How Israel Turned Gaza’s Tunnels Against Hamas | John Spencer on the Tikvah Podcast

John Spencer, a leading expert on urban warfare and military history, joins the Tikvah Podcast to discuss this unprecedented military challenge. Spencer holds the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern War Institute at West Point and is the co-director of the Urban Warfare Project. He has visited Gaza six times since October 7, studying these tunnels firsthand and speaking with the Israeli commanders who’ve had to fight in them. ...

00:00 Intro
03:27 Understanding the Tunnels of Gaza
12:22 The IDF's Response to Tunnel Warfare
15:29 Psychological and Tactical Challenges of Subterranean Warfare
18:20 Innovations in Tunnel Warfare Tactics
36:39 Understanding the Tactical Advantage of Tunnels
44:29 Changing Military Strategy: From Defense to Offense
52:26 How to Neutralize the Tunnel Threat
56:56 Lessons Learned: Future Military Strategies and Tactics

Video summary by Perplexity AI:

The Tikvah Podcast episode featuring John Spencer covers Israel’s strategic and tactical response to Hamas’s tunnel network in Gaza, offering expert insights into the scale, purpose, and transformation of subterranean warfare during the recent conflict.

Gaza Tunnel System Overview

Gaza’s tunnels span more than 600 miles (possibly over 1,000 kilometers), exceeding the length of its roads, and are layered beneath civilian infrastructure like schools and hospitals. Unlike historic uses of tunnels, Hamas designed this network not just for defense, but as the centerpiece of its political and military strategy: using civilians above the tunnels as human shields and investing over a billion dollars in their construction.

Strategic and Psychological Dimensions

The tunnels allow Hamas to “equalize” against the IDF’s military superiority by surviving airstrikes, maneuvering undetected, and facilitating guerrilla attacks, resupply, and holding hostages.
Some tunnels are extremely deep (up to 200 feet), and certain leadership tunnels featured luxury amenities.
The psychological demands of tunnel warfare on soldiers are immense, involving claustrophobic, booby-trapped environments where every step is uncertain and the risk of ambush or explosives is constant.

Israeli Adaptation and Countermeasures

The IDF’s elite Yahalom unit specializes in underground engineering and counter-tunnel operations, though the scope of Gaza’s tunnels overwhelmed available resources.
Early IDF operations were hampered by slow progress and booby-trapped entrances, requiring a shift: all infantry and engineering units received rapid training to handle tunnel encounters more independently.
Innovations included deploying dogs, robots, and specialized equipment for underground communication and navigation.

Breakthrough Tactics: The Offensive Advantage

Brigadier General Dan Goldfus of the IDF’s 98th Paratroopers Division analyzed tunnel patterns and shifted tactics, viewing the tunnels as potential Israeli assets rather than obstacles.
Goldfus’s division pioneered simultaneous surface and underground maneuvers, coordinating special forces to infiltrate tunnels while ground troops advanced above—overwhelming Hamas cognitively and operationally.

Political and Tactical Implications

Hamas’s strategy relied on “tunnels and time," aiming to survive long enough to trigger international intervention and political pressure on Israel.
The IDF’s synchronized operations flipped the tunnel system’s strategic value, turning Hamas’s years of investment and preparation into a liability.
These groundbreaking techniques—rapid risk assessment, infiltration before tunnels could be booby-trapped, and top-down coordination—marked a revolutionary evolution in modern tunnel warfare.

Lessons and Aftermath

The challenge remains on what to do with hundreds of miles of tunnels during a ceasefire to prevent Hamas from rebuilding.
The episode concludes with reflections on the uniqueness of Gaza’s tunnel conflict and the psychological heroism required of soldiers confronted by this unprecedented subterranean battlefield.

Thanks for posting. Contrary to usual Freeper practice, I watched the entire presentation. Before I saw UnwashedPeasant’s excellent AI summary, I had quickly dictated the highlights from memory. I believe that these include additional insights including the ineffectiveness of flooding tunnels. Here they are:

Hamas uses tunnels exclusively for military purposes and leaves civilians on the surface for human shields. Civilians are not permitted to enter the tunnels. In all other wars, tunnels in urban areas in war have been used to protect the civilian population.

Hamas knew they could not win a conventional war against Israel. Their strategy was to keep the war going on long enough that world opinion would turn against Israel and pressure them to stop the war leaving them in power. Hamas knew, with their tunnel network, that they could not be defeated in a short time. Although much of the world has turned against Israel, Hamas’s goal has not been achieved; rather Hamas has become mostly isolated.

It is estimated that there are about 600 miles of tunnels under Gaza. There are almost more tunnels than roads. This is incredible for an area approximately 25 miles long and 4 to 8 miles wide. An estimate of the cost for the tunnels is about a billion dollars. Just think how this money could have been used to improve the quality of life for the Gaza population.

It is important to completely destroy tunnels rather than just to neutralize them. It turns out that flooding the tunnels is not an effective solution. It flushes out the tunnels; however, the water tends to drain out into the into the surrounding earth overtime and the tunnels are not destroyed . Explosives do not completely collapse the tunnel and it’s easier to dig through the collapsed areas than it is to dig new tunnels. Hamas has installed blast doors at periodic intervals in many tunnels to minimize the damage from bombing or other explosions. Tunnels can be filled with concrete; however, this is very expensive. Cost is about $200 million per mile. There is evidence that Israel may have developed a material that’s less much expensive than concrete but is stronger than the dirt. This would achieve the objective as it would be more difficult to dig through this material than through the surrounding earth.

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