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Conclusion:
• 1900 tanks lost. Assumes 80% catalog rate. So 1900/0.8 = 2375 lost including those not cataloged.

• RuZZia has 1400-1600 active tanks remaining. [lets use 1500. 1500/(1500+2375) = 39% of tanks remaining. 61% Gone With The Wind.]

• RuZZia can ‘produced’ around 250 tanks a year. 100 new tanks and 150 refurbished tanks. [can they get Western parts though???]

Suyi控
@partizan_oleg

“Another tank thread. How is Russian tank formation composed of now after they’ve lost thousands of tanks in their first year of fight? I will give my estimation and methodology. My calculation is based on three assumptions:

1, By end of November 2022, there has been no significant changes on the front. The war had entered a stage of attrition. No major reserves held by Russians. Tank losses are basically happened in a series of skirmishes and drone attacks all across the front.

Therefore, we can assume that the loss rate of all Russian tank types (maybe except for the T-62s) at this time is approximate. In reality the loss rate of relatively new tanks (e.g. the T-72B3s) may be slightly higher but I will ignore it.

2. Among Russian tank fleets, the T-72B3s are somehow unique. They are in relatively good shape, Russia doesn’t have reserves of them, and their numbers are large enough to be statistical significant.

Therefore we can get the approximate number of T-72B3 at 2022.11.27 based on the number of T-72B3 series before the war (about 1100), the presumed Russian production capacity in 2022 (about 150), and the number of losses before 2022.11.27.

3. We then infer the number of certain types and the total number of Russian tanks of each type possessed by the Russian Army since late November 2022, ...

...based on the ratio of the number of reported losses of Russian tanks of each type between 2022.11.27 till now, combined with the presumed number of T-72B3s.

This method will have a large error margin (I guess some ±20%) but is enough for qualitative purposes. I won’t do a p-value test since I don’t think it is necessary. Just plain arithmetic.

Oryx reports 443 T-72B3 series lost before Nov 26, 2022. This figure is to multiplied with two multipliers 1.116 and 1.125(which I once explained here) and then divided by 0.8 (Oryx represents 80% of actual losses). The results is 695.

Russia roughly has 1085 T-72B3 tanks before the war. It can produce (refit) some 150 T-72B3s in the year of 2022. 1085+150-695=540. This is basically the topline figure and I think the actual number can be lower.

I set an additional checker with several types (T-80BVM, T-80U, T-90M) that have no pre-war reserves. The point is to check if the other tank types are consistent with my assumptions.

And here are the results: figures fall in good. And this indicate the total Russian tank fleet as of late Nov 2022 at 2079. Always remember there can be a ±20% margin (1663-2494), and I will recommend a -20%, since Ru is always F up harder than I can ever anticipate.

And remember, some 466 (373/0.8) of the Russian tank fleet as of Nov 27 2022 has already been destroyed as of March 26, 2023. And Russia can produce no more than 120 tanks in this 5 month period. Therefore I think the concurrent Russian tank fleet is at 1400~1600 pieces.

The methodology is not suitable for more quantitive results, and now I will move to qualitative ones:

1) Russia tank fleet is shrinking. Russia basically have 2600 (+300 DNR/LNR) MBTs in active service as of Feb 24, 2022, and now they have 1000 less. Putin said Russia “built” 1000 tanks in 2022 (while they’ve lost more than 2200), and the figures actually fit good.

2) The allegement on Military Balance 2023 by @IISS_org that Russia only has some 100 T-80BV/Us in active service is absolutely wrong. While the remaining number of T-80Us are quite low, T-80BVs now serves as the workhorse of Russian Tank Troops.

This is because the T-80BV was the best condition and most numerous model in the Russian pre-war tank stockpile. Most of the T-80BVs were deployed in East Germany and Poland at the end of the Cold War and were transferred to the reserve as soon as the Soviets withdrew.

But the amount of T-80BVs are not limitless. There should be ~2000-2500 of them before the war, and with a bulk of which in very bad shape. Combining with T-80BVMs (which are converted from T-80BV hulls), Russia has lost some 400 of them, while maintaining a 800 vehicle fleet.

And engine motor hours may also be a problem since they served in high readiness units in Soviet era and Russia has not purchasing their turbine engines from 1996 to 2016, (not mentioning the GTD-1000TF on T-80BV was produced in Ukraine). https://

That indicates the remaining T-80BV storage is quickly shrinking. If Russia keeps lossing T-80BV/BVMs at this rate, it may lost its whole T-80BV reserves this year and the bulk of its active T-80 fleet by the end of 2024.

3) There has been no significant number of “old” T-72s (i.e. excluding the B3s) demothballed by far. Russian Army roughly has 876 of them before the war and has lost 485 of them. However, the assumed concurrent T-72 fleet is at ~400. And I don’t know why.

Maybe there is no such storages. Maybe those T-72s in relatively good shape has already been converted to T-72B3s.

4) Hey, Russia just can not build “200-300 T-90Ms a month”. That’s totally vatnik bullshit. Russia tank production sticks to what it was: no more than 250 pieces a year (150 T-72B3s, 50 T-80BVMs, 50 T-90Ms). Stastics works.

Special thanks to @oryxspioenkop and @naalsio26 . End of thread.”

https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/status/1640602591980830721