see, acted in minor cases of the kind that came to the central or circulating courts.
King's Bench
The most powerful of the common law courts, excepting Parliament itself, was the court of King's Bench.'For the execution of laws, after the house of Lords in Parliament, the highest court in England at common law, is the King's Bench, so called, because anciently the sovereign sometimes sat there in person on a high bench...' (Chamberlayne:109). Chamberlayne continues that
In this court are handled the pleas of the Crown, all things that concern the loss of life or member of any subject; for then the King is concerned, because the life and limbs of the subject belong only to the King. Here are handled all treasons, felonies, breach of peace, oppression, misgovernment etc. This court moreover hath power to examine and correct errors in facto, and in jure, of all the Judges and Justices of England in their judgments and proceedings; and this, not only in pleas of the Crown, but in all pleas, real, personal, and mixed, except only in the Exchequer. (Chamberlayne;110)
In recognition of this supremacy, the chief Judge of the court was popularly known as the Lord Chief Justice of England. It was thus primarily concerned with actions between the Crown and individuals, but from the reign of Elizabeth onwards the monopoly of the court of Common Pleas in actions concerning property 'was threatened by the various fictitious devices used by King's Bench to extend the quasi-criminal action of trespass into a general civil jurisdiction'. (Elton 1960:148). Thus its records contain many Common pleas between persons.
The surviving records of this court constitute a formidable collection. They are divided roughly into the records of the Crown pleas (Crown side) and Common pleas (Plea side). We will here discuss only a few of the records of the Crown side. The major series are the cram rage rolls (KB 27), of which there are 2,149 extending from 1273 to 1701. These are a continuation of an even earlier series, the curia regis rolls (KB 26), some 234 rolls between 1194 and 1273.
The difficulties of using these plea rolls has already been mentioned. They are written for the most part in latin, though some of the later depositions are in English. The cases are split apart and continue over several rolls. There are some indexes to the rolls, however, principally the 'controlment' rolls (KB 29), of which there are some 503 between 1329 and 1843. These consisted of memoranda compiled for the use of the King's Attorney and cross-refer to the coram rege rolls.
Another set of King's Bench records are those known as 'ancient indictments' (KB 9-11). The King's Bench not only acted on business brought directly to it, but it had the power to remove indictments, presentments, and convictions from other courts, particularly from those two jurisdictions, the Justices Itinerant or Assizes, and the Commissions of the Peace, or Quarter Sessions, to whom it had delegated power. By a writ of certiorari, that is a
writ issuing out of the Chancery to an inferior court, to call up the records of a cause there depending, that justice may be done therein, upon complaint that the party who seeks the said writ hath received hard usage, or is not like to have an indifferent trial in the said court' (Jacobs,s.v. certiorari quoting Fitzherbert),
King's Bench called in many of the records of the inferior courts. These records survive from the end of the thirteenth century until the middle of the nineteenth century.
Also filed with these documents were the returns of Coroner's, that is their inquests on all sudden deaths. 'By 1500 most coroners were surrendering copies, in the form of individual indentures, of all their inquests, into cases of homicide, suicide, death by misadventure and natural death...for two and a half centuries after 1500 the records of King's Bench contain copies of almost every case of every coroner' (Hunnisett:116).

There are no references to the word "citizen" in English common law in the context of member of a nation.
Therefore, all claims that the meaning derives from English common law are likely mistaken.

Your point, if there is one? I have made no claim that the word citizen derives from the English common law.

How have you proved the negative that there is no reference to the word "citizen" in English common law in the context of a nation?

Membership in a nation is nationality. Membershp in a state is citizenship.

The word predates the English common law.

You say in the context of a nation. To clarify that particular word, and to distinguish it from the word state,

Nationality is membership of a nation; citizenship is one kind of membership of a state. A nation is a society of men united by common blood and descent, and by the various subsidiary bonds incidental thereto, such as common speech, religion, and manners. A state, on the other hand, is a society of men united under one government. These two forms of society are not necessarily coincident. A single nation may be divided into several states, and conversely a single state may comprise several nations or parts of nations.
[...]
Citizenship and its remaining privileges are the outcome of the primitive conception of the state as a personal and permanent union of determinate individuals, for whose exclusive benefit the laws and government of the state exist.
[...]
[I]n Hale's Pleas of the Crown, I. 542, it is said: "Though the statute speaks of the king's subjects, it extends to aliens, . . . for though they are not the king's natural born subjects, they are the king's subjects when in England by a local allegiance."

The quote is from JURISPRUDENCE, by John W. Salmond, Fourth Edition, London, Stevens and Haynes, Bell Yard, Temple Bar (1913), quoted in extenso below.

Aliens in England were considered subjects of the king. Aliens could be naturalized. Naturalization could not change them from subjects to subjects.

Now let me be clear about something. Your understanding of "natural born citizen" is the one which the current judiciary will impose on everyone.

The term "natural born" in English common law and in American law is identical, as per the U.S. Supreme Court which I have quoted to you. As the citizens of the United States do not have a king, they are not subjects. British citizens were also subjects. Not all British subjects were citizens. Nation and state are not the same.

