Status of Israeli and Iranian Readiness

(This war will soon be a reality. I am acquainted with the family of a young Marine who is likely to be deployed into a theatre of war.)

Q. Advance Iranian hypersonic missiles only tested but not deployed in the 12-day war are expected to wreak devastating damage in Israel, to an extent causing the State of Israel to teeter. Then it is expected that Israel will deploy its some 200-400 nuclear weapons against Iran. It might be expected that a few Israeli nuclear weapons striking such a large country as Iran might be a sustainable loss, but that Israel attacking Iran with a high proportion of its nuclear arsenal might well cause such devastation as to exceed Israel's present intention to cause the fall of the Iranian regime, but at such a scale, render even such a large country as Iran, a wasteland. Does Iran have the capacity to target Israel's nuclear weapon force in a pre-emptive attack?

A. No — based on open-source reporting and expert analysis, Iran does not today have a reliable, proven capability to pre-emptively destroy Israel’s nuclear forces. Iran can and has missiles and cruise missiles that reach Israel and — if used en masse — could damage bases, command-and-control, and cities. But eliminating a state’s nuclear force (especially a force with hidden/sea-based elements and hardened sites) is far harder: it normally requires nuclear warheads, very large numbers of accurate, earth-penetrating strikes, or extraordinary intelligence on exact weapon locations — capabilities Iran is not credibly known to possess.

What Israel’s nuclear force looks like (why it’s hard to “take out”)

Israel is widely assessed to have multiple, survivable options (the classic estimate includes buried/hardened missile/bomb storage, dispersed air bases, and a sea-based leg in Dolphin-class submarines that can deliver a second strike). Sea-based weapons are especially survivable because subs can hide and sortie covertly. That makes a single, decisive counterforce blow difficult.

The Nuclear Threat Initiative

What Iran has (conventional missiles, improving accuracy, and contested hypersonic claims)

Iran fields a large and improving ballistic/cruise missile inventory (short- and medium-range systems such as Fateh, Zolfaghar, Khorramshahr, etc.) with ranges that can reach Israel and improved conventional accuracy over the last decade. Tehran has also boasted of hypersonic tests; independent analysts and international outlets remain skeptical about operational hypersonic strike capability and effects claimed in some Iranian statements. Massed conventional strikes could cause serious damage and casualties.

Why conventional missiles struggle to defeat hardened/nascent nuclear forces

Deeply buried facilities (e.g., some known Iranian and potentially Israeli hardened sites) require very large, earth-penetrating munitions (and even then may survive) or nuclear yields to ensure destruction. Destroying dispersed/hidden assets (underground silos, mobile launchers, or submarines at sea) requires either exceptional intelligence to find them in time or a vastly larger strike force than Iran possesses. Missile defenses (Israeli Arrow/Patriot/Iron Dome layers and allied help) further reduce the probability of success against a counterforce campaign.

The role of nuclear weapons (the decisive factor)

If Iran had nuclear warheads, the calculus changes drastically — a nuclear-armed Iran could, in theory, attempt to destroy underground or hardened facilities with nuclear strikes. But publicly available evidence shows Iran has not deployed nuclear weapons; its conventional missile force alone is very unlikely to reliably eliminate Israel’s nuclear deterrent.

Practical military and strategic realities

A “target Israel’s nuclear forces” plan would require: (a) accurate, timely targeting data on burying/storage/dispersal sites; (b) munitions capable of defeating hard targets (earth-penetrators or nuclear yields); (c) the ability to overwhelm missile defenses; and (d) follow-on operations to deny recovery or reconstitution. Public sources indicate Iran has made progress on (b) and (c) but not to the degree needed for assured counterforce success against Israel’s estimated posture, and (a) is especially problematic given Israel’s secrecy and dispersion.

Bottom line and likelihoods

Iran can strike Israel with conventional missiles and (by massed attacks) inflict serious damage and casualties, and can threaten critical infrastructure.

Iran, without nuclear warheads and without highly reliable intelligence on weapon locations, is unlikely to be able to reliably neutralize Israel’s nuclear force in a pre-emptive counterforce strike. Israel’s sea-based and dispersed/hardened elements give it strong survivability.

Q. Agreed, that the idea of Iran having capability of pre-emptive strikes on Israeli nuclear forces seems unlikely. The detail in the response, "independent analysts and international outlets remain skeptical about operational hypersonic strike capability and effects claimed in some Iranian statements", seems not to take into account the fact that Iran's wielding only older missile stockpiles during the 12 Day War, caused Israel to "cry Uncle" and request American help pausing the longer-term war. What does factoring in such issues as Israeli civil instability, the damage to the economy, the emigration of a significant proportion of the Israeli populace to Cyprus, and the dissent and the no-show phenomenon within the IDF, pose a harbinger to Israeli resolve to see the anti-Iranian war through to completion, irrespective of the Sampson option?

