Why hunters are trading in traditional hunting rifles for the AR-15

One is tempted to be coy, and ask Bryanw92 if the names S.L.A. Marshall, I.B. Holley Jr, Julian Hatcher, Rene Studler, William Crozier, Stephen Benet, and James Ripley mean anything. But that would be a disservice to other forum members.

“...you totally miss my thesis: the AR-15 IS a good compromise, as you admit. That’s all I’m saying. ...”

A good start. But Bryanw92 hasn’t thought any farther into the meaning of “compromise.”

In the military context, “compromise” means that a system put into the hands of troops will perform less than optimally in some situations. Suboptimal systems fail. In action, this means some people will perish. At the very least. If the situation unravels too far, units get overcome or wiped out, victory turns to defeat; the sky is never the limit.

“Compromise” is a dirty word to many citizens and nearly all Freepers. But - moral opprobrium notwithstanding - it cannot be escaped.

As an officer responsible for operational test & evaluation of a number of aircraft subsystems, across every US military branch, including some systems of Allied nations, I was privileged to work with every technical specialty. Couldn’t help but develop a certain fondness for the people involved, and for the troops who had to take what the military establishment handed them, then go in harm’s way. Improving their chances - of prevailing and returning home safe - became an obsession, an ongoing intellectual preoccupation despite the fact they required me to leave active duty 18 years ago.

So I judge it worth at least a little extra thought into what compromises have had to be made, in system design and performance, in procurement and supply for the armed forces, from before the Founding right down to today. Not all compromises are obvious; more annoyingly, not all have relevance to system design or supportability, or other attributes.

“...If the bolt-action is so superior and the Army knows that, then explain the Garand.”

Easiest one of the bunch.

From its inception up until the formal adoption of US Rifle Cal 30 M1 in 1936, it was recognized - by some - that the self-loader could bring advantage in action. But it was resisted; expense, difficulty of resupply, inclination of troops to fire off all their ammunition prematurely, were all raised as objections (nearly all were also raised as objections to the adoption of breechloaders, metallic cartridges, repeaters, and other stuff).

The question for system designers was not, will it work? It was closer to, will it work well enough and accurately enough and long enough, and be light and simple enough, to justify the expense of changing, and can we reorganize field support to enable it to keep functioning?

The historical reality that Byranw92 has completely missed, is that military doctrine is not static (so much for timeless verities and fundamental truths that never change). Before WWII, what counted for the US Army infantry establishment was scoring hits.

It was found that the average recruit firing the M1 Garand could score more hits in a given time period than could an expert marksman firing the M1903. The recruit did miss more, but the overall result was judged to be worth the risk. And the Army Ordnance field support people proved equal to the task of keeping it all going.

After the Second World War, doctrine changed.

Data collected by S.L.A Marshall suggested plain volume of fire was as good at causing enemy casualties as aimed fire. Various influential leaders and organizations within the Army establishment agreed, and - backed by analyses from the Operations Research Office - convinced the keepers of official doctrine to make the change.

Not everyone agreed. Pushed by various factions in and out of the Ordnance Corps, the Army officially adopted US Rifle, 7.62mm, M14 as a replacement for the M1 (also the M2 Carbine, all submachine guns, and the BAR M1918A2). Not the best of compromises; various specialized offices in the defense establishment were reluctant to give up their specialized small arms (most of which were lighter and less powerful than the M14, or the M1).

Evidence grew, that various offices inside the Army establishment had doctored operational testing for the M14 or otherwise shaded the results. Unforeseen production problems arose, delaying M14 production and subsequent replacement of the M1. Defense Secretary Robert Strange McNamara was not satisfied with explanations offered by the Ordnance Corps; he terminated M14 production and declared that the military would be re-equipped with the M16. Springfield Armory was closed down as a result.

Since then, the Army firepower doctrine has been called into question, somewhat ... significant doubts have been raised about the ability of historian S.L.A. Marshall to collect the data he says he did. But he remains at the official pinnacle of orthodoxy when it comes to doctrine.