English common law is a collection of English court decisions. It is not a book by Blackstone. The early decisions were written in Latin.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Subject. Constitutional law. One that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is governed by his laws. The natives of Great Britain are subjects of the British government. Men in free governments are subjects as well as citizens; as citizens they enjoy rights and franchises; as subjects they are bound to obey the laws. The term is little used, in this sense, in countries enjoying a republican form of government.

https://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/subject

Webster's Dictionary, 1828

SUBJECT, noun [Latin]
1. One that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is governed by his laws. The natives of Great Britain are subjects of the British government. The natives of the United States, and naturalized foreigners, are subjects of the federal government. Men in free governments, are subjects as well as citizens; as citizens, they enjoy rights and franchises; as subjects, they are bound to obey the laws.

Whatever a word or term meant in English common law is not determinative of its meaning in the American Constitution. That is determined by the understanding of the meaning of the word or term as understrood by Americans at the time of ratification.

Assume arguendo that you discover absolute proof in English common law that the English understood the term natural born referred only to one-eyed Episcopalians. Would that mean that you have proven as fact that Americans determined that the only persons eligible to serve as President were and are one eyed Episcopalians? It would probably come as a surprise to those who ratified the citizenship clause. The meaning to be applied to terms in the Constitution is the plain meaning of the words as understood by the American people at the time of their framing.

The United States Government never adopted the English common law as being the law of the United States, not in any part whatever. English common law de jure ceased to be law in the American colonies with the Paris Peace Treaty.

You may assume arguendo as a given fact that the English common law holds natural born to mean whatever you please. Based on that, you still have nothing. English common law may be consulted to better understand the terms used therein, but it is not controlling as law within the United States.

Below is a British source.

JURISPRUDENCE, by John W. Salmond, Fourth Edition, London, Stevens and Haynes, Bell Yard, Temple Bar (1913)

