NASA Chief Finally Admits Boeing Starliner Was A BIG Failure! [10:45]

YouTube transcript reformatted at textformatter.ai follows.

00:00 Opening Briefing
02:09 The Mission’s Failure Timeline
05:50 Key Investigation Findings
09:35 The Road Ahead for Starliner

Transcript
Where leaders will discuss the findings of investigations into the 2024 crude test flight of Boeing Starliner to the International Space Station. Administrator Jared Isaacman will provide some opening remarks and answer questions alongside Associate Administrator Amit Shhatria, who will give closing remarks. If you have a question, please join the queue by pressing star one. We will attempt to get through as many questions as possible. Shortly, NASA will send a news release that links to the report redacted to the least extent possible for your reference. With that, the administrator.

Thank you, Bethany. Um, for those that are joining us today, I would like to read a letter that I sent to the NASA workforce in just the last few minutes. So within the next week, Congress will be briefed by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, and NASA's independent investigative report on the Starliner crude flight test will be released publicly. Many of you know this program intimately, and some of you lived every development in real time. We returned the crew safely, but the path we took did not reflect NASA at our best. There is no expectation of perfection in missions as challenging as those that we are entrusted to undertake. Even with our best efforts and programs like CCP that have seen great success, mistakes will occur. What defines us is whether we learn from them, improve because of them, and strengthen confidence across this workforce and the nation that we serve. This requires transparency and accountability, neither of which can be selectively applied. In this letter, I will summarize the timeline, the organizational root cause, and the actions we are taking to restore trust and move forward. Let me begin with the most important point. Starliner has design and engineering deficiencies that must be corrected. But the most troubling failure revealed by this investigation is not hardware. It's decision-making and leadership that, if left unchecked, could create a culture incompatible with human space flight.

To give you a little program history, Starliner was conceived under the commercial crew program in 2010 with the intent to establish dissimilar crew access to low Earth orbit. After the retirement of the space shuttle, it became a national imperative to never again accept a gap in American human space flight capability.

Now, the first test, orbital flight test one of Starliner, was in December of 2019. A mission elapsed timing error prevented the guidance software from calculating orbital insertion burn timing, which triggered excessive thruster firings, incorrect orbital insertion, major propellant use, and 10 thrusters that were declared failed off. This mission was declared a high visibility close call. Orbital flight test 2, or OFT2, was launched in August of 2021.

During the OFT2 launch countdown cycle test of the service prop module system, this actually didn't launch to be clear, but during the OFT launch countdown cycle test, the service module prop system manifold isolation valves, 13 of the 24 oxidizer valves, failed to cycle open, so they were stuck in the closed position, and that resulted in a launch scrub. So the spacecraft and the booster itself were rolled back, and the service module was removed and replaced for launch many months later, which actually led to the orbital flight test 2 of 2, which did launch in May of 2022. Now this mission proceeded mostly nominally compared to certainly the other mission. However, three aft service module RCS thrusters were declared failed off during the flight.

Now this led up to the actual crude flight. So preparation for the crude flight and OFT2 investigations did not drive to or take sufficient action on the actual root cause of the anomalies that we observed. The investigations often stopped short of the proximate or the direct cause, treated it with a fix, or accepted the issue as an unexplained anomaly. In some cases, the approximate cause diagnosis itself was incorrect due to insufficient rigor in following the data to its logical conclusion.

Now, we still stepped into crude flight test, so CFT, which was launched in June of 2024. Now, after a lot of delays and an unexpected helium leak, NASA and Boeing launched astronauts Butch Wilmore and Sunny Williams aboard Starliner during the rendezvous and proximity operations. Propulsion anomalies cascaded into multiple thruster failures and a temporary loss of six degrees of freedom control. Now the controllers and the crew performed with extraordinary professionalism. Flight rules were appropriately challenged. Control was recovered, and docking was achieved. It is worth restating what should be obvious. At that moment, had different decisions been made, had thrusters not been recovered, or had docking been unsuccessful, the outcome of this mission could have been very, very different. The astronauts did remain safely aboard the International Space Station while they were advocating for data, for more testing, and for leadership engagement necessary to complete their mission safely. On the ground, joint Boeing and NASA teams conducted tests, reviewed data, and evaluated next steps. In September 2024, Starliner undocked autonomously. It did experience an unexpected crew module propulsion failure and landed successfully, though zero fault tolerant in the crew module thrusters throughout re-entry. Butch and Sunny subsequently returned safely to Earth aboard SpaceX Crew 9 in March of 2025.

Now talking about the investigation, mistakes incurred from the program's inception and continued throughout execution, including contractual management, oversight posture, technical rigor, and leadership decision-making. Boeing built the spacecraft, and from the onset, NASA approved variances, and we agreed to fly it. As development progressed, design compromises and inadequate hardware qualification extended beyond NASA's complete understanding. Now variances exist across all major aerospace programs and by themselves are not unusual. The engineering reality, however, is that Starliner, with its qualification deficiencies, is less reliable for crew survival than other crew vehicles, and that was noted by the report. But at NASA, we managed the contract. We accepted the vehicle. We launched the crew to space. We made decisions from docking through post-mission actions. A considerable portion of the responsibility and accountability rests here.