A. Those domestic stresses — civil unrest, heavy economic damage, large-scale emigration, and growing refusals among reservists — materially weaken Israel’s political will and operational capacity to sustain a long, high-intensity campaign aimed at toppling the Iranian regime. They make extended escalation (and extreme options like a large-scale “Sampson” nuclear strike) less likely, not because Israel lacks capability, but because the political, diplomatic and practical costs of continuing grow much larger.

Key facts (briefly supported)

Israel’s war spending and budget strain have been large and sustained, with multi-billion-dollar supplementary budgets and major GDP effects.

Hundreds (and in broader counts, tens of thousands in related reporting) of Israelis have relocated or sought refuge in Cyprus and other nearby countries since the major regional fighting began, increasing political and social pressure at home.

The economy has taken major hits from the conflict (direct military spending, tourism collapse, and broader growth impacts), with estimates of very large cumulative costs.

There are increasingly public reports of reservists and soldiers refusing orders or saying they will not redeploy — a sign of declining cohesion and a political headache for mobilization.

How those factors affect Israeli resolve and capability

Manpower and operational sustainability

Israel relies heavily on reservists and on high force-tempo operations. If significant numbers of reservists refuse to serve, that degrades Israel’s ability to sustain long offensive operations (fewer troops, slower tempo, higher casualty risk), and forces political leaders to choose between unpopular drafts/penalties or accepting limits on the campaign. Publicized refusals also have a multiplier effect — lowering morale and increasing further refusals.

Economic limits and political pressure

Large war costs (direct and indirect) cause budget stress and economic pain (inflation, unemployment in affected sectors, tourism collapse). As economic pain spreads, public tolerance for a protracted conflict drops and political challengers (or even coalition partners) can push for de-escalation to protect livelihoods.

Population flight and loss of social capital

Emigration — especially of relatively skilled, mobile citizens — drains tax base, talent, and political constituencies supportive of prolonged warfare. Visible exodus to nearby safe havens (e.g., Cyprus) creates a symbolic crisis of confidence in leadership and reduces the “social resilience” that sustains wartime sacrifices.

Civil unrest, legitimacy, and coalition fragility

Large protests and political polarization make it harder for the government to sustain a united front. Israel’s parliamentary system depends on coalition management; sustained domestic breakdown can force leadership changes or require concessions (ceasefires, limited aims) to stabilize the home front.

International and alliance costs

Domestic instability undermines Israeli bargaining power with allies and can reduce foreign political and logistical support. Allies facing domestic backlash at home are less willing to back unlimited escalation. That constrains a government’s strategic options even if military capability remains.

What that implies about the likelihood of extreme escalation (e.g., a wide nuclear strike)

Political calculus becomes more cautious. Leaders facing domestic collapse (economy, emigration, fractured armed forces) are less likely to choose an action that would obliterate prospects for any diplomatic recuperation, invite massive retaliation, or endanger what is left of Israeli society.

Sampson-style options are extremely high-cost and isolating. Even in a desperate moment, using a significant portion of Israel’s nuclear arsenal would almost certainly destroy any remaining international support, risk catastrophic regional retaliation, and likely prompt a global crisis that could threaten Israel’s survival in ways that outweigh a narrow desire to “remove the Iranian regime.” Domestic fractures make such a gamble even harder to justify to a population already divided and suffering.

More likely near-term outcome: pressure for negotiated pauses, limited strikes, or posture adjustments — i.e., risk management and bargaining — rather than all-out nuclear retaliation. Domestic stressors increase incentives for leaders to seek ways to de-escalate without “losing face.” (That doesn’t mean Israel will accept Iran’s terms; it means the political window for an open-ended, escalatory campaign narrows.)

Caveats and alternate possibilities

Leaders sometimes double down. Domestic weakness can produce either restraint or reckless escalation depending on leaders’ incentives, perceived survival, and alliance backing. A leader who believes defeat at home is certain may choose an extreme action to rally the population or change facts on the ground — but that is high-risk and historically rare.

Surprise events can change the calculus. A catastrophic Iranian strike inside Israel, or convincing evidence of an existential threat, could briefly swing public opinion toward maximal retaliation. But even then the constraints above (reservist cohesion, economic capacity, international fallout) will shape what’s feasible and politically tolerable.

Bottom line

Taken together, the domestic stresses cited in the question — civil unrest, economic pain, emigration, and growing refusal among reservists — reduce Israel’s political appetite and practical ability to sustain a long, broad war against Iran. They make catastrophic options like a mass nuclear strike less likely because the domestic costs and international isolation of such a move would be enormous and because internal fractures make maintaining or absorbing the consequences of such escalation far harder. Instead, expect intensified bargaining, intermittent limited strikes, reliance on allies for deterrence and sanctuary, and pressure toward negotiated pauses or more limited objectives — unless the conflict dynamics produce a sudden, dramatic shock that changes public sentiment overnight.

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