[99]
§39. The Membership of the State.
Who then are the members of this society, and by what title do men obtain entrance into it? In all civilised communities the title of state-membership is twofold, and the members of the body politic are of two classes accordingly. These two titles are citizenship and residence. The former is a personal, the latter merely a territorial bond between the state and the individual. The former is a title of permanent, the latter one of temporary membership of the political community. The state, therefore, consists, in the first place, of all those who by virtue of this personal and permanent
[100]
relationship are its citizens or subjects, and in the second place, of all those who for the time being reside within its territory, and so possess a temporary and territorial title to statemembership. Both classes are equally members of the body politic, so long as their title lasts; for both have claims to the protection of the laws and government of the state, and to such laws and government both alike owe obedience and fidelity. They are alike subject to the dominion of the state, and it is in the interests of both that the state exists and fulfils its functions.
These two titles of state-membership are to a great extent united in the same persons. Most British subjects inhabit British territory, and most inhabitants of that territory are British subjects. Yet the coincidence is far from complete, for many men belong to the state by one title only. They are British subjects, but not resident within the dominions of the Crown; or they are resident within those dominions, but are not British subjects. In other words, they are either non-resident subjects or resident aliens. Non-resident aliens, on the other hand, possess no title of membership, and stand altogether outside the body politic. They are not within the power and jurisdiction of the state; they owe no obedience to the laws, nor fidelity to the government; it is not for them or in their interests that the state exists.1
1 Speaking generally, we may say that the terms subject and citizen are synonymous. Subjects and citizens are alike those whose relation to the state is personal and not merely territorial, permanent and not merely temporary. This equivalence, however, is not absolute. For in the first place, the term subject is commonly limited to monarchical forms of government, while the term citizen is more specially applicable in the case of republics. A British subject becomes by naturalisation a citizen of the United States of America or of France. In the second place, the term citizen brings into prominence the rights and privileges of the status, rather than its correlative obligations, while the reverse is the case with the term subject. Finally it is to be noticed that the term subject is capable of a different and wider application, in which it includes all members of the body politic, whether they are citizens (i.e. subjects stricto sensu) or resident aliens. All such persons are subjects, as being subject to the power of the state and to its jurisdiction, and as owing to it, at least temporarily, fidelity and obedience. Thus it has been said that: "Every alien coming into a British colony becomes temporarily a subject of the Crown — bound by, subject to, and entitled to the benefit of the laws which affect all British subjects." Low v. Routledge, 1 Ch. App. at p. 47. See also Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 815. So in Hale's Pleas of the Crown, I. 542, it is said: "Though the statute speaks of the king's subjects, it extends to aliens, . . . for though they are not the king's natural born subjects, they are the king's subjects when in England by a local allegiance."
[101]
The practical importance of the distinction between the two forms of state-membership lies chiefly in the superior privileges possessed by citizens or subjects. Citizenship is a title to rights which are not available for aliens. Citizens are members optimo jure, while aliens stand on a lower level in the scale of legal right. Thus British subjects alone possess political as opposed to merely civil rights;1 until a few years ago they alone were capable of inheriting or holding land in England; to this day they alone can own a British ship or any share in one; they alone are entitled when abroad to the protection of their government against other states, or to the protection of English courts of law against illegal acts of the English executive; they alone can enter British territory as of right; they alone are entitled to the benefit of certain statutes from the operation of which aliens are expressly or by implication excluded. It is true, indeed, that we must set off against these special privileges certain corresponding burdens and liabilities. Subjects alone remain within the power and jurisdiction of the Crown, even when they are outside its dominions. Wheresoever they are, they owe fidelity and obedience to the laws and government of their own state, while an alien may release himself at will from all such ties of subjection. Nevertheless the status of a subject is a privilege and not a disability, a benefit and not a burden. Citizenship is the superior, residence the inferior title of state-membership.
Viewing the matter historically, we may say that citizenship is a legal conception the importance of which is continuously diminishing. The consistent tendency of legal development is to minimise the peculiar rights and liabilities of subjects, and to make residence rather than citizenship the essential and sufficient title of state-membership. The acquisition and loss of citizenship are being gradually made easier, while the legal effects of its acquisition and loss are being
1 The possession of political rights is so characteristic and important a feature of citizenship, that some may be tempted to regard it as the essence of the matter. This, however, is not so. Women have no political rights, yet a wife is as much a British subject as her husband is. The distinction between subject and alien may exist under a despotic government, neither class possessing any political rights at all.
[102]
gradually made less. The present state of things is, indeed, a compromise between two fundamentally different ideas as to the constitution of a political society. Citizenship and its remaining privileges are the outcome of the primitive conception of the state as a personal and permanent union of determinate individuals, for whose exclusive benefit the laws and government of the state exist. Residence, regarded as a title of membership and protection, is the product of the more modern conception of the state, as consisting merely of the inhabitants for the time being of a certain territory. The personal idea is gradually giving place to the territorial, and the present twofold title of membership is the outcome of a compromise between these two co-existent and competing principles. It is not suggested, indeed, that the final issue of legal development will be the total disappearance of personal in favour of territorial membership. A compromise between the two extreme principles, in some such form as that which has now been attained to, may well prove permanent. In the present condition of international relations it is clearly necessary.
We have seen that citizens are those members of a state, whose relation to it is personal and permanent, and who by virtue of this relation receive from the state special rights, powers, and privileges. If we ask further, what is the title of citizenship, or how this special bond of union is consticuted, no general answer is possible. This is a matter of law, varying in different systems, and from time to time in the same system. English law claims as subjects all who are born within the dominions of the Crown, regardless of their descent; while French law, on the contrary, attaches French citizenship to French blood and descent, regardless in general of the place of birth.1 Viewed, however, in respect of its
1 British nationality is acquired in the following ways:—
(a) By birth in British dominions.
(b) By descent from a father or a father's father born in British dominions.
(c) By the marriage of an alien woman to a British subject.
(d) By naturalisation.
(e) By continued residence in a territory after it has been Conquered or otherwise acquired by the British Crown.
[103]
historical origin and primitive form, we may say that citizenship has its source in nationality. Fellow citizens are those who belong not merely to the same state but also to the same nation.
It is quite common to use the term citizenship and nationality as synonymous, and this usage, though incorrect, is significant of a very real connexion between the two ideas. Nationality is membership of a nation; citizenship is one kind of membership of a state. A nation is a society of men united by common blood and descent, and by the various subsidiary bonds incidental thereto, such as common speech, religion, and manners. A state, on the other hand, is a society of men united under one government. These two forms of society are not necessarily coincident. A single nation may be divided into several states, and conversely a single state may comprise several nations or parts of nations. The Hellenes were of one blood, but formed many states, while the Roman empire included many nations, but was one state. Nevertheless nations and states tend mutually to coincidence. The ethnic and the political unity tend to coalesce. In every nation there is an impulse, more or less powerful, to develop into a state—to add to the subsisting community of descent a corresponding community of government and political existei^ce. Conversely every state tends to become a nation; that is to say, the unity of political organisation eliminates in course of time the national diversities within its borders, infusing throughout all its population a new and common nationality, to the exclusion of all remembered relationship with those beyond the limits of the state.
The historical origin of the conception of citizenship is to be found in the fact that the state has grown out of the nation. Speaking generally we may say that the state is in its origin the nation politically organised. It is the nation incorporated for the purposes of government and self-defence. The citizens are the members of a nation which has thus developed into a state. Citizenship is nationality that has become political. Men become united as fellow-citizens, because they are, or are deemed to be, already united by the
[104]
bond of common kinship. It is for their benefit and protection that the body politic has been established, and they are its only members. Their citizenship is simply a legal and artificial bond of union superimposed upon the pre-existing bond of a common nationality. With aliens this national state has no concern. It was not created on their behalf, and they have no part or lot in it, for its law and government are the exclusive birthright of its citizens. Only by slow degrees does the notion of territorial membership arise and make good its claim to legal recognition. Gradually the government and the laws cease to be exclusively national and personal, and become in part territorial also. The new principle makes its way, that the state exists for the benefit and protection of the whole population of a certain territory, and not merely on behalf of a certain nationality. The law becomes more and more that of a country, rather than that of a people. State-membership becomes twofold, residence standing side by side with citizenship. It becomes possible to belong to the Roman state without being a Roman. The citizens consent to share their rights with outsiders, but the two classes never reach equality, and the personal union stands permanently on a higher level than the territorial. The special privileges retained by citizens at the present day are the scanty relics of the once exclusive claims of the nation to the protection and activities of the state.1
The relation between a state and its members is one of reciprocal obligation. The state owes protection to its members, while they in turn owe obedience and fidelity to it. Men belong to a state in order that they may be defended by it against each other and against external enemies. But this defence is not a privilege to be had for nothing, and in return for its protection the state exacts from its members services and sacrifices to which outsiders are not constrained. From its members it collects its revenue; from them it
1 On this transition from the national to the territorial idea of the state, see Maine, Early History of Institutions, pp. 72-76. As to the history of the conception and law of citizenship, see Salmond on Citizenship and Allegiance, L. Q. R. xvii. 270, and xviii. 49.
[105]
requires the performance of public duties; from them it demands an habitual submission to its will, as the price of the benefits of its guardianship. Its members, therefore, are not merely in a special manner under the protection of the state, but are also in a special manner under its coercion.
This special duty of assistance, fidelity, and obedience, is called allegiance, and is of two kinds, corresponding to the two classes of members from whom it is required. Subjects owe permanent allegiance to the state, just as they are entitled to its permanent protection. Resident aliens owe temporary allegiance during the period of their residence, just as their title to state protection is similarly limited. An alien, when in England, must be faithful to the state, must submit to its will, and obey its laws, even as an Englishman; but when he leaves English shores, he leaves behind him his obligation of allegiance, together with his title to protection. A British subject, on the other hand, takes both of these things with him on his travels. The hand of the state is still upon him for good and evil. If he commits treason abroad he will answer for it in England. The courts of justice will grant him redress even against the agents of the Crown itself; while the executive will see that no harm befalls him at the hands of foreign governments,1
[...]
1 Although states are established for the protection of their members, it is not necessary that this protection should be absolutely limited to members. In exceptional cases and to a limited extent the state will use its powers for the defence and benefit of outsiders. War may be waged on behalf of an oppressed nation, and the state may intervene, in the interests of justice, in a quarrel not its own. Nor will it necessarily refuse to administer justice in its courts even to non-resident aliens. But such external protection is exceptional and accidental, and does not pertain to the essence of government. A state is established, not for the defence of all mankind, and not for the maintenance of right throughout all the earth, but solely for the security of its own members, and the administration of its own territory. A state which absolutely refused its protection to all outsiders would none the less adequately fulfil the essential purposes of a political society.