Now talking about root causes, we have identified organizational root causes. The technical investigations to identify the approximate or direct causes for the service module and crew module thruster anomalies remain ongoing. So I think acknowledging that present-day reality is essential to mission success. So to the root causes first, NASA's limited touch acquisition and management posture left the agency without the systems knowledge and development insight required to confidently certify a human-rated spacecraft, and insight versus oversight was not applied consistently. Second, Boeing's propulsion system design and certification approach allowed hardware to operate outside qualification limits, which is incompatible with crew safety margins. Third, NASA's programmatic desire to maintain two dissimilar crew transportation systems influenced technical and operational risk discussions. Now, it is through that lens that we examine leadership decision-making through the various phases of the mission. Pre-launch, more than 30 scheduled CFT launch attempts created cumulative schedule pressure and decision fatigue. Prior OFT thruster risk was never fully understood. Corrective actions from OFT1 were incomplete, and flight rationale was therefore inadequate. Witness statements routinely reflected a belief that management within the commercial crew program could only succeed if Starliner launched.

Now on orbit, disagreements over crew return options deteriorated into unprofessional conduct while the crew remained on orbit. Witness statements describe an environment where advocacy tied to the Starliner program viability persisted alongside insufficient senior NASA leadership engagement to refocus teams on safety and mission outcomes. Now post-mission, despite the loss of sixth degree of freedom control and cost thresholds exceeding a type A mishap by a factor of over a hundred, a mishap was not declared. Concern for the Starliner program's reputation influenced that decision. Initially, our commercial crew program investigated itself. Ultimately, these decisions were inconsistent with NASA's safety culture, and a subsequent independent investigation was commissioned, and the record is now being corrected. Today, we formally designate this event a type A mishap to ensure lessons are fully captured for future missions.

Programmatic advocacy exceeded reasonable bounds and placed the mission, the crew, and America's space program at risk in ways that were not fully understood at the time decisions were being contemplated. This created a culture of mistrust that can never happen again. And there will be leadership accountability. Now, our path forward, NASA will continue to work with Boeing as we do all of our partners that are undertaking test flights. Sustained crew and cargo access to low Earth orbit will remain essential, and America benefits from competition and redundancy. But to be clear, NASA will not fly another crew on Starliner until technical causes are understood and corrected, the propulsion system is fully qualified, and appropriate investigation recommendations are implemented.

A little bit to transparency. Transparency is not a weakness. It is a strength. We will release the investigation in full, redacted only where legally required or as directed by our commercial partner. Pretending unpleasant situations did not occur teaches the wrong lessons. Failure to learn invites failure again and suggests that in human space flight, failure is an option. It is not. America trusts NASA with the hardest endeavors ever attempted. The world looks to us for the discoveries, achievements, and leadership only this agency can deliver, and that requires putting the mission and the crew first. We will achieve success through extreme ownership, immense competence, and decisive action. Thank you.

All Diversity and no Starliner

I forgot all about this. Did Musk get the people out of there, or are they still floating in orbit? What about the craft? Is it floating, did they land it, or did they crash it into an ocean?

I guess I could ask google but the replies are more fun here.

Its for sale on e bay

I watched it live. I applaud his openness. That kind of transparency is much needed. I’m hoping that under his leadership, NASA will once again be innovative.

Gosh he’s got big ears…..

SpaceX retrieved them.

Better to hear you with

As the Starliner came home without crew for safety reasons it reminded me of what a pilot once told me. I asked him why Western European and North American Airlines have a much lower accident rate? He said, “We will not fly a piece of SH-T! He was referring to maintenance in other nations and in particular 3rd world nations and pilot standards.

At least it was designed using vastly superior DEI concepts. Imagine if meritocracy was used! Jeez, imagine the disaster THAT would have been!

/s

LOLOL...”the Starliner crude flight test”

Now that’s a malapropism for the ages!

“Best offer”

I believe that Boeing aerospace has now reached the pinnacle of “diversity.”

Their StarLiner capsule will endanger any and all colors, genders, all without favoring anyone.

Oh yeah.

Oh wow, I missed that one. The reformatter catches some, but often the YT transcript generator routine really has no idea and includes what it heard phonetically and whatnot.

NASA Drops Bombshell as Boeing Starliner Mission Classified as Type A Mishap | Ellie in Space

“Oh wow, I missed that one.”

...or did you?

redacted only where legally required or as directed by our commercial partner.

I suppose if they hide anything incriminating, no Boeing whistle blowers will have to suffer sudden death syndrome.

I usually order the crude date day.