The US Marines believe a different doctrine: firepower equals hits per minute. They have long maintained a studied indifference to doctrinal disagreements inside and between the other service departments, and for quite a long time they made it a point of pride to accept whatever the War Dept, and later the Army Dept, sent to them in terms of systems.

>>A good start. But Bryanw92 hasn’t thought any farther into the meaning of “compromise.”

>>In the military context,

I am NOT in the military. I was honorably discharged many years ago. I do not have to think in their terms anymore.

I bought my first AR-15 in 1993, when they weren’t nearly as common at the gun range as they are today. In fact, when I’d pull it out of the case, the old range coots who practically lived there would start heckling me for owning:

1) a black gun
2) a varmint caliber
3) a plastic gun
4) a Mattel gun
5) a gun that holds more rounds than they need
6) a gun that shoots too fast
7) a gun that didn’t fight in WW2
8) a gun with a pistol grip

Like you, they cited years of experience to “prove” to me that I had the wrong gun and I needed one like they have. I have heard the Garand story a thousand times—and I still don’t want one.

So, here we are 24 years later. Most of them are dead and everyone is shooting an AR-15 at the range without being heckled by closed-minded people who believe that:

1) rifles should be bolt-operated
2) rifles should have a wood stock
3) telephones should be connected to the wall
4) cars should be started by hand cranks
5) petticoats should extend to the ankle
6) internet posts should be in third-person

“...I am NOT in the military. I was honorably discharged many years ago. I do not have to think in their terms anymore. ...”

Bryanw92 may believe he’s “free” of all that icky old military stuff. He isn’t. Since most of the basics and a great many subsystems were first developed specifically for the military, he is constrained but doesn’t realize it. So are we all.

To claim otherwise is like saying, “I don’t believe in Newton’s Laws, so I can jump off buildings and not get hurt.”

“...I bought my first AR-15 in 1993,... they cited years of experience to “prove” to me that I had the wrong gun ...”

Picked up my first AR in 1977: used SP-1 made in 1974. Not in the best shape - I suspect the prior owner had no idea how to reload for the thing. Came with a set of dies, which had sustained damage. After repairing them, and puzzling out my own techniques, I was able to obtain acceptable

I see I’ll have to go back to whetstoning my rhetorical techniques.

There is no “right” gun. There are a great many guns out there, designed to fit a specific set of conditions and meant to accomplish specific tasks - at which they perform better or poorer, depending on how insightful the designers were, or how artfully they have been modified since.

But things change. Once one moves into different circumstances, or attempts a different task, performance starts to decline. Sometimes the differences aren’t too large, and the user can get away with using the same gun. Sometimes they can’t.

Bryanw92 is probably prudent to avoid the M1 Garand today. Few have been maintained to US Army Ordnance standards, for many years. They are going downhill; more are becoming unsafe to fire. The operating rod may become the limiting factor: they’ve not been made for decades and the supply of never-used rods is about exhausted.

The Army and Marine Corps made many amphibious landings in WWII, armed with the M1 “Garand”. How did that work out in real life for them?

>>Bryanw92 may believe he’s “free” of all that icky old military stuff. He isn’t. Since most of the basics and a great many subsystems were first developed specifically for the military, he is constrained but doesn’t realize it. So are we all.

>>To claim otherwise is like saying, “I don’t believe in Newton’s Laws, so I can jump off buildings and not get hurt.”

Military thinking is not physics. Believing they are is why your rhetorical technique requires a rough cut file and not a whetstone.

Also, I don’t have a clue what you are arguing in favor of other than being contrarian.

There's always resistance to change.

I bought 2. One for each of my sons. I needed to get one for myself.

http://www.columbusmachine.com/oprod.htm

We have the experience and skill to rebuild your M1-Garand op rod to factory new specs.

We can also build new or repair "Tanker" Garand op rods,

as well as rebuild M-14 and M1 Carbine op rod guide lugs.

It's an Easy Fix! Simply ship your op rod to us.

“...We have the experience and skill to rebuild your M1-Garand op rod to factory new specs. ...”

This is wonderful news.

Does Columbus Machine sell newly manufactured operating rods?