Your point, if there is one? I have made no claim that the word citizen derives from the English common law.

It is inherent in your claim that "natural born citizen" refers to jus soli based citizenship.

So if you don't like to use the term "English common law" in this context, how about you tell me from where derives the Jus Soli interpretation of citizenship in the US?

And don't start about the 14th amendment. "Natural born citizen" meant whatever it meant in 1787. What was the framers understanding of the term? From whence came their understanding of the term?

Your point, if there is one? I have made no claim that the word citizen derives from the English common law.
It is inherent in your claim that "natural born citizen" refers to jus soli based citizenship.

Jus soli is of feudal origin.

Jus soli pertains to citizenship based on place of bireth as opposed to citizenship based on parentage or descent. The United States recognizes citizenship based on jus soli as well as jus sanguinis. All persons born in the United States, except for those immune from United States jurisdiction, are born citizens of the United States. (jus soli). Persons born outside the United States, of one or more United States citizen parents, are also born United Stqtes citizens. (jus sanguinis).

The term natural born was used in English common law to distinguish between citizens who were born citizens, and those who were born aliens and later naturalized. The term natural born as used in English and American law has the identical meaning.

What is your point, if any, pertaining to the citizenship of persons who acquired United States citizenship at birth?

The United States determines who are, and who are not, United States citizens. United States law applies to the absolute exclusion of all other laws.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Jus soli. The law of the place of one's birth, as contrasted with jus sanguinis, the law of the place of one's descent or parentage. The principle that a person's ctizenship is determined by place of birth rather than by the citizenship of one's perents. It is of feudal origin.
Feudal system. The system of feuds. A political and social system which prevailed throughout Europe during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and is supposed to have grown out of the peculiar usages and policy of the Teutonic nations who overran the continent after the fall of the Western Roman Empire, as developed by the exigencies of their military domination, and possibly furthered by notions taken from the Roman jurisprudence.
It was introduced into England, in its completeness, by William I, A.D. 1085, though it may have existed in a rudimentary form among the Saxons before the Conquest. It formed the entire basis of the real-property law of England in medieval times; and survivals of the system, in modern days, so modify and color that branch of jurisprudence, both in England and America, that many of its principles require for their complete understanding a knowledge of the feudal system. The feudal system originated in the relations of a military chieftain and his followers, or king and nobles, or lord and vassals, and especially their relations as determined by the bond established by a grant of land from the former to the latter. From this it grew into a complete and intricate complex of rules for the tenure and transmission of real estate, and of correlated duties and services; while, by tying men to the land and to those holding above and below them, it created a close-knit hierarchy of persons, and developed an aggregate of social and political institutions.
Feudal law. The body of jurisprudence relating to feuds; the real-property law of the feudal system; the law anciently regulating the property relations of lord and vassal, and the creation, incidents, and transmission of feudal estates.
The body of laws and usages constituting the "feudal law" was originally customary and unwritten, but a compilation was made in the twelfth century, called "Feodarum Consuetudines," which has formed the basis of later digests. The feudal law prevailed over Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth century, and was introduced into England at the Norman Conquest, where it formed the entire basis of the law of real property until comparatively modern times. Survivals of the feudal law, to the present day, sO affect and color that branch of jurisprudence as to require a certain knowledge of the feudal law in order to better comprehend modern tenures and rules of real-property law.

So if you don't like to use the term "English common law" in this context, how about you tell me from where derives the Jus Soli interpretation of citizenship in the US?

The Act of March 26, 1790 (1 Stat 103) (jus sanguinis)

And the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens: Provided, that the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States: . . .

Children born out of the ligeance of the king:

7 ANNE, c. 5, 1708 (jus sanguinis)

An Act for naturalizing Foreign Protestants.
[Whole Act except part printed rep. 10 c. 9 (c. 5 Ruff.)]
3. . . . the children of all natural born subjects born out of the ligeance of her Majesty her heires and successors shall be deemed adjudged and taken to be natural born subjects of this kingdom to all intents constructions and purposes whatsoever.
(a) Guines and Gascony,
(b) add assented
(c) and kept

A bastard born in France within territory that had been conquered by England, was considered a natural born subject, as being born within the obedience and ligiance of England. (jus soli)

Case XCI. 5 Eliz. Dyer, 224. Alien, Denizen. 7 Co. 22 b. 20. Vaugh. 282. 2 Vent. 6.

A bastard born at Tour-nay in France, when H. 8 had subdued it, between English parents, is a natural subject of England; and continues so although Tournay be won back by the French: for he was born in obedientia & ligeantia regis Angliæ. By the two chief justices and other judges.

13 George 3 c.21 (1773) - British Nationality Act (jus sanguinis)

13 George 3 c. 21: An Act to extend the Provisions of an Act, made in the Fourth Year of the Reign of His late Majesty King George the Second, intituled, An Act to explain a Clause in an Act made in the Seventh Year of the Reign of Her late Majesty Queen Anne, for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, which relates to the Children of the natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, to the Children of such Children.
[Preamble.]
WHEREAS divers natural-born Subjects of Great Britain, who profess and exercise the Protestant Religion through various lawful Causes, especially for the better carrying on of Commerce, have been, and are, obliged to reside in several trading Cities and other Foreign Places, where they have contracted Marriages, and brought up Families: And whereas it is equally just and expedient that the Kingdom should not be deprived of such Subjects, nor lose the Benefit of the Wealth that they have acquired; and therefore that not only the Children of such natural-born Subjects, but their Children also, should continue under the Allegiance of His Majesty, and be intituled to come into this Kingdom, and to bring hither and realize, or otherwise employ, their Capital; but no Provision hath hitherto been made to extend farther than to the Children born out of the ligeance of His Majesty, whose Fathers were natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain: May it therefore please Your most Excellent Majesty that it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the Authority of the same, That all Persons born, or who hereafter shall be born, out of the ligeance of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, whose Fathers were or shall be, by virtue of a Statute made in the Fourth Year of King George the Second, to explain a Clause in an Act made in the Seventh Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Anne, for naturalizing Foreign Protestants, which relates to the natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, intitled to all the Rights and Privileges of natural-born Subjects of the Crown of England or of Great Britain, shall and may be adjudged and taken to be, and are hereby declared and enacted to be, natural-born Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, to all Intents, Constructions, and Purposes whatsoever, as if he and they had been and were born in this Kingdom: any Thing contained in an Act of the Twelfth Year of the Reign of King William the Third, intituled, An Act for the further Limitation of the Crown, and better securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, to the contrary in any-wise notwithstanding.
[...]

Note that 13 George 3 c.21 (1773) establishes natural born subjects of persons whose father was a natural born subject. The mother could have been an alien. Not even under English law did it require two citizen parents, or birth within the territory, to become a natural born subject at birth.

And of course,

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, Clause 1: (jus soli)

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.

For all persons born in the United States, jus soli determines they are citizens at birth, except for the child of a parent who enjoys immunity. For such parent, by a fiction of law, his country is considered to travel with him, and the child is considered a citizen of the nation of such parent.

For all persons born outside the United States, of one or two citizen parents, jus sanguinis prevails pursuant to whatever conditions may be set by Federal law.

I think that covers it from colonial times, to the early thirteen sovereign states, to United States under the Constitution, showing both jus soli and jus sanguinis.

And don't start about the 14th amendment. "Natural born citizen" meant whatever it meant in 1787. What was the framers understanding of the term? From whence came their understanding of the term?

Unfortunately for your blather, the 14th amendment prevails. The Framers explicitly stated it only put in the Constitution what had always been the law of United States citizenship, in order to remove it from the control of Congress. If you consider earier American law to be somehow different, that is just too bad. The 14th Amendment struck down any and all prior law that may have been inconsistent.

If you consider an earlier definition of natural born citizen to include only one-eyed Episcopalians, and could prove it, it would do nothing. All persons born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, would still be born citizens.

Any ratification was done with the meaning of the text as understood at the time the words were framed.

If you have a legal argument to pitch, pitch it. As it stands, you are just playing trivia.

Citizenship determinations today are made pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment (jus soli) and effective Federal law 66 Stat. 163 (27 June 1952) as amended. (jus sanguinis).

A natural born citizen (or subject) is one who is born a citizen (or subject), as opposed to being born an alien and naturalized at some later time.

The term natural born was used in English common law to distinguish between citizens who were born citizens, ...

English common law did not recognize the term "citizen" as national membership. It recognized it as meaning "resident of a city."

The meaning of the word as membership in a nation does not derive from English common law or even English culture. The proper word for English is "subject", and English common law is all over that.

You are trying to jam "natural born" onto "citizen" as if they came from the same origin. "Citizen" appears to come from Switzerland. It does not appear to come from England.

Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.

Jus soli. The law of the place of one's birth, as contrasted with jus sanguinis, the law of the place of one's descent or parentage. The principle that a person's ctizenship is determined by place of birth rather than by the citizenship of one's perents. It is of feudal origin.

I'm having difficulty following you. You repeatedly tell me that American citizenship has nothing to do with English Common law, but you keep citing English Common law in support of your claim that American citizenship is jus soli.

I also don't see you addressing the American understanding of the word "citizen" from 1776 to 1787.

The Act of March 26, 1790 (1 Stat 103) (jus sanguinis)

What happened in 1790 doesn't really bear on it. Also, the term "natural born" was removed in the subsequent act, and it appears it's inclusion in the 1790 act was an error.

If you have a legal argument to pitch, pitch it. As it stands, you are just playing trivia.

I have been trying to do so, but I think we need to get this origin of the word "citizen" straightened out before I try to present my legal argument.

I will say my legal argument is going to derive from William Lewis of Pennsylvania. He was a member of the Pennsylvania legislature when the US Constitution was ratified by Pennsylvania, and he ought to have known what was meant by "natural born citizen" in the context of the Framer's intent.

I'm sure others knew as well, but very little in the way of evidence as to it's meaning has descended from others.

William Rawle is the most commonly cited origin for jus soli interpretation of American citizenship, but Rawle was not a member of the Constitutional convention nor a member of a ratifying legislature.

It is my understanding he was in Philadelphia in 1787 and would converse with framers in the evenings when they went out to the taverns, but he had no official role in the Convention or in ratification.

I believe I have a pretty good case to demonstrate Rawle was wrong about his claims regarding American Citizenship and knew he was wrong when he wrote "A View of the Constitution."

Unfortunately for your blather, the 14th amendment prevails.

The 14th amendment cannot change the definition of "natural born citizen" as it pertains to the qualifications to be president.

What it meant in 1787 is what it must still mean in 1868, and especially since the 14th amendment was most certainly not meant to address Presidential qualifications.

You cannot redefine words in the US Constitution. You can amend the US Constitution, but you cannot change the meaning of terms already used.

You especially cannot do this unintentionally, such as from an amendment which grants citizenship to freed slaves.

The 14th amendment does not create a right to abortion. It does not create a right to "gay marriage". It does not ban prayer in schools, and it does not alter the qualifications to be President.

All of this is made up crap from liberal judges who are imposing their own personal preferences and pretending there is constitutional legitimacy for them.

You are trying to jam "natural born" onto "citizen" as if they came from the same origin. "Citizen" appears to come from Switzerland. It does not appear to come from England.

https://study.com/academy/lesson/significance-of-citizenship-in-ancient-greece.html

Citizenship in ancient Greece.
Greek Society
Let's start at the beginning. How did the ancient Greeks start talking about citizenship? Well, it's important to remember that in the ancient world, there was no single nation or kingdom called Greece. Instead, there were several different urban centers where people congregated for safety and economic opportunities. As the Greeks engaged in Mediterranean trade, these cities grew in size and wealth, forming their own governments and becoming essentially miniature nations of their own, which we call city-states. The Greeks called each city a polis. Your polis was more than just your home; it was the basis of you identity. If someone asked who you were, you might say Athenian, Spartan, or Corinthian, whatever your polis was. Well, scholars and politicians alike decided that there needed to be a way to distinguish the true members of a polis from foreigners. Thus, the concept of the citizen was born. Citizenship Rights
Being recognized as a citizen meant that you were a true inhabitant of the polis, that you legally belonged. It also meant that you had certain political rights. This was very important to the Greeks from early on. Since citizens were seen as legally belonging, they were essentially equals, which meant that they deserved certain rights. In particular, the government of the city was supposed to protect the interests of the citizens. Any government that didn't was tyrannical, something that Greeks saw themselves as too civilized to tolerate. But how exactly were these city-state governments supposed to consider the opinions of citizens? Well, this is where the concept of democracy was developed - a system of government in which the members all have a say in politics.

Take a mulligan on that Swiss thing.

I do not give a crap where the term came from. It exists in United States law and the United States did NOT adopt the English common law (the body of old court decisions and precedents).

With over two centuries of United States jurisprudence to choose from, you got nothing. You Biden over and over about one foreign belief or another, but you act as if United States law has the plague. United States citizenship determinations are made EXCLUSIVELY upon United States law. United States nationality and citizenship law are written law. The common law has no application to anything, anywhere, in the face of written law.

I also don't see you addressing the American understanding of the word "citizen" from 1776 to 1787.

Observe the evolution of the term natural born subject in the Vermont constitutions of 1777, 1786, and 1793 to the term natural born citizen in the 1828 Amendment to the Vermont Constitution of 1828.

[Vermont Const. 1777]
Section XXXVIII. Every foreigner of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer, land or other real estate; and after one years residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and intitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this State; except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative, until after two years residence.
[Vermont Const. 1786]
XXXVI. Every person of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means, acquire, hold and transfer land, or other real estate; and, after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this State, except that he shall not be capable of being elected Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Treasurer, Counsellor, or Representative in Assembly, until after two years' residence.
[Vermont Const. 1793]
SEC 39. Every person of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer, land, or other real estate; and, after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all rights of a natural-born subject of this State, except that he shall not be capable of being elected governor, lieutenant-governor, treasurer, councillor, or representative in assembly, until after two years' residence.
[Vermont Const. Amdt. 1828]
ARTICLE I. No person, who is not already a freeman of this State, shall be entitled to exercise the privilege of a freeman, unless he be a natural-born citizen of this or some one of the United States, or until he shall have been naturalized agreeably to the acts of Congress.

From 1777 to 1828, they did not share in your befuddlement.

If you have a legal argument to pitch, pitch it. As it stands, you are just playing trivia.
I have been trying to do so, but I think we need to get this origin of the word "citizen" straightened out before I try to present my legal argument.

If you have been trying to make any legal argument at all, you have failed. I can identify no such argument having been made. None is presented here.

In State v. Manuel (1838) the Court stated,

The term "citizen" as understoood in our law, is precisely analogous to the term subject in the common law, and the change of phrase has entirely resulted from the change of government.. The sovereignty has been transferred from one man to the collective body of the people—and he who before was a "subject of the king" is now "a citizen of the State."

Lynch v. Clarke (1844)

I can entertain no doubt, but that by the law of the United States, every person born within the dominions and allegiance of the United States, whatever were the situation of his parents, is a natural born citizen.

Webster's Dictionary, 1828

SUBJECT, noun [Latin]
1. One that owes allegiance to a sovereign and is governed by his laws. The natives of Great Britain are subjects of the British government. The natives of the United States, and naturalized foreigners, are subjects of the federal government. Men in free governments, are subjects as well as citizens; as citizens, they enjoy rights and franchises; as subjects, they are bound to obey the laws.

https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000203/html/am203--378.html

17 Maryland Laws 378 (1884)

CHAP. XII.
An ACT to naturalize major-general the marquis de la Fayette and his heirs male for ever.
WHEREAS the general assembly of Maryland, anxious to perpetuate a name dear to the state, and to recognize the marquis de la Fayette for one of its citizens, who, at the age of nineteen, left his native country, and risked his life in the late revolution; who, on his joining the American army, after being appointed by congress to the rank of major-general, disinterestedly refused the usual rewards of command, and sought only to deserve what he attained, the character of patriot and soldier; who, when appointed to conduct an incursion into Canada, called forth by his prudence and extraordinary discretion the approbation of congress; who, at the head of an army in Virginia, baffled the manœuvres of a distinguished general, and excited the admiration of the oldest commanders; who early attracted the notice and obtained the friendship of the illustrious general Washington; and who laboured and succeeded in raising the honour and the name of the United States of America: Therefore,
II. Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights and privileges.

Damn. French Lafayette was made a natural born citizen before the Constitution was Framed or adopted. There just ain't no telling what a sovereign state might do. And, as Maryland did this before the Constitution....

"No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President...."

Lafayette was a citizen, nay a natural born citizen, before the adoption of the Constitution. How did those turtles know to use that exact phrase?

William Rawle is the most commonly cited origin for jus soli interpretation of American citizenship, but Rawle was not a member of the Constitutional convention nor a member of a ratifying legislature.

The 14th Amendment citizenship clause is an example of jus soli, citizenship by place of birth. It is cited a great deal more than William Rawle. It is the organic law of the United States.

Also Wong Kim Ark, the leading Supreme Court precedent. At 169 U.S. 693

The foregoing considerations and authorities irresistibly lead us to these conclusions: the Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States.

It is the law of the land, expressly stated as such.

I will say my legal argument is going to derive from William Lewis of Pennsylvania. He was a member of the Pennsylvania legislature when the US Constitution was ratified by Pennsylvania, and he ought to have known what was meant by "natural born citizen" in the context of the Framer's intent.

As a legal argument, it goes as far as a motion to dismiss for improper argument. A Court may not even consider an argument on such a basis. Whoever Lewis was, nobody ratified his opinion.

Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

United States v Union Pacific Railroad Company, 91 U.S. 72 (1875)

In construing an act of Congress, we are not at liberty to recur to the views of individual members in debate nor to consider the motives which influenced them to vote for or against its passage. The act itself speaks the will of Congress, and this is to be ascertained from the language used. But courts, in construing a statute, may with propriety recur to the history of the times when it was passed, and this is frequently necessary in order to ascertain the reason as well as the meaning of particular provisions in it. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120 [argument of counsel -- omitted].

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 254 (1901)

In expounding this law, the judgment of the Court cannot in any degree be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage nor by the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered. The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both houses, and the only mode in which that will is spoken is in the act itself, and we must gather their intention from the language there used, comparing it, when any ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed.

The 14th amendment cannot change the definition of "natural born citizen" as it pertains to the qualifications to be president.

As the 14th Amendment nowhere uses the term natural born citizen, and nobody has said that it does, to your shame you have resorted to the Straw Man Argument.

However, in so doing, your claim about the 14th Amendment is absurdly false as a matter of law. Were the 14th Amendment to have said, "the term natural born citizen, as it pertains to the qualifications to be president, means a person born with one or more parents who is a one-eyed Episcopalian," that would be the definition of natural born citizen as it pertains to qaulifications to be president.

While they were at it, the people, acting in their sovereign capacity could amend the Constitution in any way of their choosing. They could adopt a communist form of government. Sovereign power answers to no higher power because there can be no higher power.

You cannot redefine words in the US Constitution. You can amend the US Constitution, but you cannot change the meaning of terms already used.

The sovereigns can change anything they want, in any way they want.

The 14th amendment does not create a right to abortion. It does not create a right to "gay marriage". It does not ban prayer in schools, and it does not alter the qualifications to be President.

Being unable, or stubbornly unwilling, to cite United States law to support your brain farts, you must again resort to an absurd Straw Man Argument, Nobody argued that the 14th Amendment altered the qualifications to be President. It did not. It took the previously existing definition of who were born citizens of the United States by birth in the United States, and it placed it in the Constitution, beyond the reach of Congress to change.

All persons born in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, are born citizens of the United States.

It does not state a bleeping word about parents.

As you are unable or unwilling to discuss effective United States law, preferring things written about old English court opinions which were written in Latin, and you are simply inventing Straw Man Arguments and making up absurd crap about the Constitution, your argument, or lack thereof, is dismissed.

https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/000001/000203/html/am203--378.html

17 Maryland Laws 378 (1884)

CHAP. XII.
An ACT to naturalize major-general the marquis de la Fayette and his heirs male for ever.
WHEREAS the general assembly of Maryland, anxious to perpetuate a name dear to the state, and to recognize the marquis de la Fayette for one of its citizens, who, at the age of nineteen, left his native country, and risked his life in the late revolution; who, on his joining the American army, after being appointed by congress to the rank of major-general, disinterestedly refused the usual rewards of command, and sought only to deserve what he attained, the character of patriot and soldier; who, when appointed to conduct an incursion into Canada, called forth by his prudence and extraordinary discretion the approbation of congress; who, at the head of an army in Virginia, baffled the manœuvres of a distinguished general, and excited the admiration of the oldest commanders; who early attracted the notice and obtained the friendship of the illustrious general Washington; and who laboured and succeeded in raising the honour and the name of the United States of America: Therefore,
II. Be it enacted, by the general assembly of Maryland, That the marquis de la Fayette, and his heirs male for ever, shall be, and they and each of them are hereby deemed, adjudged, and taken to be, natural born citizens of this state, and shall henceforth be entitled to all the immunities, rights and privileges, of natural born citizens thereof, they and every of them conforming to the constitution and laws of this state, in the enjoyment and exercise of such immunities, rights and privileges.

Damn. French Lafayette was made a natural born citizen before the Constitution was Framed or adopted. There just ain't no telling what a sovereign state might do. And, as Maryland did this before the Constitution....

"No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President...."

Lafayette was a citizen, nay a natural born citizen, before the adoption of the Constitution. How did those turtles know to use that exact phrase?

Take a mulligan on that Swiss thing.

Your reference to Greece supports the contention that Jus Sanguinus has always been the norm. I have somewhere in my forest of links a reference to Aristotle (I think) in which he makes it clear that citizenship descends from parents, and not from place of birth.

This establishes Jus Sanguinus as the norm throughout human history, and it shows just how much of an outlier England is. You and I discussed the reasons why England became different at the beginning of this thread.

I do not give a crap where the term came from.

It is the core of the issue. If the word comes from Switzerland, as the evidence indicates it does, then the understanding of it's meaning could only have come from there as well.

I suspect you don't give a crap about the origin of the word because it does not support your position.

With over two centuries of United States jurisprudence to choose from, you got nothing.

This statement boggles my mind. For some reason you think the opinions of judges decide truth, and to me, they are just men with all the fallibilities that mankind possesses.

Their status and position does not make them correct. It simply means they have the power to enforce their opinion.

Do you love truth, or do you love power?

[Vermont Const. 1777]

Vermont was a bit player and not one of the prime movers.

Even so, by 1828 they had stopped using "subject" and replaced it with "citizen."

I can identify no such argument having been made.

There are a few court cases I could cite, but I don't believe court decisions are a useful stop along the path to truth. They are second hand opinions and not primary sources.

We need to try to see what information the Judges used to arrive at their decisions. The opinions without sources are not really useful.

Sources which are contradicted by known facts are also not really useful.

The 14th Amendment citizenship clause is an example of jus soli, citizenship by place of birth. It is cited a great deal more than William Rawle.

It is now but what did they cite before the 14th in an effort to support the notion of Jus Soli?

Pretty much Rawle. He is the most prominent source on this. His book was widely spread in the early days of law, and that's why his claims have taken hold on the larger legal community after 1825.

Whoever Lewis was, nobody ratified his opinion.

More like, Lewis conveyed the understood opinion of the legislators of Pennsylvania who ratified the Constitution. If this is the case, then it appears that Pennsylvania did indeed ratify his opinion.

I think Pennsylvania was a much more important state to the creation of the US Constitution than was Vermont. Don't you agree? :)